

Politico-Economic Determinants of American Trade Policy Attitudes*

Michael E. S. Hoffman[†]
Duke University

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[†] hoffmanme@gao.gov, Center for Economics, U.S. Government Accountability Office.

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Abstract

Voting behavior and constituent attitudes are central to many models of trade policy determination. Examining the demographic and economic variables that are associated with attitudes toward various trade policies can provide some insight into the public perception of globalization, and the political response to those perceptions. Using detailed response and demographic data from the Program on International Policy Attitudes survey “Americans on Globalization, Trade, and Farm Subsidies” I assess a number of potential determinants of trade policy attitudes. Educational attainment is most clearly associated with pro-trade attitudes, and party affiliation suggests a certain malleability of opinion on trade issues. In addition, there is substantial variation in the determinants of trade policy attitudes across policy variables.

1. Introduction

Voting behavior and constituent attitudes are central to many models of trade policy determination. For example, voting behavior is crucial in models such as Mayer’s (1984) median voter approach, while constituent attitudes are implicitly important to political support approaches such as Grossman and Helpman (1994). In models of political influence, in general, the process through which various factors influence constituents may be just as important as the process through which interest groups influence politicians. There is, therefore, value in understanding how individual opinions regarding economic and trade policies are formed.

At the very least, survey research provides a quantitative description of the distribution of opinions on a given issue. Coupled with economic and demographic data at the individual level, survey data can contribute further to the understanding of the deep determinants of those opinions. Such is the case with the Program on International

Policy Attitudes (PIPA)/Knowledge Networks December 2003-January 2004 national survey, “Americans on Globalization, Trade, and Farm Subsidies.”¹

The dataset produced as a result of the survey has a number of advantages. First, it assesses American attitudes on a number of distinct trade policy issues, ranging from North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the upcoming Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) to steel tariffs and agriculture subsidies for small farmers. This allows for an unprecedented comparison of the bases of trade policy opinions across policies. Second, survey respondents were asked a series of questions relating to their individual economic and demographic characteristics, including employment status, income, occupation, and political party affiliation. This combined information allows for a statistical examination of the determinants of trade policy attitudes, with a dataset that has not been used in any previous study of this kind.

There are several major findings of the paper. First, the determinants of opinions on trade policy are far from uniform across policy variables. In other words, Americans do not view trade policy as a monolithic entity, but, for example, may have favorable opinions when it comes to farm subsidies, but unfavorable opinions concerning other trade interventions. This sends a very different message than similar studies that use a single generic variable in their analysis. A college education is more likely than anything else to make people favor more liberal trade policies. Finally, political affiliation is largely unrelated to trade policy preferences, except in cases where prominent partisans, in this context Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, make a vocal public appeal on an issue, here the “safeguard” steel tariffs of 2002 and NAFTA, respectively.

¹ The major findings of the survey and associated questions can be found on PIPA’s website, <http://www.pipa.org>. Summary statistics for response and demographic variables used in this paper can be found in the Appendix.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main results in the relatively young literature, and some related hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 details the regression results and attempts at a coherent interpretation. Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review

There is a growing but incomplete literature that utilizes survey responses to evaluate possible determinants of trade policy attitudes.² Research varies according to the dataset used and the types of explanatory variables considered. Much of the literature involves explicit or implicit tests of the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Balistreri (1997) is an example of some early work in this area. Using the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement as a natural experiment, Balistreri finds that factor ownership matters for individual policy opinions, using data from the 1988 Canadian National Election Study.

Recent work by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) uses data from the National Election Studies (NES), which includes a single binary response variable: whether the subject does or does not support additional trade barriers. By including both education level (factor endowment) and occupation (industry of employment) as explanatory variables they find that the NES data support a Heckscher-Ohlin theory over a specific-factors theory of income distribution.³ An additional finding of Scheve and Slaughter is that asset ownership, in this case a home, matters for trade policy preferences: homeowners

² The literature is broader than merely trade policy. For example, Blinder and Krueger (2004) utilize survey data to study the determinants of the quality of an individual's economic knowledge, with special emphasis on their sources of information.

³ See Bhagwati et al. (1998) for a rigorous theoretical look at these two models, and Magee (1980) for a comparison of the political incentives inherent in them.

in labor-intensive communities favor protectionism as a means of increasing real estate values.

