

Arno Tausch¹

1 **Arno Tausch** Adjunct Professor (Universitaetsdozent) of Political Science at Innsbruck University, Department of Political Science, A-6020 Innsbruck University; Innrain 52/III; Austria (Founder: Professor Anton Pelinka). Available book publications: <http://www.campusi.com>. e-mail address: Arno.Tausch@bmsg.gv.at

Is Islam really a development blockade?

12 predictors of development, including membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, and their influence on 14 indicators of development in 109 countries of the world with completely available data

***Abstract:** With all the talk in Europe about “Islam” and “Muslim culture” it is surprising how little hard-core empirical evidence exists on the compatibility of “Muslim culture” with positive patterns of political, social, and ecological development in the world system in the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond. This article tries to close this gap by using latest (United Nations and other data) and multivariate techniques, investigating the determination of 14 indicators of development in 109 countries with complete data by 12 determinants of development, including membership in the 57 member and 3 observer Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), comprising 57 members and 3 observer states. The empirical record, presented in this essay, speaks a clear language in favor of Islamic democracy and against those in the West that attempt to treat Islamic cultural heritage as a general development burden. It should be also clear that a reliance on the “Washington Consensus” alone will not “fix” the performance of countries beyond a better and more predictable “development stability”. The most consistent consequence of the “dependency” analysis of this essay is the realization that a reliance on foreign capital in the short term might bring about positive consequences for employment – especially female employment – but that the long-term negative consequences of dependence in the social sphere, but also for sustainable development, outweigh the immediate, positive effects. Our three-fold empirical understanding of the process of globalization – reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and unequal transfer, - goes beyond the average analysis of the workings of dependency structures and shows how different aspects of dependency negatively affect development performance. The integration of the countries of the periphery into larger currency blocs – quite contrary to what the “Washington Consensus” has to say about “competitive currencies” - will be one of the most important tasks for international development strategies for years to come. EU membership, by contrast, under the present institutional conditions of the EU – not as it should be but as it is - fails to have sufficiently enough dynamic effects and its democratic deficits become ever more clear. In terms of the size of the quantitative effects on the 14 dimensions of development under investigation here, it is shown that the new political structures associated with political feminism that substituted patriarchic structures inherent in practically all world regions for much of the 19th and the early 20th Century have a very considerable effect on the development outcomes of today. Feminism in power – i.e. the share of women in positions of political decision making - achieves to transform many aspects of development, but, as other “distribution coalitions” before it, creates certain aspects of stagnation as well and thus is not free from the effects of the logic of “collective action”. Islamic culture is not a development blockade; on the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus – a very positive effect on political democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto-process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a “religion of the Middle Ages” Islam has an important message for the 21st Century. The article also analyses recent trends in the structure of international saving, pension systems and the dynamics of “unequal transfer”. It emerges that the European Center is going to become the main loser in the structural changes that affect the position of Europe in the 21st Century.*

Keywords: cross-section models, income distribution, inequality, international economic order, economic welfare, globalization; general welfare, social security and public pensions, macroeconomics – Asia including Middle East; macroeconomic analyses of economic development, comparative economic systems, cultural economics

JEL classification: C21, D31, D60, F02, F15, I3, I31, H55, N15; O11; P50; Z10

Introduction

Recent debates about globalization among decision makers and social scientists have coined the term “*pathfinders of globalization*” (Harss and Maier, 1998). A good segment of the international social scientific community would be in accordance with such a role-description, while an equally important and growing segment of the social scientific community would vehemently oppose the basic axioms of globalization in its present form.

Conventional wisdom of the “*Washington Consensus*” has it that it is always the periphery or semi-periphery country that got it all wrong during a crisis, like in East Asia, Russia or recently in Turkey and that a good combination of economic freedom, privatization, tight monetary policies and above all private foreign direct investment will “fix” it, once the forces of the market are properly at work.²

The “*Washington Consensus*” has been summarized by Raffer (pp. 305 – 323 in Tausch, 2003) as to represent the following policy priorities:

1. *Fiscal discipline*: a primary budget surplus of several percent of GDP
2. *Public expenditure priorities*: defined as re-directions of public expenditures towards fields with high economic returns such as primary health and education
3. *Tax reform*: cutting marginal tax rates
4. *Financial liberalization*: moderately positive real interest rates and the abolition of preferential interest rates (such as for developmentally useful or socially demanded projects)
5. *Exchange rates*: unified and competitive
6. *Trade liberalization*: abolishing quotas (replacing them by tariffs) and reducing tariffs to a uniform low level within three to ten years.
7. *Foreign direct investment*: equal treatment with domestic firms. The World Bank calls this the elimination of barriers. This principle is also enshrined in the WTO treaties.
8. *Privatization*
9. *Deregulation*: abolishing regulations aiming at achieving developmental or social aims
10. *Property rights*: must be guaranteed.

The counter-position, advanced by globalization critics, environmentalists, liberation theologians of all denominations, and – most recently – dissidents from the once homogeneous neo-liberal camp would hold that unfettered globalization increases the social gaps between rich and poor both within countries as well as on a global scale. Most of the adherents of this camp would share the view proposed by Cornia and Kiiski that income distribution in the world system has worsened during the period of globalization.

The idea that economic and social progress is not linear has many implications for the ascent and decline of nations in the world system. The clearest proof of discontinuous development in our age is the real income at purchasing power data series available from the international developmental

² See, for example, the highly interesting account on how international economists see the reasons for the “Turkish melt-down” at the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research http://www.nber.org/crisis/turkey_report.html


institutions. Large parts of our globe were once richer, in real terms, than in 2000; a great number of countries experienced real decades of economic impoverishment over the last ¼ of a Century. The UNDP 2002 electronic data base³ easily permits such a calculation from 1975 to 2000. The UNDP data tell you in which year since 1975 the highest income was reached. Normally, you would expect that a country had 25 years of progress since 1975, but this is not the case. Many nations reached their maximum national average welfare in the 1980s, several of them even before. When you subtract from the number 2000 the year with the highest real income since 1975, you arrive at a global map of development failure since 1975, and you arrive equally at a map of the failures of globalization since 1975. 63 nations lost 10 or more years of their development; and only 70 of 159 ranked countries had their highest average real welfare level in 2000. The record holders of development failure in these terms (20 or more years lost) were the following 26 countries:

1. Angola
2. Bolivia
3. Central African Republic
4. Chad
5. Côte d'Ivoire
6. El Salvador
7. Gabon
8. Ghana
9. Guatemala
10. Haiti
11. Honduras
12. Iran
13. Jamaica
14. Kuwait
15. Madagascar
16. Mali
17. Mauritania
18. Namibia
19. Nicaragua
20. Niger
21. Nigeria
22. Saudi Arabia
23. Senegal
24. Togo
25. Venezuela
26. Zambia

Map 1: lost development years since 1975 in the world system


³ <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=index.html>

lost development years in 2000



Legend: “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging from” “to”

lost development years in 2000



Legend: no data for Cuba, French Guyana, Greenland, West Sahara, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Libya, Iraq, the Dem. Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and North Korea

The Latin American social scientist Osvaldo Sunkel first proposed in his essay '*Transnational capitalism and national disintegration (in Latin America)*' the still provocative thought that transnational investment and integration might go hand in hand under certain conditions with an increasing relative social polarization between rich and poor in the host countries of the evolving transnational system and on the international level. At that time, Sunkel said:

'The interpretation so far advanced suggests that the international capitalist system contains an internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying degrees of importance in each country. These sectors share a common culture and 'way of life', which expresses itself through the same books, texts, films, television programs, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of family and social life, similar style of decoration of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, furniture and urban design. Despite linguistic barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity for communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal persons of the same country who speak the same language (...) Modernization implies the gradual replacement of the traditional productive structure by another of much higher capital intensiveness (...) On the one hand, the process of modernization incorporates into the new structures the individuals and groups that are apt to fit into the kind of rationality that prevails there; on the other hand, it expels the individuals and groups that have no place in the new productive structure or who lack the capacity to become adapted to it. It is important to emphasize that this process does not only prevent or limit the formation of a national entrepreneurial class, as indicated by Furtado, but also of a national middle class (...) and even a national working class. The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some national entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those absorbed by the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff and the segment of employees are incorporated, and the rest are marginalized; part of the qualified labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are incorporated, while the remainder are marginalized.'

