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RATES OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING IN CHINA

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Abstract. This study uses data from a 1988 survey of Chinese individuals to estimate rates of return to schooling in China. The Mincer-type rate of return to schooling was estimated at 4.02 percent in the rural areas and 3.29 percent in the urban areas; these are fairly low estimates compared with similar estimates in other countries. The rate of return to schooling for females was significantly higher than that for males in urban areas. In addition, members of the Communist Party in urban areas had significantly lower returns to schooling compared with non-members.

1. INTRODUCTION

The study of human capital began in the USA in the late 1950s and has yielded important research on the rates of return to schooling, on-the-job training and other human capital investment activities. The issue addressed in this paper is the rate of return to formal education or "schooling" in China. This is studied using a survey of income and related variables of Chinese individuals in 1988, after China had undergone ten years of economic reform. It is of interest to examine how the rate of return to schooling in China differs with gender, race and Communist Party affiliation, as well as to compare the estimated rates in China with those in other countries. This analysis may shed light on how wages are determined in different labor markets.

Jamison and van der Gaag (1987) and Byron and Manaloto (1990) both used Chinese data to estimate Mincer-type earnings functions.[1] However, the data used in the present study may be more informative in that they cover a broader geographical area and contain more observations. The data here also include variables on race and Communist Party affiliation that have not been used in prior studies.

2. THE DATA

The data used in this analysis are taken from the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project conducted by Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei (1993) in cooperation with the State Statistical Bureau. Observations from both the urban and the rural areas are used, with "urban households" defined as those holding

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[1]They analyzed data on 2154 individuals from Hui County and 800 individuals from the city of Nanjing, respectively.

urban household registrations and "rural households" as the remaining households. The data set includes information gathered on 51 352 individuals belonging to 10 258 rural households and 31 827 individuals belonging to 9009 urban households. Because of the focus on the returns to education in this paper, only individuals earning the relevant basic, monthly wage are included in the analysis; those who are retired, in school, or working part-time, are excluded.

Owing to the possible differences that may exist between the labor market conditions in the urban and rural areas, separate questionnaires were administered to individuals in these areas. This results in a difference in the definitions of wage used for the two groups. The urban individuals were asked to report, if applicable, an average basic monthly wage for 1988. For the 16 917 individuals in the urban area included in the sample, wage is the sum of "basic monthly wage" and "bonuses and above-quota wages." However, the rural individuals did not report an equivalent basic wage. We have used as the rural wage variable the "average basic monthly wage" which includes the basic wage as well as "various subsidies and bonuses."[2] The latter wage includes transfer payments as well as bonuses, possibly making the definition of wage broader for the rural individuals. The possible difference in definition of the wage variable may affect the estimate of the rate of return to education in the pooled urban–rural sample. It may affect to a lesser extent the separate estimates for the urban and rural populations.

The other variables have the same definitions for the urban and rural areas and thus should not affect the quality of the pooled regressions. Among the explanatory variables are (1) years of education, (2) a dummy variable, equal to one for Communist Party membership, (3) a dummy variable equal to one for minorities and zero for Han Chinese, (4) a gender dummy variable equal to one for females, and (5) age. Certain assumptions are made concerning years of education (see table 1).

Table 1. Assumptions concerning years of education

Level of education	*Years of education*
College or above	16
Community college	14
Professional school	14
Upper middle school	12
Lower middle school	9
Primary school grad.	6
Primary yrs ≥ 3	4
$1 <$ primary yrs < 3	2
Illiterate	0

Source: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1965).

[2] A further description of the dataset is included in the Appendix.

