------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Papers received as of Thu Jan 1 02:29:08 CST 1998. (To retrieve abstracts without full papers, use e.g. get 9801001.abs ) get 3 2.abs 9303001 , e.g., returns multiple papers. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-pe/9801001 From: Rebecca-Morton@uiowa.edu Date: Sun, 4 Jan 98 11:11:16 CST ( 0kb + 75kb + 239kb + 1kb + 248kb + 223kb ) Title: Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting Author: Rebecca B. Morton (University of Iowa) and Kenneth C. Williams (Michigan State University) Contact: Rebecca-Morton@uiowa.edu Comments: Type of Document - Microsoft Word; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 65 ; figures: none Keywords: voting games, sequential voting, experiments, presidential primaries, JEL: C7, D8, D7 EWPA-references: Report-no: RBM-001 \\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-pe/9801002 From: boylan@boylan.wustl.edu Date: Thu, 15 Jan 98 14:07:25 CST ( 0kb + 302kb + 126kb ) Title: Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying Author: Richard Boylan (Washington University in St. Louis) Contact: boylan@boylan.wustl.edu Comments: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on Ultra Latex; to print on PostScript; pages: 43 ; figures: included. 43 pages, prepared with dvips Keywords: Lobbying, private bills, Congress, immigration, bribery JEL: D72 EWPA-references: Report-no: RTB-98-1 \\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-pe/9801003 From: Robert Dur ABSTRACT ONLY ABSTRACT ONLY ABSTRACT ONLY ABSTRACT ONLY ABSTRACT ONLY ( 0kb ) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 1998 10:50:37 +0100 Title: The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits Are Politically Motivated Author: Robert A.J. Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Ben D. Peletier (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Otto H. Swank (Erasmus University Rotterdam) Contact: dur@few.eur.nl Phone: +31-10-4088923 Address: Robert A.J. Dur EUR / Tinbergen Institute P.O. Box 1738, Rotterdam, Netherlands JEL: D72 H61 H62 URL: http://members.xoom.com/dur/papers.html EWPA-references: Keywords: fiscal rules and budget deficits and public investment Report-no: TI97-125/1 \\