The effects of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for social mobility. The marginalized entrepreneur will probably add to the ranks of small or artisanal manufacture, or will abandon independent activity and become a middle class employee. The marginalized sectors of the middle class will probably form a group of frustrated lower middle class people trying to maintain middle class appearance without much possibility of upward mobility and terrorized by the danger of proletarianization. The marginalized workers will surely add to the ranks of absolute marginality, where, as in the lower middle class, growing pools of resentment and frustration of considerable demographic dimension will accumulate (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular base, the universities etc.' (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42).

While debates abound, hard-core social scientific evidence on the contradictory effects of globalization is needed more than ever before.

The intense debate about globalization and social welfare in the world system


On the surface, there seems to exist a certain kind of agreement among the political and the research community world wide that globalization since 1980 negatively affected the lives of around 1.5 thousand million people on earth, whose per-capita incomes were lower than in earlier decades. These 1.5 thousand million people live in around 100 countries; while 15 nations experienced rapid capitalist development over the last decade (UNDP, 1996, 1997).

No question that the world economy is characterized at present, as happened in earlier periods, by a quantitative and qualitative jump in the degree of globalization (Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 2000; Cornia and Kiiski, 2001). Luttwak defines this present phase as *'turbo capitalism'* by private enterprise, liberated from government regulation, unchecked by effective trade unions, unfettered by concerns for employees or communities, and unhindered by taxation or investment restrictions. **Globalization** is generally understood to be the **growing transborder flow of goods, services, capital and labor**. The following UNDP 2000 numbers might illustrate this:

- World exports are more than 21% of world GNP
- Foreign direct investments are above 400 thousand million \$
- Daily currency exchanges are 1500 thousand million \$, i.e. the annual world currency trade is 18.6 times the yearly world GNP
- International bank credits are above 4200 thousand million \$

There is a never-ending flow of literature on the interrelation between globalization and poverty, with a very wide array of research results. Nobody in his minds would negate that we are confronted with the phenomenon of globalization – just to suffice to draw our attention here to the fact that foreign assets per world GDP fluctuated in the following fashion since 1870:

Graph 1: The Waves of Globalization since 1870 in the World Economy




Legend: our own compilation from Crafts, 2000

Summarizing the unique UNCTAD *World Investment Report* 2002 data base⁴, freely available on the Internet, one is lead to the following conclusions:


1. there was a tremendous increase in the process of globalization in the 1990s, but
2. this process experienced a sharp decline in its growth rate already prior to the 09/11 attacks in New York, indicating a qualitative and quantitative reversal in the capitalist world economy.

Both inward and outward investments increased tremendously until the year 2000, and declined sharply in 2001. Also the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions declined sharply in that year.


Graph 2: globalization 1980 – 2000 in the world system



Graph 3: outward investments per GDP in the world system



Graph 4: world FDI flows and world cross-border mergers halted in 2001, well before the September 11 terrorist attacks



At the same time, it has been established fairly well enough that there is a continuing phenomenon of world poverty. But what beyond that? Is globalization really the cause of world poverty? Or is rather the absence of globalization and foreign investment to blame for the continued misery in countries, say, like Myanmar, while outward-looking policies dramatically increased the lot of wide strata of the population in countries like China, Thailand and India over the last decades?

This growing international controversy on globalization and social inequality – the main contributions were written amongst others, by the Australian Treasury, 2001; Crafts, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Lindert and Williamson, 2001a, 2001b; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; Melchior, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000; and Schultz, 1998 – can be summarized as follows:

- Initial attempts by pro-globalization scholars (Dollar and Kraay, 2001) to prove the **positive effects of globalization** by selecting the post-1980 globalizing countries **Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe** as the most **successful development performers** of the world are not convincing. Of these 24 “mega-performers”, 8 are immediately “knocked out” because of their serious economic, social and political collapse, such as the political and economic events in **Argentina** (financial crash 2001), **Bangladesh** (child labor on the increase, millions face contamination from poisoned water, 15000 children die each year from pollution in Dakha alone, the Asian Development Bank diagnoses “*slow economic growth during the past decades and rising income inequality are the primary reasons for slow progress in poverty reduction*”), **Brazil** (financial crash 1998), **Colombia** (civil war, 2 million people live on the streets of Bogota, the capital, alone),

Mexico (except for a brief period in 1997, Mexico has never fully recovered from the crash of 1994), **Nepal** (civil war with more than 7000 deaths since 1994), **Rwanda** (genocide and civil war 1994) and **Zimbabwe** (after months of withholding finance, bringing Zimbabwe to the brink of collapse, the International Monetary Fund has finally agreed to provide a 14-month standby loan of US\$193 million. This is to enable the country to resume its repayments to its international creditors. For the first time since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe is \$20 million a month behind in its foreign debt payments, resulting in a \$190 million deficit for 1999). Of the remaining 16 countries, 4 more have to be discounted because **Cote d'Ivoire**, **Haiti**, **Jamaica**, and **Mali** are among the 26 countries that in reality had the **most dramatic development instability in the entire world economy since 1975** in real terms (see above) and lost 20 or more of their development years since 1975⁵. Thus only half of the countries chosen qualify for a further analysis of their “development success”.

- The other much publicized Dollar/Kraay 2000 study also does not prove clearly enough that globalization – as understood in this study – leads 1:1 to an increased well-being of the poorer population. Although the absolute income levels of the poor are indeed clearly affected by overall preceding growth, and although growth policies lead to pro-poor policies (with Dollar and Kraay implying that pro-globalization policies lead to pro-growth policies), it should be noted that their globalization **master variable is exports + imports per GDP** and thus does not measure at all important other aspects of exposure to globalization, i.e. a negative resource balance (i.e. foreign saving determines accumulation) or MNC penetration (FDI per total GDP; FDI = foreign direct investment i.e. the control of transnational capital over the entire economy of the host country) or unequal exchange (or, as Gernot Kohler prefers, „unequal transfer“) (1/ERDI; ERDI = exchange rate deviation index, i.e. a low global market value of the currency of a country compared to the purchasing power due to the process of unequal transfer). The Dollar and Kray measure⁶ in a way must be considered as an absurdity, insofar

⁵ internet country documentation: *Le Monde Diplomatique*, *United States Department of State*; *Guardian*; *Washington Post*; and *World Socialist Website*.