3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

This section will begin with a brief discussion of the basic regression equation that is used throughout our analysis, and then we explain some assumptions made in order to simplify the model. The forms of the regressions are based on Mincer's basic equation:

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_4 E^2 + u \quad (1)$$

where Y is wage, S is years of schooling, E is experience, and E^2 is experience squared. This regression equation allows an estimate to be made of the monetary rate of return per year of completed schooling separate from the effects of post-school investment or "experience."[3] Experience squared is included in the model in order to account for the fact that the "lifecycle" of earnings is not a linear pattern of growth (Mincer, 1958). To generate the experience variable, we assume that the average person began his schooling at age 6 years and that time not spent in formal schooling was spent gaining on-the-job experience:

$$experience = (age - schooling - 6). \quad (2)$$

The first assumption we make in the regression analysis is that the individuals in the sample had the same average number of work hours per month. Because the individuals did not report the number of hours they worked each month, average hourly wage was not available. To the extent that the number of hours an individual works is correlated with his wage and his past education, this assumption may cause bias in our estimates of the rate of return to schooling. We reduce the probability of the coefficients experiencing this bias by dropping from our sample those individuals who worked part-time.

Another simplifying assumption of our model is that ability is not correlated with education. There has been some evidence that this assumption is fair (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994). However, were our data longitudinal, we would use an error-components model to correct for possible ability bias in the estimates. We might also include a proxy to account for motivation or personality. To the extent that ability may be positively correlated with both education and wages, our estimates may be upward biased upwards.

3.1 *The returns to education of China as a whole: a pooled regression*

In this section we present an estimate of the monetary rate of return per additional year of schooling completed in China. We used the pooled sample of Chinese individuals in the urban and rural samples, with 17 261 urban observations and 1677 rural observations. The mean wages, log wages and years of schooling are given in table 2.

[3]Mincer (1974) shows that the rate of return to schooling is the proportional increase in earnings per year of schooling if schooling and schooling level are independent and if the costs of foregone earnings are schooling's only costs.

Table 2. Average values over the pooled sample

Subgroup	*Log wage (yuan)*	*Wage (yuan)*	*Years of education*
Rural individuals	4.55	119.02	6.06
Urban individuals	4.63	113.15	10.65
Females	4.54	101.57	6.96
Males	4.70	120.68	8.57
Communists	4.84	137.00	10.57
Non-communists	4.55	106.40	7.41
Minorities	4.59	108.88	6.44
Han Chinese	4.62	113.90	7.89

In general, except in the case of rural individuals, the data indicate that groups of individuals having higher average levels of education also had higher average wages. The average years of schooling were higher for urban individuals, males, members of the Communist Party and Han Chinese. The preliminary observation that individuals with more schooling also had higher wages indicates that the relationship between schooling and earnings may be positive in nature. We investigate this possibility using regression analysis.

The first model we test follows the specification of equation (1) and includes four dummy variables to control for differences in gender, Communist Party status, location (urban or rural) and ethnicity:

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_4 E^2 + \beta_5 Fem + \beta_6 Com + \beta_7 Rur + \beta_8 Min + u. \quad (3)$$

Running OLS on the model estimates that each additional year of schooling yielded, on average, a 3.34 percent higher wage. With the exception of the "rural" dummy, the other coefficients are all significant at the 0.05 level and are summarized later in table 5. The dummy variable "rural," which is equal to 1 for rural observations and 0 for urban observations, is positive but insignificant with a value of 0.022; this indicates that, all else being equal, living in an urban or rural area did not have a significant effect on one's wages. Given the possible difference in definition of wage for urban and rural areas, this result should be carefully interpreted.

In order to control for possible differences in rates of return to education across labor markets in the rural and urban areas, a *rural*∗*schooling* interaction term is added to the model (model (4) in table 5).[4] The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that, when the other independent variables are restricted to have no urban–rural differences, the rate of return to education is significantly higher in the rural areas at the 0.05 level. The estimate of returns to education is 4.82 percent in the rural areas and 3.20 percent in the urban areas. The OLS estimate of the coefficient on the rural dummy is significant at the 0.05 level, but becomes negative instead of positive. With regard to the effects of the various demographic variables on wages, the model predicts that

[4]Equations mentioned in the text correspond to models estimated in tables 5 and 6, but are not necessarily written out explicitly in the text.

Communists had, on average, higher wages, while females and minorities had lower average wages, other things being equal. These results are not unexpected.

3.2. *The returns to education in rural areas*

In this and the following subsection we address the possibility that fitting a model for the pooled observations may be inappropriate. We disaggregate the sample into rural and urban subsamples, first examining the returns to schooling in the rural areas and then continuing with a similar analysis for the urban areas.

