%Paper: ewp-pe/9406002
%From: AGLAZER@vmsa.oac.uci.edu
%Date: Wed, 08 Jun 1994 16:19:13 -0700 (PDT)

\documentstyle[12pt]{article}
\title{How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: \\
       An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency
}
 
\author
 {Amihai Glazer \\
  and \\
  Charles Lave \\
  Department of Economics \\
  University of California, Irvine \\
  Irvine, CA 92717
 }
 
\date{\today}
\begin{document}
\maketitle
%\setlength{\baselineskip}{4ex}
 
\begin{abstract}
 
In 1975 the United States government required automobile manufacturers
to increase the corporate average fuel economy of their products. Why
were such CAFE regulations more effective than increases in the price
of gasoline in improving fuel economy? Our answer focuses on myopia by
consumers, myopia by producers, and the rational incentive to delay
irreversible investments.
 
\end{abstract}
 
\pagebreak
 
\section{Introduction}
 
Much policy analysis asks whether a policy was effective, and examines
whether different policies could have been more effective or more
efficient. Often unasked and unanswered, however, is the issue of why
a policy was effective. This paper examines regulations in the United
States requiring automobile manufacturers to increase the fuel
efficiency of their vehicles. Could such regulations make a difference
when higher oil prices in 1979 and 1980 already gave consumers a great
incentive to demand more fuel-efficient vehicles? A related question
is whether command and control regulation can be more effective than
an increased tax on gasoline. The standard answer is No. But given the
extensive data showing that fuel-efficiency regulations did matter, an
inquiry into why they mattered is appropriate.
 
\section{History of CAFE}
 
Following the energy crisis of 1973, Congress enacted the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, mandating minimum corporate average
fuel economy (CAFE) standards for all new light-duty passenger
vehicles sold in the United States. Each automobile manufacturer was
essentially required to double the fuel-efficiency.\footnote
{
The measure of fuel efficiency for a manufacturer was the average miles
per gallon (mpg) of its entire fleet. Congress voted against a proposal to
require each vehicle to meet the standards.
}
The efficiency targets were to be phased in: 18.5 mpg for the 1978
model year, 21 mpg for the 1980 model year, and 27.5 mpg for the 1986
model year.\footnote
{
For 1981 through 1984 the Secretary of Transportation determined the fuel
economy standards. For 1985 or after the Secretary of Transportation could
modify the standard in a range of 26-27.5 mpg, but subject to
Congressional veto. See {\em United States Code}, Title 15, section 2002.
The standards mandated by the 1975 Act were relaxed three times, by the
authority granted to the Secretary of Transportation. Standards for the
1986 model year were relaxed to 26 mpg in October 1985; standards for the
1987 and 1988 model years were relaxed to 26 mpg in October 1986;
standards for the 1989 model year were relaxed to 26.5 mpg in September
1988.
}
The Act imposed a fine of \$5 per car sold per 0.1 mpg shortfall, but
firms earned credits when they exceeded standards. In no year did any
American manufacturer pay fines, though some foreign firms did.\footnote
{
For example, in 1991 the federal government collected total fines of
\$54,578,880. Of these, BMW paid \$14,878,160, and
Mercedes-Benz paid \$17,556,105.
}
 
\section{Effects of CAFE}
 
As the table below shows, fuel economy of new cars increased by over 60
percent between 1975 and 1985. Fuel efficiency and remained at the
higher level even when gasoline prices declined after 1983.\footnote
{
Data come from Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, ``Automotive Fuel Economy Program Report to
Congress"
{\em Federal Register} 58 FR 6837, February 2, 1993.
}
All three domestic producers greatly increased the fuel economy of their
vehicles. Even Rolls-Royce, whose customers we suspect would not prefer
to sacrifice performance or quality for increased fuel economy, improved
fuel economy by over 25 percent since 1978.
 
