CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

DR. GODWIN CHUKWUDUM NWAOBI

genwaobi@yuppa.com
234-08035925021

QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU
P.O. BOX 240, GWAGWALADA, ABUJA
NIGERIA, WEST AFRICA
ABSTRACT

Nigeria is going through a difficult political and economic transition after forty years of independence. Yet, Nigeria remains a society rich in cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic and political diversity. Today, the average Nigerian struggles hard to make ends meet; sees himself or herself as being poorer than he or she was a decade ago; and finds it hard to be hopeful that things will get better soon. It is against this background that this project sets out to increase the knowledge about state capacity in Nigeria by taking stock of economic and governance issues. Using a simple growth model, we illustrate the interrelationships between natural resources, corruption and economic growth in Nigeria; as well as proposing anti-corruption policies for Nigeria.

KEY WORDS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, CORRUPTION, BRIBERY, GOVERNANCE, NIGERIAN ECONOMY

JEL: Q4, Q32, D73, H3, K00, O1
1.0 PROBLEM STATEMENT

“Father in Heaven, you always provide for all your creatures so that all may live as you have willed. You have blessed our country Nigeria with rich human and natural resources to be used to your honor and glory and for the well being of every Nigerian. We are deeply sorry for the wrong use of these your gifts and blessing through acts of injustice, bribery and corruption, as a result of which many of our people are hungry, sick, ignorant and defenseless. Father, you alone can heal us and our nation of this sickness. We beg you; touch our lives and the lives of our leaders and people so that we may all realize the evil effect of bribery and corruption and work hard to eliminate it. Raise up for us God-fearing people and leaders who care for us and who will lead us in the path of peace, prosperity and progress” [CBCN, 1998]

Unlike a fiscal system with a single level of government only, we must now allow for the fact that fiscal operations are typically carried out by many units of government or jurisdictions. Here, this multiple unit system includes the federal government, States government and local governments. This multiunit fiscal structure (three-tier arrangement) reflects the historical forces of nation making, wars and geography. Compared with that of most other countries, the fiscal structure of Nigeria has developed along relatively decentralized lines. At the same time, it has shown flexibility toward changing needs and attitudes, as evidenced by the
expanding role of intergovernmental transfers and the reassignment of fiscal responsibilities over the last decade. Specifically, the Nigeria Constitution (1999) has it that the federation shall maintain a special account to be called “the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all revenues collected by the government of the federation, except the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of the Armed forces of the federation, the Nigeria police force, the ministry or department of government charged with the responsibility for external affairs and the residents of the federal capital territory Abuja.

However, these legal requirements may be impracticable without good governance. Hence, the World Bank (1994) identified three distinct aspects of governance: the form of political regime; the process by which authority exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions. But regional progress is usually reported under the four major components of governance: public sector management; accountability; legal framework for development; and transparency and information. Yet, public sector management (in relation to fiscal federalism) is the most visible of these four dimensions of governance. It has to do with the capacity of governments to make and implement public policy, the effectiveness of public programs and the strength of public institutions. The subject matter of public sector management is the means to achieve those parts (the civil
service, the government budget, the public investment program, accounting, auditing and other financial management systems, strategic planning and program evaluation, aid coordination, economic management agencies, the cabinet system and other parts of the machinery of government that are essential to a well-functioning public sector. In addition, it is equally concerned with the relationship between central government agencies and public enterprises on the other hand, and between central and subordinate tiers of government on the other (World bank, 1994). And yet, widespread corruption remains a symptom of a poorly functioning state as witnessed in most developing countries such as Nigeria.

Indeed, those who pay and receive bribes can expropriate a nation’s wealth, leaving little for its poorest citizens. Where corruption is systematic, Nigeria with extensive natural resources may fail to develop in a way that benefits ordinary citizens. Highly corrupt country face particular challenges even when controlled by reform-minded rulers. Reforming public institutions and government policies is essential but poverty limits available options. Policymakers, however, can arrive at plausible conclusions only after understanding corruption’s effect on the efficiency and equity of an economic system corruption can therefore be defined as the use of public office for private gain and this include bribery and extortion which necessarily involve at least two parties and other types of malfeasance that
a public official can carry out alone (including fraud and embezzlement). In most cases, corruption is entrenched, embedded in a social setting that both shows its consequences and helps sustain it. Entrenched corruption can be political, bureaucratic or both and helps perpetuate the development problems as well as diverting development resources and saps the political and social vitality societies need to use aid effectively. It is in such a case that corruption does the most to keep poor nations poor (Johnston, 1997)

Entrenched corruption is well organized and embedded in a political and helps sustain it. In fact, it is best thought of as equilibrium, an understanding of which can help explain its origins and tenacity. But it is not the only possible equilibrium: by altering the political and economic environment it is possible to shift toward low-corruption, higher growth equilibrium that benefit from and help sustain accountable politics and administration.

Although political and bureaucratic corruption differs, both could be considered entrenched if they are pressure organized and monopolistic. Here perverse means that corruption is so common that there are few practical alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials (Rose – Ackerman, 1996, Olderburg 1997). Organized corruption involves internal coordination, shared knowledge, and a vertical exchange of benefits. It facilitate an internal economy linking principals and agents. Principals provide protection, make major decisions, control agents discretion and powers,
and confer or withhold shares of the take. Political or bureaucratic agents pay their agents through loyal support. When political corruption is entrenched, political activity is dominated by a monopolistic organization or factor that maintains its power in part through corruption and reaps large rewards from it. For entrenched bureaucratic corruption, the situation is different. Several agencies might deal with one sector of the economy but in specialized ways: one might regulate working conditions, another inspects products, and yet another collects taxes. These agencies usually cannot abolish one another or drive each other out of the corruption business. But they can collide creating lasting and lucrative corruption networks that feed on and help sustain economic and political dependence.

Where bureaucratic corruption is not pervasive, some officials may take bribes as opportunity allows. Most do not, however, nor do they systematically seek them out. However, vertically organized bureaucratic corruption is a significant step toward entrenchment. Here, a portion of the agents take is shared with principals and emphasis shifts from corruption without theft “corruption with theft”. In the first case agents keep aside payment but pass the full nominal price of a good to the public treasury; while in the second case, agents keep some or all of the fee and the treasury receives little or nothing. Low – level agents who do not enjoy protection will find corruption without theft easier to conceal or will at least keep theft within limits to avoid notice. But with vertical organization
corruption with theft grows rapidly both because of the increasing number of claimants to take and because of the official protection that corruption enjoys political corruption and bureaucratic corruption can therefore flourish in each other’s absence. But in most cases, the two types of corruption coexist and may be introduced. Political corruption can intrude into the bureaucracy as well as the bureaucratic corruption can become a factor in politics. Different connections between political and bureaucratic corruption produce different patterns of extended clientelism in society but the more serious either types of corruption becomes, the less likely it is to exist independently. An interlocked system of entrenched bureaucratic and political corruption is a powerful force: rents can be coordinated and shared across both realms while monopoly power allows politicians to preempt opposition Economic policies can minimize corruption while curtailing competition. There will be few opportunities for direct competition. There will be few opportunities for direct countervailing actions, and illicit responses will require the indulgence of corrupt officials.

The debate on the effects of corruption is very fervent. Some authors have suggested that corruption might raise economic growth through two types of mechanisms. Corrupt practices such as “speed money” would enable individual to avoid bureaucratic delay while government employees who are allowed to levy bribes would work harder especially where bribes act as a piece rate [Leff, 1964, Huntinton, 1968] many recent studies [North, 1990, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993] have argued that malfunctioning
government institutions severely harm economic performance through the reduction in both incentive and opportunities to invest and innovate. Thus, corruption has received particular attention by both policy makers and researchers as the recent availability of corruption measures has helped to quantify its extent and allowed international comparisons.

Econometrician have recently weighed into the debates as Mauro (1995) pioneering study and the Transparency International (TI) has now brought to the attention of researchers the availability of corruption indices and prompted a number of empirical investigations into the effects of corruption on various aspects of economic performance. Tanzi (1998) List the significant econometric findings to date of the effects of corruption on the level of investment, the productivity of public investment and the level of maintenance expenditures, the level of foreign direct investment, the level of education and health expenditures and the level of tax revenue. Our present study therefore constitutes a first step towards an investigation of the effect of natural resources on corruption and growth. This is in addition to the modeling the government’s anti-corruption practices as the response of an optimizing agent, which would allow, inter alia, a formal derivation of the need for, and the extent of, infrastructure and administrative adjustments in response to resources discoveries.
2.0 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The board objective of this paper is to theoretically and empirically investigate the channel through which the natural resources might affect a country’s economic growth, that is through an increase in rent-seeking activities. Our specific research questions include:

[1] What factors determine the incidence of corruption and what role does the abundance of natural resources play in Nigeria?

[2] What factors determine the extent of corruption and how one can explain the stylized fact that resources rich economy tend to grow slower.

3.0 NIGERIA POLITICAL ECONOMY

Like other parts of West Africa, the areas that eventually became part of Nigeria has a long – established traditional society Nigeria has an area of 923,768sq km and is bounded by Niger on the north, by Chad and Cameroon on the east by the Gulf of guinea on the south, and by Benin on the west. During the 19th century, there were many local rulers, who assigned card for cultivation, controlled trade, and collected taxes. Agriculture, using shifting cultivation and simple implements, was mainly for subsistence, though there was some exchange of surpluses in local markets. There was a network of village markets in which farmers could exchange produce for handicrafts. After about 1830, exports of palm oil and kernels, primarily to Britain gradually replaced the dying share trade. Although the initial base was small, the growth rate of export and imports was high.

British penetration first occurred through ship owners and chartered merchant companies with political authority developing later. The initial contacts were confined to coastal areas because of transport difficulties, endemic malaria and tribal warfare in the interior. Lagos was ceded to Britain in 1861 and in 1886, an oil river protectorate (Southern Nigeria) was established over Niger Delta. In 1900, the northern territories were taken over (Britain) which became the protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In 1914, Northern and Southern protectorates were merged and thus, modern Nigeria like most other African state is a colonial creation.
The primary reason for amalgamation was economic rather than political. The northern protectorate, which became the Northern province, had annual budget deficits, while the Southern protectorate that became the Southern province had surpluses. To eliminate the subventions from the British treasury, the budgets of the two components were integrated. Some central institutions were also established to anchor the evolving clarified structure. The first Governor general (Frederic Lugard) organized a central secretariat at Lagos and established the Nigeria Council to provide a forum for representative. Drawn from the provinces.

The process of unification wars undermined by the persistence of different regional perspective on governance between the Northern and Southern provinces. While Southern colonial administrators welcomed amalgamation, their counterparts in the Northern province believed that it was injurious to them.

Indeed, these differential attitudes signaled that a Federal system might be a suitable framework for keeping Nigeria as a single political entity. Subsequently political developments confirmed the Federal solution as the best political arrangement that could provide the compromises and assurances necessary for advancement to political unity. In an effort to establish a viable Federation, the British modified the constitution four times (1922, 1945, 1951 and 1954). The final result was a Federation of three regions following the splitting of Southern province in 1946 to create the Eastern and Western regions, which was a continuation of the Northern
province. The establishment of this region was a response to fundamental ethnographic and cultural configuration of Nigerian society. During the run-up to independence, the British, responding to Nigerian demands, transferred responsibilities to Nigerian Leaders by establishing a parliamentary form of government based on the British model at both the regional Federal Level, and holding elections for each of those bodies. Internal self-government was thus granted to the eastern and western regions in 1957, and to the Northern Region in 1959.

At independence, (1960) Nigeria was a multi-party democracy with a federal constitution. Its parliamentary system gave promise of evolution towards a stable pluralist political system. However, this system was soon undermined by the nature of political forces of the time. During this period, three political parties emerged to dominate Nigerian politics: The National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon’s (NCNC), Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and Action Group (AG). However, the disagreement over the 1962/63 population census figures ruptured the Federal coalition of NCNC and the NPC. The conflict over the census exacerbated political tensions that had previously led to outbreaks of violence in the Western Region and some parts of Northern Region. These situations led to the first military intervention in January 1966. After the second coup that was a reprisal for the wanton killing of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the Eastern Region attempted in 1967 to secede and to create an independent 1960 homeland (Biafra) which resulted in a 30-month civil war. In response, the Federal
Military government began to create more state to outflank and break-up the eastern region by providing homelands for ethnic minorities of the region, but also to break-up the dominant bases of power in the west and the north. The military believed that by creating a large number of relatively weak states under a strong central government it could overcome the instability of the past. In other words, the military sought to unilaterally redefine the shape of Nigerian Federation into one consistent with its own hierarchical structure and vision. The result was the creation of multiple state structures. Though seemingly inconsistent with the logic of military rule. The military believed that elected local government would provide a more viable and legitimate form of government at the local level and further weaken the States. Few local government areas were established initially. But over the years the number grew astronomically.

During the 1970s, Nigeria evolved from a poor agricultural economy into a relatively rich, oil-dominated one. The economic policy orientation during the 1970s left the country ill prepared for the eventual collapse of oil prices. Public investment was concentrated in costly, and often inappropriate, infrastructure projects with questionable rates of returns and sizable recurrent cost implications, while the agricultural sector was largely neglected. Nigeria’s industrial policy was inward looking, with a heavy emphasis on protection and government controls, which bred an uncompetitive manufacturing sector. While attending an O.A.U summit in Kampala, Uganda on Tuesday 29 July 1975, General Gowon’s government
was sacked after mounting opposition to his government’s in decision to return the country to civil rule. Gen Murtala R. Mohammed who in October 1975 presented the nation with a well – detailed timetable to return the country to democratic rule replaced him. He was assassinated in a failed coup d’etat on Friday 13 February 1976. This automatically brought Gen Olusegun Obasanjo (second in command) into power.

Fulfilling his promise to complete his predecessor’s transition to civil rule program. Obasanjo handed over to a civilian government headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). This second republic witnessed a replay of political intolerance and official misconduct. It was this confusion that Shagari’s government was re-elected for a second term. However, the regime massively looked the treasury, mismanaged the economy and undermined the legitimacy of civil democratic rule by blatantly rigging the 1983 Federal elections. On Saturday 31st December 1983, his government was deposed and major General Mohammadu Buhari became the Head of State. His regime was criticized of high-handedness and despite its corrective posture; its radical policies were still Alien to Nigeria. Thus, the regime was toppled on Tuesday 27 August 1985 and Gen Ibrahim B. Babangida became Nigeria’s first military President.

From early 1986 through late 1989, Babangida regime laid the political foundation for the transition to elected government through the establishment of National Electoral Commission (1987), the election of a
continent Assembly (1988), the approval of a new constitution (1989) and
the establishment of two party system (1989), comprising the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republic Convention (NRC).
Following an attempted coup in 1990, the government moved more
aggressively to implement the more of the political reform agenda.
Legislative elections at the state level were held in December 1991 and at
the federal level in July 1992. In the latter, the SDP won the majority in both
the Senate and House of Representatives. The presidential elections,
however, proved problematic of a series of presidential crises. The results
of a series of presidential primaries were annulled in September 1992
because of alleged irregularities and the candidates were declared
ineligible to participate in the presidential elections.