Ongoing work by Mayda and Rodrik (2002), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and O'Rourke (2003), uses data from the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) 1995 survey on national identity. The cross-country dataset contains responses to a question on trade policy (Agree or disagree: "[respondent's country] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.") that the above authors use as their dependent variable, as well as a variety of demographic information. Rodrik and Mayda (2002) find that both factor endowments (measured by education level) and industry of employment are important determinants of opinions on foreign imports. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and O'Rourke (2003) find strong support for a Heckscher-Ohlin type model.⁴ Rodrik and Mayda (2002), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and O'Rourke (2003) include many non-economic variables in their regressions, such as measures of patriotism, chauvinism, and religiosity. Despite the atheoretic context, the authors find that many of them are strongly associated with trade policy preferences.

Data limitations of previous studies of individual trade policy attitudes have forced researchers to use a single dependent variable to measure opinions. The current dataset offers the ability to compare how the determinants of trade policy attitudes differ across policy variables. Moreover, the statistical evidence reported here establishes that Americans view trade policy as a multifaceted entity, and that different trade policies alter economic incentives in asymmetric ways. For example, people working in

⁴ O'Rourke (2003) finds that opinions are consistent with an H-O model featuring trade in goods or international labor mobility.

manufacturing may be strongly against NAFTA, but indifferent to the more agriculturally oriented CAFTA.

3. Data

The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) is a “joint program of the Center on Policy Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies” both at the University of Maryland (<http://www.pipa.org>). The survey in question, titled “Americans on Globalization, Trade, and Farm Subsidies” was conducted “with a nationwide sample of 1,896 respondents from December 19 to January 5” 2003-2004 (Kull et al., 2004).

The survey is composed of over 100 questions, though many questions were not asked of the entire sample, all related to American international economic policy. I chose seven questions to serve as dependent variables. The questions were related to the (1) widely publicized steel tariffs enacted in 2002, (2) free trade in general, (3) NAFTA, (4) globalization in general, (5) farm subsidies for small farmers, (6) the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and (7) the FTAA, respectively. See the Appendix for a complete description of the questions and possible responses.

Respondents were also asked a series questions regarding their political views and economic status. The demographic variables include occupational category, political party, age, dual income household, education, race/ethnicity, gender, household size, household income, marital status, state of residence, rural/suburban/urban area, home ownership, and employment status. The result is a wealth of information, limited only by the fact that much of the data are categorical in nature, even for variables that could be measured continuously (e.g. income and education). This will ultimately limit the ability

of the independent variables to account for more than a small proportion of the variation in the response variables.

I focus on a subset of variables that are likely to have an economic or political interpretation. (1) Political party: Democrats are (roughly speaking) the party of labor, so in a Heckscher-Ohlin context should generally be anti-trade. Conversely, Republicans are thought to be the party of capital, so the same Stolper-Samuelson reasoning should make them more in favor of trade and globalization.⁵ (2) Education: I convert the categorical education variable into a dummy variable equal to one when the respondent is a college graduate. There are two possible interpretations for the education variable. Skilled labor is presumably the abundant factor in the U.S., which should benefit from trade. However, even if the H-O model is not a reasonable description of the economy, a college education may still convey a greater understanding of the, often intangible, benefits of free trade. Walstad (1997) finds that education in economics affects people's opinions on public policy issues, making them more likely to agree with economists.⁶ (3) Location: I convert the residence variable to a binary variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a rural area (zero if urban or suburban). Rural residents may be more financially and culturally connected to the agricultural economy, which will give them a vested interest in trade policies that affect farming. (4) Income: The income response variable is categorical (1 = less than \$5000, 2 = \$5000-\$7499, 3 = \$7500-\$9999, etc.), so I convert it to a continuous (though stepwise) variable (1 = \$2500, 2 = \$6250, 3 = \$8750, etc.). Income may be another signal of ownership of the factors favored by free trade,

⁵ Judkins and Milner (2004) find that this is the case for left-right parties in 25 developed economies, including the United States.