Table 3 summarizes the mean values of wage, log wage and years of schooling in the rural areas. The rural data show that, consistent with the results in the pooled data, the mean wage was higher for Communist Party members, males, and Han Chinese than for their respective counterparts, the non-communists, females and minorities. The rural data also reflect the pooled data in that average wages were higher for the groups that had higher average levels of schooling.

The first regression includes the education and experience variables as well as dummies for Communist Party membership, gender and race:

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_4 E^2 + \beta_5 Fem + \beta_6 Com + \beta_7 Min + u. \qquad (5)$$

Table 5 shows that the coefficient on years of schooling is 0.0402, indicating that each additional year of schooling obtained by a rural individual resulted in a 4.02 percent increase in wage, on average. The model also predicts that, in the rural areas, each additional year of experience resulted in a wage increase of 1.95 percent, on average. The various dummy variables are significant at the 5 percent level with the expected signs. The coefficient on the female dummy indicates that, holding schooling and experience constant, females earned less than males, their average wage being 7.48 percent lower than the average male wage. The model estimates that a minority with a given level of education and experience earned a wage that was, on average, 19.37 percent lower than the wage of a Han Chinese with the same amount of schooling and experience.

We next investigate the possibility of variation in returns to schooling over two different subgroups, gender and Party status. Running a Chow test on the data results in our accepting the null hypothesis that the same model can be

Table 3. Average values over the rural sample

Subgroup	*Log wage (yuan)*	*Wage (yuan)*	*Years of education*
Females	4.44	103.54	4.90
Males	4.61	126.39	7.07
Communists	4.64	127.08	7.66
Non-communists	4.53	117.22	5.93
Minorities	4.42	115.49	5.09
Han Chinese	4.56	119.40	6.10

used to explain wages for Communist Party members as for non-communists in the rural areas. (Model (6) is the constrained model and (7), located in table 6 in the Appendix owing to its length, is the unconstrained model.) In order to test differences in returns for females and males, the basic Mincer variables (years of schooling, experience and square experience) are interacted with the female dummy (equation (8)). The estimated rates of return to education are not found to be significantly different for males and females at the 0.05 level.

3.3. *The returns to education in urban areas*

The average values of wage, log wage and years of schooling for individuals in the urban areas are recorded in table 4.

The OLS estimates of the basic regression

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_5 Fem + \beta_6 Com \beta_7 Min + u \tag{9}$$

estimate the rate of return to schooling to be 3.29 percent. Experience had a slightly greater effect on wages; each additional year of experience resulted in a 4.50 percent increase in wage, on average. The three dummies are also significant at the 0.05 level, with the expected results: being a female is found to have a negative effect on wages, being a communist a positive effect on wages, and being a minority a negative effect, all else being equal.

From table 4 it appears that there was a fairly substantial difference in mean wages between communists and non-communists (31.90 yuan). Although our prior analysis found that the same earnings function may be used to explain the wages of Party members and non-members in the rural areas, it may be possible that two separate equations are needed to explain wages in the urban areas. The next part of our analysis addresses the possible effects of being a member of the Communist Party on returns to education.

In order to test for a difference in slopes between the two groups, we added interaction terms on the schooling and experience variables. The resulting regression

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_4 E^2 + \beta_5 Fem + \beta_6 Com + \beta_7 Min + \beta_8 Com{*}S + \beta_9 Com{*}E + \beta_{10} Com{*}E^2 + u \tag{10}$$

has significant *t*-statistics for all the coefficients. The estimated rate of return to education for communists is a wage increase of 2.42 percent a year of

Table 4. Average values over the urban sample

Subgroup	*Log wage (yuan)*	*Wage (yuan)*	*Years of education*
Females	4.54	103.57	10.30
Males	4.71	122.01	10.94
Communists	4.85	137.44	11.69
Non-communists	4.56	105.54	10.30
Minorities	4.61	108.54	10.69
Han Chinese	4.63	113.53	10.63

schooling, compared with an estimated 3.68 percent rate of return for non-communists. This may indicate that Communist Party members have a different wage structure from non-communists. The estimated rate of return to experience was also lower for the communists, the OLS estimates being 4.83 percent for non-communists and 2.97 percent for communists. Although the result is not central to the discussion in this paper, it is interesting to note that the communist dummy variable is significant with a *t*-value of 8.929. The model estimates that, holding experience, schooling, gender and race constant, members of the Communist Party earned wages that were, on average, 42.0 percent higher than the wages of non-members in the urban areas.