Subsequently, President Babangida postponed the transition to an
elected government and in January 1993 the formation of an interim
government, which consisted of all-civilian Transitional Council headed by
Chief Shonekan to handle the day-to-day affairs of government under the
National Defense and Security Council, chaired by President Babangida.
President elections were set for June 12, 1993 and a new government was
schedule to assume office on August 27, 1993. In the event the elections
were annulled after chief Abiola, a Leader of SDP had emerged as the
apparent winner. This annulment led to domestic unrest and international
protest. Against this background, President Babangida, the military
leadership and the leadership of SDP and the NRC agreed to another
transitional government. On August 26, 1993, armed widespread Labor unrest and civil strikes, president Babangida resigned as Head of State and commander –in–chief of the Armed forces, and chief Shonekan was sworn in as Head of the Interim national Government for the period through March 31, 1994, when as elected government was scheduled to assume office. On November 17, 1993, the Interim National Government was outset by military under General Sani Abacha. All democratic institution was dissolved and all elected officials were removed from office. Also a new transition agenda was set.

A constitutional conference was inaugurated in Abuja in 1994 and another transition program opened as the constitutional conference closed. Between 1995 and 1997, there were reported coup attempts allegedly aimed at Abacha’s regime. Latter, General Abacha died on Monday 8 June 1998 at a time when the request for his self-succession as civilian president peaked. General Abdusalam Abubakar then chief of defense staff, became Head of state and sacked all democratic structures and ordered the formation of political associations. With the establishment of independent National Electoral commission (INEC), a new political timetable was released to end rule on 29 may 1999. While Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the All People’s Party (APP) fielded Chief Olu Falae, the People Democratic Party (APP) fielded Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as its candidates for the presidential seat.
However, General Olusegen Obasanjo won the keenly contested election and General Abdusalam Abubakar successfully handed over to retired General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo on Saturday 29 May 1999, Indeed, Nigerians has been going through a difficult political and economic transition after thirty years of military rule. Thus, the new federal government faces an array of complicated issues that must be overcome for Nigeria to be successful in its transition to a democratic political system and a vibrant market economy. Again, Obasanjo was re-elected in May 2003, as the new President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (though the validity of the position is still being disputed in the Nigerian Court).
Indeed, corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the poor. Many aspects of bribery and corruption include accepting gratification, giving or accepting gratification through agent, fraudulent acquisition of property; fraudulent receipt of property. Offences committed through postal system, deliberate frustration of investigation, making false statement or returns gratification by and through agents, bribery of public officer; using office or position for gratification; bribery transactions; false or misleading statements to the commission and attempt (conspiracy) punishable as offences.

Corruption respects no national boundaries and it deeper poverty around the globe by distorting political, economic and social life. Transparency International (TI) was born from the experience of people who witnessed first hand the real threat to human liver posed by corruption. Today, corruption at the highest levels captures headlines everywhere, and people are becoming aware of its disastrous consequences.
Indeed, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 2003; United Nations, 1999). Several factors contribute to the persistence of national poverty, and corruption is definitely one of them. Oil and Gas have brought wealth to Nigeria but these industries have historically provided opportunities for corruption on a massive scale. The corruption perceptions index (CPI) is a poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of business people and country analysts, both resident and non-resident. The table below shows the relative performance of Nigeria’s CPI (1980 –2002). Here, the comparisons to the results from previous years should be based on the country’s score, not its rank. A country’s rank can change suggesting that now countries enter the index and others dropout. A higher score suggests that respondents provided better ratings, while a lower score suggest that respondents revised their perception downwards. However, year-to-year in a country’s score can result not only from a changing way of a changing way of a country’s performance but also from a changing sample and methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing methods change in a country’s score may also relate to the fact that different viewpoints have been collected and different questions being administered. Table 4.1 presents the CPI for 1980 – 1992.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>43; 9</td>
<td>41; 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the 1996 CPI report, the rank relates to the results drawn from a number of surveys and reflects only the perception of business people that participated in these surveys. Score’ 96 relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and a perfect 10.00 would be a totally corrupt-free country. Score ‘95 has to be interpreted similarly but fewer countries were include in the index and fewer surveys were drawn upon and thus the 1995 column is at best a rough comparison. Conclusions with regard to historical trends should be based on the historical data as shown below. The variance indicates different results from different surveys: the greater the variance, the greater were the differences of perceptions of a country among the surveys used. For the number of surveys used, 10 surveys were used and at least four surveys were required for a country to be included in the list. Table 4.2A presents the 1996 CPI while Table 4.2B presents the historical data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE ’96 (MAX. 10)</th>
<th>SCORE ’98 (MAX. 10)</th>
<th>VARIANCE IN ’96</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SURVEYS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st (clean)</td>
<td>NEW</td>
<td>9, 43</td>
<td>9, 55</td>
<td>0, 39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>9, 43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9, 30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>0, 69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0, 63</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, a lower score indicates a worse performance whereas a higher indicates a perception of improvements. The tables also present two figures for each period. The first is the average score and the trend is the more reliable the higher the difference between the respective periods, the more surveys are available and the lower the variance.

The 1997 CPI was an improved index when compared to the previous years. Its ranking system was designed so that countries that are perceived to be the least corrupt are given the highest scores out of ten. No country scored ten, but Denmark, Finland and Sweden emerged in top place with
New Zealand slipping from its 1996 top scores. For another year running, Nigeria emerged in the lowest position and was thus perceived to be the most corrupt country of those analyzed for the 1997 index. Table 4.3 presents the CPI table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE 1997 (MAX. 10.00)</th>
<th>SCORE 1996 (MAX. 10.00)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SURVEYS USED IN 1997</th>
<th>VARIANCE IN 1997 BETWEEN SURVEYS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>9, 94</td>
<td>9, 33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(clean)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>1, 76</td>
<td>0, 69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(corrupt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rank relates solely to the results drawn from a number of surveys and reflects only the perceptions of business people that participated in these surveys. Score 1997 and score 1996 relate to perceptions of the degree of which corruption is seen be business people—a perfect 10.00 would be a totally corruption-free country. Variance indicates differences in the values to the sources for the 1997 index: the greater the variance, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources here. The number of surveys used had to be at least four for a country to be included in the CPI.
For the 1998 CPI, the rank relates solely to the results drawn from a number of surveys and reflects the perceptions of business people that participated in these surveys. The score column relates to perceptions of the degree of which business people see corruption. Perfect 10.00 would be a totally corruption-free country. Standard deviation indicates differences in values of the sources from the 1998 index: the greater the variance, the greater the differences of perceptions of the country among the sources. Again, the number of survey used had to be at least four for a country to be included in CPI. Table 4.4 presents CPU table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
<th>SURVEYS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st (clean)</td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st (corrupt)</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1999 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The surveys used refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance seventeen surveys were used and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included into the 1999 CPI. The standard deviation indicates difference in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater
the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. Table 4.5 presents the CPI table.

TABLE 4.5 CPI: 1999 [99 COUNTRY SAMPLE]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
<th>SURVEY USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st [CLEAN]</td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th [Corrupt]</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2000 CPI score relates to the perception of the degree of corruption as seen by people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (high clean) and 0 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The surveys used refer to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. Sixteen surveys were used and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI. Table 4.6 presents the CPI table.

TABLE 4.6 CPI: 2000 [90 COUNTRY SAMPLE]
The 2001 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (high clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) – The survey used reflects to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. Here, a total of fourteen surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI. The standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: the differences of perceptions of a country among the highest and lowest values of the sources. Since each individual’s sources have its own sealing system, scores are standardized around a common mean. Table 4.7 presents the 2001 CPI table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>SURVEYS USED</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
<th>HIGH - LOW RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.0 – 10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6 – 2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.7 C.P.I : 2001 [91 COUNTRY SAMPLE]
The 2002 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupts). The surveys used refer to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. Here, a total of fifteen surveys were used from nine independent institutions, and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included in CPI. The standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. The high –low range provides the highest and lowest values of the different sources. Table 4.8 presents the 2002 CPI table.

**TABLE 4.8: 2002 [102 COUNTRY SAMPLE]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>SURVEY USED</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
<th>HIGH –LOW RANGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st [Clean]</td>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st CORRUPT</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>10.0 – 2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 2003 CPI score relates to perception of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risks analyst, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). A surveys used refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. A total of seventeen surveys were used from thirteen independent institutions, and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI. The standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. The High low range provides the highest and the lowest values of the different sources. Table 4.9 presents the 2003 CPI table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>SURVEY USED</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION</th>
<th>HIGH – LOW RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st [Clean]</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.2 – 10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132nd [Corrupt]</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9 – 2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indeed, the above corruption picture in Nigeria is highly alarming and consequently, we wish to trace the origin and scope of this problem. Corruption in public life manifested in 1950’s when the first panel of inquiry was set up to look into African Continental Bank (ACB) – Nnamdi Azikiwe Affairs. The charges were that Dr. Azikiwe abused his office by allowing public funds to be invested in which he (Zik) had an interest. The allegation proved to be a big scandal, a tour de force that led to the institution of Justice STRAFFORD FORSTER – SUTTON Commission of enquiry on July 24, 1956 to investigate the above allegation. The subsequent indictment of DR. Azikiwe in the commission’s report (as at January 6, 1957) led him to transfer all his rights and interest in the bank to the Eastern Nigeria Government (Nwankwo 1999).

In 1962 Chief Obafemi Awolowo was dragged to the court of accountability. This led to a call or an investigation of the relationship between the erstwhile Awolowo government and the National investment and property Company, a private enterprise said to be indebted to the western regional government to the tune of £7,200.00. On June 20 1962, the Federal government appointed a commission headed by Justice G.B. Coker to investigate the allegations and later the commission indicted Awolowo in its report. Consequently, the western regional government acquired all the property owned by the National Investment and property company.
In 1967, another commission of enquiry was instituted to investigate assets of fifteen public officers in the defunct mid-western region. At the conclusion of the panel’s report, all the public officers were indicated for corruptly enriching themselves. The panel recommended that they should forfeit such ill-gotten gains to the government. On the basis of growing tide of corruption, it was not surprising that when Major Kaura Nzeogwu and colleagues struck, he harped on the theme of corruption. Although the text of the Nzeogwu- led coup, promised socio-political changes, it was not forthcoming because of a counter-coup that made it a nullity. High voltage intrigues characterized by nights of long knives, stoking of ethnic hatreds, primordial fears of domination and hegemony pervaded the land. The nation would go to war, survive the war and enter another critical stage of its chequered history. The genocidal war against the Republic of Biafra commenced. It was an era of excessive spending especially on armaments with which to prosecute the war.

Despite this incipient tide of corruption, it is to the discovery of oil that we owe the magnification of the penchant of successive Nigeria leadership to Loot and plunder. Foreign oil companies first discovered oil in the 1950’s. Before they could start pumping it, the civil war started and put it on hold. However, at the end of the civil war in 1970, the price of oil soared. A nation emerging from a painful civil war suddenly found itself awash with petrol – dollars. General Yakubu Gowon’s’ tragic
pronouncement that Nigeria had so much money which it did not know how to spend triggered a new wave of foreign invasion and corrupt practices.

By March 1974; the nation was rocked by a cement scandal. The federal government placed an order for two million metric tonnes of cement with various firms in the United States, Romania and USSR. The supply was to be made through the National supply company. However, in a sudden change, the ministry of Defense which 2.9 million metric tonnes for its construction projects placed an additional order for 16.23 metric tonnes.

Despite the fact that the price for a tone of cement at that time stood at $25 and freight $15 Nigeria paid $115 per tone. Somebody therefore stood to gain $75 per tone for 16.23 million tones. Consequently, the state instituted Justice M.B. Belgore Panel to investigate the alleged irregularities. The probe seriously indicted the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defense and he was dismissed along with other officers. Surprisingly, criminal proceedings were never brought against the dismissed men.

In an atmosphere of moral and social decay, the plot to overthrow Gowon thickened. Eventually, the coup took place on July 19, 1975. After consolidating his hold on power, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed set up a federal Assets investigation panel on September 16, 1975 to probe the assets of all former governors, the administrator of East Central State and some Federal Commissioners who served in the Gowon’s regime.
On February 3, 1976, the panel released its report and all the governor (with the exception of Mobolaji Johnson and Oluwole Rotimi who were acquitted) were found guilty of gross abuse of office. The confiscated assets stood at about ₦10 million.

Towards, the dying days of 1975, a disturbing three page circular said to emanate from supreme Headquarters, Lagos and headed: Facts about Murtala’s government since Gowon’s outing on July 29, 1975, an opening warning to the nation broke into the domain of public discourse. This circular alleged that looting and plunders of national wealth through to be the hallmark of the Gowon era had started in earnest. They also deposed that the Mohammed regime was as corrupt as the sacked Gowon government. This accusation cast a pull on Mohammed’s regime and was to dog it until Col. Bukar Dimka unleashed his coup d’eat on the nation.

Indeed, the failure of Dimka’s coup proved the way for the emergence of Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo as Head of state. One of the first actions he performed on coming into power was the promulgation of decree No11 of 1976 (Public officers Protection Against False Accusation). Hence forth, corrupt government officials armed with the carte blanche handed over to them by Obansanjo, thought they were above the law. This retroactive decree to all interest and purposes was a clever plan to provide cover and immunity for corrupt public servants and thus deter members of
the public from exposing such public figures in his regime. Critics therefore point out that before his death, Murtala Mohammed strongly disagreed with Obasanjo over his role in a N45,216,000 contract (No 13 / 1731 for designing, construction equipping and furnishing of the international trade fair complex in Lagos). Three weeks after Murtala’s death, and regardless of his stand on the contract, it was reviewed upwards by the Obasanjo regime to N95,820,000. This was further revised again to N116,257,893. However, the Obasanjo regime was enmeshed in the scandal surrounding N 2.8 billion naira missing from the coffers of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

Consequently, first class firm of chartered accountant, coopers & Lybrand was commissioned in May 1978 to keep the accounts of the corporation. A team of accountants and auditors worked from may 1978 to January 1980 to reconstruct the account and audit the 1977 and 1978 accounts. However, one of the Nigeria’s dailies (punch) blew the whistle over the disappearance of 2.841 billion being proceeds from the sale of crude oil. The uproar it generated survived the termination of the Olusegun Obasanjo regime and split into the second republic government headed by Shehu Shagari. Responsive to the controversy that refused to abate, the Shagari administration instituted a probe panel headed by Justice Ayo Irekefe to get to the root of the scandal.
Although, the full extent of the (BCCI) involvement and contribution to the economic adversity of Nigeria cannot be fully accounted for; the said missing money was lodged with the London branch of the bank (between 1977 and 1980). For almost three years, the men of power and influence appropriated the accumulated interest on the principal. When the roar could not be swept under the carpet, the money was returned to the coffers of government without interest. It was with this interest running for three years that BCC I and its chief backers in Nigeria used to commence operations in Nigeria. Deposed sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Dasuki and late Shehu Musa Yaradua were particularly close to BCCI banking conglomerate. Alhaji Dasuki was therefore made the chairman of BCC I Nigeria when the bubble finally burst for the bank, the Nigeria arm transformed over nights into African International Bank (AIB).

Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as the President of Nigeria on October 1 1979, Party Politics which climaxed in the retreat of the military to the barracks was married by intrigues, smear campaigns, thuggery, violence, and widespread rigging, Repositories of power, the teeming citizens were cajoled, intimated and brazenly bribed as the politicians took their campaign messages to the people. Indeed, the Shagari’s scorecard was a parchment of corruption and iniquities a shocking and sad commentary on how unpatriotic leaders would sink a nation into an irredeemable abyss of perdition. Between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria earned about ₦40.5 billion and squandered it. The external reserve of ₦2.3 billion,
she inherited in 1979 was wiped out and replaced with a staggering external debt of N 10.21 billion as the curtain fell on this criminally corrupt government.

The life of the shagari civilian administration was terminated on 31st December 1983, paving way for Buhari/Idiagbon military administration. Politicians were held under the state security (Detention of persons), Decree 2 of 1984 and many were tried by the Recovery of Public Property Special Military Tribunals established by Decree 3. Some were convicted for various offences and duly sentenced. Specifically, justice Mohammed Bello Tribunal convicted 51 politicians and placed refund orders on them for their ill-gotten wealth. Indeed, Gowon’s profligacy in an era of oil boom left Nigeria with a $1.6 billion debt burden. Under the Olusegun Obasenjo regime, the figure jumped to $3.3 billion. Under the shehu shagari’s regime, the debt burden stood at $6.8 billion. However, the Buhari government rejected loan from the international monetary fund because of its stiff conditionality but spent $2.7 billion servicing the nation’s debt.

On August 27, 1985, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power with a reputation for kindness and humility. As he unfolded his policies on the political and economic fonts, discerning observers of the nation socio-political condition observed that Nigeria was in for a period of deceit.

In 1986, Babangida administration rejected the IMF bank loan but adopted most of the reforms contained in the package (called the structural
Adjustment program). However, the transition to civil democracy kicked off in 1986 with the establishment of a political bureau led by Samuel Cookey. The majority report of the commission set 1990, as the hand over date and this date was later changed to 1992 and later, later 1993. The June 12, 1993 presidential elections and chief Manhood Abiola’s comprehensive electoral landslide win, its annulment by babangida plunged the nation into chaos, anarchy and cold war. The embattled president, members of the Armed forces sat through hours of marathon meetings where two options: conduction a fresh election or setting up as interim national government were deliberated on. However, the horse trading that went on and the failure of the political class to defend democracy gave birth to the interim National Government. At the core of Abiola’s unsuccessful ambition to realize the mandate are the domination of the military by the North and the preponderance of militicians within their ranks.

Indeed, the interim National Government was a grand strategy to pave the way for a safe exists for Ibrahim Babangida. The choice of Chief Ernest Shoneken to carry this burden is a sign of the arrogance of the ruling northern class. Under the dual regime, Nigeria’s oil was constantly lifted and diverted to neighboring countries without being paid for. Some of these shady deals had the imprimatur of foreign governments suggesting conspiracy at the highest level of authority. With the collapse of the babangida regime and knowing its disregard for the rule of law and respect of fundamental freedoms, and the employment of violence ad
assassinations, babangida recoiled into its shell to bid for time and wait for an opportune time to spring back to power.

Unable to grasp the fast changing scenario and realignments of the power equation, shoneken moved into the presidential villa. On the international front, the British were very supportive of his government paving the way for his visit to Britain, the common wealth and the United Nations. Even as the Head of state and commander in chief of the Armed forces, shoneken had no control of over-Northern ethnic army, which he inherited from Babangida. Only General Sani Abacha, the then secretary of defense and the most powerful and ambitions military officer could decide the fate of the embattled shoneken government. With the practiced steps of a general who had participated in coup d’ etats three times in the nation’s history, he made his move. The waiting game was over. In November 1993, shoneken met with General Sani Abacha and other Army staff at the presidential villa, Aso Rock, Abuja. Abacha delivered the blow. After extensive consultations with members of the Armed forces, the soldiers have come to the painful conclusion that shoneken must go with immediate effect. Thus ended shoneken’s important regime after 82 days of drift and riots on the major streets of the nation.

In an address to the nation, he dissolved the interim National Assembly and the state Executive councils. Alternatively, he established a provisional ruling council. At the onset of the regime, Abacha set in motion
a flurry of probes to keep the nation busy, while he perfected his president-for-life project. In January 1994, this administration instituted a panel under the chairmanship of respected economist, DR. Pius Okigbo. The panel was expected to come up with practical solutions that would lead to the reform and reorganization of the Central Bank of Nigeria, grossly abused under Babangida’s regime. The panel’s report exposed the outrageous frittering away of $12.4 billion income from oil using the conduit of special accounts. Babangida ran a government, which was accountable to no one else but himself. Under the sub-heading Dedication and other Special Accounts, the panel started: “your Excellency instructed us to examine the use of the Dedication and other special accounts. These were established in 1988 to house the proceeds of the sale of crude oil dedicated to special projects and to receive the windfall of oil revenues from the Gulf war. Between September 1988 and 30th June 1994, US $12.4 billion was been recorded in these accounts. That US $12.2 billion was liquidated in less than six years, that they were spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment, that neither the president nor the governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra budgetary expenditures; that these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt over hang. These represent, no matter the initial justification for creating the accounts, a gross abuse of public trust. Had these resources of US $12.4 billion, or even only a significant portion, been paid into the external
reserves, the impact on the naira/dollar exchange rate today, on the attitude of our external creditors, on the credibility of Nigeria and the environment for foreign investment would have been incalculable. We have recommended the immediate closure of these accounts with the outstanding balance of some $206 million as at 30\textsuperscript{th} June, 1994, paid into the external reserves”.

The Bank of credit and commerce international (BCCI)-a rogue bank for drug barons and money launderer’s worldwide was used as a conduit to siphon money out of the country. Throughout the Babangida years, the bank enjoyed a lucrative presence in Nigeria. BCCI: The inside story of the world’s most corrupt financial Empire authored by two award winning American Journalists, peter Truell and larry Gurwin exposed some of Babangida’s dirty deals with BCCI. One of the hefty deals was the $1.5 billion oil transaction with ATTACK OIL, a subsidiary of BCCI. The book clamed that the general’s front men pocketed $50 million for this deal (Nwankwo, 1999). Again, under General Babangida, Julius Berger’s Construction Company hit Gold. In 1985, the construction giant’s turnover was a modest ₦2.234 billion. Of note is the “State House” project, a cover for the general’s 50-room luxurious personal country home built at a conservative estimate of ₦1.5 billion. The full details of Babangida’s worldwide investments will never be known. While he is perhaps the richest Nigerian alive today with assets in excess of $30 billion, proxy
holds much of his holdings. After eight years of plunder and pillage, the effect was clear. More than 3,000 officials now have Swiss Amounts totaling about $90 billion and in Britain £75 billion (nwankwo, 1999)

The revelations of the Abacha years are a story of modern day wealth in which the Nigerian people were used as cannon fodders. Abacha’s extensive business empire is an intimidating behemoth, whose stretch is in the four corners of the world. Abacha was able to perpetuate one of the most comprehensive plunder and looting of the resources of the state in contemporary history through intimidation, brigand, and a plethora of conduits. At the center of his scam schemes is the CHAGOURI AND CHAGOURI, an international consortium owned by five Lebanese brothers. There substantial interest cut across oil aluminum, smelting, flour milling, commodity trading, fertilizer importation, and real estate.

The company’s total assets trod at $18 billion. If was with this powerful conglomerate that Abacha planned and executed his fraud agenda. With the extensive international connections of the chagouris, the Abuja fortune was securely deposited in the vaults of several banks in different parts of the world. The Abuja corruption empire is awesome. While he and his cronies systematically pillaged the resources of the nation, millions of its citizens wallowed in scandalous poverty. General Abacha’s incorrupt fortune may never have been known given the secrecy and mystery surrounding such hot monies. If will be protected by the confidentially of banks in Europe, South and North America.
Middle East it is only through the quest by a patriotic Nigerian government and the humanitarian consideration of these bankers that Nigeria may recover this loot. If not, the over $20 billion will lie in the vaults of these banks assessable only to the family of Abacha.

The sudden death of General Sani Abacha, on June 8, 1998, pulled the nation from the brink of assured civil war and paved the way for the emergence of General Abdulsalami Abubakar as Head of state. A man said to be an honest man with a large heart; he pledged to return the nation to democratic rule in ten months. However, only a few weeks in power, chairman of the National Economic intelligence committee (NEC) Prof Aluko made a shaking disclosure to the effect that $50 million was missing from the nations coffers. General Abubakar stated that the missing amount was used to offer assistance to some neighboring Africa countries. The Central Banks of Nigeria (CBN) was another beneficiary of regime's financial profligacy. Construction of its corporate headquarters was awarded at the same sum of $158 million (N15 billion). As the spending spree gathered momentum, ten presenters and contract inflators in and out of uniform celebrated the mindless milking of the nation. Notably, Gen. Abubakar supervised the disbursement of the dizzying sum of N19 billion during the world youth services championship alone. Accountable to no one in particular, he imposed all the contractors on the local organizing committee. He also supervised the hurried attempt to privatize major government companies and parastatals as the head of National council on privatization (NCP). The
dazzling speed with which the privatization process was pursued was indicative of the dubious intentions of the chief promoters. Having assessed questionable wealth, the nation was being readied for sale to the ‘Chosen” and not necessary highest bidder. This process is akin to internal slavery since money stolen form national treasury would now be used to buy up Nigeria. Again, the service chiefs and influence peddlers in the corridors of power hastily awarded themselves oil exploration blocks and oil lifting contracts. These last minute deals were consummated in utter negation to transparency and accountability.

Even in the face of a mass of evidence pointing to an extraordinary looting spree under the regime of Gen. Abubakar, he struggles to salvage an anti-corruption crusade gone awry and the staggering evidence and circumstances made his unpopular. Three days before he left office, Abubakar signed a decree causing Abacha and some influential men under his administration to forfeit varying sums of money and property running into billion of Naira. At the end of this military rule, one sad conclusion is that the nation has once again been taken for a ride. The relay race from Babangida to Abubakar transforms into one long nightmare of plunder and pillage, wanton stealing and gross abuse of office. Foreign banks as revealed by World Bank and Published, in financial times of London (23 July 1999) as shown in Table 4.10. However, the presented list is by no means exhaustive.
### TABLE 4.10 CLASSIFIED LOOTING OF NIGERIA FUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES (A)</th>
<th>Amount in London (B)</th>
<th>Amount in Swiss©</th>
<th>Deposit in USA(D)</th>
<th>Deposit in Germany(E)</th>
<th>Total Naira(F) EQUIVALENT(1999 EXCHANGE RATE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gen Babangida</td>
<td>£6.256b</td>
<td>$7.416</td>
<td>$2.00b</td>
<td>DM9, 00b</td>
<td>N2.4635 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gen Abubakar</td>
<td>£1.131b</td>
<td>$2.33b</td>
<td>$800b</td>
<td>DM16</td>
<td>N 0.4938 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mike Akhigbe</td>
<td>£1.24b</td>
<td>$2.426b</td>
<td>$671b</td>
<td>DM9,00</td>
<td>N 0.8059 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jerry Useni</td>
<td>£3.04b</td>
<td>$2.01b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>DM900m</td>
<td>N 0.8059 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ismaila Gowon</td>
<td>£1.03b</td>
<td>$2.00b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>DM700m</td>
<td>N 0.50176 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Umaru Dikko</td>
<td>£4.4bb</td>
<td>$1.46b</td>
<td>$700m</td>
<td>DM345m</td>
<td>N 0.89465 Trillion</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Paul Ogwuma</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.42b</td>
<td>$200m</td>
<td>DM500m</td>
<td>N 35 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sani Abacha</td>
<td>£5.01b</td>
<td>$4.09b</td>
<td>$800m</td>
<td>DM3.01m</td>
<td>N 1.2107 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mohammed Abacha</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.2b</td>
<td>$150m</td>
<td>DM535</td>
<td>N 0.2107 Trillion</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Abdu Abacha</td>
<td>£700m</td>
<td>$1.21b</td>
<td>$900m</td>
<td>DM417m</td>
<td>N 0.3384 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Wada Nas</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.32b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DM300m</td>
<td>N 0.2374 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Tom Ikimi</td>
<td>£400b</td>
<td>$1.39b</td>
<td>$153m</td>
<td>DM371m</td>
<td>N 0.25255 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Dan Etete</td>
<td>£1.12b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>$400m</td>
<td>DM1.72b</td>
<td>N 0.32743 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Don Etiebet</td>
<td>£2.5b</td>
<td>$1.06</td>
<td>$700m</td>
<td>DM361m</td>
<td>N 0.56747 Trillion</td>
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**SOURCES:** FINANCIAL TIMES OF LONDON [23 JULY 1999]

**THE NIGERIAN COMMENTOR [VOL. 2 NO 4 1999]

When General Olusegun Obasanjo was vying for the office of the president under the platform of People Democratic Party (PDP) he never promised much. However, when Obasanjo won the elections (as INEC declared but highly contested by opponents) and upon assumption of office (May 29, 1999), he took some drastic steps that left Nigeria’s surpassed. For one thing nobody expected Obasanjo to muster the courage to cast the frit stone at corruption. The well known looters of Nigeria’s treasury are the Nigerian military past leaders mostly generals with part of their loot they sponsored Obasanjo to victory and thus probing past looters amount to Disgracing these generally looks like biting the finger that fed one.
Barely a month into the life of the new administration, reports started making the rounds that some N32.5 billion that was withdrawn from the central Bank in July 1998 was not returned to the bank. Two Abuja based newspapers published a letter signed by Gen Abdullah Mohammed, who requested N200 million dollars, 75 million pounds and N500 million for sundry (expenses) purpose (The News, August 1999). Apparently surprised that obasanjo retained Mohammed (as chief of staff), his supporters dismiss the allegations as black mail, orchestrated to compel him to resign his position to new in the villa is that the uproar over thee matter is a storm in a tea up and that obasanjo’s confidence in Mohammed remains unaffected. And yet for a country that reportedly topped the international corruption chart, Obasanjo’s seeming seriousness about the issue of corruption in public life rekindled hope that Nigeria might be its way out of the notorious club of rogue nations. Firstly, he sent his anti-corruption Bill to the National Assembly for endorsement. This bill was entitled “A bill for a law to prohibit and punish Bribery and corruption of or by public officers and other persons (presented by the president, commander-in chief, federal Republic of Nigeria)—7th JULY, 1999. Next, president Obasanjo ignited what would have been the fire of his anticorruption campaign via the constitution of a panel to review various contract awards and appointments made during the administration of his predecessor, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, the panel was headed by Chief Christopher kolade. Of the over 500 national awards bestowed indiscriminately on some Nigerian citizens, the kolade led report pruned the number to about 13. However, the fear among the public is that the findings and recommendation of the panel may have gone the way of other such preview exercise in the country.

