

# **Time and Financial Transfers Within and Beyond the Family: Results From the Health and Retirement Study**

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**ABSTRACT:** Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along two distinct lines—transfers within the family and transfers beyond the family—without considering the fact that the two types of transfers are actually interrelated. Using longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), this article investigates the links between the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family. The concepts of within and beyond the family transfers are discussed. Several data quality problems with the transfer measures in the HRS are corrected. Focusing on the interrelationships among the four types of transfers, the study finds that the transfers within and beyond the family are complements in the sense that households that are more willing to make within-family transfers are also more willing to make beyond-family transfers, and vice versa. Income and wealth are strong predictors of financial transfers. Black and Hispanic households lag systematically in the generosity to help the people both within and beyond their families.

**KEY WORDS:** time and financial transfers; transfers within the family; transfers beyond the family; philanthropy and volunteerism; HRS

## I. Introduction

Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along two distinct lines. In one line, economists and sociologists focus on transfers within the family, arguing that such transfers are the result of altruistic preference for family members (Becker, 1974, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 1986; Loury, 1981), or of mutual perceived advantage in transacting, or engaging in joint production by the family members (Pollak, 1985; Williamson, 1979). In the other line, writers on philanthropy and nonprofit work concentrate on the time and financial transfers beyond the family, studying such phenomena as charitable donations and volunteer work (Andreoni, Gale, & Scholz, 1995; Bekkers, 2001; Callen, 1994; Carlin, 2001; Jones & Posnett, 1991; Kitchen & Dalton, 1990). With a few exceptions (e.g., Mulligan, 1997; Schervish & Havens, 2003), the two lines of research have seldom intersected, leaving researchers on the transfers within the family taking as exogenous the time and financial transfers beyond the family, and researchers on philanthropy and nonprofit work treating charitable donations and volunteer work as isolated decisions unrelated to the within-family transfers.

Time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are clearly interrelated, however, for several obvious reasons. First, the two types of financial transfers and a family's own consumption add up, determined by the total financial resources available to each family. *Other things being equal*, more within-family financial transfers imply fewer resources available for decisions related to charitable donations. More charitable donations would shift the budget line inward when making decisions regarding financial transfers to children or parents. Second, the total amount of time available to each individual (and hence, to each family) is fixed. When a family has more obligations to spend time caring for their children or parents, less time is

available to do volunteer work, and vice versa. In short, the within-family transfer and the beyond-family transfer seem to be substitutes.

Families do not have the same propensities to give, of course, due to either differential preferences or heterogeneity or both. Research shows, for example, that parents differ in their valuation of child well-being (Nordblom & Ohlsson, 2003), that people with higher income and level of education are more likely to volunteer (Current Population Survey, 2002), that adults who were involved in giving and volunteerism in their youth tend to maintain that involvement in their adulthood (Independent Sector, 2001), and that those who belong to religious organizations are more likely to volunteer and make charitable donations (Independent Sector, 2001). Thus, if differential propensities to give exist across the destinations (family and philanthropic organization) of transfers, those who are more willing to give within the family may also have high propensities to give beyond the family, suggesting that transfers within and beyond the family may also act as complements. The exact relationship between the within-family transfer and the beyond-family transfer is therefore likely to be determined by the two competing—substitution versus complementary—effects.

Understanding the empirical interrelationship between the within-family and the beyond-family transfers has both important theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, by bringing together these transfers, researchers can help lay ground for any future effort to unite them in an integrated theoretical model. If the transfers are indeed strongly correlated, for example, conventional studies on intergenerational transfer or more generally on family behavior, which take as exogenous any transfers beyond family, need to be expanded. Practically, empirical evidence on the relationship between the transfers, which is currently

scarce in the literature, may help the nonprofit sector better understand the mechanism of individual giving and identify viable and reliable sources to increase the sector's sustainability.

In this article I attempt to link the time and financial transfers within the family to those beyond the family. Specifically, I use panel data from the Health and Retirement Study 1992–2000 to examine the potential correlations among all the four types of transfers. The following fundamental issues will be examined: (a) to what extent do the financial transfers within the family influence the financial and time transfers beyond the family (i.e., charitable donations and volunteer work); (b) to what extent do time transfers within the family influence the financial and time transfers beyond the family; (c) to what extent do charitable donations influence the financial and time transfers within the family; and (d) to what extent does volunteer work influence the financial and time transfers within the family. Do the transfers within the family and beyond the family behave as substitutes or complements? How do time transfers influence financial transfers—and vice versa in a model that integrates all the four types of transfers? Do the factors influencing the transfers within the family or beyond the family play the same or similar roles in the model?