Another question is whether gender affected the rate of return to schooling. To test this possibility, we added to the previous model a *female***schooling* interaction term:

$$\ln Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 S + \beta_3 E + \beta_4 E^2 + \beta_5 Fem + \beta_6 Com + \beta_7 Min + \beta_8 Fem{*}S + \beta_9 Com{*}S + \beta_{10} Com{*}E + \beta_{10} Com{*}E^2 + u. \quad (11)$$

The coefficient on the *female***schooling* interaction term estimates a significantly higher rate of return for females in the urban areas. The model estimates that the rate of return to education was, on average, 4.46 percent for females and 2.78 percent for males (assuming that they were not Communist Party members). The estimated rate of return to schooling for minorities was not found to be significantly different from that of the Han Chinese at the 0.05 level; the results from those tests are not included in this paper.

4. DISCUSSION

When analyzing the rural and urban data separately,[5] the estimated rate of return to schooling in China was 4.02 percent in the rural areas in equation (5) and 3.29 percent in the urban areas in equation (9). These rates of return to schooling are low compared with similar estimates for other countries. Psacharapoulos (1985) estimates the mean rate of return to schooling for 34 countries, all of which have higher estimates than those found in our analysis of Chinese data. A comparison that is particularly worthy of note is that between China and Taiwan. Although China and Taiwan share a common culture and are in the same region, the estimates of their rates of return to education appear to be different; China had a lower rate of return to schooling than Taiwan, which was estimated to have a 16.1 percent rate for females and a 8.4 percent rate for males (Gannicott, 1984).

Our results are similar to those of Byron and Manaloto (1990) and Jamison and van der Gaag (1987) in that they also found relatively low rates of return to education in China.[6] One possible explanation for the low estimated rate is that

[5]As previously discussed, the pooled estimate of the rate of return to schooling, estimated at 3.34 percent, may be difficult to interpret given the different definitions of wage in rural and urban areas. Therefore, in this section we will primarily refer to the rates of return estimated separately for the urban and rural areas.

[6]Jamison and van der Gaag estimated the rate of return to be 4.5 percent for males and 5.6 percent for females. Byron and Manaloto estimated the rate to be 4 percent.

Table 5. Determinants of wage in pooled, urban and rural samples (dependent variable: log wage)[a]

Independent variable	(3) *Pooled*	(4) *Pooled*	(5) *Rural*	(6) *Rural*	(8) *Rural*	(9) *Urban*	(10) *Urban*	(11) *Urban*
Schooling (years)	0.0334	0.0320	0.0402	0.0357	0.0295	0.0329	0.0368	0.0278
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0059)	(0.0057)	(0.0071)	(0.0010)	(0.0013)	(0.0017)
Experience (years)	0.0420	0.0419	0.0195	0.0194	0.0244	0.0449	0.0483	0.0489
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0040)	(0.0039)	(0.0047)	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
Experience squared	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0004	−0.0006	−0.0007	−0.0007
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Female	−0.0857	−0.0850	−0.0748	−0.0754	−0.1353	−0.0902	−0.0898	−0.2687
	(0.0062)	(0.0062)	(0.0345)	(0.0339)	(0.1394)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0232)
Communist	0.0622	0.0629	−0.0454	—	—	0.0680	0.4196	0.3599
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0427)			(0.0066)	(0.0470)	(0.0471)
Minority	−0.0604	−0.0606	−0.1937	−0.1937	−0.1892	−0.0445	−0.0446	−0.0451
	(0.0070)	(0.0141)	(0.0856)	(0.0847)	(0.0852)	(0.0130)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)
Rural	0.221	−0.1183	—	—	—	—	—	—
	(0.0162)	(0.0495)						
Rural*schooling	—	0.0162	—	—	—	—	—	—
		(0.0054)						
Female*experience	—	—	—	—	−0.0182	—	—	—
					(0.0086)			