⁶ The correlations of the Dollar/Kray measure with UNDP indicators of poverty are the following. Several correlations support Dollar/Kray, while correlations, **contradicting** the thesis that **globalization is good** for the **poor** (including small ones), are printed in **bold** letters. It should be known, however that the number of countries, for which calculations are possible, are sometimes relatively small; i.e. the strong trade-off between trade orientation and median poverty reduction is based on only 26 countries; the trade-off between trade orientation and 11 \$ per capita and day poverty level reduction is based on only 11 countries.

Long-term unemployment (as % of labour force), 2000	0,237
Tertiary net enrolment ratio (female as % of male), 1998	0,183
Human development index (HDI) value, 2000	0,180
Human development index (HDI) value, 1995	0,177
People who are functionally illiterate (% age 16-65), 1994-98	0,167
life expectancy, 1970-75	0,161
Life expectancy 2000	0,148
GNP per capita	0,136
growth acceleration	0,134
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1975-2000	0,116

as the **large country United States is less globalized than the relatively small and world economically relatively isolated country Belarus!**

- Results that speak of a supposed growing international inequality depend on whether income is measured at market exchange rates (growing world inequality) or real purchasing power (lessening world inequality). The divergence between these two processes also opens up the question of unequal transfer, defined by world systems theories as the difference between purchasing power and income at market exchange rates (see below).
- While the Dollar and Kraay-study 2000 must be considered the flagship pro-globalization study today, careful econometric globalization-skeptical evidence seems to suggest – see especially the pooled regression results from time series in 38 countries, reported in Lundberg and Squire – that globalization affects different social strata in a different manner. Without going into the econometric details here, it is sufficient to mention that Lundberg and Squire report a regression slope of -2.87840 (t-value 2.06, and thus significant at the 5 % level) for the variable ‘world economic openness’ on the income growth of the bottom 40 % of the respective population, while the top 40 % reap significant benefits from globalization (slope $+9.89084$, significant even at the 1 % level).). The divergent interpretations and evaluations of these two flagship studies were part and parcel of further controversies.⁷

GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1975-2000	0,113
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income	0,108
Malaria cases (per 100,000 people), 2000	0,081
Female economic activity rate (as % of male rate), 2000	0,029
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1990-2000	0,021
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1990-2000	0,021
Tuberculosis cases (per 100,000 people), 1999	-0,013
Human poverty index (HPI-2) value (%), 2000	-0,016
life expectancy increases	-0,025
People living with HIV/AIDS, adults (% age 15-49), 2001	-0,025
Proportion of the population below \$4 a day (1990 PPP US\$), 1996-99	-0,041
% of population not using improved drinking water sources (%), 2000	-0,139
Infants with low birth-weight (%), 1995-2000	-0,157
Underweight children under age-five (%), 1995-2000	-0,157
Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort), 1995-2000	-0,162
Population below income poverty line (%), \$2 a day (1993 PPP US\$), 1983-2000	-0,217
Adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 and above), 2000	-0,254
Proportion of the population below 50% of median income, 1987-98	-0,539
Proportion of the population below \$11,00 a day (1994 PPP US\$), 1994-95	-0,694

⁷ See The *Guardian* Newspaper Tuesday, July 4, 2000.

- A preliminary final word on these controversies seems to be the recent finding reported by World Bank and Carnegie researcher Branko Milanovic, who established that at low average income levels, it is the rich who benefit from openness. As incomes rise, it is the relative incomes of the poor and the middle class that rise compared to the rich.⁸
- Results on human development indicators – like the ‘*Human Development Index*’, life expectancy or education data rather tend to confirm the hypothesis that today, we have a flattening of international inequalities. Never before in history we have had so many people around the world with such high life expectancies, and the world distribution of lived life times around the world has dramatically improved (see especially Melchior, 2000 and Crafts, 2000). World average life expectancy has increased from 55.0 years in 1962 to 66.6 years in 1997; with the GINI Index of the intra-country world lived lifetimes decreasing during the same period from 0.237 to 0.114 (Melchior, 2000). However, as we show in this article, the most spectacular cases of rapid life expectancy development took place precisely in regimes, which might be termed “Arab socialist” or “Kemalist”.
- Results differ widely whether we speak about absolute numbers of people living in poverty – say the 1 \$ or 2 \$ per capita and day threshold in real terms (these have risen according to some studies and during certain, but not all time periods since the 1960s) and the percentages of total population, falling under a given poverty line (decreasing in most studies, in most of the world regions).
- A recent summary of World Bank research results was presented by Chen and Ravallion⁹: These materials render themselves for further rigorous testing and calculations (see also appendix). It emerges that there was nowhere in the major world regions a **rapid, uniform reduction in the percentage of people falling under the 2 \$ a day poverty threshold**, but rather very strong cyclical fluctuations, and ups and downs along the waves of recession that hit the world in the 1980s and 1990s (economic maturity and the position in the international division of labor seems to determine that Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America were affected by the “shock waves” of international recession and hence a set-back in poverty reduction earlier on than South Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa). Only South Asia India never experienced an absolute rise in the percentage of poor people since the 1980s, while all other world macro-regions, including East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa at least once in their development history since the 1980s also experienced once in the period also an increase in the number of poor people as compared to the earlier periods, thus set-back in poverty reduction. Thus, while the percentage of poor people according to the World Bank concept “2 \$ a day” was reduced in the entire region from 66,7 % to 52,9 %, only South Asia is really well fluctuating (rather than “shining”, anyway more intensely for only 250 million of its inhabitants¹⁰).


⁸ http://econ.worldbank.org/files/17877_wp2876.pdf

⁹ http://econ.worldbank.org/files/36297_wps3341.pdf

¹⁰ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3518029.stm and <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/601.cms>


- the wave of the world recession of the early 1980s badly affected the Middle East, while Eastern Europe and Central Asia still experienced a period of relative poverty reduction. The end of the 1980s was a good period for all world regions, with a general decline in relative poverty rates. The turn of the decade with its recession devastatingly hit first East Asia and Eastern Europe, with the tide then spreading to the Middle East and Latin America. Latin America was worst hit by the crisis of the early 1990s and did not manage to benefit from the “Clinton boom” years, while the Middle East reduced its poverty first in the middle of the 1990s only to see an increase again at the turn of the decade and the millennium. At any rate it is impossible to say that globalization is uniformly good for the poor –in a regional as well as in a time-series perspective.

Graph 5a: World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 \$ a Day Per Capita Income – absolute numbers



Legend: our own calculations from Chen and Ravallion, Table 3.

Graph 5b: World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 \$ a Day Per Capita Income – percentages of population



Legend: our own compilations from Chen and Ravallion

Theories explaining backwardness and disarticulation

After the “ultimate triumph” of the market economy on a global scale (Fukuyama) as the result of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, an intensive debate about the development prospects of Europe’s Southern and Southeastern neighbors set in.

On a global economy level, **neo-liberal authors** like Barro; Barro and associates; Crafts; Dadush and Brahmatt; Dollar and Kraay and Weede generally tend to think that with the establishment of “**economic freedom**” positive patterns of development will prevail in practically all countries.

Cultural theories of development tend to stress that at present development perspectives for the large region between Morocco in the West and Iran in the East are not good. Their principal spokesperson today is Huntington, but also such diverse sources as the UNDP’s *Arab Human Development Report* (2002) or the World Bank’s *MENA Report* (2002) tend to highlight the various development

constraints in that region. While the UNDP stresses the lack of democracy, human resource development and gender equality as the main development blocks, the World Bank highlights the negative heritage of “Arab Socialism” or past state sector influence.