Other than from the family of the late Head of State, General Sani Abacha, no effort appears directed so far towards the recovery of the obviously over inflated contracts during regimes. But what may yet shock many Nigerians and which apparently casts
a serious doubt over the credibility of Kolade led panel and on the moral platform on which the Obasanjo administration would prosecute any culprit that may emerge from the Kolade panel's findings is the fact that some of the panel members that worked with Kolade have incriminating question marks dangling over their heads.

Again, an interim management committee of the petroleum trust fund (IMC-PTF) was setup by President Olusegun Obasanjo to wind down the activities of the organization. Newswatch gathered that the sum of N500m was put in a bank by the erstwhile management led by Muhammadu Buhari, but when the IMC-PTF took over the operations of the body, it discovered that the money had been withdraw by unidentified persons. Both the bank and Buhari were dragged before President Obasanjo who insisted that the money must be recovered. The committee was also asking questions about several contracts worth N207 billion awarded by PTF under Buhari. It was also raising serious doubts over different payments totaling N135.59 billion made by the fund for various projects, leaving a debt burden of more than N70 billion owed numerous contractors, consultants, manufactures, publishers and supplies who are waging a big war against the IMC-PTF. IMC is also alleging serious contractual anomaly in the N800 million PTF staff housing estate; importation of expired drugs especially the N28 billion HIV/AIDS screening and confirmation kits as well as the mysterious disappearance of the N500 million (N
The missing money, in fact, exposed the laid of “Unholy” business relationship that existed between PTF of the Buhari era and APC (Afri-project consortium) led by late salihijo Ahmad (Adamawa State). The committee asserted that the APC consultants virtually managed PTF. In other words, the PTF in its operation was not functioning as a government agency in the real sense. APC was actually the real PTF and yet it way a private company. It was also gathered that PTF had about 620 consultancy firms reported to APC, which had the sole responsibility for the issuance of certificate for payment by PTF. As a confirmation that APC was really making payments on behalf of PTF, an investigation showed that in 1995, PTF lodged N1 billion in commercial Bank credit lynonais, marina branch, Lagos and it was APC official who made withdrawals from the account for various payments. By the end of 1997, only N200 million was remaining in the account. As a result of Buhari’s alleged poor handling of PTF projects, and finances some PTF officials believe that the N135 billion that was disbursed out of the PTF’s total income of N946 billion was squandered.

However, Adamu and his IMC were also accused of corruption. Each member of the committee received a furniture allowance of N5 million. Some officials were also accused of extorting money from contractors and consultants before they are paid their claims. In fact, only persons who are able to pay the buses are paid their claims.

Perhaps what confounds Nigerians most is the Federal Government's apparent unwillingness to probe Babangida's tenure as head of state. Clear
indications that Obasanjo may not have the political will to probe IBB emanate from the president himself via Radio France international. On February 14, 2000. The president, who was on a visit to France, while affirming his government’s determination to probe public officers believed to have stashed the nation’s wealth away in foreign banks, threw a surprising challenge at Nigerians. He specifically asked those clamoring for IBB’s trial to supply proof of the former military president’s loot. “If anybody knows where Babangida money is let them give me the particulars and see; people are just being malicious let then give us evidence that this is Babangida’s money” (This week, April 17, 2000)

Indeed, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s search for evidence of corruption against Gen. Ibrahim Babangida yields a staggering result from as unexpected quarter. Nigeria’s London-based sports ambassador John Fashanu, blows the whistle on IBB $6 billion debt buy-back scam. Fashanu recently put the lid on three-year investigation into a $6 billion debt buy-back scam perpetrated between 1988 and 1993, a period during which IBB was in control of government. Fashanu stumbled on the fraud in 1997 and since then a lot of information began to come out; it got bigger and bigger until they were looking at a fraud of at least $6 billion involving 200 separate bank accounts. By conducting sponsored investigation he found and Africa confidential, confirmed that Nigeria bought back its debt in a top-secret operation that was technically illegal. Some $4.4 billion and there scheme cost only $2.5 billion an there are no records other buy-back or

currency stabilization operations in that period (1988-1993). This operation was said to have been coordinated by the former Governor of central Bank,
late Abdulkadir Ahmed. Further revelations were that two close associates of IBB, Jeffrey Schmidt and Robert Minton, both American, operated the offshore companies used in the scheme. The Americans reportedly used a London-based company, Growth Management Limited, GML, for the purchase of the debts, a translation for which the Nigerian government deposited money into an Austrian Bank, Osterreichische Landesbank that, in turn, passed the credit to GML. Finding of the buy tacks was provided either by the central Bank or the Nigerian National petroleum corporation through three banks, namely the federal reserve bank of New York; Morgan Guaranty in New York or the bank of international settlements in Switzerland. Therefore, the funds were routed into various Swiss and Austrian bank accounts through Greenland Holdings incorporated in panama. Fashanu admitted having details of account numbers identities of those involved, dates and times these frauds were perpetrated; adding that the chain runs form Liechtenstein to Austria Switzerland and USA. Essentially the fashanu report painstakingly compiled cover a three year period has been turned over to the federal Government with the aim of recovering a sizeable amount of an estimated $17 billion of Nigerian’s hard earned money illegally stashed in European banks.

While the previous military governments systematically overtime milked the economy, dry the economy and killed moral in the public services Gen Abubakar (specifically) spent the last five month of his tenure decapitating the country. The Christopher Kolade panel, in its 300–page
final report, reviewed 4072 contracts, 575 license, 807 appointments, 768 awards and 111 approvals. It observed a public service in which standards have collapsed and discipline was almost completely banished from the system. There was a widespread failure to follow laid down guidelines and procedure. Most of the expenditures on the project during the period were extra –budgetary and the bulk of projects in rolling plans were not always the ones eventually executed in annual budgets. Again the report pointed out that the basic principles of planning accountability and transparency were violated in most of the contracts awarded during the period.

The former minister of federal capital Territory (Jerry Useni) was also tried in Abuja by the code of conduct bureau for failure to declare his assets while in office. He was also linked to a new failed contracts scan totaling about N70 billion. The scam uncovered in 20 federal government projects by the Iguda Inuwa led 13 – man commission of enquiry into failed or non performing contracts in Abuja also involves two other former ministers in the regime of late Abacha. An interim report which the committee submitted to Obasanjo showed that the over N70 billion naira loss by Nigeria came through spurious contracts deals involving construction, supplies and services for the 20 federal government establishments in Abuja which the panel investigated. The commission indicted Useni over N58, 608, 627 million contract he awarded to New Hamlets limited to furnish the Supreme Court complex in Abuja. The commission’s findings showed that Useni directly awarded the contract
without recourse to the normal tender process. Irregular contract deals were also discovered in the N235, 810, 63 million contract for the Constitution of the Abuja head office building of the National planning commission (NPC).

After examining the performance of each of the 20 projects it inspected in Abuja, the INUWA COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY has an explanation for why the projects either failed or failed to perform. One of the reasons was that most of the abandoned projects were embarked upon without sustainable funding sources to ensure timely completion and some project designs were over ambitious and beyond the needs of the beneficiaries. Again, thoughts were not given for maintenance of the structures in planning, specification and Execution of the projects and they cited pour accountability and supervision as the bone of most of the projects. Federal government’s reaction to the issues raised by the inuwa commission of inquiry is being awaited. If Obasanjo accepts the recommendations go ahead to implement them, it would compound problems faced by former official of government who were recommended of reprimand (News watch July 17 2000).

In pursuant of the statutory functions of the office of the Accountant General of the federation, a team of inspectorate officers was mandated vide letter of introduction Ref No.insp 0089/s.701/1 701/1, dated 19 may 2000, to carry out an in depth inspection of the books of accounts of the National Assembly Abuja. The inspection was carried out between 23 and
25 May 2000 by the Deputy Director and senior accountant. The inspection covers the period of January 1999 to May and it was a routine inspection. The team in carrying out its assignment conducted a thorough review of the accounting records and books of the National Assembly that were made available to them from January 1999 to 23 May 2000. They also obtained some explanation from some of the schedule officer. The review were made using the extant rules and regulation as benchmark. In almost all the contracts reviewed, the national Assembly did not comply with the promotion for the operation guidelines on Tenders Board procedures and powers of spending. All the contracts were awarded based on anticipatory approval with 50 per cent – 70 percent mobilization fee/advance payment paid to the contractors without bank guarantee or performance board. In addition, of the contracts was opened for open tenders procedure. All were bused on selective tendering and accountability. Also, in the course of their inspection, the team discovered its vote up to the time of N421,866,819.45 as at 23 May 2000. Some of these liabilities were brought from 1999 and it total N421 million. In addition to these liabilities the National Assembly has also taken over-draft facilities of about N550,000,000 as at 23 May 2000. However, it is pertinent to note that the committee did not have enough time to undertake the exercise, as two working days were not sufficient for a comprehensive inspection exercise of this nature.

The IDRIS KUTA PANEL
Terms of reference include: to determine the number of contracts awarded by the senate in the past on year from 11th June 1999 to 17th July, 2000 and to identify the officers of the senate and other senators that participated in the exercise of contract awards.

Available records showed that a total number of about 91 contracts were awarded by the senate during the period under reference. This finding also clearly revealed that most senators participated in the award of contracts between 4th June 1999 and 17th July 2000. The third reference way to identify to whom the contracts were awarded, for what and the amounts involved. It was very clear from the submissions of both senator Gbenga Aluko and the Director of budget, planning, research and statistics that the defunct senator services committee under the chairmanship of senator A.T. Ahmed agreed to share certain contracts amount the principal officers and members of the defunct committee. From the discussions between the defunct senate services committee and the director of Budget, research, planning and statistics the contracts were shared accordingly.

However, before the sharing could be effected a new senate Lordship emerged.

The fourth terms of reference is to determine whether laid Dan Rules and procedure were complied with in the Award of contract. Individual there are laid down rules and procedure of the award of contracts, which have been in existence in the National Assembly since the second Republic. The rules and procedure were reproduced and sent to all the
principal officers senators and Honorable member by the clerk of the National Assembly under reference NASS/810/1/T.I/34. On the whole laid down rules and procedures were not complied with in the award of all the recognized contracts in the National Assembly. The CNA (clerk) of National Assembly in his evidence stated that he advised the senate president of the need to avoid Abuse of “anticipatory approval” which he said must be restricted to emergency situation only.

He award of contracts as these functions were taken over by the principal officers. Here contracts were awarded, executed and fully paid without the necessary contract documents. The National Assembly also becomes a place where people could make money without doing anything. The decision to give to the sum of N39, 900,000 as Christmas welfare package to the senate president and his Deputy was taken on 21st December 1999.

The fifth term of reference was to determine the position of the contracts- whether satisfactory completed or still in the process of being completed some of the contracts awarded and which were fully paid for were not executed or were abandoned completely form the ministers of the Body of principal officers meeting of 21st June 2000, some principal officers observed that contractors did not execute their contracts after full payments were made. Yet nothing was done by the management of the National Assembly to get those contractors to compete their projects.

The Eight term of reference was to examine any other issue
Relevant or incidental to the investigation form the, it was very clear that contracts were inflated and this was made possible by the technique of selective tendering, where contractor of choice were selected from contracts awards. Also the system of market survey where reasonable and appropriate price could be determined was neglected. Thus the use of anticipatory approvals in the award of contracts give rise to abuse and thereby encouraged fraud- the management of the National Assembly, particularly as it relates to the senate has not been as transparent, prudent and accountable as is to be expected. These shortcoming all emitted from the disregard of laid down procedure and rules by the leadership of the National Assembly, in particular, the senate and management consequently, the committee recommended that the police and other appropriate security agencies should be invited to investigate the issues highlighted on their report such as the loss of official vehicles and the manner in which unregistered companies got their cheque payments honored, since they could not legally operate bank accounts in the names of these companies.

Unbelievably, in the sixteen months of the Obasanjo presidency, he made about 45 foreign trips that have taken him to 25 countries cutting across the continent of Africa, Asia, America and Europe. In one major trip he embarked on, in September 2000, Obasanjo was out of the country for all of 14 days and yet he was not on vacation. Sometimes about thirty Nigerians accompany Obasanjo on each of such trips. On his part the
president is entitled to $3,000 (N300, 000) per night, accompanying
government get $1,000 each per night while the ministers and other senior
aides get about $500 each night. Junior aides and members of the press
get $250 estacode per night. In February 2000 the presidency had written to
the senate asking it for an additional N1,013,773,560 to meat the overseas
travel needs of both the president and his deputy. There was also a request
of N270 million as hospitality and entertainment allowance for both the first
and second citizens in the year 2000. In making the request, president had
pleaded that the N486,266, 440 and the N230 million provided for him and
his deputy were grossly inadequate. But beyond the public angst over the
frequency of these trips, Observers have raid queries over the benefits of
such travels.

Indeed, the federal Audit report of the federal ministries and
parastatals was made public for the first time ever by Vincent Azie, the
ACTING AUDITOR- GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION. This audit report
revealed that more than N23 billion was lost in 10 major ministries in one
year (2001). The amount represents financial frauds ranging from
embezzlement payments for jobs not done, over-involving double debiting,
and inflation of contract figures to release of money without the consent of
the appointment approving authority (Newswatch feb.24, 2003). Top on the
list of corrupt ministries (2001) was that of competition and integration in
Africa with about N10.453 billion unaccounted for during the financial audit.
A breakdown of the level of misappropriation is shown in table 4.11 below.
TABLE 4.11 MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS BY MINISTRIES (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>MINISTRY</th>
<th>AMOUNT MISAPPROPRIATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Co-operation and integration in Africa</td>
<td>N10, 453, 241.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Power and steel</td>
<td>N4, 394, 649, 602.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Works and Housing</td>
<td>N2, 262, 797, 737.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>N1, 785, 877, 023.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>N1, 265, 272, 388.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Police Affair</td>
<td>N1, 209, 216, 325.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>N664, 124, 321.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>N640, 053, 177.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>N465, 103, 959.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>N356, 064, 369.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N23, 860, 732, 145.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details of the audit report revealed all sorts of financial frauds imaginable. For instance, at the federal ministry of works and housing the report observed that cheques of the ministry totaling N1.088 million were debited twice by the central Bank of Nigeria for the ministry of finance, the report revealed that 12 payment vouchers with individual values exceeding N5 million and totaling N105.926 million were raised and paid between Nov. 16 and Dec. 28, 2001 as final payments without the representative of the auditor general co-signing the certificates of completion contrary to
financial guidelines. Again the audit examination of revenue records at the Tin-Can Island port, Lagos Nigeria revealed that between July and September 2001, amounts totaling N134.769 million collected by some designated banks were not remitted into the coffers of Central Bank of Nigeria.