Female*experience^2	—	—	—	—	0.0005 (0.002)	—	—	—
Female*schooling	—	—	—	—	0.0187 (0.0120)	—	—	0.0168 (0.0020)
Communist*schooling	—	—	—	—	—	—	−0.0126 (0.0021)	−0.0074 (0.0022)
Communist*experience	—	—	—	—	—	—	−0.0186 (0.0029)	−0.0187 (0.0029)
Communist*experience^2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.0004 (0.0001)	0.0004 (0.0001)
_cons.	3.729 (0.0177)	3.744 (0.0175)	3.990 (0.0732)	4.033 (0.0725)	4.056 (0.0854)	3.695 (0.0173)	3.627 (0.0201)	3.720 (0.0230)
Observations	18 491	18 491	1626	1658	1658	16 865	16 865	16 865
F-test that all of the coefficients are jointly equal to zero	F(7, 18483) 867.15	F(8, 18482) 757.29	F(6, 1619) 18.42	F(5, 1652) 20.72	F(8, 11649) 14.61	F(6, 16858) 1178.97	F(9, 16855) 803.36	F(10, 16854) 727.66

[a]Mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable are: for (3) and (4), 4.625 and 0.4589 respectively; for (5), (6) and (8), 4.554 and 0.6340 respectively; for (9), (10) and (11), 4.632 and 0.4376, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions use Huber standard errors, which correct for heteroscedasticity of an unspecified form. For a further discussion, see White (1980).

the definition of wage used in the analysis does not adequately capture the total monetary "return" to schooling. In China, a system based on "relationships" or *guan-xi* exists, whereby people participate in informal trading of goods and services in order to obtain returns for goods and services that cannot be sold or otherwise traded in the formal market (Chow, 1994). The basic wage that accounts for earnings in our model does not include compensation or benefits from these informal transactions. If education were positively correlated with the ability to prosper in this informal system of *guan-xi*, then an estimate of the rate of return to education not reflecting informal compensation may be biased downwards.

The estimated rate of return to schooling in urban areas of China (3.29 percent) is low compared with the estimated rate in rural areas (4.02 percent) when they are estimated separately. Although an in-depth analysis of the varying structures in the urban and rural areas is beyond the scope of this paper, the difference in rate of return may be influenced by the occupations held by the individuals earning the relevant basic wage in the two areas. Tables 7 and 8, in the Appendix, set out the various types of employment of the rural and urban wage earners. The most obvious difference lies in the number of wage earners working in the state-owned or publicly owned sector. While 79.70 percent of the urban wage earners worked in the state-owned sector, only 16.49 percent of the rural wage earners worked in this sector. The majority (69.25 percent) of the rural wage earners worked in cooperatives or farmed under the household responsibility system. Bonnin and Carter (1988) suggest that, in the late 1980s (when the sample in our study was taken) freedom of choice in jobs and job mobility were greater in the individual enterprises and cooperatives than in the state-owned businesses. Thus, the lower rate of return to education in the urban areas may have been caused in part by the nature of employment in the public sector, which may be less inclined to base wages on "human capital" variables such as education and experience (Cheung, 1990).

Another result is that the return to education for members of the Communist Party in the urban areas (2.42 percent) was low relative to non-members in urban areas (3.68), although the average wage level for Party members was 36 percent higher (equation (11)). It is interesting that, when the communist dummy variable is equal to 1, the rate of return to education is lower. This difference may be caused by the nature of employment within the party where the wage structure may be based on seniority and relationships, rather than on productivity and quality of human capital. Another possible explanation is that Communist Party membership enables a person to get education with perhaps fewer qualifications. Were a person's ability correlated with his schooling, the estimated rate of return to schooling would be higher for non-communists than for communists. In any case, the high coefficient on the communist dummy variable would seem to support the view that, in the communist system, there may be less incentive to invest in education in order to improve wages and more incentive to increase one's wage returns by, among other things, joining the Party and developing seniority and relationships within it (Chow, 1994).