Dependency authors by contrast explain backwardness and stagnation by the ever-growing dependent insertion of these countries into the world economy. Starting with the writings of Perroux, Prebisch and Rothschild in the 1930s, their leading spokespersons, like Addo; Baran; Bello; Cardoso; Cordova; Cordova and Silva - Michelena; Dubiel; Feder; Flechsig; Frank; Frank and associates; Froebel *et al.*; Gonzales Casanova; Griffin; Griffin and associates; Kent; Linnemann and Sarma; Müller *et al.*; Raffer; Senghaas; Singer; So; Sunkel; and Woehlcke all would stress the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from the highly developed countries. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; their leading spokesperson in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin.

Later **world system analyses** – that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - tended to confirm and expand this dependency argument. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations, and there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal transfer tends to remain stable. Authors from the world system approach, like Arrighi; Arrighi and associates; Beaud; Bornschier; Chase - Dunn; Chase - Dunn and associates; Frank and associates; Goldfrank; Goldstein; Hopkins; Hopkins and Wallerstein; Kiljunen; Modelski; Raffer; Ross and Trachte; So; Tausch and associates; Walker; and Wallerstein tended to discard the “culturalist” explanations, offered by Huntington, and rather would support the argument that world economic position, and not culture, determines conflict. **Wallerstein** comes clearly up in defense **against demonizing the Arab/Islamic world** and thinks that opposing forces against the present world order will increase:

This brings me to my very last theme. Can the West do without a demon? I doubt it at the moment. The West is facing a massive crisis - not merely economic, but fundamentally political and social. The capitalist world-economy is in crisis as an historical social system. I cannot review here the crisis in detail, something I have done elsewhere on several occasions, but I raise these issues to insist that the consequence is a great deal of confusion and self-doubt in the West, a situation which always evokes the need for demons. This same confusion and self-doubt pervades the Islamic world, as is evident from the zigzagging tactics of all the main actors. The secularist forces are in disarray. The Islamist forces are not very clear, and not at all agreed among themselves, what their real political program is or ought to be. Once again, we should put this in the context of the world-system as a whole, and not limit our attention to the Islamic world. Systems that are in crisis enter into a chaotic period, out of which eventually emerges a new order. Their trajectories bifurcate, and it is intrinsically impossible to predict the branch that will prevail. In practice this means two things. Even small pressures in one direction or another may be decisive, since the system is far from equilibrium. And the social struggle is therefore extremely acute. The question that arises therefore is how the sides in the struggle for shaping the successor social system will align themselves. When the struggles were less acute, the lines seemed to be sharp. That is why we can speak of antisystemic movements within the modern world-system. These movements thought they knew what they were about and who their primary enemy was. So did the forces that defended the existing system. What the last twenty-five years has

taught us all - I think of it as the lesson of the world revolution of 1968 - was that our vision of the struggle was deeply flawed that opponents were not real opponents, and allies not real allies, whichever side one was on. In this sense, the Islamists are profoundly correct in saying that we have to recalibrate our understanding of what are the issues that divide the existing historical system and what are the alternative historical possibilities of a possible reconstructed world-system. Their critique is on the mark, but what of their solution? As I have said, I do not believe they are sure of what solution they really intend. Those of us who do not share some or most of their premises and are heirs of a more secularist tradition find it difficult to accept most of what they offer as first steps to a better future. What I do feel is that there is a need for a genuine dialogue, or multilogue, about the essential limitations of our existing world-system, and the parameters of our historical alternatives. Personally, I think the basic conflict is that between those who seek to establish/reestablish a hierarchical world order in which some are privileged and most others not and those who wish to construct a maximally democratic and egalitarian order. I think that each requires different kinds of value-systems to undergird it, and that the historic world religions may have much to teach us about what is crucial in such value-systems. The real problem is that among the secularist and the fundamentalist camps in all parts of the world, there are persons on both sides of what I anticipate will be the great politico-social struggle of the coming fifty years. I think myself that posing the issue as one of secularism versus fundamentalism is distracting us in a very major way from clarity of vision. And clarity, not demons, is what we need most at the present time. (Wallerstein, 1997: <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwislam.htm>)

Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries – like the Islamic world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations have in the international division of labor. **Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery.** Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when he was still a social scientist, summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:

- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations
- these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979)

A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over time determines that, in order to keep the share of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to offset the balance. There is a massive, internationally published evidence that speaks in favor of dependency theory. However, it would be wrong to portray dependency simply in terms of MNC penetration, and to neglect other aspects of that relationship. Such authors as Singer and Tausch have put emphasis on the **resource balance** as an indicator of the weight of **foreign saving**. Other formulations of dependency insisted on **‘unequal exchange’** which, according to one such formulation, hampers development (i.e. double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their

exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivity. Since double factorial terms of trade are simply net barter terms of trade weighted by productivities (F) of X, exports, and M, imports, the formula

$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = 1$ denotes the conditions of 'equal' exchange as opposed to unequal transfer:

$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = < 1.0$

Nations with

$((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = > 1.0$

are the countries that benefited from unequal exchange.

Empirical support for Raffer's and Gernot Kohler's reformulation of the theory of unequal transfer is overwhelming. Losses or gains from unequal transfer are calculated as the difference between a "fair value" of exports/imports and the "actual (unfair) value" of exports/imports. The estimation formula is:

$T = d*X - X$

where

d = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated as "ERD" or "ERDI" in the literature)

X = the volume of exports from a low- or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at the actual exchange rate)

T = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal transfer

The transfer of value from the peripheries to the center, according to this reasoning, is gigantic:

Unequal transfer 1965 and 1995, by Center/Periphery

	Unequal transfer	
	Gain (+)	Loss (-)
	CENTER	PERIPHERY
	(% of OECD GDP)	(% of NON-OECD GDP)
1965	+1.4%	- 1.8 %
1995	+8 %	-24 %

(Number of countries: OECD N=19 (1965) and N=22 (1995); NON-OECD N=88 (1965) and N=97 (1995)) (see Kohler/Tausch, 2002).

Neo-dependency and world system schools (see Tausch and Prager, 1993) would fear in addition that the most recent tendencies of world capitalism will **strongly work against high female employment and create female unemployment**, and they would especially expect two hypotheses to hold

- (i) transnational capital marginalizes female labor power
- (ii) the dynamics of growth turn away from those countries, where women still have a strong position on the labor market.

The measurement scale, compatible with such hypotheses, would be the share of women in total employment and its trade-off with growth rates. The gender empowerment indicator series, first developed by the UNDP for the UNO-Women-Conference in Beijing 1995, provides a further testing ground for the different **feminist social theories** of world development.

However, **neo-liberal** thought would caution against such conclusions. Feminism per se might positively affect development patterns, but it might also work like a **'distribution coalition'** that tries to influence – like all distribution coalitions – the results of the market via **political pressure**. Instead of changing the sexist distribution of human capital endowments, and thus changing the “starting capital” of women in society, feminism, the argument would say, tries to directly influence distributive relations via **politics** alone. The result could be – like with any distribution coalition – long-run **stagnation** and **worsening income** and other **inequality**.

Our theory has to be qualified in one important further respect. **Militarism** will under certain circumstances be a 'substitute' for a Keynesian strategy and might have positive consequences for **employment**, and hence, perhaps also **distribution issues**. Apart from that, it is not entirely clear whether – like it or not - a negative short term or middle term relation between militarism and economic growth is to be ruled out entirely. Earlier research by Tausch (1993 – 2002) replicated some of the surprising findings by Weede in this respect.