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l| r| r r r r}
\multicolumn{6}{c}{\bf Fuel Efficiency of US Produced Automobiles} \\
Model Year  &  Federal Standard & Chrysler &  Ford  &   GM  & Industry \\
\hline \\
   1975  &                   &         &         &        &   15.8 \\
   1978  &   18.0            &   18.4  &   18.4  &   19.0 &   18.7 \\
   1979  &   19.0            &   20.5  &   19.2  &   19.1 &   19.3 \\
   1980  &   20.0            &   22.3  &   22.9  &   22.6 &   22.6 \\
   1981  &   22.0            &   26.8  &   24.1  &   23.8 &   24.2 \\
   1982  &   24.0            &   27.6  &   25.0  &   24.6 &   25.0 \\
   1983  &   26.0            &   26.9  &   24.3  &   24.0 &   24.4 \\
   1984  &   27.0            &   27.8  &   25.8  &   24.9 &   25.5 \\
   1985  &   27.5            &   27.8  &   26.6  &   25.8 &   26.3 \\
   1986  &   26.0            &   27.8  &   27.0  &   26.6 &   26.9 \\
   1987  &   26.0            &   27.5  &   26.9  &   26.9 &   27.0 \\
   1988  &   26.0            &   28.5  &   26.6  &   27.6 &   27.4 \\
   1989  &   26.5            &   28.0  &   26.6  &   27.2 &   27.2 \\
   1990  &   27.5            &   27.4  &   26.3  &   27.1 &   26.9 \\
   1991  &   27.5            &   27.5  &   27.7  &   27.2 &   27.3 \\
   1992  &   27.5            &   27.8  &   27.3  &   26.8 &   27.0 \\
 
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
 
 
A comparison of changes in fuel efficiency in different countries also
suggests that CAFE regulations mattered.\footnote{
See also Schipper, et al. (1993).
}
Since the oil crisis of 1973, average mpg in the U.S. fleet increased by
45 percent; in France it declined, in Japan it was unchanged, and in
other countries it barely improved. Given that the US fleet includes
many cars built before CAFE standards became effective, it is not
surprising that the US fleet is on average less fuel-efficient. New cars
in the United States have mpg very similar to those in Europe and Japan,
even though the price of gasoline in the United States is half of that
in Germany, or a third of that in Sweden.\footnote
{
For data on fuel prices, see {\em Statistical Abstract of the United
States}, 1993-1994, Table 1417.
}
 
\vspace{2em}
 
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l| c c c c c c c}
\multicolumn{8}{c}{\bf Fuel Economy in Various Countries} \\
  Year & Japan &   France & Italy   & Sweden   & UK      & Germany & US  \\
\hline
 1973 &  21.4 &     27.9 &    27.8 &     21.5 &    21.7 &   21.9 &  13.0 \\
 1974 &  21.4 &     27.6 &         &          &    21.8 &   22.1 &  13.1 \\
 1975 &  21.4 &     27.2 &         &          &    22.5 &   21.9 &  13.2 \\
 1976 &  21.4 &     26.2 &         &     22.1 &    22.6 &   21.8 &  13.2 \\
 1977 &  21.4 &     26.3 &         &          &    22.4 &   21.6 &  13.5 \\
 1978 &  19.6 &     25.9 &         &     21.8 &    22.0 &   21.4 &  13.7 \\
 1979 &  19.6 &     26.3 &    27.8 &          &    21.5 &   21.7 &  14.0 \\
 1980 &  19.6 &     27.5 &    28.7 &          &    22.6 &   21.5 &  14.9 \\
 1981 &  19.6 &     28.0 &    28.0 &     21.6 &    23.5 &   21.6 &  15.3 \\
 1982 &  21.4 &     26.8 &    28.0 &     21.5 &    23.6 &   21.6 &  15.9 \\
 1983 &  21.4 &     26.6 &    28.2 &     21.8 &    23.7 &   21.6 &  16.3 \\
 1984 &  21.4 &     26.8 &    28.7 &     21.8 &    23.7 &   21.6 &  16.8 \\
 1985 &  21.4 &     26.9 &    28.9 &     22.0 &    24.1 &   21.6 &  17.1 \\
 1986 &  21.4 &     26.8 &    29.4 &     22.4 &    24.0 &   21.6 &  17.1 \\
 1987 &  21.4 &     26.9 &    29.9 &     22.8 &    24.4 &   21.8 &  17.5 \\
 1988 &  21.4 &     26.5 &    30.1 &     23.1 &    24.1 &   22.0 &  18.4 \\
 1989 &       &     26.9 &    30.6 &     23.1 &    25.3 &   22.4 &  18.9
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
 