Azie's report also frowned at the financial records of the National Assembly. For example, his report stated that N1,520 million was paid to a member of the house of Representatives on payment voucher number 2030 of February 7, 2001 as refund of out-of-pocket expenses incurred on foreign medical treatment. The report found out that only N440,000 was approved on the advice of the chief medical officer of the National Assembly, who observed that there was no referral from the National Assembly clinic or any government hospital before undergoing treatment abroad.

Indeed, Obasanjo's first reaction to the report was that of indignation. He immediately issue a directive to all the ministries found guilty found of financial fraud by the report to provide answers to the public Accounts committee of the National Assembly. The directive was issued after the federal executive council meeting. Basically, the audit report would have been a boost for president Obasanjo's campaign for transparency and accountability, but rather unfortunately, these ministers did not see it that way. In fact, the ministers reduced the entire report to the machinations of Obasanjo's political opponents. Specifically, Prof Gana
(Information minister said that the report was clearly targeted at embarrassing the federal government and went on to dismiss it, saying that the auditor general did not follow professional procedure in presenting the report therefore, he described the report as rash.

Barely 24 hours after she was sworn in by president Obasanjo’s as Nigeria new ministers of finance, DR. Okonjo- Iweala has resigned her appointment (The Sunday Sun July 20, 2003). This resignation was as a result of her sharp disagreement with the leadership style of Obasanjo government. Apart from the removal of the Budgeting function to the presidency, the minister was (4.65) not comfortable with the level of transparency in the system. She was particularly uncomfortable with the clearing regime at Nigerian ports. For instance, the regime compelled textile dealers in both the North and Eastern parts of the country to abandon the Kano airport and Calabar and Port Harcourt ports for Lagos (where government decreed that all imported textiles must be cleared).

Indeed her resignation action threw to entire presidency into panic as top Government functionaries appointed pressure on her to resumed her decision.

Similarly in August 2003, the Revenue mobilization, Allocation and fiscal commission (RMAFC) called on the nation to ask the presidency about what happened to N35 billion meant for local governments monthly. It also repeated its allegations that several billion naira of oil revenue were missing from the federation Account. In fact, the chairman of RMAFC
(engineer Tukur) who had in 2002 alleged that N350 billion oil revenue was missing told the senate president and other principal officers that the N35 billion meant for local government was regularly collected, but the money was not getting to the intended beneficiaries. Tukur also restated his allegations over oil revenue, which the Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC) is illegally holding unto. Only NNPC can tell the nation how much we are earning. What they are doing is unconstitutional. NNPC is a parastatal of the federal government and the oil money belongs to the federation. That the federal government is controlling that federation Account is wrong and unconstitutional. The commission also accused Obasanjo of breaching the constitution by his refusal to submit the Revenue According bill to the National Assembly. In fact, the constitution empowers the commission to prepare revenue allocation bill while the president is to submit it to the Legislature without amendment unfortunately the president was withholding such bill and refused to submit it to the legislature. Also in November 2003, there was a change of guards at the Nigerian National petroleum corporation, the epicenter of the economy, and that raised fresh crisis of confidence and the direction of president Olusegun Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign.

Right now, Nigeria is broke. Years of accumulated bad habits reckless governments and outright looting of the country’s treasury continue to sink the nation further into the abyss of poverty and huge debts. With external debts totaling $31 million and domestic debts of about
N1.16 trillion excluding contractor debts and supplier credits, the nation currently rank 152nd among 175 countries in human progress and development. Unfortunately, *Nigeria is the only oil-producing nation classified among the world’s poorest nation.*

Regionally, the common fate that ties the Ibos (South east of Nigeria) in a bond with their Niger Delta (South South of Nigeria) neighbors is power oppression. Where as the Ibos were massacred before and during the Civil war for daring to say no oppression, the Niger Deltan were and are still being massacred for asking for a fair share for the proceeds of oil from their own land. It is therefore not surprising that Ibos in Diaspora have issued a “calm down” message to Ibos within the Nigeria territory in the struggle to actualize the state of Biafra. Under the leadership of the Biafra foundation based in the United States, this statement was made at the International conference on Ibos held on 18th October 2003 at Ivy lane, Green belt Maryland, United States of America. Here, one of the key resolutions of the conference was that Biafrans within should do everything to pursue the re-actualization process in a non-violent manner. That is, they concluded that *Nigeria has expired.* To validate their claim, the movement for actualization of the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) has recently threatened to form a government in exile by April 18, 2004 if the Federal Government of Nigeria does not convey a Sovereign National Conference. However, at a meeting in Enugu (Thisday Newspaper, March 28, 2004) the South-East governors expressed a new resolve to produce Nigeria's next
President from the Zone come 2007. Against the background of such failed projects in the past, one examines the substance of the latest group's expression of intent. In the face of Cold Northern calculations to retake political power in 2007. And speculations of President Olusegun Obasanjo's unknown agenda, Ndigbo may again suffer the pains of another botched dream or endless humiliation and intimidation.

More recently (insider weekly, April 5, 2004) one of the Military Officers with a rank of a Major had questioned the sincerity of Obasanjo anti-corruption crusade. He said, "Sir, we are very much aware of your fight against corruption and like a good leader, one had thought that this crusade should start from the Presidency. But it appears not to be so. Under your eyes, your Vice President, Atiku Abubakar is busy buying up all public parastatals under the name of privatization and nothing is being done about it. Why?" President Obasanjo answered, "if you have any evidence about what you are saying, bring it to me and I will surely act on it". Indeed privatization as a major Government socio-economic policy started during the regime of Military President, General Ibrahim babangida (IBB) in 1985. IBB then, created the Technical Committee for Privatization and commercialization (TCPC) under the leadership of late Hamza Zayyad. The whole idea was to superintend over the divestment of government interests in specified companies and the commercialization of others considered too critical to be handed over wholesale to private operators. According to experts, Zayyad between 1985 and 1993 handled the exercise with such finesse that the pain and acrimony usually generated by privatization exercise worldwide
were virtually absent”. And yet, on July 20, 1999, while inaugurating the Atiku Abubakar led National Council on Privatization (NCP) President Obasanjo painted a horrifying picture of how successive government in the country have invested well over N800 billion in Federal Government owned parastatals, with peltry return on investments. But how come Obasanjo’s exercise has ran into buying most of the privatized enterprises? What happened to the billions of naira (approximately N200 billion) realized from privatization so far? Can Obasanjo stop his deputy as advised by the Military? These are the questions the Senate and President Obasanjo would have to answer urgently in the interest of transparency accountability and openness.

In line with the recent decision to probe the alleged missing monies realized from the privatization exercise, Deputy Senate President (on Tuesday March 23, 2004) announced the composition of the membership of the ad-hoc committee that will carry out the investigations. The committee (headed by Senator John Azuta Mbaka) which has six weeks to submit its report, is expected to determine the total number of privatized enterprises since the exercise started, the total amount of money generated as well as the where about of such monies. However, the Vice President and El-Rufai (Current Minister of Federal Capital Territory) says their hands are clean and therefore do not entertain any fear about the probe. Specifically, El-Rufai said that the planned probe was targeted as retaliation for the allegation of bribery he made in 2003 against some big shots in the Senate. He was surely referring to Ibrahim Manty and Jonathan Zwigina, Deputy Senate President and Deputy Senate Leader respectively,
Whom the minister had accused of demanding a ₦54 million bribe from him to speed up his smooth clearance as a minister. Whatever and counter allegations, is a very dangerous signal to the Nigerian economy.

In conclusion, we are said to report the identified high level income disparity in Nigeria as supported by the Federal Government and United Nations Development Programme. The crux of the matter is that the two ministers are paid their salaries in Dollar and that they earn far higher than what other average Nigerian workers are earning. Dr. (Mrs.) Okonjo-Iweala for instance, earns ₦3 million every month, while Ambassador Adeniji collects ₦1.7 million monthly while other ministers (and average Nigerian workers) are paid far less than these amount. Thus, the Obasanjo administration should be blamed for its fragrant disrespect fort the constitution and the certain political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Act no. 6 of 2002, which stipulates that the yearly salary of every minister is ₦794,085.00

4B ELECTORAL AND JUDICIAL FRAUD

In one of his articles, Wole Soyinka revisited what we can call the last days of Sani Abacha. June 8, 1998 was the culmination of a progression in death of the tyrant, which started I June 1993, where he ordered his troops to shoot to death hundreds of innocent Nigerians who protested the criminal annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. Thus Abacha’s end began from the moment when Nigerians finally came to
a realization, not only that his morbid ambition to perpetuate himself as the country’s head of state could be stopped but that he must be stopped (Odey 2003).

Unfortunately, one of the greatest problems of Nigeria is that the leaders fail repeatedly to learn any lesson from history as a result of greed for material wealth and lust for power. Therefore, one cannot understand why the incumbent president (Obasanjo) could descend so low as to mastermind the April 12 and 19, 2003 travesty that turned the nascent journeying into a hollow ritual. Apart from the ravages of the Nigerian Civil war, Nigeria never has it so bad in her history. In fact Obasanjo and his disciples aggravated the Nation’s problem by throwing out those that were voted for and imposing those that they want to rule by hook and by crook.

The appointed time indeed was April 12 and 19, 2003. Those were the days when president Obasanjo and his disciples lied to the world and to Nigerians by telling us that there would be a democratic election instead of telling us that there would be the peoples Democratic Party convention, which is what actually took place. These were no election on those two days.

Rather, it was a day PDP members and their thugs rounded up all those who do not belong to their party and sent all of them packing to the valley of grumbling. Until this political perfidy is resolved, Nigeria may not become in the democratic and good peoples may continues to during suffer for many years to come. However, on April 22, 2003 the independent National Electoral commission (INEC) declared president Obasanjo the winner of the April 19
presidential election. Clear Observations should that the elections were not transparent. They were neither nor fair, Here people were not allowed to make their choice and where they insisted on making their choice their wishes were not respected as the INEC officials announced other persons for whom the people did not vote as winners.

As independent observes, we are grateful to the European Union Election observation mission for their Nigeria. They were in Nigeria during the elections and they filed their report on what they observed in the few paces they were allowed to go during elections. According to this group, they observed that our election were a complete show and organized fraud. It was neither transparent, free, fair nor peaceful.

The observed case studies include Anambra, Benue, Edo, Kastina, Kogi, Nasarawa, Cross River, Delta, Imo, Kaduna, and River State. Witnesses include stuffing of ballot boxes, forgery of results, falsification of result sheets and snatching of ballot boxes. The international observers headed by Dr. Oscar Lebner, Dr. Max Van Den Berg and Dr. Heins Jocker, made it very clear that their report was far form being exhaustive of the shocking election malpractice that took place in Nigeria where Obasanjo is presiding. What they said about the so-called elections casts a very dark shadow on our country. Thus for this country to live in peace, majority of Nigerian’s believe that the so-called April 2003 election s must be cancelled from the beginning till the end and a fresh date be fixed for the elections (Odey 2003).
According to the 1999 constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, the judicial powers of the federation shall be rested in the courts being established for the federation. These courts refers to the supreme court of Nigeria; the court of appeal the federal High court; the high court of the federal capital territory; a sharia court of appeal of a state; the customary court of appeal of the federal capital territory, Abuja; the customary court of Appeal of state; and such other courts as may be authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction on matters with respect to which the National Assembly may make laws and such other courts as may be authorized by land to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or an appeal on matters with respect to which a house of Assembly may make laws.

The judicial powers rested in accordance with the foregoing shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in constitution, to all
inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law, shall extend to all matters between
persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to
all actions and proceedings relating there to, for the determination of any question
as to the civil rights and obligations of that person, shall not, except as otherwise
provided by this constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any
actor a mission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial
decision is in conformity with the fundamental objective and Directive principles of
state policy and shall not as from the date when this constitution comes into force,
extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after
15th January 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any
such law.

Victor Attah the governor of Akwa Ibom State must have thought the worst
was over when the election petition tribunal headed by Matilda Adamu, a high
court Judge, upheld his election for a second term in office. However, there was
allegation and counter-allegation that the judge and tribunal members were bribed
to give the verdict (News watch August 25 2003). Apart form this case, the National
Judicial commission (NJC) also investigated the circumstances surrounding the
withdrawal of three judges form the trial of those allegedly involved in the killing of
Bola Ige, former Justice Minister and the controversial ruling of Justice Wilson
Egbo –Egbo, ordering governor Chris Ngige of Anambra State to vacate Office. All
these case and other have gingered the public interest had been sifting through the
murky statements and allegation of miscarriage of justice purportedly induced by
bribery to determine those cases.
Ime Sampson umanah, billionaire businessman’ stirred the hornet’s nest when he charged that Attah’s Victory was purchased. He attached the purported confessional statement of Adamu’s orderly with his petition to back up his claim. In a statement dated July 11, Peter Kasai, a police sergeant and former orderly to Adamu from the police headquarters in Jos, admitted that he paid a total of N6.4 million to two accounts at the standard Trust Bank, on behalf of his former boss.

He said he had no doubt that the money represented part of what Adamu was allegedly paid, like other members of the tribunal, by idong. He said in the statement that he was driven to Uyo by Edet, a driver attached to the tribunal, on June 3, 2003 where he first paid N4 million into account No 0174811801125, belonging to Hadiza Adamu, daughter of the tribunal chairman, at STB in two denominations. A sum of N3 million was in N500 notes denomination and N1 million was in N200 notes. Kasai said he was asked to deposit another N2.4 million, all in N500 notes into the account of Ogaba Odioga Michael, son of Adamu, at STB, Calabar, on the instruction of the tribunal Chairman, June 26, 2003. Kasai insisted that the money was proceeds from bribe given to the judges.

The Presidency and the PDP hierarchy were also being fingered in the case of abduction of Chris Ngige, governor of Anambra state. In what looked like a most insensitive landmark court decision, Wilson Egbo-Egbo, federal High court judge, asked Ngige, to vacate his seat and hand over to okey udeh, his controversial deputy, Tuesday, July 15, 2003. The Judge had granted Chris Uba, Mentor of the governor and Eucharia Azodo, former speaker of Anambra state, an exparte order asking
Ngige to vacate office because he had purportedly resigned from office. Would Egbo–Egbo be cleared and given a clean state? That was a matter of conjecture. But many Nigerians are not comfortable with the trend of things in the judiciary. They fear that if the situations are not arrested in time it could truncate the fledgling democracy.