The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II examines the time and financial transfer measures in the HRS. Several data quality problems are discussed and an overall picture of the four types of transfers is provided. In Section III, I first define two levels of “cross-transfer” effects (the impact of one type of transfer on another), and then estimate the cross-effects in various regression models. Among the results from these models, which are summarized in Section IV, are evidence of complementarities between the transfers within and beyond the family; strong household income and asset effects on the financial transfers; and

evidence that minority populations lag systematically in their generosity in helping the people both within and beyond the family.

## **II. Measuring the Time and Financial Transfers in the HRS**

The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), conducted biennially since 1992, is a national longitudinal survey of older (50+ years) Americans. Developed to “provide data for researchers, policy analysts, and program planners who are making major policy decisions that affect retirement, health insurance, saving and economic well-being” (HRS, 1999), the study contains rich information on the income and time transfers—including within-family time and financial transfers—that may affect individuals’ retirement expectations, attitudes, and opportunities. It also contains rich information on individual characteristics that have been found to be significant in influencing a family’s decisions on time and financial transfers.

The within-family time transfer in the HRS is measured as an aggregate of three major components: the hours spent caring for grandchildren; the hours spent helping parents eat, dress, and bathe; and the hours spent helping parents with household chores, errands, and transportation. These components, however, were not measured consistently across waves. In HRS 1992 and 1994, the time frame for measuring such transfers was “the past 12 months.” Since HRS 1996, however, the time frame has been changed to “since the last interview” or “in the past 2 years.” In order to achieve cross-wave comparability, I converted the measures in HRS 1996-2000<sup>1</sup> into ones related only to “the past 12 months.” The total time transfer within the

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<sup>1</sup> For those interviewed in both the HRS 1994 and 1996, the actual interview months were used in making this conversion for the comparable measures in the HRS 1996. For those who were first interviewed in HRS 1996 or after, I assumed that the original HRS 1996 measures were about “the last 2 years” or 24 months. Conversions for the HRS 1998 or 2000 measures were done in the similar way.

family was thus defined as sum of the hours spent caring for grandchildren and caring for parents in the past 12 months.

The “2 years to 12 months conversion” procedure runs as follows. Let  $X$  be the time transfer measure reported for the past 2 years or since the last interview. Let the number of the months between the current and last interviews be  $n$ . The new, time-frame-adjusted transfer measure,  $y$ , would then be calculated as  $(12X/n)$ , based on a simple linear relationship between the quantity of the transfer and the reference period.<sup>2</sup>

The within-family financial transfer has two components: financial assistance given to parents and financial assistance given to children.<sup>3</sup> Like the within-family time transfer, these components were measured inconsistently across waves. They were similarly transformed to yield 12 month measures. The total financial transfer within the family was thus defined as total financial assistance given to parents and children in the past 12 months.

The information about the transfers beyond the family in the HRS is not as rich as the information about the transfers within the family. For the financial transfer, each household was first asked whether it had made at least \$500 charitable donations in the past year, and—if the answer was yes—then how much the donations had been. For the time transfer, the most relevant measure was the hours of volunteer work done in the past 12 months for religious, educational, health-related, or other charitable organizations.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> According to Hill (1999), however, this strategy may introduce bias to the adjusted measure because people recall events over a more recent time period better than for a more distant time period. To concentrate on the task at hand, I will not explore this issue in this article.

<sup>3</sup> The within-family financial transfer does not include financial assistance to grandchildren as the information is not available in all the HRS waves studied.

<sup>4</sup> The HRS also had an experimental module on volunteer work in 1996. I excluded the information from the analysis because it was not for the entire HRS sample or for other years.

## Data Truncation and Cross-Wave Inconsistency

In addition to the different time frames used for measuring the time and financial transfers within the family mentioned above, the transfer measures in the HRS suffer from two other types of data limitations. First, in most cases, the information on the transfer variables was truncated, in the sense that it was available only when a certain threshold was exceeded. If a specific threshold was not met, the relevant transfer measure had to be set to zero. This type of data limitation leads to the mean value of the measure being downward biased.<sup>5</sup> Second, when a truncation rule was imposed, the truncation point was not always the same across waves. The information on the hours helping grandchildren, for example, was available if a respondent had helped his or her grandchildren more than 50 hours in the past 12 months in HRS 1994, whereas the same information was available only if a respondent had helped his or her grandchildren more than 100 hours in the past 12 months in HRS 1992. This type of data limitation produces inconsistent transfer measures.

Although the combined impact of the two types of data limitations is unknown, it is the second type of data limitation that is likely to cause more serious problems in the analysis of the transfer data. Consequently, I will ignore here the truncation bias due to the first type of data limitation and concentrate on the inconsistencies caused by using different truncation values across waves.