Not all agree that CAFE is desirable or effective.\footnote
{
For a survey see National Research Council (1992).
}
Officials in the administration of President Ford testified
against mandatory fuel-economy standards, saying that consumers had
sufficient incentives to buy fuel-efficient cars.\footnote
{
House Report No. 94-340, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on PL-94-163, Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
}
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, charged with
enforcing the CAFE standards, takes an ambiguous position. It claims,
for example, that the market, and not the CAFE program, is primarily
responsible for the approximately 15 percent weight reductions that occurred
since 1975. Crandall, {\em et al.} (1986) claim that OPEC's gasoline price
increases were the force that induced consumers to purchase more
fuel-efficient cars, and that the CAFE standards were irrelevant.\footnote
{
Greene (1990), provides a contrasting evaluation, and estimates that
CAFE standards were at least twice as important as fuel price rises in
increasing fuel efficiency.
}
 
Some analysts therefore claim that an increased tax on gasoline would
have been a better policy. Thus, Leone and Parkinson (1990) argue that
a 2.4 cents tax per gallon would have saved as much fuel consumption
as CAFE, at about one-seventh the social cost. A study sponsored by the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association claims that a 40 mpg CAFE
standard would cost consumers \$104 per ton of carbon dioxide removed,
or \$45 per barrel of oil saved. By contrast, a gasoline tax would
cost only \$23 per ton of carbon dioxide removed and only \$10 per
barrel of oil save. Other studies (see National Research Council
(1992)) find that the tax necessary to meet CAFE standards may be as
high as a dollar per gallon.\footnote
{
Congress, however, resoundingly rejected such an approach. The House had
rejected by a vote of 345-72 a 20 cents per gallon gasoline tax the day
before it adopted the CAFE standards in 1975. It also voted by 209-187 to
reject a tax of 3 cents per gallon. See ``Auto fuel economy standards
mandated," {\em CQ Quarterly Report}, July 19,1975, p. 1525.
}
 
\section{Why Regulations May Work}
 
The argument against CAFE and in favor of taxation or a reliance on the
market rests on a chain of incentives:
\begin{itemize}
 
\item An increase in gasoline prices causes consumers to demand more
fuel-efficient cars.
 
\item Manufacturers foresee this change in consumer demand.
 
\item Hence manufacturers will make investments to produce fuel
efficient cars.
 
\end{itemize}
 
We shall examine these assumptions in turn.
 
\subsection{Consumer expectations}
 
Consider the textbook world of perfect rationality. The rational
consumer considers the future path of gasoline prices and buys a car
of appropriate efficiency. But how does the consumer estimate future
prices? If he believes the current high prices are a temporary
aberration, he will make not change his purchase decisions.
 
Now suppose you are the President in this hypothetical world. All your
experts argue that gasoline use must be reduced, for a variety of
economic and environmental reasons. Your cabinet presents you with two
alternative energy conservation policies:
 
\begin{itemize}
 
\item The variable tax. Institute a fuel pricing policy that generates
enough certainty in the minds of consumers to allow them to make
efficient decisions. You should announce: ``From now on, the real
price of gasoline will be \$2 per gallon. We will achieve this by
placing a variable gasoline tax on top of the OPEC price. If the OPEC
price should happen to fall, we will raise the tax enough to keep the
final price at \$2."
 
\item The technology mandate.  Require manufacturers to improve the fuel
efficiency of their line of new light-duty vehicles.
 
\end{itemize}
 
Although the variable tax seems to solve the consumers' price
forecasting problems, it does not. Consumers know that tax policies
are subject to change with the whim of Congress or new
Administrations. Such a tax policy is not credible, so consumers (even
non-myopic ones) are unlikely to purchase the fuel-efficient cars
that your experts say are needed.
 
Contrast a tax with the technology mandate. A tax may be removed after
a few years. But manufacturers who retooled their assembly lines and
learned how to produce fuel efficient cars will not reverse these
changes even if a later government repeals the regulations.
 
\subsection{Myopic consumers}
 
An increase in gasoline prices is unlikely to increase vehicle fuel
efficiency if consumers do not consider future operating costs when
deciding what car to purchase.  There is direct evidence on this point.
 
In the eight years following the 1973 oil embargo, the real price of
gasoline increased by about fifty percent. The increased prices should
have made gas-guzzling automobiles less desirable, giving a price
premium to fuel-efficient cars. Kahn (1986) estimated the size of
these effects: how much did an increase in gasoline prices reduce the
price of low-mpg automobiles?
 
Consider a consumer choosing between cars with different fuel
efficiencies, but that are similar in other respects. Kahn found that,
on average, an increase in gasoline prices sufficient to cause a
\$1,000 per year difference in the expected operating costs of the two
cars reduced the selling price of the inefficient car by only \$370 to
\$500. That is, a \$370 to \$500 increase in purchase price would
bring a \$1,000 saving in operating cost the first year, and continued
savings in later years. It is difficult to explain why farsighted
consumers would refuse to spend more than \$500 to gain a first-year
saving of \$1,000 in operating cost. The implicit discount rate needed
to explain this decision is incredibly large.
 