Other schools of thought (**Holzmann et al.**; **Modigliani** and **European Roundtable of Industrialists**) have stressed recently the importance of **pension reforms in a globally aging society** as a determinant of growth and development. Aging societies and inadequate pension systems, and not culture, economic freedom or dependency alone, are to blame for the negative development perspectives in many countries. **Without adequate pension reform, aging will be an increasing burden on the comparative growth and development perspectives of the aging richer nations.**

Ever since the writings of **Colemann** (1965), also **education** should be mentioned among the determining variables of the development performance of a country. Education and human capital formation figure prominently in *the “Human Development Reports”* of the **United Nations Development Programme** as variables which determine positively the development outcome. For the UNDP it has been self-evident over the last decade that **gender empowerment** and the re-direction of **public expenditures away from defense** will positively contribute to a positive development outcome.

However, neo-liberal thought would caution against such premature conclusions. **Public** education expenditures are still **public expenditures**, and it is entirely conceivable that in the long run public education expenditures might **negatively** affect the development chances of a society, not because they are education expenditures, but because they are still **public** expenditures. For such a theoretical understanding, University reform and University privatization would be important political steps to achieve a more viable development.

Developing the research design

The almost unlimited number of **empirical studies** on peripheral capitalism and development on a world level in the B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle from 1965 onwards go back, in a way, to the classic essay published by Johan Galtung in the *Journal of Peace Research* (Galtung, 1971). For Galtung, income inequality, and hence, relative poverty in the nations of the world system is linked to trade partner concentration of the peripheral country and a trade structure that relies on the exports of raw materials and the imports of finished products. Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and their school later on reformulated the argument: not only income inequality, but also long term economic growth are being negatively determined by dependency from transnational capital, to be measured by a weighted share of transnational investment penetration per the economic and demographic size of a nation. Later essays extended the argument to other indicators of human well-being, the environment as well as democratic stability. **Macroquantitative analyses modeled around the dependency/world system school** generally have confirmed dependency arguments. According to these quantitative data analyses, there are powerful influences at work, which cause inequality and external imbalances in the periphery. Flagship essays and book publications of this school were written among others by Beer and Boswell; Birdsall; Bornschier; Bornschier and associates; Boswell; Boswell and associates; Bradshaw; Bradshaw and Huang; Bullock and Firebaugh; Chase - Dunn; Chase - Dunn and associates; Crenshaw; Delacroix and Ragin; Dixon; Dixon and Boswell; Evans and Timberlake; Fiala; Firebaugh; Juchler; Kentor; London; London and Robinson; London and Ross; London and Smith; London and Williams; Moaddel; Muller; Muller and Seligson; Nollert; Nollert and Fielder; Ragin and Bradshaw; Robinson and London; Rubinson; Russell; Tausch; Tausch and associates; Timberlake and Kantor; Timberlake and Williams; Trezzini and Bornschier; and Van Rossem.

There has been a **tendency** in more recent **cross-national research** to focus not only on such variables as economic growth, income inequality and a few other indicators of social well-being, but to interpret “well-being” more widely to include also democracy, the environment, gender inequality and human development. Research results by Alderson and Nielsen; Beer; Bullock and Firebaugh; Burns *et al.*; DeSoysa and Oneal; Dixon, Fain *et al.*; Firebaugh and Beck.; Firebaugh; Hertz *et al.*; Kick *et al.*; Korzeniewicz and Moran; London and Williams; Meyer; Shen and Williamson; Shin, Smith; Tausch; Ward; Wimberley; and Wimberley and Bello in general terms indicate that there is reason to believe that the march of global capitalism not only negatively affects the distribution of economic values in the world system, but also of democracy, human development, gender equality and the quality of the environment.

The present essay is well placed within that tradition, but qualifies these results in important respects. What are the negative social and ecological consequences of the dependent insertion into the world economy on a global scale and in the Southern and Southeastern neighborhood of Europe? Countries as far apart as large parts of Africa and Asia, just as Poland from 1795 - 1918, did not constitute a national state during the important era of the Industrial Revolution. Their economies were geared to the needs of others, i.e. their colonizers. The structural heterogeneity between the different economic sectors on the one hand and the ‘modern’, export oriented sector, the medium sector and the ‘traditional sector’ in agriculture, industry and services, became the main reason for the unequal income distribution in the countries of the periphery. Colonial trade, foreign investment in the 19th Century, import substitution in the first half of the 20th Century, and the new international division of

labor that we observe from the middle of the 1960s onwards did not really change the structures of inequality in the world system. While mass demand and agricultural structures (Elsenhans, 1983) were responsible for the transition from the tributary mode of production in Western Europe to capitalism from the Long 16th Century onwards, periphery capitalism was and is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997):

1. regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
2. unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0 ; see Raffer, 1987)
3. these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
4. the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings)
5. structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong ‘compradore’ element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class

For this reason, our concept of dependence at least includes three dimensions:

- unequal transfer
- MNC penetration
- the resource balance.

The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Our analysis starts from well-known empirical research results of Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella on this issue (Tausch, 1997, 1998). Cyclical fluctuations have also a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What could have been spectacular long-run growth, in the end might turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. For that reason, we include “development stability” among the dependent variables of our analysis.

Cycle time plays, as we already stated, an important role in our approach. Arrighi’s thought is especially worthwhile mentioning here: that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts along time, and that we again witness during the 1980s and beyond a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital. Arrighi further teaches us that even a century can be a ‘short run’ in the evolution of world capitalism. For Arrighi, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual Kondratieff depressions), and there are terminal crises of the world system, like the great crash of the early 1340s, which marked the beginning of the Genoese age, the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the 1750s and 1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the 1930s, which were the terminal

crisis of British world capitalist dominance. Regulation can be successful, like after 1560, and 1930, and deregulation can be successful, like after 1340, 1760, and - most probably - the 1980s (compiled from Arrighi, 1995).

The long cycle literature, largely overlooked by macroquantitative development studies, tells us why there is a recurrent pattern of instability in the social orders both at the level of national society as well as at the level of the international system. It also explains the often-puzzling aspect, how different studies, using different time perspectives, reach different results. There is no single 'correct' theory of economic growth and development, but only theories that explain correctly growth and development at a given, cyclical time period. So, to be correct, our results are valid for the 1990s, and it is entirely possible that during other time periods, other results might be achieved.

Long cycles, themselves to be explained by at least 13 different types of theories, by themselves are quite a strong argument in the debate about the long-run viability of the world-wide market economy: the recurrence of cycles, depressions and wars was thematically portrayed, amongst others, by Scandella (1998) and Goldstein (1988), furthermore Bornschier and Suter (1992), Bornschier (1988, expanded and updated English version 1996), Tausch (1998) and Arrighi (1995). The intense controversy about cycles should only be mentioned briefly here; for the policy-maker perhaps more important is the fact that after the economic crisis of 1825, the stock exchange collapse of 1873, the Black Friday of 1929 and the world recession starting in 1973/75, world capitalism has experienced quite severe downswing-phases that hit with elementary weight especially the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery. The Kondratieff cycles of approximately 40-60 years duration and the Kuznets cycles, 18-22 years long, are especially relevant for our understanding of the ups and downs of world economics and politics. And add to this the lagged movement of world prices and interest rates, which are part and parcel of the cycle structure (Scandella, 1998; Bornschier and Suter, 1992; Tausch, 1998). It is very probable that the long boom of the 1990s now comes to a close, and that the world economy enters anew a B-phase of the long economic cycle.