Table 1, rows A and B, document the time frames and truncation values used for measuring all the four types of transfer variables in HRS 1992–2000. Except for the financial transfer beyond the family, which was measured for the past 12 months and truncated at \$500 for all waves, all other types of transfers had cross-wave inconsistencies. The aggregate measure of

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<sup>5</sup> Consider a positive transfer measure,  $Y$ , that is left-truncated at threshold  $\alpha$ .  $E(Y) = \Pr(Y \leq \alpha) * E(Y | Y \leq \alpha) + \Pr(Y > \alpha) * E(Y | > \alpha) \geq \Pr(Y \leq \alpha) * 0 + \Pr(Y > \alpha) * E(Y | > \alpha)$ .

the within-family time transfer in HRS 1992 tended to be downward biased considering that the truncation values in all the other waves were lower. By the same token, the within-family financial transfer tended to be downward biased in HRS 1992 but upward biased in HRS 1994, relative to the standards used in HRS 1996-2000. In addition, the time transfers beyond the family in both HRS 1992 and 1994 were also downward biased.

(Table 1 about here)

Table 2, row A, summarizes the four types of transfers in the past 12 months in HRS 1992–2000 before corrections. Several points need to be made about these data. First, as expected, the mean values of the time transfer beyond the family was significantly downward biased in both HRS 1992 and 1994, relative to the numbers in the other HRS waves. With no truncation on the measure in HRS 1996-2000, 40% of households reported to have done some volunteer work in the past 12 months. When the measure was truncated at 100 hours, as in HRS 1992 and 1994, the percentage was reduced to about 20, suggesting that only half of the volunteering households had done volunteer work 100 hours or more. Second, the mean value of the time transfer within the family in HRS 1992 seemed also to be downward biased. Third, the financial transfer beyond the family, the only type of transfer measured in the same way across waves, seemed to show a very consistent time-series pattern, with the mean value of the transfer steadily increasing from \$823 in HRS 1992 to \$1,298 in HRS 2000.

(Table 2 about here)

## **Correcting for Cross-Wave Consistency**

There are two alternative ways to correct the cross-wave inconsistencies in the transfer measures in the HRS. First, with the help of certain distributional assumptions of each transfer variable, one can get corrected mean values of the entire sample with no data truncation. Although the prospect of getting unconditional mean values for all the transfer variables is tempting, the validity of this approach critically hinges on the validity of the distributional assumptions. Second, one may get a consistent measure of each transfer variable across waves by setting a new, uniform truncation point for the variable in all the waves. Obviously, this approach does not require any distributional assumptions about the transfers. But because a new truncation point has to be as great as the greatest of all the original truncation points, some of the transfer information has to be thrown away.

In this article, I use the second approach to correct the inconsistencies in the transfer variables. Specifically, I use the truncation values in HRS 1992 as the base, determining the new truncation points in other waves according to the time frames used. For the within-family financial transfer, for example, the new truncation point is \$500 in HRS 1994, when the time frame was “in the past 12 months,” and \$1,000 in HRS 1996-2000, when the time frame was “in the last 2 years” or “since the last interview.” Similarly, for the within-family time transfer, it is 100 hours in HRS 1994, and 200 hours in HRS 1996-2000. Because the financial transfer beyond the family has already been measured with the same truncation point in all the waves, no correction is needed for this type of transfer. The new, adjusted truncation values for each of the transfers are given in Table 1, row C.

Table 2, row B, summarizes the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family in the past 12 months in HRS 1992–2000 after corrections. Compared to the results before

corrections in row A, all the measures affected by the correction go in the expected direction: their mean values go down when the truncation values in HRS 1992 are used as the base. The time series patterns of the transfers—if any—are stronger and more consistent. Both the time and financial transfers within the family were declining steadily. In HRS 1992, 30% of the households provided more than 100 hours of family care, whereas 40% of the households provided more than \$500 financial assistance to their family members. These numbers were 31% and 32%, respectively, in HRS 2000. Over the same period, average family care hours dropped by about 34%, from 310 hours in HRS 1992, to 226 hours in HRS 2000, whereas the average amount of financial assistance dropped by one third, from \$2,231 in HRS 1992 to \$1,496 in HRS 2000.

By contrast, both types of transfers beyond the family showed a nontrivial trend of increase. The financial transfer in particular exhibited a very strong increasing pattern over the HRS 1992–2000 period: The percentage of the households donating at least \$500 to charities increased from 40 in HRS 1992 to 45 in HRS 2000, whereas the average donations increased by 57%, from \$823 to \$1,289. On the other hand, the percentage of households who had done more than 100 hours of volunteer work was 18 in HRS 1992, and 20 in HRS 2000. Over the same period, the average hours of volunteer work increased by about 35%, from 58 to 78.