⁶ There is a surprising consensus among economists in a number of areas, most notably international trade. See Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003).

namely human and physical capital. Thus higher income individuals are expected to be more in favor of trade. (5) Manufacturing employment: I convert the categorical occupation variable to binary variable which is equal to one if the respondent is employed in manufacturing (the category also includes construction and maintenance, which has the potential to confound interpretation of the results).⁷ With limited factor mobility (i.e. the specific factors model) trade preferences will be associated with sectors of the economy. Given that manufacturing is often the target of foreign competition, people employed in that sector should tend to be anti-trade. (6) Homeownership: I also convert the home status variable, which has three categories (own/rent/don't pay for housing), to a dummy equal to one if the individual owns their own home. Asset ownership, in the form of a home, may insulate individuals from some of the uncertainty associated with globalization, and thus make them more pro-trade.⁸

I extend the existing dataset with two variables meant to capture local (state level) economic conditions. (7) Unemployment: As a measure of local employment conditions, I add state level unemployment data for December 2003. If unemployment is perceived to be a result of foreign competition, local unemployment may bias people against trade.⁹ (8) Export exposure: To gauge the importance of international trade to the local economy, I construct a measure of export exposure, defined as the quantity of

⁷ The inclusion of construction and maintenance occupations, along with manufacturing, may be less confounding if people view trade liberalization as including the liberalization of immigration policies as well. With immigration allowed, liberalization can create competition for labor-intensive nontradeables, including construction and maintenance services.

⁸ Later, I also test the generality of Scheve and Slaughter's (2001) result (that homeowners in labor-intensive counties are more protectionist) by interacting homeownership with trade exposure. I provide a partial confirmation of the result.

⁹ Higher unemployment is associated with greater protectionism at the aggregate level in the US. See Magee, Brock, and Young (1989).

state production exported divided by gross state product.¹⁰ Individuals living, and working, in areas with higher export exposure should be more aware of, and economically connected to, the benefits of freer trade.

4. Results

4.1 Estimation

The reported results are from a logistic regression (logit) estimated with Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors, except for the globalization dependent variable (measured from zero to ten) which is estimated by linear regression with White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. In Tables 1 through 7, corresponding to the seven response variables, each coefficient is reported with its standard error in parentheses, and with an asterisk denoting level of statistical significance (at *.05 or **.01), if any.

Ten models are estimated for each dependent variable. Models 1 through 8 are bivariate regressions, which include only a single independent variable (and a constant). Model 9 includes all eight explanatory variables. Limited nonresponse in the explanatory variables makes Model 9 somewhat less informative than it would be otherwise. Because the nonresponse is inconsistent across variables, including all independent variables in a single regression reduces the total sample size substantially. For this reason, I also estimate Model 10 with the explanatory variables that were found to be significant in Models 1 through 8. This should eliminate any spurious results from the bivariate regressions while reducing the problem of nonresponse associated with Model 9.

¹⁰ Export data at the state level is available from TradeStats Express, a service of the International Trade Administration at <http://tse.export.gov>. Gross state product is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Both are annual data from 2003.

Recall that the eight explanatory variables are party affiliation (PARTY=1 for Republican, 0 for Democrat), college graduate (EDUC=1 for yes, 0 for no), rural resident (RURAL=1 for yes, 0 for no), state level of unemployment (UNEMST=percentage unemployed in December 2003), household income (INCOME=estimated household income in hundreds of dollars), employed in manufacturing (MANU=1 if yes, 0 if no), home ownership (HOME=1 if yes, 0 if no), and export exposure (XEXP=total state exports/gross state product [in 2003]).

Table 1 – Steel Tariffs (0 = “Tariffs a mistake”, 1 = “Not a mistake”)

Model:										
Coefficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(Std. Error)										
Party	1.63** (0.212)								1.58** (0.264)	1.66** (.221)
Educ		-.532** (0.174)							-.74** (0.296)	-.697** (0.226)
Unemst			-.095 (0.089)						-.267 (0.167)	
Income				2.8E-5 (2.6E-4)					-4.1E-5 (3.7E-4)	
Manu					0.117 (0.215)				-.135 (0.327)	
Home						0.139 (0.174)			0.081 (0.288)	
Xexp							2.35 (3.06)		6.34 (6.15)	
Rural								0.554** (0.176)	0.26 (0.28)	0.286 (0.232)

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 2 – Free Trade (0 = “Support free trade”, 1 = “Don’t support”)

Model: Coefficient (Std. Error)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Party	0.005 (0.168)								-.024 (0.204)	
Educ		-.788** (0.176)							-.91** (0.27)	-.78** (0.2)
Unemst			0.049 (0.076)						-.092 (0.150)	
Income				-3.4E-4 (2.1E-4)					5.4E-5 (3.3E-4)	
Manu					0.546** (0.175)				0.328 (0.226)	0.339* (0.178)
Home						0.255 (0.156)			0.419 (0.288)	
Xexp							1.06 (2.34)		-.805 (4.47)	
Rural								0.281* (0.142)	0.157 (0.215)	0.304 (0.167)