The notice was relatively brief but direct. In it, Soji Oye, head, public relations and protocol matters of the National Judicial council (NJC) announced the suspension of Justice Samuel Wilson Egbo–Egbo. The action, he said was the outcome of the 19th meeting of the NJC which ended on Tuesday, October 7, 2003 and in the exercise of the powers of the council as enshrined in the 1999 constitution. The suspension Oye remarked, was with immediate effect and would remained in force until further notice (The source, October 27, 2003). It is equally important to note that the National judicial council has sacked not less than 50 magistrates and judges dismissed or retired compulsorily in the last four years.

However, some peoples believe that some powerful peoples in government could influence the trial of omisore and other accused persons (suspected murderers of BOLA IGE). When president Olusegun Obasanjo met with some judges of the appeal court in August 4, 2003. Members of the opposition, All Nigeria people's party (ANPP) and All progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) describe the meeting as deplorable. They said that such a meeting, coming after Abass withdrawal form the omisore trial by claiming pressures and threats from many quarters was too suggestive. But Umaru Abdullahi, Justice and president, Court of Appeal, said that
the meeting of the Appeal Court Justices with Obasanjo was informed by the need to secure a piece of land for building a befitting Appeal Court Complex.

Be that as it may reports of manipulation of the Judiciary is a sensory concern to many Nigerians, who still believe that is it the last hope of the common man. But is it still? That is no doubt a billion naira question? To the best of my knowledge, it is not at present. There is need for intensive (extensive) Judicial reforms (and overhaul) in Nigeria.

4C STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION

Between 1960 and today, a clear pattern emerged of the systematic plunder and pillage of resources of the states and local government in Nigeria. On 7\textsuperscript{th} July 1982, as interim report of the Director of Audit or the Accounts of Anambra state Health management Board was laid on the Table of the House and was thereafter referred to the public Account committee.

The committee viewed with all seriousness the inability of the staff of the Board to keep appropriate records of account and to produce final account statements as required by the law. An amount of N6,500.00 appeared to have been fraudulently paid out to a company for materials not supplied and services not rendered to the Board. This amount should be recovered without delay and appropriate disciplinary measures taken against the members of the staff who appeared to have been involved in the fraudulent deal.
Again Civilian governor complained bitterly on assumption of office (in 1999) that their military predecessors and their henchmen left behind empty treasuries in the states.

The probe panels set up by various state governors across the country also confirmed that indeed many states in the federation were literally looted by their former military administrators commissioners and contractors.

One case that seems of agitate the Imo state government very much is the stealing of N36 million given to the state to fight ecological problems by the federal government. By a letter dated July 15, 1998 Zubairu (military Administrator) authorized Orji to award contracts without tender formalities for the construction of 36 bore holes in the state act a cost of N1 million per bore hole. Orji and Zubairu claimed that 36 boreholes were constructed in different parts of the state. But the Ahamba committee discovered that no single borehole out of the 36 was sunk. Yet, Orji collected the N36million allocated for the project.

In Kogi state, a judicial commission of inquiry was set up by the governor Abubaka Audu with Henry Olusiyi as the Chairman. Accordingly, the Aniebo administration was characterized by financial impropriety and gross disregard for rules and procedure in contract awards. For instance the contract for the construction of the Ganaja road Housing estate, which was awarded for N197 million, did not pass through the state tender’s board nor was it deliberated up on by the state executive council.

The committee also found that aniebo’s administration inflated a water supply construct by about N83 million through G.M. water Board.
In Plateau State, its panel of enquiry instituted by Joshua Chibi Dariye, to investigate the activities of the two former military Administrators (Habibu Idris and Musa Shehu) also submitted its report. The committee stated that Shaibu awarded contracts amounting to over N1.3 billion within the two years he spent in the state; and yet most of the contracts were not executed. The committee found that in one instance, N285.6 million was earmarked for the supply of various items. N241.3 million was paid out from the amount, and yet most of the items were not supplied. The committee also found that another N121.7 million was set aside for the renovation of government existing facilities. The contractors were paid N72.6 million yet most of the jobs had not taken off when the civilian regime took over in May 1999 (Newswatch 7, 2000).

Government Boni Haruna of Adamawa State is equally scandalized by the looting of his state by the past administration. Haruna noted that his administration inherited only N44.5 million as against a debt profile of N1.08 billion.

Of this amount N405 million was for workers salaries while N357 million was debt owed local contractor. The governor who inherited a workforce of 24,000 with an average salary bill of N211 million monthly described the workforce as excessive arguing that government needed only 10,000 workers.

In Ondo State, Four past military administrations of the state namely Mike Torey, Ahmed usman, Anthony Onyeamgbulem and Moses Fasanya may have been asked to refund some money over the N24 million contract given to him
supply Rosco patcher equipment to the ministry of works. The equipment was said to be non-functional when it was supplied to the ministry.

And still in Anambra State, the first report of the contract review committee revealed that the state was rubbed of N4 billion through unexecuted contracts. The committee indicted many contractors including Swift Engineering services owned by S.M.O. Nnoruka. Swift Engineering got the contract for the construction of the parade ground and cenotaph (phase I) in Awka at a cost of N6,915,012.50. The company collected a mobilization free of N2,074,503.70 and an interim payment of N3,571,215.00 for which no work was done for the paid site.

Indeed, the question of what the 36 states governors have done, in the last four years with the billions of naira they collected, as the revenue of their state Government is one that refused to be swept under the political carpet of the country. The national criminal misappropriation of government of government funds with impurity, accompanied by the nation wide trampling on public accountability with impurity, has over the last four years, led to the rapidly expanding appropriation of polities by criminals, with impurity, and the creeping criminalisation of Government with equal impunity.

Due to the consistently high prices of crude oil in the international market, State Governments’ revenue has been increasing geometrically from June 1999. This has, therefore placed the State governors in a very good position to effectively discharge their constitutional responsibilities to the electorate. But how many of these Governors have used this massive revenue responsibly enough goes to
carry out their function satisfactory, by improving the living condition of the people who put them in position of responsibility?

In fact, by the end of their tenure on May 29, 2003. The 26 State Governors had in four years collected a total sum of N1.15 trillion from just two sources in the Federation Account (statutory and VAT). The state Government also collected on behalf of the local governments when they illegally imposed their henchmen as caretakers, thus their total revenue profile stood at N2 trillion. Again the pertinent question by people is, have the Governor used this revenue in the interest of the peoples?

According to the national development report: 2000–2001 by the UNDP, the impoverishment of Nigeria has vastly increased at the same times as the revenues collected by these governors also vastly increase. This devastating trend in the immiseration and worsening insecurity for almost 100 million Nigerians has continued in spite of the vast increase in revenue from the federation account.

On the certificate and qualification scandal of some governors; there was a lot of evidence from cross-river state to show that the incumbent governor, Donald Duke was not qualified to contest the May 19, 2003 governorship election. His opponents were privileged to look at his NYSC exemption certificate and found out that somebody who graduated in 1983 from the University with a law degree and did his law school as well as call to the Bar in 1984 had not done his NYSC which supposes to be mandatory for him at that time. Instead of
NYSC, he chooses to do his masters and manage to get exemptions certificate seven years after. This is smart fraud (The week, August 25, 2003).

In 2001, the newswatch investigation showed that the council chairmen, no fewer than 31 from different parts of Nigeria were either under investigation, impeached or on suspension. Frank Bala, Baba, chairman, Sanga local government area of Kaduna state was sent on suspension by the state house of assembly. By his own account he spent N100, 145,025.03 to transform his local government. A break down of the expenses showed that he purchased two six-wheeled vehicles for N3 million fenced his own official residence with N1.5 million and furniture his own official residence with N2.3 million. The same extra-budgeting spending for the release of stabilization fund was one of the undoings of the chairman of chikun local government. His colleagues in Igbabi council spent N410,000.00 on efforts to get stabilization fund released and N1.2 million on communication gadgets and constructed a 1.4 kilometre road for N8 million. Kaduna South chairman was indicted because he claimed to have bought a Peugeot 406 saloon car for N3 million for himself, spent N410,000.00 on stabilization fund and bought communication equipment worth N1.3 million. The sabon gari Chairman offence was that he ignored the accounting laws and went ahead to give each of his councilor N150,000.00 for their loyalty; spent N1 million as turning allowance for the month of August above and spent N1.5 million on radio communication equipment. In kwara state, Ismail Agboola, was accused of spending N3 million on sallah rams. He was said to have 12 personal cars,
including a Mercedes Benz 230 salon car a Toyota celica car, spots car, a 4
Runner Toyota, a Honda Accord and Six fairly used buses.

J.O.Ojobu lawyer and chairman of Ika local government in Delta state,
was also in trouble for alleged financial impropriety. He was said to have
awarded several contract amounting to several millions of naira illegally and
fraudulently. Ojobu allegedly awarded a contract for the building of modern
secretariat for N25million but later adjusted the contract sum to N28 million
unilaterally. And in Cross- River state, the chairman of Akpabuyo local
government area, Eyo Okon Eyo was also in trouble. An audit report indicted him
for spending N1.5 million to celebrate his election as chairman of the council and
he was asked to refund N 500,000 of the amount. Iduma Igariwey, Chairman,
Afikpo local government, Ebonyi State, spent about seven days in detention in
Abuja over allegations of forgery of hotel receipts to steal money from his council.
The hotel bills were put at more than N700, 000 and that of his wife cost the
council N360, 000. By all indications many local government chairman seem to
have been doing pretty well for themselves at the expenses of the people who
elected them (Newswatch, June 25, 2001).

A new secretariat being built at Ibi Taraba state, meant to provide
accommodation for the smooth running of Ibi local government area, was a
source of bitter wrangling between the chairman of the council and deputy
Governor of Taraba State. The Chairman said that he inherited the secretariat
complex in May 1999 and after a revaluation of the project, it was released that
N97 million will be required to complete it. Thus he promptly released N80 million
to the contractor to complete the project. However, Danboyi initiated the project in 1992 when he was Chairman of Ibi council and it was then valued at N1.2million. But before the project could be completed the transition programme was trauncated and Danboyi left office.

Given this scenario, president Olusegun Obasanjo in his nationwide broadcast June 18, 2003 identified that one area of immediate attention is the structure of government at the third tier of government, which requires urgent review to incorporate an efficient and participatory framework that should maximize the utilization of scarce resources available to Governments. The need for review of the present structure of government at local government level was in formed by three disturbing trends: the non-performance or gross under-performance of the local Government, the high cost of governments and near prohibitive costs of electioneering campaign to individual political contestants in Nigeria and atomization and continual atomization of local Government council including impractical division of town and cities into unworkable mini-local Governments.

4D BUSINESS BRIBERY

In Nigeria, they are commonly referred to as 419ers. But these fraudsters are known internationally by different derogatory names like white-collar animals, con artists, e-mail hucksters, spammers, tele-marketers and scam artists. This is obviously due to their cross border animal activities that
seen to be breaking new ground almost by the minute. However, Nigeria remains a focal point because the global fraud now appears to be synonymous with the country. The Internet fraud Complaints Center (IFCC) 2002 Internet fraud report captures the growing anxiety among concerned Nigerians and the International community. One complaint that IFCC continues to receive in high volume is the well-known Nigeria letter fraud. This letter is defined as a correspondence outlining an opportunity to receive non-existent government funds from alleged dignitaries and is designed to collect advance fees from the victims. This is sometime represented as pay off money required to bribe government officials. While other countries may be mentioned, the correspondence typically indicates “The Government of Nigeria” as the nation of origin. But the Americans are taking the crime issue seriously. In fact, they are already culling it terrorism. At the government circles, there also appears to be a new vigor in the struggle to save Nigeria from 419ers given the establishment of the Economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC). But how efficient and effective is the commission?

Tracing the vaswani brother’s business history in Nigeria and its attending rise the News magazine (25 August 2003) revealed that the Vaswani brothers are the second generation of the vas in Nigeria. Their father sunderdas vaswani come into Nigeria in 1954 and established successful business out fit dealing in textile, manufacturing and fish trawling. The eldest of the brothers, Sunil took over the fathers business in
1983 and concentrated at first on fish trawling before expanding the business into commodities, car franchise, construction, real estates, manufacturing in virtually every sector of the economy. The two other brothers, Haresh and Mahesh later joined Sunil to complement and enrich his efforts.

For seven years, the vaswanis continued to ride the crest of their high connections in government until about two years ago (2001) when customs’ boss. Ahmed Mustapha ordered the various area commands not to compute the duties on the vaswani brothers imports based on their own value any more. This was based on the several petitions and allegations by other competitors of the brothers.

Consequently the customs impounded shiploads of rice imported by the Vaswani brothers for under invoicing. In all this case, the nation lost N50 billion that should have been paid as customs duty.

ASHVIM SAMTHANI (Indian born billionaire) was another bad news to the Nigerian Economy. Those who documented the economic crimes of Samthani said that he brings in rotten seafoods into the country. Usually these are discarded consignments that are brought in as seafood fit for consumption with under value custom duty. And even when the consignment is genuine Samthani understanding of the revenue collection system ensures that he pays too paltry an amount. Those who suffer from the latter pitch being the competitors whose imports find far cheaper items of the same quality in the market.
5.0 METHODOLOGY

Following Leite and Weidmann (1999) we model the influence of natural resources on, and the growth effects of corruption within a neoclassical general equilibrium framework. In an open-economy infinite-horizon growth model, we assume that investment projects need administrative approval, which is granted after the firm pays a bribe to the government employee. Hence, corruption acts like an investment tax borne by firms and ultimately by all shareholders, to the benefits of government employees who constitute a fixed share $0 < S < 1$ of the total population.

Here, households earn wages and receive interest income. They purchase goods for consumption and save by accumulating additional assets. The current households head maximizes "family utility" by taking into account the well being of all his descendants; thus, are face with an infinite horizon maximization problem. Labeling the population growth rate $n$ and normalizing the number of adults at time $0$ to unity, the total adult population at time $t$ is

$$L(t) = e^{nt}$$

Of which $L_g(t) = Se$

Agents are government employees. The subscripts $g$ and $p$ denote variables referring to the government and private sector employees respectively. And given that $C(t)$ is total consumption at time $t$, households maximize overall utility, $U$, which can be represented as a weighted sum of all future discounted utility flows, $U(c)$:

$$U = \int_0^\infty u[c(t)]e^{nt}e^{-pt} \, dt$$
Where \( p > 0 \) is the rate of time preference

We assume that \( p > n \) to ensure that \( U \) is bounder for constant \( c \) and that \( u(c) \) has the usual properties. Government employees dispose of three sources of income: Labour income, interest income, and bribes. Agents are competitive, i.e., they take the wage rate, \( W \), and the Interest rate, \( r \), as given and supply inelastically 1 unit of labour services per time unit. The bribe is a fraction \( \gamma \) of gross investment

\[
I = k + \delta k
\]

Where \( \delta \) is the rate of depreciation.