Tausch, 1998; and Tausch and Herrmann, 2002 reached the conclusion that **stocks of achieved globalization** – measured by the UNCTAD indicator transnational investment stocks per total GDP in 1985 – significantly and negatively affected 15 of the reported 19 development dimensions in 123 countries¹¹ with fairly complete data during the period from 1965 to around 1993 – with the development dimensions ranging from economic growth to human development, gender empowerment, life expectancy, human and civil rights performance, economic equality etc. Controlling variables were – in a sociological and political science tradition – government expenditures, trade dependency, social security expenditures, fertility, years of United Nations membership of a country and the non-linear trade-off between development levels and development performance, among others. Table 1 summarizes these results¹²:

Table 1: The effects of MNC penetration on 19 dimensions of development, 1980s and 1990s (123 countries with fairly complete data) according to Tausch/Herrmann

11 For this sample there were fairly complete data for the following 38 Islamic countries available: Algeria; Bangladesh; Benin; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Chad; Comoros; Cote d'Ivoire; Egypt; Gabon; Gambia; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Indonesia; Iran; Jordan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Morocco; Mozambique; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Surinam; Syria; Togo; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Arab Emirates

¹² see Graph about error probabilities in the t-test in the appendix. $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test

Number of variables	F, entire equation	degrees of freedom	explained variable	t-value for MNC PEN 1985, direction of the influence	error probability for dependency theory (MNC PEN 1985)	R ²	control variables	error probability for the entire equation
12	1,393	110	<i>destabilization and war</i>	0,880	0,381	13,200	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	0,180
11	7,423	111	<i>green house index</i>	0,880	0,381	42,400	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
12	1,193	110	<i>ethnowelfare</i>	0,940	0,349	11,500	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	0,297
11	31,349	111	<i>DYN life expectancy</i>	-1,600	0,112	75,600	life expectancy in the starting period, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, violations of civil rights, terms of trade	0,000
12	4,820	110	annual rate of deforestation	1,980	0,050	34,500	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	0,000
6	50,487	116	maternal mortality	2,300	0,023	72,300	trade dependency, terms of trade, violations of civil rights	0,000
5	4,927	73	inequality share top 20 %	2,540	0,013	25,200	fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,001
12	3,983	110	% coverage of territory with forest area	-3,400	0,001	30,300	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	0,000
11	12,397	111	overall employment rate	-4,000	0,000	55,100	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	15,203	111	civil	4,230	0,000	60,100	social security effort, government	0,000

			rights violations				expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	
6	66,116	116	life expectancy	-4,700	0,000	77,400	trade dependency, terms of trade, violations of civil rights	0,000
11	6,124	111	adjustment of growth from 1965 to 1993	-4,800	0,000	37,700	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	46,465	111	gender empowerment index	-5,100	0,000	82,200	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	13,266	111	pol rights violations	5,200	0,000	56,800	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	8,011	111	economic growth 1980-1993	-5,800	0,000	44,300	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, % territory used for agriculture	0,000
10	14,917	88	UNDP CPM poverty measure	5,930	0,000	65,100	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	73,939	111	mean years of education	-9,400	0,000	88,000	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	67,801	111	gender development index	-12,000	0,000	87,100	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level	0,000
11	67,224	111	human development index	-12,000	0,000	87,000	social security effort, government expenditures, trade dependency, UN membership years, women in parliament, women in the labor force, fertility rate, military personnel rate, nonlinear tradeoff development level, violations of civil rights	0,000

Legend: our own calculations, based on the F-VERT and T-VERT routines of the EXCEL computer program, re-affirming the results reported in Tausch/Herrmann, 2001. Only the first 4 equations, whose explanatory variables are printed in indented letters, would need a future re-formulation, while

all the other equations, including those for life expectancy, the Beijing-process indicators (gender empowerment and gender development) and the human development index are highly significant.

A later and partial replication of these results came to the conclusion that in 134 countries¹³ under investigation with fairly complete data from 1960 to 1995 – including the world of former Communism - both the UNCTAD variable – stocks of MNC capital per total GDP – as well as the new indicator of unequal transfer (simply based on the reciprocal value of the exchange rate deviation index, i.e. 1/ERDI¹⁴) negatively and significantly affected several development processes (see below; error probability 10 % or less in the two-tailed t-test). It should be noted that in this presentation, we already considered duly that “good effects” are “good effects” and that “bad effects” are “bad effects” when presenting our results; i.e. a development strategy that **increases**, say, under 60 **mortality** rates (negative indicator of human survival), is a **bad** strategy and thus has **negative effects on survival**:

Table 2: the effects of unequal transfer and MNC penetration on world development in 134 countries (including Eastern Europe and the former USSR), covering the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and the first half of the 1990s according to Kohler/Tausch

	Model based on:	R ² for the 134 countries with fairly complete data	F for the entire equation	t-test for the dependency predictor and direction of	further positive, significant predictors	further negative, significant predictors

13 This sample included the following 35 Islamic countries with fairly complete data (data of entry into the Organization of Islamic Conference in brackets): Albania, Republic of (1992); Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of (1969); Azerbaijan, Republic of (1991); Bahrain, State of (1970); Bangladesh, People's Republic of (1974); Benin, Republic of (1982); Burkina Faso (1975); Cameroon, Republic of (1975); Comoros, Federal Islamic Republic of the (1976); Cote d'Ivoire, Republic of (2001); Egypt, Arab Republic of (1969); Gabon, Republic of (1974); Gambia, Republic of the (1974); Guinea-Bissau, Republic of (1974); Guyana, Republic of (1998); Indonesia, Republic of (1969); Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of (1969); Kazakhstan, Republic of (1995); Kyrgyzstan, Republic of (1992); Malaysia (1969); Maldives, Republic of (1976); Mali, Republic of (1969); Mauritania, Islamic Republic of (1969); Morocco, Kingdom of (1969); Mozambique, Republic of (1994); Niger, Republic of (1969); Nigeria, Federal Republic of (1986); Oman, Sultanate of (1970); Pakistan, Islamic Republic of (1969); Sierra Leone, Republic of (1972); Surinam, Republic of the (1996); Tajikistan, Republic of (1992); Togo, Republic of (1997); Tunisia, Republic of (1969); Turkey, Republic of (1969); Uzbekistan, Republic of (1995)

14 At the top of the international rank scale of global exploitation according to the ERDI concept (exchange rate deviation; the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the real purchasing power parity rate) we find countries like Switzerland, Luxemburg, Scandinavian countries, and Japan, while nations like Nicaragua, China and Mozambique come at the bottom. It would be wrong to start from the assumption - as conventional economics is inclined to do - that the ERDI or 1/ERDI phenomenon - or call it unequal transfer - is an autonomous consequence of a relatively high price level in the non-tradable sector. If it were only so, there would be, among others, a high correlation between state sector expenditures (influencing the amount of non-tradables per total GDP) and the ERDI, which is not the case. See also Kohler/Tausch, 2002

				the influence ¹⁵		
Explanation of economic growth	1/ERDI	57,20%	12,35	-1,33	mean years of education, population growth	labor force participation rate, military expenditures
	UNCTAD indicator MNC penetration	56%	11,86	-1,57¹⁶	mean years of education, population growth	labor force participation rate, military expenditures
Explanation of child survival infant mortality	1/ERDI	91,30%	96,7	-2,45		UN membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures
	UNCTAD indicator	91,00%	95,04	-2,08		UN membership years, absolute GNP, years of Communism, military expenditures
Explanation of general survival (early death)	1/ERDI	89,40%	93,14	-2,87	agrarian share per GDP	years of Communism, human development index
	UNCTAD indicator	89,00%	93,12	-2,84	agrarian share per GDP	years of Communism, human development index
Explanation of democracy (political repression)	1/ERDI	52,50%	10,2	-0,68	educational level, labor force participation rate	military expenditures
	UNCTAD indicator	52,00%	9,9	-0,45	educational level, labor force participation rate	military expenditures
Explanation of distributing the benefits of growth (income concentration for the top 20%)	1/ERDI	41,00%	6,52	-0,17	population growth	absolute GNP
	UNCTAD indicator	41,00%	6,5	-0,16	population growth	absolute GNP
Explanation of life expectancy	1/ERDI	95%	161,5	-1,14	state sector expenditures	population growth

¹⁵ (p<.10, two-tailed test)

¹⁶ throughout this work, predictors, printed in bold letters, are significant predictors (error probability 10 %, two-tailed test).