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 3 – NAFTA (0 = “Been good”, 1 = “Not good”)

Model: Coefficient (Std. Error)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Party	0.354* (0.175)								0.467* (0.213)	0.467* (0.211)
Educ		-.421** (0.162)							-.285 (0.247)	-.255 (0.239)
Unemst			-.131 (0.082)						0.051 (.158)	
Income				-1.9E-4 (2.2E-4)					2.7E-5 (3.2E-4)	
Manu					0.887** (0.202)				0.815** (0.266)	0.839** (0.262)
Home						0.363* (0.153)			.365 (.248)	0.335 (0.24)
Xexp							-5.84* (2.74)		-2.91 (5.08)	-2.03 (3.9)
Rural								0.260 (0.149)	-.024 (0.227)	

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 4 – Globalization (0...10, 0 = “Completely negative”, 10 = “Completely positive”)

Model:										
Coefficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(Std. Error)										
Party	-0.385 (0.243)								-0.338 (0.282)	
Educ		0.791** (0.230)							1.04** (0.330)	0.661* (0.261)
Unemst			0.187 (0.106)						-0.089 (0.208)	
Income				3.6E-4 (2.9E-4)					4.2E-4 (4.3E-4)	
Manu					-0.626* (0.256)				0.010 (0.370)	-0.313 (0.27)
Home						0.045 (0.218)			-0.004 (0.367)	
Xexp							10.3** (3.23)		15.9** (5.56)	13.2** (3.64)
Rural								-0.249 (0.203)	-0.156 (0.310)	

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 5 – Farm Subsidies (0 = “Oppose”, 1 = “Support”)

Model:										
Coefficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(Std. Error)										
Party	-0.251 (0.167)								-0.389 (.203)	
Educ		-0.121 (0.154)							0.139 (.233)	
Unemst			0.029 (0.079)						-0.051 (0.137)	
Income				-5.3E-4 (2.1E-4)					-7.7E-6 (3.4E-4)	
Manu					0.037 (0.184)				0.351 (0.249)	
Home						-0.251 (0.158)			-0.292 (.243)	
Xexp							0.887 (2.61)		0.978 (4.37)	
Rural								0.371* (0.150)	0.392 (0.224)	0.371* (0.150)

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 6 – CAFTA (0 = “Support”, 1 = “Oppose”)

Model:										
Coefficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(Std. Error)										
Party	0.053 (0.173)								0.187 (0.213)	
Educ		-.469** (0.163)							-.587* (0.245)	-.474* (0.189)
Unemst			-.036 (0.081)						-.213 (0.159)	
Income				-9.8E-5 (2.3E-4)					-7.3E-5 (3.4E-4)	
Manu					0.439* (0.189)				0.210 (0.247)	0.314 (0.195)
Home						0.129 (0.160)			0.084 (0.252)	
Xexp							-3.98 (2.65)		1.92 (4.75)	
Rural								0.477** (0.151)	0.264 (0.228)	0.303 (0.180)

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

Table 7 – FTAA (0 = “Support”, 1 = “Oppose”)

Model:										
Coefficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(Std. Error)										
Party	0.228 (0.223)								0.386 (0.271)	
Educ		-.274 (0.204)							-.586 (0.337)	
Unemst			-.096 (0.101)						-.180 (0.200)	
Income				-3.5E-4 (2.9E-4)					-6.3E-4 (4.1E-4)	
Manu					0.360 (0.241)				-.320 (0.327)	
Home						0.086 (0.194)			0.486 (0.327)	
Xexp							-4.55 (3.41)		3.61 (6.16)	
Rural								0.184 (0.187)	-.305 (0.300)	

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

4.2 Discussion

I will begin by discussing the regressions singly, followed by an interpretation of the results as a whole. Attitudes on the “safeguard” steel tariffs of 2002 are significantly affected by party affiliation (Republicans think they were the right thing to do) and education (those with college degrees were against the tariffs). Education is once again a determinant of opinions on free trade in general (college graduates support it), as is employment in the manufacturing sector (manufacturing workers are against it). Views on NAFTA are also related to manufacturing employment (manufacturing workers view it as a failure) and party affiliation (Democrats are more likely to view it as a success). Export exposure and education are significant determinants of views on globalization in general, with college graduates viewing globalization as more positive, as well people living in states with greater export-orientation. Rural residence is the only significant determinant of opinions on farm subsidies for small farmers; rather intuitively, people who live in rural areas are more likely to believe the government should give subsidies to farmers working on 500 or fewer acres. Individuals with a college education tend to be supportive of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, while rural residents are not. Finally, opinions on the FTAA seem somewhat random: none of the explanatory variables are significant determinants of support of FTAA negotiations, despite the fact that 92 percent of respondents had an opinion.¹¹