Consumer myopia is also found in studies of consumers' implicit
discount rates, which are both high and variable. For example, studies
of purchase decisions for space heating systems show discount rates
ranging from 2 percent a year to 68 percent; studies on
energy-efficient refrigerators show discount rates of 30 percent to
300 percent; studies on water heaters show discount rates of 24 to 67
percent.\footnote
{
See Dubin (1992) Tables 1 and 2.
}
 
Many works by economists commonly assume such myopia. Consider the
theoretical justifications for social security. Textbooks inform
students that ``One rationale [for social security], and perhaps the
most important one, is based on paternalism: People may be unwise,
shortsighted, or ill-informed. When they are young, they may fail to
save adequately for old age..." (Boadway and Wildasin 1984, p. 461);
``The usual argument is that individuals are not farsighted enough to
buy enough insurance for their own good and therefore the government
must force them to. For example, it is popularly believed that in the
absence of social security, most people would not accumulate enough
assets to finance an adequate level of consumption during their
retirement" (Rosen 1988, p. 195); ``The programs were introduced
partly for income distribution reasons...partly because it was felt
that individuals might suffer from myopia and not provide adequately
for their own retirement" (Blanchard and Fischer 1989, p. 110). In the
professional literature such statements are made by Diamond (1977),
Feldstein (1985, 1987), Atkinson (1987, pp. 808-809), and Kotlikoff
(1987).
 
Empirical work supports this argument for myopia. Consider one
implication of the assumption that consumers are not myopic and have
rational expectations: consumption should respond to news of income
changes rather than to the income changes themselves. Wilcox (1989)
tested this idea by studying purchases made by recipients of Social
Security benefits. He noted that increases in Social Security benefits
are announced at least six weeks before taking effect. Consumers who
have rational expectations should adjust their consumption immediately
after learning about forthcoming changes in benefits, and not wait six
weeks until they receive the higher benefits. But Wilcox finds strong
evidence that consumption responds to actual rather than to
anticipated changes in Social Security benefits.
 
Similar myopia is found in the behavior of taxpayers. In 1992, the
income tax withholding tables were adjusted to reduce withholding. A
typical worker received an extra \$28.80 in take-home pay per month in
March through December 1992, to be offset by a lower tax refund in
1993. The change in withholding amounted to 0.5 percent of Gross
Domestic Product. President Bush, who proposed this change in his
State of the Union address, intended that it provide a temporary
stimulus to demand. But the policy change involved only the timing of
income. If consumers are forward-looking, the change would have a
negligible effect on consumption and aggregate demand.
 
Shapiro and Slemrod (1993) analyzed a survey taken shortly after the
lower withholding went into effect. Forty-three percent of consumers
reported spending the extra take-home pay---much more than
the zero percent predicted by the standard models. The fraction of
income earners who correctly noted the change in withholding rates a
month after the change was only one-third.
 
\subsection{Myopic producers}
 
 
Firms usually pay attention to their markets, anticipate market
changes, learn from their mistakes, and plan rationally. Such
behavior, however, does not describe American automobile manufacturers
over the past two decades. They ignored the urgent warnings made by
analysts outside the industry. They ignored the successful practices
of their foreign competitors. They were slow to recognize that the
world had changed, and that they had to change with it. As a result,
the American manufacturers lost market share and billions of dollars.
One of the big three manufacturers, Chrysler, was saved from
bankruptcy only by a government bailout. The auto industry does not
provide a textbook case of rational profit-maximizing
decisions.\footnote
{
{\em Automotive News} (January 24, 1994, p. 16) gives anecdotal evidence
about suppliers to the industry. Toyota, the industry's most efficient
producer, offers free advice to its suppliers about the Toyota
Production System. Most of this advice requires no investment by the
parts makers, and has produced efficiency gains of 50 to 100 percent.
Nevertheless, out of the thousands of U.S. suppliers---391 of whom
supply Toyota---only 22 have requested Toyota's free assistance.
}
 
Recent literature provides one reason for rational managers to reject
potentially profitable investments.  In particular, Scharfstein and
Stein (1990) claim that rational managers may be unwilling to
undertake some line of investment unless other firms do as well.  Such
behavior arises when managers are concerned about their reputations in
the labor market: rational managers with imperfect information may
find it advantageous to mimic the behavior of other managers. The
essential idea was expressed by Keynes in {\em The General Theory}
(1936, pp.  157-158):
\begin{quote}
... it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public
interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever
investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is
in the essence of his behavior that he should be eccentric,
unconventional, and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is
successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and
if in the short-run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not
receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches us that it is better for
reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.
\end{quote}
 
Thus, an unwillingness to invest by a few managers may discourage
investment by many additional managers.  An industry-wide regulation,
such as CAFE, may therefore induce additional investment.
 