	UNCTAD indicator	95%	161,3	-1,16	state sector expenditures, military expenditures	absolute GNP, agrarian share per GDP
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
	Model based on:	R ² for the 134 countries with fairly complete data	F for the entire equation	t-test for the dependency predictor or direction of the influence	degrees of freedom	number of variables in the equation	error probability for the dependency indicator	error probability for the entire equation	page in Kohler/Tausch (2002), on which the equation is reported
Explanation of economic growth	1/ERDI	57,20%	12,35	-1,33	120	13	0,186	0,000	323
	UNCTAD indicator MNC penetration	56%	11,86	-1,57	120	13	0,119	0,000	229
Explanation of child survival infant mortality	1/ERDI	91,30%	96,7	-2,45	120	13	0,016	0,000	332
	UNCTAD indicator	91,00%	95,04	-2,08	120	13	0,040	0,000	231; 327
Explanation of general survival (early death)	1/ERDI	89,40%	93,14	-2,87	122	11	0,005	0,000	332
	UNCTAD indicator	89,00%	93,12	-2,84	122	11	0,005	0,000	328
Explanation of democracy (political repression)	1/ERDI	52,50%	10,2	-0,68	120	13	0,498	0,000	331
	UNCTAD indicator	52,00%	9,9	-0,45	120	13	0,654	0,000	328
Explanation of distributing the benefits of growth (income concentration for the top 20%)	1/ERDI	41,00%	6,52	-0,17	120	13	0,865	0,000	331
	UNCTAD indicator	41,00%	6,5	-0,16	120	13	0,873	0,000	329
Explanation of life expectancy	1/ERDI	95%	161,5	-1,14	120	13	0,257	0,000	331
	UNCTAD indicator	95%	161,3	-1,16	120	13	0,248	0,000	329

*Legend: our own calculations, based on the F-VERT and T-VERT routines of the EXCEL computer program, re-affirming the results reported in Kohler/Tausch, 2002. Only the equations, whose explanatory variables are printed in **bold letters**, are acceptable, while the other equations, including those for life expectancy, need a reformulation.*

Questions of measurement of the multivariate analysis

Our final sample – determined exclusively by data availability – had the following geographical shape:

Map 2: the sample for our multivariate analysis



The choice of the 109 countries was determined by the availability of a complete data series for the independent variables (if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data):

- % population, aged >65y, 1998
- % women in government, ministerial level
- (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP)
- state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom¹⁷, 2000)

17 <http://www.freetheworld.com/>; also: <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/>. We used the latter website as the source of our data. It has to be kept in mind, that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom

- EU-membership by 2000
- Islamic conference membership (OIC website¹⁸)
- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$
- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
- military expenditure as % of GDP
- MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD)
- public education expenditure per GDP
- unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: $1/\text{ERDI}$)

The following dependent variables were used; with listwise deletion of missing values each time determining the number of countries entering into the 14 final regression equations:

- % people not expected to survive age 60
- CO2 emissions per capita
- development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975 (calculated from UNDP)
- ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website¹⁹)
- Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS factor analysis²⁰)

scale have the numerically highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao People's Dem. Rep. – the economically “unfreest” country in our sample, has the numerical value 4.6, while the economically freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our indicator “state interventionism”

18 <http://www.oic-oci.org/> there the icon “members”

19 <http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/> We have chosen the 2001 data series at <http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/archive.html>. The general description of this indicator says that the

‘Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is a measure of overall progress towards environmental sustainability, developed for 142 countries. The ESI scores are based upon a set of 20 core “indicators,” each of which combines two to eight variables for a total of 68 underlying variables. The ESI permits cross-national comparisons of environmental progress in a systematic and quantitative fashion. It represents a first step towards a more analytically driven approach to environmental decision making.’

²⁰ Female life expectancy; life expectancy, 1995-2000; life expectancy, 1970-75; male life expectancy; human development index; female literacy; male literacy; contraceptive prevalence; daily supply of calories; immunization against measles; public health expenditure; doctors per inhabitants; average cigarette consumption; female tertiary students as % of male tertiary students; parliamentary seats held by women; gender empowerment; women's GDP per capita in purchasing power; growth of female economic activity; public education expenditure; women in government, ministerial level; women in government, all levels; female share in professional and technical workforce; women in government, sub-ministerial level; female share in administrative and managerial workforce; female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate; teen-age mothers; food import dependence; share of top 20% compared to bottom 20% in income distribution; female economic activity rate; TBC cases per 100,000 inhabitants; HIV rate; infants with low birth-weight; maternal mortality rate; infant mortality rate; % of people not expected to survive age 60.

- female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
- female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP – share of female life expectancy in the sum of male and female life expectancy)
- GDP output per kg energy use (“*eco-social market economy*”²¹)
- GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98
- human development index
- life expectancy, 1995-2000
- Political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000²²)
- share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%
- unemployment (UN social indicators website)


The following countries featured in the analysis: Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

Our geographical presentation of the variables used in the analysis will be kept to a minimum, since we mention all the data in the appendix. Among the dependent variables, we just mention **MNC penetration**, **unequal transfer** and the **resource balance** as the three “master variables” of dependency. **Unequal transfer** is strongest in the periphery, and weakest in the centers, with the semi-periphery showing medium levels of exposure to unequal transfer. Our map might be even termed to be an update of this Wallersteinian concept to the realities of the turn of the Century and Millennium:

Map 3: unequal transfer in the world system


²¹ This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People's Party – to be precise, its former Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 1980s. For more on that debate: <http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf>; and Michael Rösch, Tübingen University at http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm. As an indicator of the reconciliation between the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP output per kg energy use; the term ‘eco-social market economy’ neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical formulation

²² Taken here from Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, edition 2002. The political freedom data referring to the year 2000 can also be downloaded at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>




Foreign saving, for its turn, is strongest in many parts of Latin America, Southern Africa, in the “new Europe” and in China and in several countries of Southeast Asia:

Map 4: foreign saving in the world system




In general terms, we observe today high levels of MNC penetration in the “dominion economies” like Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in some parts of Eastern Europe, in Central Asia, other parts of the former USSR, in many parts of Latin America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in Tunisia, and in China and Southeast Asia:

Map 5: MNC penetration in the world system




Legend: missing values for Greenland, Suriname, French Guyana, West Sahara, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and North Korea