An interesting picture emerges from the regression results when they are considered together. Educational attainment is most clearly associated with pro-globalization attitudes. Income is not. The latter result is at odds with Scheve and

¹¹ Of all the policy variables discussed here, the FTAA is the most recent, and has received the least amount of news coverage (as of December 2004).

Slaughter (2001), and Mayda and Rodrik (2002). If income is not associated with trade policy attitudes, but education is, then the effect of education may be based more on information (see Coughlin [2002] for a discussion) and less on factor endowments (as income should also indicate that the individual is considerably endowed with physical and/or human capital). Blinder and Krueger (2004) conclude that greater education leads people to be better informed about economic policy issues, which could certainly explain the effect of college education in this case.

The partisan effect is perhaps the most interesting. Party affiliation is not significantly related to opinions on globalization or free trade in general. However, Republicans are much more likely to support the steel tariffs that President George W. Bush approved in 2002. This became a signature issue for Bush (*Economist*, February 14, 2002). Republicans are significantly less likely to be pro-NAFTA, which was a signature issue for Bush's predecessor, President Bill Clinton. Rather than being a pro-capital party, as predicted, rank-and-file Republicans instead take positions espoused by party leaders (or take the opposite positions of opposing party leaders!). Blinder and Krueger (2004) also find that partisan ideology is a major determinant of opinions on policy issues. This suggests that opinions are very malleable when it comes to trade policy. Attempts at trade liberalization (or trade intervention!) may be made feasible through vocal party advocacy.

There are some industry effects as well. People working in manufacturing are anti-NAFTA and anti-trade in general, and individuals living in rural areas are less likely to support the CAFTA, perhaps due to a presumed agricultural comparative advantage of Central American nations. These sector effects, coupled with the fact that income is not a

significant determinant of trade policy attitudes, seem to support a specific-factors view of the economy. This is consistent with Magee (1980), but inconsistent with Scheve and Slaughter (2001), and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2002), among others.

In general, it seems that vague questions about globalization or trade are not particularly meaningful to people. Questions about specific policies, on the other hand, are very tangible to people who have an economic interest at stake, or a party leader who has taken a stand on the issue. People do not feel the same way about all trade policies, and their individual economic characteristics do not influence their opinions in the same way for all trade policies.

4.3 Role of Home Ownership

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) put particular emphasis on the role of assets in their analysis of trade policy preferences. They do not test the role of home ownership in isolation (and interestingly, in the results reported earlier here, the coefficient on home ownership is marginally significant in only one of the regressions), but by interacting it with the degree of import competition. If some of consumers' wealth is stored in their homes, they should be concerned about how trade policy affects the value of real estate in their area. Trade liberalization (barriers) should increase (decrease) the value of housing in export-oriented communities and vice versa for import-competing communities.

To test this econometrically, I follow Scheve and Slaughter and interact the home ownership dummy variable with the measure of export exposure. It is a significant determinant of trade policy attitudes for only one of the dependent variables: free trade in general. The regression is reported below.

Table 8 – Free Trade/Home Ownership Interaction

Model Coefficient (Std. Error)	Original (Model 10)	With Interaction
Educ	-.78** (0.2)	-.836** (0.202)
Manu	0.339* (0.178)	0.314 (0.180)
Rural	0.304 (0.167)	0.277 (0.168)
Home*(1-Xexp)		0.4222* (0.194)

*Significant at .05, **Significant at .01

The results in Table 8 provide some limited confirmation of Scheve and Slaughter's (2001) result regarding the role of assets. Individual opinions of free trade are significantly affected by their asset ownership and degree of trade exposure in their state; homeowners in states with large import-competing industries are against trade, but homeowners in export-oriented states are largely for free trade.

One important difference between the current analysis and theirs regards the coarseness of the geographic variable. Here the level of aggregation is the state, whereas it is the county in Scheve and Slaughter. In other words, because of the possibility of aggregation bias, one should not read too much into the failure to confirm their results with the other six dependent variables.