The corrupt bureaucrat is detected and punished with probability \( p \), increasing with the extent of corruption, \( \gamma \), and the monitoring technology of the society, \( M \), so that

\[
\bar{p} = \bar{p} (\gamma, m),
\]

with \( \frac{\delta \bar{p}}{\delta \gamma} > 0 \)

\( \frac{\delta \bar{p}}{\delta m} > 0 \)

Firms produce the economy's single good \( \gamma \), employing a production technology with neoclassical properties, i.e., constant returns to scale in \( K \) and \( L \) and positive
decreasing marginal products. Here, the level of technology is assumed to be independent of time. The production technology can be written as

\[ Y = F(K, L) \quad (5.2) \]

The firms net cash flow is defined as sale proceeds net of wage payments and investment costs, CI:

\[ \pi = F(k, L) - WL - CI, \quad (5.3) \]

Where CI equals the physical cost of investment plus the 'unavoidable' bribe payment, i.e.,

\[ CI = I[1 + \gamma] . \]

The firms objective is to maximize the present value of net cash flows between time \( O \) and infinity by an appropriate choice of \( L \) and \( I \), subject to

\[ K = I - \delta k \]

And an initial value of \( k[o] \). Le\( \bar{r}(t) \) be the average interest rate between times \( o \) and \( t \), i.e.,

\[ F(t) = \left( \frac{1}{t} \right) \int_{0}^{t} r(v) \delta v \]

In which case the firm's optimization problem can be represented by the following Hamiltonians:

\[ J = e^{F(t)_{t}} [F(K, L) - WL - I(1+r)] + \nu(1-\delta k) \quad (5.4) \]

In (5.4) \( V \) is the shadow price associated with installed capital units of time \( o \) output, i.e., the present value shadow price of installed capital. The current-value shadow price of installed capital, \( q \) is then

\[ q = \nu e^{-r(t)_{t}} \]

firms are competitive, taking \( w \) and \( r \) as given, and hence first order conditions are:
\[
\frac{\delta l}{\delta L} = o \Rightarrow F_L(K,L) = f(k) - kf^{-1}(k) = W \tag{5.5}
\]

\[
\frac{\delta l}{\delta L} = o \Rightarrow q = 1 + r \tag{5.6}
\]

\[
V = - \frac{\delta l}{\delta k} \Rightarrow q = (r + \delta)q - f'(k) \tag{5.7}
\]

Where \( f(k) \) is the intensive form of the production function. (5.5) represents the usual result that the marginal product of labour equals the wage rate, and (5.6) shows the shadow price of installed capital exceeds unity by the extent of corruption. (5.7) can be rewritten to yield.

\[
r = \frac{f'(k)}{q} - \frac{\delta}{q}
\]

which differs from the conventional results,

\[
r = f'(k) - \delta \text{ by the terms in } q.
\]

This equation for \( r \) indicates that with a given world interest rate, the steady state capital stock will be lower in the presence of corruption as \( q > 1 \) for \( r > 0 \).

Next, we consider the empirical determinants of corruption and its effects on growth. The two key propositions from the above theoretical model are that corruption takes the for m rent seeking activities, with the level of corruption positively related to the incidence of high rent activities and negatively related to monitoring efforts, and lowers the steady state income level, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate. Consistent with the interest in the role of natural resources, we endogenze corruption within the growth regression framework of Sachs and Wamer (1995) with the following resultant econometric specifications:
Corruption = zθ + δ_1 Natural Resources
+ δ_2 Trade Openness.
+ δ_3 Rule of Law
+ δ_4 Political Instability
+ ε_1 + δ_5 ΔGDP

\[ I_n^{ΔGDP} = XB + I_{n}^{GDP1} \]
+ &_2 Corruption
+ &_3 Natural Resources
+ ε_21

In the corruption equation the availability of rent-seeking opportunities is measured by the structure of the economy (particularly endowments of natural resources and the degree of openness to trade; while monitoring efforts by the government are measured by the strength of the institutions charged with the implementation of laws (rule of law) and the level of political instability (the incidence of revolutions and coups). The set of additional conditioning variables, Z, includes the rate of economic growth, a measure of ethnic diversity and the ethno linguistic fractionalization index. Also, we intend to test the robustness of our model by the addition of a wider set of variables.

Indeed, economic growth, particularly rapid economic growth, entails substantial changes in production methods and social relationships, including changes in the importance of different industries, skills and business practices. At the same time, there is no guarantee that the evolution of the new institutions (be they government agencies,
social or professional organisation or even social norms) required to either manage or support these changes will take place in concert with the changes themselves.

In the specific case of rapid economic growth brought on by oil and mineral discoveries, the accrual of a majority of the revenue directly to the government is liable to exacerbate the incidence of rent-seeking behaviour, as claimed by Kahn (1994) for the unique case of Nigeria. Here, we post that more labour intensive natural resources such as food and agricultural products would tend to generate fewer rents and be associated with less corruption. Given the expected differences in behaviour for the different components of natural resources we split the natural resources variable into its two broad components. Agriculture and Mining (and Quarrying) the sub-components include crop production, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Crude Petroleum and Gas, Metal Ore, Quarrying and others, we will originally add each component as a separate variable as well as adding the rate of economic growth along with the different components of natural resources, in order to control for the effects of non resource based rapid growth.

Here, the rent-seeking literature suggests that the incidence of bribery is also likely to be associated with the extent of trade regulations, the quality of legal and political institutions, and the level of political instability. Ceteris paribus, we should expect that an economy more open to trade (a higher value for trade openness) with stronger institutions (a higher score for rule of law), and with a higher degree of political stability (a lower value for political instability) would tend to have less corruption. The inclusion of ethnic diversity variable is an attempt to assess whether societal divisions along ethnic and linguistic lines contribute to rent-seeking behaviour. It may be that the prevalence of strong family ties, together with a lack of national identity and the absence
of accountability of government officials, lead people in positions of power to favour friends and relatives, at the expense of greater public good. Thus, a more ethnically diverse society (a higher value on the ethnic fractionalization measure) would be expected to have more corruption.

For the growth equation, our theoretical model predicts that more corruption is, ceteris paribus, associated with lower rates of growth and that abundance of natural resources tends to reduce economic growth. The set of additional conditioning variables, X, includes the period average for the ratio of investment to GDP, the level of trade openness over the periods, and the change in the terms of trade over the period. Ceteris Paribus, we would expect that an economy with a higher investment ratio, a more open trade policy, with more favorable changes in the terms of trade (higher value for terms of trade and facing less commodity-based export price variability / lower value for commodity price variability) would tend to have a higher rate of growth.

Yet, in the context of the neoclassical growth model, the incidence of natural resources is interpreted as an exogenous technology shock affecting growth through the aggregate production function. By raising the steady state level of income and leaving the economy further from its long-run target, natural resources should, Ceteris paribus, stimulate economic growth. However, given the direct (Dutch disease) and indirect/institutional impact) effects, some of the characteristics of resource-led growth can induce a net negative effect on growth, even as average income increases. That is, the initial increase in production (and growth) may be accompanied by policy and institutional changes that, after sometime, leave the steady state level of income closer to the current level of income, thereby reducing the rate of economic growth over the
medium term. Given the specification for the corruption regression, we should then be able to assess the strength of corruption as a transmission mechanism from natural resource abundance to economic growth. The data set for regression model is presented in the appendix of the paper accordingly.
6.0 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The empirical determinants of corruption and its effects on growth are considered in this section. The two key propositions from our theoretical model are that corruption takes the form of rent-seeking activities and negatively related to monitoring efforts, and also lower the steady state income level, thereby reducing the economy’s growth rate.

In the corruption equation (COB) the availability of rent-seeking opportunities is measured by the structure of the economy such as the endowment of natural resources (KNAR) and the degree of openness to trade (TOP), while monitoring efforts by the government are measured by the level of political instability such as the incidence of revolutions and coups (TOM).

In the specific case of rapid economic growth brought on by oil mineral discoveries (MIR) the accrual of a majority of the revenue directly to the government is liable to exacerbate the incidence of rent-seeking behaviour such as the case of Nigeria. As a corollary, we would also posit that more labor-intensive natural resources such as food and agricultural products (AGR) would tend to generate fewer rents and be associated with less corruption. Given the expected differences in behaviour for the different components of natural resources, we split the natural resources variable into two components (mineral and agricultural), originally, adding each component as a separate variable. We also add the rate of economic growth (dGDP) along with the different components of natural resources, in order to control for the effects of non-
resources based rapid growth. The rent-seeking literature suggests that the incidence of bribery is also likely to be associated with the extent of trade regulations and the level of political instability Ceteris Paribus we would expect that an economy more open to trade (TOP) and with a higher degree of political instability (TUM) would tend to have less corruption.

The Inclusion of the ethnic diversity variable is an attempt to assess whether societal divisions along ethnic and linguistic lines contribute to rent seeking behaviour. It may be that the prevalence of strong family ties together with a lack of national identity and the absence of accountability of government officials leads people in positions of power to favour friends and relative at the expense of the greater of the greater public good. In other word, an ethnic group in power will find it easier to pass on the costs of bribe payments to other ethnic groups, reducing the incentive for the former to internalize the costs of corruption. Thus, a more ethnically diverse society would be expected to have more corruption. Here, the effect of bureaucratic concentration (or the degree of internalization of the costs of corruption) may be proxies by the share of government current expenditures in Gross Domestic Product.

For the growth equation (DLGDP) our main variable of interest are corruption (COB) and Natural Resources (NAR). Here, the theoretical model predicts that more corruption is Ceteris Paribus associated with lower rates of growth while abundance of natural resources tends to reduce economic growth. The set of additional conditioning variables, X, includes the period average for the ratio of investment to GDP (IGD), the level of trade openness (ToP) over the
period, and the change in the terms of trade (TTE) over the period. Ceteris Paribus we would expect that an economy with a higher investment ratio, a more open trade policy, with more favorable changes in the terms of trade, to have a higher rate of growth.

In the context of the neoclassical growth mood, the incidence of natural resources is interpreted as an exogenous technology shock affecting growth through the aggregate production function. By raising the steady state level of income and leaving the economy further from its long-run target, natural resources, should ceteris paribus, stimulate economic growth. However, some of the characteristics of resource-led growth can induce a net negative effect on growth, even as average income increases. That is, the initial increase in production (and growth) may be accompanied by policy and institutional changes that, after sometime, leave the steady state level of income closer to the current level of income, thereby reducing that rate economic growth over the medium term.

The Results of our regression analysis are shown below:

**CORRUPTION MODEL RESULTS**

1. \( \text{CoB} = -3.4774 - 1.7751 \text{DLGDP} + 0.32887 \text{LNAR} \)

\( (-5.2276) \quad (-3.1217) \quad (6.1320) \)

\( R^2 = 0.68163 \quad R^2 = 0.64626 \quad F(2,18) = 19.2691 \)

The figures in parenthesis are T-ratios.
2. CoB = -4.3033 + 0.24017LNAR + 0.43571ToP
   (-4.6133) (5.6999) (0.93789)
   + 0.0002TUM + 3.4670 - 1.2707 DLGDP
   (-1.4573) (0.75036) (-2.0312)

   \[ R^2 = 0.70475 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.59930 \quad F(5,14) = 6.6834. \]

   The figures in parenthesis are T-ratios.

3. CoB = -4.2402 - 0.20651 LMIR
   (-4.5871) (0.55285)
   + 0.58259 LAGR + 0.55856 ToP
   (1.4163) (1.1487)
   -0.0002TUM - 0.03062 GCP
   (-1.25116) (-0.0052)
   - 1.1478 DLGDP

   \[ R^2 = 0.72410 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.59676 \quad F(6,13) = 5.6864 \]

   The figures in parenthesis are T-ratios.
4. CoB = -3.8151 - 0.18365 + 0.55183 LAGR
   (-4.8320) (-0.63971) (1.7195)
   - 1.5243DLGDP
   (-2.5364)
   \[ R^2 = 0.70580 \] \[ \bar{R}^2 = 0.65388 \] \[ F(3,17) = 13.5946 \]
   The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios

5. DLGDP = -0.50719 - 0.12134LGDP
   (-0.64488) (-0.45038)
   + 0.18955LNAR - 0.17307 CoB
   (0.82951) (-2.0346)
   \[ R^2 = 0.44288 \] \[ \bar{R}^2 = 0.34456 \] \[ F(3,17) = 4.5046 \]
   The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios

6. DLGDP = 0.16548 - 0.24431 LGDP
   (0.10437) (0.62700)
   -0.19459CoB + 0.27533LNAR - 2.5744 IGD
   (-1.9655) (0.92004) (-1.0075)
   + 0.0004TE + 0.55767 ToP
   \[ R^2 = 0.48981 \] \[ \bar{R}^2 = 0.25434 \] \[ F(6, 13) = 2.0801 \]
The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios

7. DLGDP = -0.066415 - 0.16961 LGDP
   (-0.74460) (-0.62180)

   0.21693 LNAR - 1.7818 IGD
   (0.94525) (-1.0392)

   $R^2 = 47818 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.34763 \quad F(4,16) = 3.6643$

   The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios

8. DLGDP = 0.71883 - 0.13639 LGDP
   (0.67411) (-0.50777)

   -0.14735CoB + 0.29596LMIR
   (-1.7154) (1.2862)

   -0.15042LNAR - 3.1358 IGD
   (-0.41375) (-1.5812)

   $R^2 = 0.52994 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.37325 \quad F(5,15) = 3.3822$

   The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios
9. \( DLGDP = 0.62804 - 0.14894 \times LGDP \)

\[ (0.57811) \quad (-0.57405) \]

\(- 0.14540 \times CoB + 0.22720 \times LMR \)

\[ (-1.7059) \quad (1.5840) \]

\(-0.69472 \times LAGR \)

\[ (-0.37380) \]

\[ (-1.5746) \]

\[ R^2 = 0.52896 \quad R^2 = 0.37195 \quad F(5,15) = 3.3689 \]

The suggested groupings are in line with the general characterization of mineral resources as relatively capital intensive, and agricultural resources as relatively labour intensive, and the obtained results are in line with earlier theoretical predictions. Capital (Labour) intensive natural resources industries tend to induce a higher (lower) level of corruption, ceteris paribus.

The coefficient on trade openness identifies corruption as a channel through which trade restrictions affect growth, consistent with the rent seeking literature. The obtained results suggest that countries more open to external trade that is with fewer trade restrictions tend to generate both substantial rents and rent seeking behaviour. The results also support the hypothesis that monitoring efforts tends to dampen corruption. Political Instability as proxied by turmoil and revolutions tends fosters a high level of corruption.
On a related level, we find no evidence for the predicted effect of bureaucratic power concentration: the robust to the addition of a variable on government current expenditures as a share of GDP. Again, the coefficient on the GDP growth rate suggests that rapid growth leads to more corruption, a result robust to instrumenting Long-run growth with initial income. There, the inference is not that a lower growth rate is somehow to be preferred but simply that rapid economic progress, if its beneficial effect is to be fully felt, requires special attention to be paid to the social and institutional fabric. Convergence hypothesis is confirmed by the negative coefficient on initial income, the positive impact of trade (absence of trade restrictions) is confirmed by the positive coefficient on trade openness; and positive terms of trade shocks are associated with higher growth. In the context of the neoclassical model, these results confirm that countries converge faster the farther they are from their own steady state. And consistent with the predictions from the Dutch disease literature, our results suggest that natural resource abundance tends to reduce long-run growth rate.