One immediate consequence of the diverging within and beyond the family transfer patterns is that the total time transfer, which combines the time transfers within and beyond the family, and the total financial transfer, which combines the financial transfers within and beyond the family, show less salient time series patterns (see Table 2, rows C and D). From HRS 1992 to 2000, though the percentage of households who had made at least 100 hours of time transfer either within or beyond the family increased by about 3%, the mean value of the transfer

decreased by about 28%. Similarly, while the percentage of households who had made at least \$500 of financial transfer either within or beyond the family remained practically the same, the mean value of the transfer decreased by about 8%. These results seem to lead to the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1. Time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are substitutes. More time transfer within the family leads to less time transfer beyond the family, and vice versa. Greater financial transfer within the family leads to fewer financial transfer beyond the family, and vice versa.*

*Hypothesis 2. As people approach their retirement, time and financial transfers within the family are decreasing, whereas the transfers beyond the family are increasing.*

### **III. Cross-Effects in Regression Models**

In order to test the validity of the above hypotheses, and more generally, to understand the mechanism of the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family, I estimated a set of simple regression models. Included in each transfer model were demographic variables (e.g., age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment), variables representing a household's economic and labor market status, and variables representing the family structure. To capture the effects of other transfers on the transfer as the dependent variable (or "cross-transfer effects" for short), all three other transfers were also included in the model.

Two levels of cross-transfer effects were defined. In the first level, the cross-transfer effect refers to the impact of one type of transfer on another type across the form of transfer (time or money) or across the "destination" of the transfer (within or beyond the family), but not both. Examples of this include the effect of the within-family time transfer on the within-family financial transfer, the effect of the within-family time transfer on the beyond-family time

transfer, and the effect of the beyond-family financial transfer on the beyond-family time transfer. In the second level, the cross-transfer effect refers to the impact of one type of transfer on another type across both the form and the “destination” of transfer. Examples of this include the effect of the within-family time transfer on the beyond-family financial transfer, and the effect of the beyond-family time transfer on the within-family financial transfer. Empirical evidence on the signs or the magnitude of these cross-effects is scarce. Presumably, strong and positive cross-effects would suggest that the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are complements, whereas strong and negative cross-effects imply that the transfers are substitutes.

That a household’s economic and labor market status affects its transfer behavior has been well documented in the literature (Andreoni et al., 1995; Becker, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 1986; Brooks, 2004; Dettinger & Clarkberg, 2002; Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987). Wealthier parents, for example, are not only more capable of transferring their assets to their children—in the forms of both human capital investment and bequest—but also more capable of making charitable donations. Compared to those who are not very active in the labor market, individuals who have full-time jobs may have less time caring for their family members or doing volunteer work.

The variables reflecting a household economic and labor market status in the transfer models included total household assets at the time of the interview, total household income in the last calendar year, and a dummy variable indicating whether any of the household income was labor income. In accordance with the HRS income and asset definitions (HRS, 2002), total household assets comprise housing equities, real estate, business or farm, individual retirement accounts, stocks or mutual funds, certificates of deposit, bonds, checking or savings accounts,

transportation vehicles, and other nonliquid assets, minus debts. Total household income was calculated as the sum of labor income, income from assets, and income from any other sources defined by the HRS. Labor income included wages or salary, bonuses, tips or commissions, income from professional practice or trade, and income from a second job or self-employment.

The definitions and a summary of all the independent variables in the models are given in Table 3.

(Table 3 about here)

### **Single Wave Results**

Tables 4a–4d list the Tobit regression results for the models estimated separately for each of the HRS data waves from 1992 to 2000. Tobit models were chosen for two reasons. First, all transfer measures as the dependent variables were truncated. Second, because the truncation points were set mechanically, there are no obvious reasons to believe Tobit models would produce biased estimates.

A strong education effect is shown in all the four transfer models and across all the HRS waves. In general, a household with more education tends to spend less time on family care but provides more financial assistance to the family members. In addition, a household with more education tends to do more volunteer work and make more charitable donations. Age plays a statistically significant role only in determining the financial transfers. Older people tend to provide less financial assistance to their parents and their children but make more charitable donations.

(Tables 4a-4d about here)

The race/ethnicity effects are not all statistically significant. Nevertheless, the overall picture clearly suggests that Hispanic households tend to spend less time on family care and volunteer work, Black and Hispanic households tend to provide less financial assistance to the family members, and White non-Hispanic households tend to make more charitable donations.

The asset and income effects are strong in the models predicting the financial transfers, but trivial in the models predicting the time transfers. In general, rich or high-income households tend to make more financial transfers both within and beyond the family. Conditional on income, households with no labor income tend to make more financial transfers.