\section{Delay}
 
Even if the long-run effect of increased gasoline on fuel-efficiency is the
same as a CAFE regulation, the short-run effects can greatly differ.  The
differences arise because a rational consumer or firm has an incentive
to delay undertaking an investment.  (For succinctness we shall call a
consumer or a firm contemplating an investment an investor.)
 
The delay can be caused by two factors. First, in the short run a
consumer consume can use less gasoline by driving less, tuning his car more
frequently, increasing the tire pressure of his car, and so on. Such
reductions in fuel consumption reduce a consumer's gain from
purchasing a fuel-efficient car.
 
A different reason for delay arises with uncertainty about future
costs or benefits.  The relevant principles were first presented in
the theory for option markets. Pindyck (1991) and Dixit (1992)
present related principles for the timing of investments.  They show
that a firm (or government) may gain by postponing a decision to
adopt a profitable investment.
 
Delay may be advantageous when the following three conditions are
satisfied. (1) The investment entails some sunk cost; this cost (such
as expenditure on specific machinery or causation of environmental
damage) cannot be recouped if the action is later reversed. (2) The
decision maker is uncertain about future economic conditions, and can
obtain additional information only gradually. (3) An investment not
undertaken now can be undertaken later.
 
To illustrate the basic idea, consider an investment that in the current
period costs 100 and in the next period generates benefits of either
80 or 140. Let these two outcomes be considered equally likely. For
simplicity, let the inter temporal rate of time preference be zero. If the
project is immediately adopted, the expected net benefit is
$ 1/2(-100+80) + 1/2(-100+140) = 10 $.
 
Suppose that if the decision is postponed for one period the benefits
become known with certainty. Therefore, if the benefits turn out to be
80, the investment will not be made. If the benefits turn out to be
140 the investment will be made, for a net benefit of $-100 + 140 =
40$. Since these outcomes are equally likely, the expected benefits when
the decision is postponed are $(1/2)0 + (1/2)40 = 20$. This expected
benefit is greater than the expected benefit of 10 obtainable when the
investment is made immediately. A risk-neutral consumer or firm should
postpone the decision.
 
The benefit of postponement arises because it allows an investor to
reject the investment when it turns out to have negative net benefits.
More generally, postponement can be worthwhile if new information
could induce the investor to change its decision.
 
The example can be generalized.  It is not necessary that
in later periods an investor knows with certainty the benefits of the
investment. Instead, we can allow for a partial resolution of
uncertainty. The technical analysis then employs the notion of
information sets.\footnote
{
See, for example, Binmore (1992), section 10.4.
}
To illustrate, suppose that initially the investor believes the
investment is equally likely to have net benefits of -20, 0, 10, or
20. The expected value is then 2.5. In the second period the investor
gets some new information. It now knows that the net benefits lie
either in the set $(-20,0)$, or else in the set $(10,20)$. Each set is
equally likely {\em a priori}, and each value in each set is equally
likely. Now the investor will make the investment only if it believes
the benefits lie in the set $(10,20)$.
 
To apply these insights to our purposes, consider an increase in the
price of gasoline caused by a tax or by reduced supply of oil by OPEC.
A cost-benefit study may show that consumers would profit from
purchasing more fuel-efficient automobiles. That, however, does not
mean they will immediately do so. Rational consumers may prefer to
wait until uncertainty about technology or gasoline prices is
resolved. Similarly, even if consumers immediately demand more
fuel-efficient vehicles, manufacturers may prefer to wait before
undertaking costly research and development, redesign of cars, and
retooling of assembly lines. Even if an increase in the price of
gasoline has powerful effects, those effects may be delayed.
Regulation, such as CAFE rules, can force quicker responses
than taxes.
 
The data show that CAFE regulations worked.  We now have some idea
why.
 
\pagebreak
 
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\end{document}