Unlike other studies, however, we find no, evidence that, ceteris paribus, the growth process in Nigeria, is different from other parts of the world. In accordance with our theoretical model, Long-term growth id negatively affected by the level of corruption from the results for the corruption regression, we can identify three mechanisms for such a relationship: trade policy, equality of institutions and political stability. Operationally, the normative implication is that to attenuate the extent of corruption and to foster significant improvements in the standard of living, policy makers should focus their efforts on liberalizing the
external trade regime and enhancing the quality of legal and political institutions. Given our finding that neither the corruption nor the growth process has specific country dimensions, this proposal remains as valid in Nigeria as in any other region of the world.

Although our regression results confirms that natural resources affect economic growth partly through their effect on corruption. The regressions also reveal that the proposition on the negative effect of natural resources on growth remains intact (as shown below)

**NATURAL RESOURCE MODEL RESULTS**

10. LNAR = 0.58254 - 0.00607 CoB + 0.05913 LGDP

\[
\begin{align*}
&= 0.58254 - 0.00607 \cdot 0.4872 + 0.05913 \cdot 1.2109 + 0.4365 \cdot 18.8988 + 0.5094 \cdot 14.7199 + 0.9763 \cdot 0.24059 - 0.0411 \cdot (-1.3739) + 0.0007 \cdot 0.16034 \\
&\quad R^2 = 0.99 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.99 \quad F(7,13) = 25533.8
\end{align*}
\]

The results in parenthesis are T-ratios
11. LNAR = 0.56068 - 0.0072656CoB
     (-0.53343)
     + 0.06773LGDP + 0.43140LMIR
     (1.1428) (14.2942)
     + 0.51288LAGR + 0.12689IGD
     (13.5029) (0.29251)
     - 0.05836ToP + 0.0013TTE
     (-1.1728) (0.29251)
     - 0.00729LGOL

\[ R^2 = 0.999 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.999 \quad F(8,12) = 20757 \]

The results in parenthesis are T-ratios

12. LNAR = -4.3408 - 0.11629CoB
     (-5.4988) (-1.4562)
     + 1.2837LGDP + 0.58169IGD
     (20.9604) (0.34318)
     -0.11246ToP - 0.00508TTE
     (-0.66745) (-2.1075)

\[ R^2 = 0.9959 \quad \bar{R}^2 = 0.9946 \quad F(5,15) = 745.8015 \]

The results in parenthesis are T-ratios
13. \( \text{LNAR} = -4.3654 - 0.12269\text{CoB} \)
\[\begin{align*}
(-5.6383) &\quad (-1.5637) \\
+ 1.4187 \text{LGDP} - 0.27137 \text{IGD} &\quad (11.5918) &\quad (-0.15132) \\
+ 0.039605 \text{ToP} - 0.00408 \text{TTE} &\quad (0.19391) &\quad (-1.6374) \\
- 16950 \text{LGOC} &
\end{align*}\)
\[(-1.2660)\]
\[\text{R}^2 = 0.99641 \quad \overline{\text{R}}^2 = 0.9948 \quad F(6,14) = 646.7456\]

Although the corruption model equations confirms that natural resources affect economic growth partly through their effect on corruption. The regressions of growth model equation reveals that the proposition on the negative effect of natural resources on growth remains intact, even after accounting for the endogeneity of corruption and trade liberalization.

Indeed, a resource boom has often triggered as (unsustainable) increase in government spending, an effect particularly important in developing countries and in cases of fuel or ore discoveries, where the additional revenue mostly accrues directly to the government. To the extent that such spending spurts reflect current consumption instead of investment in economically justifiable projects, long-run economic growth should be negatively affected, partly in the likely event of a down turn in commodity markets. To account for this effect, we
include, as an explanatory variable, the beginning of period ratio of government consumption to GDP, where government consumption is defined as government expenditure. The results as reported above, reveal that the negative effect of natural resources on growth is now confined to the Agricultural sector with the conclusion robust to the inclusion of the variable on government consumption and to the aggregation of mineral and agricultural resources into one variable.
7.0 LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The first ever-concrete step to fight corruption in Nigeria was the corrupt practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000. It was a bill for an act to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices; and other related offences. However, it was latter commended as the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Bill, 2003. It was equally a bill for an act to establish a commission to prohibit and possible punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences (as enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This act may be cited as the corrupt practices and other Related Offences Commission Act, 2003. There is established a commission to be known as the Anti-Corruption Commission. It shall be the duty of the commission where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has conspired to commit or has attempted to commit or has committed an offence under this Act or any other Law prohibiting corruption, to receive and investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or the commission of such offence and in appropriate cases make its recommendation for prosecution or otherwise to the office of the Attorney - General of the Federation or of the State. Examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where in the opinion of the commission, such practices, systems or procedures aid or facilitate fraud or corrupts, to direct and supervise a review of them. Instruct, advice and assist any officer, agency or parastatals on ways by which fraud or corrupt may be eliminated or minimized by such officer, agency or parastatals. Advise heads of
public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as the commission thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related offences. Educates the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offenses. And enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.

Another related legal reform was a bill for an act to further amend the banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991, as amended and for matters connected therewith (Act 2002). Also, was a bill for an act to amend the Money Laundering Act 1995 and for matters connected therewith as enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Act 2002).

Furthermore, there was a bill for an act to provide for the establishment of a commission for Anti-terrorism, economic and financial crimes and for matters connected therewith (as was enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act, 2001). The Commission shall be responsible for the enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of this Act; the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, Counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scan, etc; the co-ordination and enforcement of all anti-terrorism, economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority; carrying out and sustaining vigorous public and enlightenment campaign against terrorism, economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria and carrying out such other activities as are necessary or
expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under this Act.

In December 2003, the National Assembly of Nigeria also endorsed the United Nations (UN) convention on transnational organized crime with the passage of a bill that effect. The bill, entitled "Enforcement of the Provision of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes" was passage by the senate and the House of Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The bill makes it a criminal offence for any person or country to conceal, disguise the origin of property of any person who is involved in the commission of predicate offense with a view to eroding consequences of the crime. In article 8 entitled criminalization of corruption, the bill visits the acts that constitute corruption under the conviction as follows "the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly of an undue advantage for the official himself or herself or another person to entity in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Solicitation of acceptance by a public official directly or indirectly, or an undue advantage for the official himself or another person on entity in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties." The bill therefore recommends outright seizure of proceeds of crime.

In the case of recovery of looted funds, the conversion under international Co-operation for purposes of confiscation says: "A state partly that has received a request from another state partly having jurisdiction over an offence covered by his convention for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other
instrumentalities referred to in its territory, shall to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system (comply).

On the policy front, there is recently a reform agenda of the new administration put together by its economic team and tagged National Economic Empowerment and Development strategy (NEEDs). The bedrock of Needs is its vision of a Nigerian with new set of values and principles, which will facilitate the achievements of national goals of wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction. Specific reform programmes in the NEEDs include Government and institutional Reform, which entails public sector reforms, privatization and liberalization, governance, transparency and anti-corruption; as well as service delivery by government agencies. It also specifies private sector reform, which will address issues like security and rule of law; infrastructure; finance; sectoral strategies; privatization and liberalization; and trade and regional integration. It then drew a human Development Agenda or social charter, which will focus on health, education, integrated rural development, housing development, employment and youth development, safety nests, as well as geopolitical balance. NEEDS also specifies its financing and plan implementation strategies, and is indeed a medium-term strategy, but which derives from the country's long-tem goals of poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation and value re-orientation. Here, the Federal Government under the NEEDs and the state Government under the State Economic Empowerment and Development strategy (SEEDs) will coordinate a planning framework with agreed common primitives to agriculture, public finance/ public
sector reforms with emphasis on the social sector. The core team include Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala; Charles Chukwuma Soludo; El-Rufai and Ezekwesili. Will this team give Nigerians cause to stay back at home rather than risk their lives across the Sahara Desert in search of the good life? Or will they go down in history as those who also tried but failed? However, the more relevant question is: will the strategy lead to its stated aim of building "a solid foundation for the attainment of Nigeria’s long term vision of becoming the Largest and strongest Africa Economy and a key player in the world economy’? It depends since the inhospitable Nigerian environment has always ensured the death of grand development plans even in the cradle. The most critical factor in that environment is the all-pervasive corruption, which the government has been unable to tame in almost five years. Without a leash on this rampaging minister, no reform will take off, let alone work. With corruption on the loose, it is nigh impossible to achieve the set targets of public works to open up the rural areas such as boosting agricultural productivity and expanding utilities. That is, besides the fact that corruption increases the cost of doing business and inflicts grievous distortions on the reward system that is so crucial to competitive capitalism. Other inhibiting factors include object lack of infrastructure, national insecurity, unresponsive legislative support for enabling laws, policy inconsistency, poor and show judicial arbitration, government's an fiscal indiscipline lack of regulatory capacity and integrity; and notorious lack of continuity in governance (This day, March 28, 2004). Perhaps NEED (SEEDs) may have developed a solid problem statement (mission or vision), it however lacks on operational analytic framework of policy formulation and implementation.
in a related working paper; Nwaobi (2004) has demonstrated the work of Nigeria’s economic problem and the way out. Nwaobi (2000) also demonstrated proposed policy measures for revitalizing a poor developing economy.

At this juncture, to curb national and international corruption, there is a need to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat more effectively corruption and to promote, facilitate and support international cooperation to curb corruption. Quality in government demands that anti-corruption measures be implemented worldwide to identify and deter corruption and all that flows from it. It is crucial to recognize the dire need for an integrated international approach in preventing corruption, money laundering and to facilitate asset recovery. When one accept the idea that lack of opportunity and deterrence are major factors helping to reduce corruption, it follows that when ill-gotten gains are difficult to hide, the level of deterrence is raised and the risk of corruption is reduced. Furthermore, there is a need for a global and integrated approach that is evidence based, inclusive, and transparent comprehensive, non-partisan and impact oriented approach, negotiated and accepted by the international community. It has emerged clearly that national institutions cannot operate successfully in isolation but there is a need to create new strategic partnerships across all sectors and levels of government and civil society in the effort to build integrity to curb corruption. Abuse of power for private gain can only be fought successfully with an international dynamic, integrated in a poor country such as Nigeria.
Indeed, countless initiatives have failed in the past because of the main players not being sufficiently "clean to withstand the backlash that serious anti-corruption initiatives tend to cause. Successful anti-corruption efforts must be based on integrity, credibility and trusted by the general public. Where there is no integrity in the very system designed to detect and combat corruption, the risk of detection and punishment to a corrupt regime will not be meaningfully increased. Complaints may not come forward if they perceive that reporting corrupt activity exposes them to personal risk. Corrupt activity flourishes in an environment where intimidating tactics are used to quell, or silence, the public. When the public perceives that its anti-corruption force cannot be trusted, the most valuable and efficient detection tool will cease to function. Without the necessary (real and perceived) integrity, national and international "corruption fighters" will be seriously handicapped.
8.0 CONCLUSION

The thrust of this paper was the theoretical and empirical investigation of the channel through which natural resources might affect Nigeria's Economic growth, that is, an increase in rent-seeking activities. Specifically, the paper analysed two intertwined broader issues: what factors determine the incidence of corruption or what roles does the abundance of natural resources play: and what factors affect economic growth in Nigeria.

Our analytical model focused on four major determinants of the extent of corruption in an economy. It demonstrated the corruption dampening effects of improvements in monitoring technology and increases in penalties, and the corruption-fostering effects of capital-intensive production and concentration of bureaucratic power. In the framework of the model, natural resource discoveries were interpreted as technology shocks with their extent depending on the specific type of commodity considered. **Empirically, one of the main results was to confirm that capital-intensive natural resources are a major determinant of corruption in Nigeria.**

Indeed, both our theoretical and empirical results stress the importance of strong institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries as a mean to curb the associated negative growth effects of corruption. This is especially true in a developing economy (such as Nigeria) where natural resource discoveries have a much higher relative impact on the economy's capital stock and on the extent
of corruption, and are confronted with generally weaker and less adaptable institutions.

Essentially, this study constitutes a first step towards an investigation of the effect of natural resources on corruption and growth in Nigeria. In this context, it would be useful to model the government's anti-corruption policies as the response of an optimizing agent, which would allow, inter alia, a formal derivation of the need for, and the extent of, institutional and administrative adjustments in response to resource discoveries. The addition of a time dimension to our empirical analysis would also allow some understanding of the economic dynamics of natural resource discoveries.

The main conclusion of this paper is that corruption is not going to be curbed neither nationally or internationally unless a broad agreement is reached towards a more dynamic, integrated and global approach against corruption for this global approach to be accepted and implemented globally, there is a need for a strong UN convention against corruption establishing efficient international anti-corruption measures and implemented through strong international collaboration and coordination. Building integrity to curb corruption at the national level is an extensive and ongoing task. It requires real not merely expressed political will and the dedication of social and financial resources, which in turn only tend to materialize when the true nature and extent of the problem and the harm it causes to societies and populations are made apparent. Progress is difficult to achieve, if achieved, it is difficult to measure. The creation of popular expectations about standards of public service and the right to be free of
corruption are important elements of an anti-corruption strategy. Yet the difficulties inherent in effecting progress involve careful management of and lining up to public expectations. Winning public trust is the key and it has to be earned. As soon as the UN convention against corruption has been rectified, it is critical that the necessary international and national political will and resources are being mobilized in a coordinated manner to secure a realistic implementation of a global evidence based, transparent, comprehensive, inclusive, non partisan and impact oriented approach. This is a task that must be accomplished for a new world economic order to emerge. How ready are we in Nigeria?
Appendix:

REGRESSION DATA

GROWTH AND CORRUPTION INDICES

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Notes:

a Turmoil = Largescale protests general strike + Demonstration + terrorism + guemla warfare+ Cinlwar + Cross border war.

b Natural Resources = Mineral resources + Agricultural resources.

c 1981 - 1994 - Naira official cross exchange rates

d 1986, 87, 94, 95 => 0 assumed for these years exchange rate used to proxy terms of trade imports/export Ratio to Capture trade openness.

Gross output at current price

MINERAL RESOURCES AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

<p>| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |</p>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Coal Mining Million</th>
<th>Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Million</th>
<th>Metal ores Million</th>
<th>Quarrying &amp; other Mining Million</th>
<th>Mineral Resources Million</th>
<th>Crop Production Million</th>
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Sources: Federal Office of Statistics national Accounts of Nigeria.
Federal office of Statistics Annual Abstract of Statistics
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