### **Cross-Effects**

The correlations between one type of transfer on the other for the same transfer form or for the same transfer destination are strong, as indicated in Table 5, which summarizes all the 12 possible cross-effects based on the single wave regression results in Tables 4a–4d. All 8 Level-1 cross-effects are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Hypothesis 1 induced from Table 2 is probably not valid. On the other hand, all the four Level-2 cross effects are zero, indicating that there is a boundary for one type of transfer to impact another type of transfer.

(Table 5 about here)

Another interesting result from Table 5 is that the cross-effects are symmetric, suggesting that a household probably makes a joint decision on the transfers within the family and beyond the family, and makes a joint decision on the time transfer and the financial transfer.

## Models with Pooled Data<sup>6</sup>

Regression results are not very different if the models are estimated with the HRS 1992–2000 data pooled together (Tables 6 and 7). Several important points need to be emphasized, however.

(Tables 6 and 7 about here)

First, the race/ethnicity effect becomes more evident than that in the single wave data models: Other things being equal, Black and Hispanic households tend to spend less time on family care, do less volunteer work, provide less financial assistance to the family members, and make less charitable donations.

Second, the income and asset effects are stronger in the models predicting financial transfers than in the models predicting time transfers. Rich households tend to provide more financial assistance to their family members and make more charitable donations. Conditional on income, households with no labor income—thus not actively engaged in the labor market—tend to do more volunteer work.

Third, two Level-2 cross-effects emerge from the pooled models: the more the beyond-family time transfer, the more the within-family financial transfer, and vice versa. One possible explanation for this effect is that people who spend a lot of time away from the family may try to compensate family members by providing them with more money, whereas people who have more family care obligations may try to fulfill their volunteering work by making more monetary donations.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> I have also estimated a set of “fixed effect” models using the pooled data but found no significant differences in the cross-effect variables.

<sup>7</sup> I owe an anonymous referee for this explanation.

Fourth, age becomes a statistically significant factor in all the transfer models. Overall, the time and financial transfers within the family tend to decrease over time, whereas the transfers beyond the family increase over the time. This finding suggests that Hypothesis 2 induced from Table 2 is probably valid.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The empirical results from the HRS clearly indicate that the time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are closely related. The consistently positive and symmetric Level-1 cross-effects suggest that the transfers within and beyond the family are not substitutes but complements, in the sense that households that are more willing to make within-family transfers are also more willing to make beyond-family transfers, and vice versa. In addition, within the same transfer destinations, households that are more willing to make time transfers are also more willing to make financial transfers.

Education plays a significant role in influencing a family's transfer decision. In general, a household with more education tends to spend less time on family care, but do more volunteer work, provide more financial assistance to family members, and make more charitable donations. There are several possible explanations for the strong education effect on the time transfers within and beyond the family. First, well-educated households are perhaps more efficient household producers, so they have more time for outside activities. Second, well-educated households may be more valuable to nonprofit organizations; demand for their service is higher. Third, well-educated households may be more knowledgeable about the importance of volunteering work and about where their expertise can be used.

Other things being equal, Black and Hispanic households tend to spend less time on family care, do less volunteer work, provide less financial assistance to the family members, and make less charitable donations. Although contradictory to some studies regarding ethnic differences in the propensity to give (e.g., the Twenty-First Century Foundation, 2003), the finding from this study agrees with many others (e.g., Knapp & Smith, 1995) and suggests that the minority populations still lag systematically in the generosity to help the people both within and beyond their families. Consequently, educating the minority groups about philanthropy and volunteerism (P&V) may have a great impact on unleashing new resources in the field of P&V, as realized in some recent P&V programs (e.g., the W. K. Kellogg Foundation's "Unleashing Resources for the Common Good Initiative") that target those groups.

Income and wealth are strong predictors of financial transfers. It is not surprising that wealthy households tend to provide more financial assistance to their family members and make more charitable donations. In the meantime, when people are not actively engaged in labor market, they tend to do more volunteer work.

Family transfer decisions are probably made jointly as reflected by the symmetric nature of the cross-effects. To better understand family transfer behavior, therefore, researchers should not constrain their studies to either the within-family transfers or the beyond-family transfers. Instead, they should have a comprehensive model integrating the decisions about both the within-family and beyond-family transfers. In this way, researchers on the transfers within the family may benefit from and contribute to studies on philanthropy and nonprofit work. Members of the philanthropic community will also have a better understanding of the nature of giving and volunteerism, which may enhance future opportunities for such work.