5. CONCLUSION

This study indicates that the rates of return per year to schooling in China (4.02 percent in the rural areas and 3.29 percent in the urban areas) are low in comparison with the rates of return in many other countries. This result may be influenced by the exclusion from the definition of "monetary return" of compensation received by Chinese wage earners in off-market transactions. This study also indicates that the rate of return to schooling for Chinese wage earners in the rural areas is higher than the rate of return in the urban areas. Within the urban areas, the rates of return for communists and non-communists are significantly different. While Communist Party members had lower returns to education, they earned a significantly higher wage than non-members. Finally, the rate of return to schooling for females was significantly higher than that for males in the urban areas, which is in agreement with the findings of other studies.

APPENDIX

1. *The data*

Chinese Household Income Project, 1988. Principal investigators: Keith Griffin, University of California-Riverside and Zhao Renwei, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing.

The Chinese Household Income Project was a joint research project done in conjunction with the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Ford Foundation. Support was also provided by the Columbia East Asian Institute and the City University of New York. Investigators collected the sample, consisting of 51 352 rural individuals and 31 827 urban individuals, with the help of the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. The sample includes observations from rural areas in all of the provinces excluding Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan. The sample's urban observations are obtained from Liaoning, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Anhui, Hunan, Hebei, Gansu, Yuannan provinces as well as from Beijing.

Those individuals who failed to report information on age, education, wage, sex, race or Communist Party membership were dropped from the analysis, as were part-time workers, retirees, students or those not earning the basic wage. In addition, those individuals whose "experience" variable was negative were excluded. The end results are sample sizes of 16 865 individuals in the urban areas and 1626 individuals in the rural areas.

2. *Chow test comparing wage equations for communists and non-communists in rural areas*

The Chow test used in our analysis tests the null hypothesis that the β-coefficients in the earnings function for Communist Party members are equal to the β-coefficients in the earnings function for non-members. The test statistic is

the following:

$$F = \frac{(R_{ur}^2 - R_r^2)/q}{(1 - R_{ur}^2)/(N - k)} = 1.14$$

where the critical value for $F_{(6,1646)}$ is 2.10, leading us to accept our null that the same earnings function can be fit for Communist Party members and non-members in the rural areas.

Table 6. Test of H_0: the coefficients on equations (6) and (7) are the same

Independent variable	(6)	(7)
Schooling	0.0357	0.0392
	(0.0057)	(0.0065)
Experience	0.0194	0.0197
	(0.0039)	(0.0044)
Experience squared	−0.0002	−0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Female	−0.0754	−0.0777
	(0.0339)	(0.0360)
Minority	−0.1937	−0.1687
	(0.0847)	(0.1106)
Communist	—	−0.1269
		(0.2769)
Communist*schooling	—	0.0052
		(0.0151)
Communist*experience	—	0.0004
		(0.0133)
Communist*experience^2	—	0.0000
		(0.0002)
Communist*female	—	0.0356
		(0.1297)
Communist*minority	—	−0.0873
		(0.1617)
_cons.	4.033	3.997
	(0.0725)	(0.0794)
Observations	1658	1658
R^2	0.055	0.059

3. *Occupations in the urban and rural areas*

Table 7. Sectors of work in the urban areas

Employment type	*Percent*	*Frequency*
State-owned	40.01	6836
Other publicly owned	39.69	6782
Collective	19.83	3388
Privately/individually owned	0.06	10
Sino-foreign joint venture	0.26	44
Foreign owned	0.02	3
Other	0.12	21
Multiple ownership	0.01	2

Table 8. Sectors of work in the rural areas

Employment type	*Percent*	*Frequency*
State-owned	3.07	51
Local-state owned	13.42	223
Cooperative	50.18	834
Privately/individually owned	5.35	89
Foreign owned	0.24	4
Farming under household responsibility system	19.07	317
Other	8.66	144

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