5. Conclusion

As with Scheve and Slaughter (2001), the intention here is not to perform an explicit test of competing models of comparative advantage,¹² but rather to characterize the data in a way that can inform future models of the political economy of trade policy, which depend crucially on individual attitudes and voting behavior. In particular, current models of political economy may put too much emphasis on the ability of voters to sway politicians, and not enough on the ability of elected officials to sway their constituents.

Research in this area is still developing, and this paper contributes to the growing literature by revealing a few empirical generalizations regarding the determinants of attitudes toward globalization. To do this, I mobilize a fresh dataset of opinions on trade policies and the demographic backgrounds of individual respondents, and investigate the determinants of trade policy attitudes econometrically. First and foremost, the deep determinants of trade policy attitudes are not uniform across policy variables. Second, industry ties (e.g. rural and manufacturing) are important causal factors. Third, education affects trade policy attitudes, though this may be a result of information quality as much as factor endowments. Finally, people seem to develop their trade policy opinions based on political affiliation, rather than the other way around. In other words, trade policy attitudes seem to be formed through an eclectic mix of self-interest, informed speculation, and partisan leanings.

¹² As Balistreri (1997) notes, empirical exercises of this type actually *are* tests of competing theories of comparative advantage only under the “assumption that agents are fully informed about the true distributional effects of policy,” *and* these distributional effects are the agents’ overriding concern.

Appendix

Dependent variable #4 (Q1 in survey): Globalization (percentage of responses)

“I’d like to know how positive or negative you think this process of globalization is, overall. Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being completely negative, 10 being completely positive, and 5 being equally positive and negative.”

0 (2)
1 (2)
2 (2)
3 (7)
4 (7)
5 (39)
6 (10)
7 (11)
8 (10)
9 (2)
10 (6)
No answer (3)

Dependent variable #6 (Q33 in survey): CAFTA (percentage of responses)

“As you may know, the US and some countries of Central America have negotiated a treaty called the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that is similar to what the US now has with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA. Would you favor or oppose Congress approving such an agreement?”

Favor (49)
Oppose (42)
No Answer (10)

Dependent variable #2 (Q35 in survey): Free trade (percentage responses)

“As you may know, there are views on the question of whether the US should promote freer trade. There are also different views on whether the US government should have programs that try to help workers who lose their jobs because of free trade. Which of the following three positions comes closest to your point of view?”

I favor free trade, and I believe that it IS necessary for the government to have programs to help [workers] who lose their jobs. (60)
I favor free trade, and I believe that it is NOT necessary for the government to have programs to help workers who lose their jobs. (13)
I do not favor free trade. (22)
No answer (5)

Dependent variable #5 (Q38 in survey): Farm subsidies (percentage responses)

“Do you favor or oppose the US government giving subsidies to small farmers, who work farms less than 500 acres?”

Favor (77)
Oppose (19)
No answer (4)

Dependent variable #3 (Q36 in survey): NAFTA (percentage responses)

“As you may know, the US and most countries of North, Central, and South America have been discussing the possibility of having a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, similar to what the US now has with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA. Would you favor or oppose have such a new agreement?”

Favor (52)
Oppose (40)
No answer (8)

Dependent variable #1 (Q66 in survey): Steel tariffs (percentage responses)

“As you may know, in early 2002 President Bush raised tariffs on steel imports. In response to challenges by other countries the World Trade Organization ruled that these increases were in violation of international trade rules. President Bush subsequently lowered the steel tariffs. What is your position on this decision?”

He was right to raise them in the first place, and he was right to lower them in response to the WTO ruling. (30)
It was a mistake for him to raise them in the first place. (32)
He was right to raise them in the first place and he should not have lowered them (24)
No answer (14)

Dependent variable #3 (Q67 in survey): NAFTA (percentage responses)

“Do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, has been good or bad for the United States?”

Good (47)
Bad (39)
Neither (6)
No answer (7)

Summary statistics for explanatory variables

Table 9 – Summary Statistics/Explanatory Variables

Variable	Mean (Std. Deviation)
Party	0.5028 (0.5002)
Educ	0.2642 (0.4410)
Unemst	5.8 (.8885)
Income	483.5 (317.6)
Manu	0.2402 (0.4274)
Home	0.7036 (0.4568)
Xexp	0.0660 (0.0274)
Rural	0.3623 (0.4808)

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