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**Table 1. Measuring the Time and Financial Transfers Within and Beyond the Family  
Time Frames and Truncation Values Used in HRS 1992–2000**

	HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000	
Time Transfer Within the Family	(A) Time Frame	a	a	b	b	b
	(B) Original Truncation Value (Hours)	100	50	100	100	100
	(C) Adjusted Truncation Value (Hours)	100	100	200	200	200
Financial Transfer Within the Family	(A) Time Frame	a	a	b	b	b
	(B) Original Truncation Value (Dollars)	500	100	500	500	500
	(C) Adjusted Truncation Value (Dollars)	500	500	1000	1000	1000
Time Transfer Beyond the Family	(A) Time Frame	a	a	a	a	a
	(B) Original Truncation Value (Hours)	100	100	0	0	0
	(C) Adjusted Truncation Value (Hours)	100	100	100	100	100
Financial Transfer Beyond the Family	(A) Time Frame	a	a	a	a	a
	(B) Original Truncation Value (Dollars)	500	500	500	500	500
	(C) Adjusted Truncation Value (Dollars)	500	500	500	500	500

<sup>a</sup> past 12 months.

<sup>b</sup> Since the last interview or in the past 2 years.

**Table 2. Time and Financial Transfers Within and Beyond the Family Before and After Corrections: HRS 1992–2000**

		HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000
-----						
Time Transfer Within the Family (Hours)						
Before Correction (A)	Yes	.30	.49	.45	.46	.43
	Mean	342	412	305	325	242
After Correction (B)	Yes	.30	.38	.30	.34	.31
	Mean	342	393	291	307	226
-----						
Financial Transfer Within the Family (Dollars)						
Before Correction (A)	Yes	.40	.47	.43	.39	.39
	Mean	2,231	1,906	1,614	1,557	1,541
After Correction (B)	Yes	.40	.37	.36	.33	.32
	Mean	2,231	1,854	1,573	1,520	1,507
-----						
Time Transfer Beyond the Family (Hours)						
Before Correction (A)	Yes	.18	.17	.46	.40	.40
	Mean	58	50	91	78	88
After Correction (B)	Yes	.18	.17	.21	.18	.20
	Mean	58	50	81	69	78
-----						
Financial Transfer Beyond the Family (Dollars)						
Before Correction (A)	Yes	.40	.40	.43	.44	.45
	Mean	823	854	991	1,066	1,289
After Correction (B)	Yes	.40	.40	.43	.44	.45
	Mean	823	854	991	1,066	1,289
-----						
Total Time Transfer After Correction (C)	Yes	.41	.47	.46	.45	.44
	Mean (Hours)	385	432	365	364	300
-----						
Total Financial Transfer After Correction (D)	Yes	.59	.58	.59	.57	.59
	Mean (Dollars)	3,054	2,708	2,564	2,587	2,796
-----						
N		7,540	6,782	6,718	6,519	6,250

Notes: (a) All results were weighted; (b) Financial transfers were in the 1996 dollars; and (c) one outlier (Charitable Donation=\$600,000) was dropped from the HRS 2000 sample.

**Table 3. Definitions and Simple Statistics of the Independent Variables**

Variable Name	HRS 1992		HRS 1994		HRS 1996		HRS 1998		HRS 2000	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	53.9	264.9	55.7	270.5	58.3	272.1	59.9	280.6	61.8	289.1
White	.84	18.0	.86	17.4	.85	18.1	.85	17.9	.85	18.1
Black	.11	15.4	.10	15.3	.11	15.7	.10	15.4	.10	15.5
Other Races	.05	10.5	.04	9.3	.04	9.5	.04	10.4	.04	10.6
Hispanic	.07	12.2	.06	12.4	.07	13.1	.07	12.8	.07	13.1
Non-Hispanic	.93	12.2	.94	12.4	.93	13.1	.93	12.8	.93	13.1
Education-1 (School Year<12)	.25	21.3	.24	21.6	.25	22.1	.24	21.8	.23	21.8
Education-2 (School Year=12)	.39	24.1	.39	24.5	.37	24.7	.37	24.6	.38	24.9
Education-3 (School Year=13-15)	.20	19.7	.20	20.2	.20	20.5	.20	20.4	.21	20.8
Education-4 (School Year=16+)	.16	18.2	.17	18.8	.18	19.5	.18	19.6	.18	19.8
Couple (Household Has Two Respondents)	.68	23.0	.67	23.6	.66	24.2	.62	24.7	.62	25.0
With Kids (Whether Has Kids 18+ years old living away in 1992)	.82	19.1	.83	18.7	.82	19.5	.82	19.3	.83	19.4
HH Income (\$1,000) (Total Household Income in the Last Calendar Year)	51.2	2.8	53.9	4.8	54.3	4.3	53.6	5.1	53.4	5.5
No Earn (\$1,000) (No Labor Income in the Last Calendar Year)	.16	18.1	.20	20.2	.26	22.3	.31	23.5	.38	24.9
Asset (\$1,000) (Total Household Assets at the Time of Interview)	268.0	28.9	267.2	28.1	297.5	35.1	336.7	68.1	364.8	52.7
<i>N</i>	7,540		6,782		6,718		6,519		6,250	

Note: For a two respondent household, the demographic characteristics were of the respondent selected according to the following priority rules: (a) original HRS respondent; (b) the second respondent interviewed in a wave; and (c) male. Total household income was calculated as the sum of labor income, income from assets and income from other sources, as defined by the HRS. Labor income includes wage or salary, bonuses, tips or commissions, income from professional practice or trade, and income from second job or self-employment. Total household assets consist of housing equities, real estate, business or farm, individual retirement accounts, stocks or mutual funds, certificates of deposit, bonds, checking or savings accounts, transportation vehicles, and other nonliquid assets, minus debts.

**Table 4a. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model  
Predicting the Time Transfer Within the Family**

Independent Variable	HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000
Age	22.4**	4.2	3.6	-30.0**	-21.3**
White	506.6*	84.3	-146.8	-130.3	-131.0
Black	91.7	-107.0	-474.3*	-358.4	-423.3*
Hispanic	-410.7*	-399.8**	-165.5	-392.9*	-386.1**
Education-1	786.8**	293.1*	355.8**	90.3	287.8**
Education-2	579.7**	349.7**	484.9**	376.1**	402.8**
Education-3	499.0**	135.3	165.7	142.9	304.4**
Couple	960.0**	678.5**	570.3**	562.7**	471.1**
With Kids	1663.6**	975.2**	734.1**	742.9**	519.5**
HH Income (\$1,000)	-4.8**	-1.9**	-.7	-.3	-.6
No Earn	9.4	93.3	-41.5	208.9*	22.2
Asset (\$1,000)	-.007	.034	-.000	-.034	.027
Money Transfer Within the Family	.020**	.023**	.031**	.024**	.016**
Charitable Donation	-.008	-.013	-.030*	-.004	.003
Volunteer Work	.494**	.543**	.503**	.226	.029
Intercept	-5847.2**	-2873.2**	-2587.9**	-816.7	-796.8*
Pseudo R2	.012	.007	.007	.005	.007

Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .

**Table 4b. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model Predicting the Financial Transfer Within the Family**

Independent Variable	HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000
Age	-147.4**	-160.7**	-148.1**	-115.7**	-70.8
White	1908.7	409.8	-281.5	-339.4	-913.4
Black	-4716.6**	-4286.1**	-3589.8**	-6666.1**	-7296.9**
Hispanic	-2129.7*	-521.7	-3426.5**	-4512.6**	-4155.6**
Education-1	-8349.7**	-5226.9**	-4818.6**	-6611.3**	-7283.3**
Education-2	-4812.1**	-2685.0**	-2811.2**	-3442.2**	-3567.4**
Education-3	-2616.2**	-1124.9*	-1240.9**	-1985.5**	-1881.0**
Couple	638.8	1269.6**	708.4*	-684.6	745.8
With Kids	2252.8**	-64.5	-198.8**	-425.0	1388.3**
HH Income (\$1,000)	41.3**	19.7**	11.7**	25.8**	21.1**
No Earn	-4006.5**	-2272.4**	-993.2**	-2661.0**	-539.3
Asset (\$1,000)	2.0**	1.9**	1.3**	.4**	.8**
Time Transfer Within the Family	1.2**	.8**	1.0**	1.0**	1.2**
Charitable Donation	.16*	.44**	.25**	.21**	.12**
Volunteer Work	3.1**	.6	.4	1.0	.3
Intercept	-958.7	3199.6	-6000.0**	3728.5	-778.2
Pseudo R2	.018	.021	.020	.022	.019

Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .

**Table 4c. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model  
Predicting the Time Transfer Beyond the Family**

Independent Variable	HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000
Age	-.3	-.5	2.8	8.0*	4.9
White	200.0*	-19.7	-34.2	-14.8	31.9
Black	-57.5	-211.9*	-119.6	-266.8*	-239.8*
Hispanic	-218.1**	-162.4*	-208.1**	-251.7**	-279.1**
Education-1	-552.6**	-496.7**	-599.8**	-598.2**	-856.9**
Education-2	-289.7**	-271.3**	-366.5**	-300.0**	-428.0**
Education-3	-221.3**	-131.7**	-215.2**	-220.2**	-261.1**
Couple	139.1**	151.6**	296.7**	267.4**	373.0**
With Kids	67.6	1.0	10.3	14.3	101.3
HH Income (\$1,000)	-.8**	-.5*	-.1	-.05	-.2
No Earn	13.6	19.3	52.6	39.3	125.0**
Asset (\$1,000)	.01	.01	.02	-.01	.01
Time Transfer Within the Family	.03*	.04**	.08**	.03*	.03
Money Transfer Within the Family	.010**	.004*	.001	.002	-.001
Charitable Donation	.06**	.05**	.022**	.040**	.011**
Intercept	-923.9**	-676.8**	-761.6**	1269.0**	-1261.9**
Pseudo R2	.023	.026	.020	.024	.022

Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .

**Table 4d. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Model Predicting the Financial Transfer Beyond the Family**

Independent Variable	HRS 1992	HRS 1994	HRS 1996	HRS 1998	HRS 2000
Age	41.1**	33.9* *	52.2*	45.9**	111.9**
White	634.5*	1093.2**	1360.8*	1054.1*	2020.3
Black	-121.4	45.0	519.2	-455.4	-567.8
Hispanic	-2178.3**	-2284.7**	-3519.0**	-3193.4**	-5511.8**
Education-1	-2758.8**	-3440.4**	-4905.4**	-4949.2**	-8040.4**
Education-2	-1437.8**	-1972.0**	-2243.3**	-2762.3**	-4181.6**
Education-3	-857.0**	-1223.2**	-1563.7**	-1611.2**	-2653.9**
Couple	1394.2**	1851.8**	2613.1**	2147.6**	4437.6**
With Kids	2.9	166.6	303.0	239.3	-885.5**
HH Income (\$1,000)	14.4**	2.9**	1.3	4.5**	15.1**
No Earn	-989.1**	-1235.9**	-1927.4**	-1338.7**	-1537.9**
Asset (\$1,000)	.9**	.9**	2.0**	.4**	1.1**
Time Transfer Within the Family	.005	-.024	-.338*	-.047	.089
Money Transfer Within the Family	.010	.060**	.200**	.045**	.223**
Volunteer Work	1.79**	3.47**	3.55**	2.99**	4.18**
Intercept	-4919.1**	-4683.5**	-8380.2**	-5497.8**	14632.9**
Pseudo R2	.036	.032	.031	.026	.022

Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .

**Table 5. Cross-Effects of the Time and Financial Transfers  
Shown in the Single Wave Models**

		Model			
		Time		Money	
		Within the Family	Beyond the Family	Within the Family	Beyond the Family
Time	Within the Family	x	+*	+**	0
	Beyond the Family	+*	x	0	+**
Money	Within the Family	+**	0	x	+**
	Beyond the Family	0	+**	+**	x

Note: + = positive cross-effect; 0 = no cross-effect; x = not relevant for the cross-effect.

\* $p = .05$ .

\*\* $p = .01$ .

**Table 6. Tobit Regression Coefficients in the Models  
Predicting the Time and Financial Transfers with Pooled Data**

Independent Variable	Model			
	Time Transfer Within the Family	Financial Transfer Within the Family	Time Transfer Beyond the Family	Financial Transfer Beyond the Family
Age	-8.8**	-149.6**	7.4**	92.6**
White	40.3	260.1	38.2	1267.0**
Black	-258.1**	-5393.6**	-174.0**	-323.8
Hispanic	-347.0**	-3095.7**	-231.3**	-3832.6**
Education-1	394.8**	-6736.7**	-649.7**	-5507.2**
Education-2	454.6**	-3670.2**	-355.9**	-2927.6**
Education-3	248.5**	-1877.1**	-223.2**	-1805.8**
Couple	623.0**	683.8**	265.8**	2894.6**
With Kids	914.5**	606.9**	38.1	-107.4**
HH Income (\$1,000)	-.95**	24.0**	-.09	7.6**
No Earn	44.2	-1853.9**	59.3**	-1545.5**
Asset (\$1,000)	.003	.814**	.011	.853**
Time Transfer Within the Family	--	1.0**	.04**	-.090
Money Transfer Within the Family	.02**	--	.004**	.087**
Volunteer Work	.30**	1.23**	--	3.38**
Charitable Donation	-.003	.18**	.02**	--
Intercept	-2392.2**	3451.7**	-1226.2**	-10009.78**
Pseudo R2	.007	.019	.021	.025

Note. No Earn = no labor income in the last year.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .

**Table 7. Cross-Effects of the Time and Financial Transfers  
Shown in the Pooled Data Models**

		Model			
		Time		Money	
		Within the Family	Beyond the Family	Within the Family	Beyond the Family
Time	Within the Family	x	+**	+**	0
	Beyond the Family	+**	x	+**	+**
Money	Within the Family	+**	+**	x	+**
	Beyond the Family	0	+**	+**	x

Note: + = positive cross effect; 0 = no cross effect; x = not relevant for the cross effect.

\*  $p = .05$ .

\*\*  $p = .01$ .