During the 1990s, penetration by transnational capital dramatically increased in many parts of Europe (especially in what was described by Donald Rumsfeld²³, US Secretary of Defense, recently as “the new Europe”); in eastern Latin America, in Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in South and Southeast Asia. However, there was a **dramatic decrease of MNC penetration in most countries of the Arab world** during the second half of the 1990s:

Map 6: the increase/decrease of MNC penetration in the world system




Among the **dependent variables** perhaps only the **environmental stability index** might be not so well known in the macro-quantitative research community. As it was stated, the ESI Index is a measure of the overall progress towards environmental sustainability and was developed for 142 countries. ESI scores are based upon 20 core indicators, each of which combines two to eight variables for a total of 68 underlying variables. It is the first time in the research literature that a single yardstick of sustainable development has been developed:


Map 7: environmental stability in the world system

²³ See also: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/24012003172118.asp>

environmental stability index




The picture for the region of the MENA countries is rather mixed, with Turkey being classified ahead of the United Kingdom and on an equal level with Italy:



The Yale/Columbia project also calculated a “capacity” variable that shows the underlying chances of a country to realize an environment-friendly policy. The residuals from the linear standard regression comparing environment political capacity and environment policy (with capacity on the x-axis and the ESI index on the y –axis) shows how several nations, including large parts of Latin America, but also many parts of East Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey performed much better than might have been expected on the basis of their limited capacities; while the United States, China, India and states on the Arab Peninsula did not realize enough their existing policy potential for a sustainable development strategy (interestingly also Germany, its red-green government notwithstanding):

Map 8: environment policy capacity and environment policy outcomes




Summarizing the main theoretical expectations, we could present the following diagrams. The variables for the “*Washington Consensus*” are:

- state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom, 2000). Effect on development: -
- MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD). Effect on development: +
- competitive exchange rates (calculated from UNDP, concept: $1/ERDI$). Effect on development: +

The “*Washington Consensus*” would thus expect:

Graph 6: development according to the “*Washington Consensus*”




The “**UNDP**” approach could be measured by the following variables

- % women in government, ministerial level. Effect on development: +
- military expenditure as % of GDP. Effect on development: -
- public education expenditure per GDP. Effect on development: +


Graph 7: development according to the UNDP

The UNDP approach



The **dependency model** would expect the following relations to hold:

Graph 8: the dependency model of world development



The bivariate results for unequal transfer

Already our bi-variate analysis indicates that the new indicator series on unequal transfer, proposed by Kohler/Tausch, might serve as a tool to analyze social cohesion in the world system. The bivariate Pearson/Bravais correlations of unequal transfer with the UNDP social data set are overwhelming and show how unequal transfer negatively affects human well being in the world system:

Table 3: bivariate correlations with unequal transfer

	correlation with unequal transfer	total variance explained in %
women's GDP per capita	-0,78	60,80
gender empowerment	-0,74	54,80
GDP per capita PPP	-0,71	50,40
main telephone lines per 1000 people	-0,70	49,00
GNP per capita	-0,66	43,60
human development index	-0,66	43,60
GDP output per kg energy use	-0,64	41,00
daily supply of calories, 1998	-0,61	37,20
Televisions per 1000 people	-0,61	37,20
male life expectancy	-0,54	29,20
female literacy	-0,54	29,20
life expectancy, 1995-2000	-0,54	29,20
female life expectancy	-0,53	28,10
male literacy	-0,52	27,00
contraceptive prevalence rate	-0,51	26,00
tax revenue as % of GDP	-0,46	21,20
internet hosts per 1000 people	-0,44	19,40
public health expenditure per GDP	-0,43	18,50
gross domestic savings rate	-0,42	17,60
central government expenditures as % of GDP	-0,40	16,00
% immunization against measles	-0,38	14,40
economic growth, 1975-98	-0,36	13,00
% parliamentary seats held by women	-0,32	10,20
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)	-0,32	10,20
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1975-90	-0,30	9,00
female tertiary students as % of males	-0,28	7,80

GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	-0,28	7,80
doctors per 100.000 people	-0,27	7,30
public education expenditure per GDP	-0,26	6,80
% women in government, ministerial level	-0,25	6,30
% women in government, all levels	-0,25	6,30
female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid family workers	-0,24	5,80
% women in government, subministerial level	-0,20	4,00
% female administrators and managers	-0,18	3,20
% immunization against TB	-0,18	3,20
overall budget surplus/deficit as % of GDP	-0,17	2,90
% female professional and technical workers	-0,15	2,30
gross domestic investment	-0,08	0,60
homicide rate	0,01	0,00
female unemployment rate	0,03	0,10
youth female unemployment rate	0,04	0,20
military expenditure as % of GDP	0,08	0,60
male unemployment rate	0,09	0,80
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	0,09	0,80
youth male unemployment rate	0,12	1,40
HIV rate	0,15	2,30
food imports as % of merchandise imports	0,20	4,00
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	0,22	4,80
juvenile convictions as % of all convictions	0,23	5,30
TBC cases per 100.000 inhabitants	0,26	6,80
female economic activity rate	0,35	12,30
% infants with low birth-weight	0,38	14,40
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers	0,39	15,20
maternal mortality ratio	0,45	20,30
% people not expected to survive age 60	0,50	25,00
infant mortality rate	0,56	31,40
food consumption as % of total household consumption	0,57	32,50

For the multivariate analysis, we will group our variables into the following dimensions of development:

1 indicator political democracy

- Political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000)

4 indicators human development

- % people not expected to survive age 60
- Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS factor analysis)
- human development index
- life expectancy, 1995-2000

3 indicators environmental quality

- CO2 emissions per capita
- ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website)
- GDP output per kg energy use

1 indicator development stability

- development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975 (calculated from UNDP)

1 indicator growth

- GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98

2 indicators social inclusion

- share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%
- unemployment (UN social indicators website)

2 indicators gender justice

- female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
- female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP – share of female life expectancy in the sum of male and female life expectancy)

These variables are explained by the following predictors:

3 indicators of dependency

- (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP) (resource balance)
- MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD)
- unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: 1/ERDI)

1 variable (non)adherence to the advice by international financial institutions

- state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom, 2000)

2 variables world political or world cultural identities

- EU-membership
- Islamic conference membership (OIC website)

1 variable aging society

- % population, aged >65y, 1998

1 variable political feminism

- % women in government, ministerial level

1 variable militarism

- military expenditure as % of GDP

1 variable public education effort

- public education expenditure per GDP

2 control variables for development level, interacting

- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
- $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$

We have to start here from the assumption that the basic tools of multivariate macro-quantitative analysis in political science and sociology are known to the audience of this article (for further literature on the subject, see Achen; Clauss and Ebner; Huang; Jackman; Kriz; Krzysztofiak. and Luszczewicz; Lewis - Beck; Microsoft Excel; Opp and Schmidt).

A sophisticated re-analysis of the tendencies of world development in the 1990s should start from the assumption that the development level has a decisive, non-linear trade-off with subsequent development performance: poor countries increase rapidly their average life expectancy or economic growth and they quickly reduce their income inequality etc.

Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in middle-income countries *vis-à-vis* the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the former Second and Third World (Tausch/Herrmann, 2002):

(Equation 1) development performance = $a_1 + b_1 * \ln(\text{PCI}_m) - b_2 * (\ln(\text{PCI}_m))^2$

The same function is also applied to income inequality and the rest of our 14 indicators, following a famous essay published by S. Kuznets in 1955. Growth and development accelerate with

redistribution, and then stagnate. In general terms, we explain development performance by the following standard multiple cross-national development research equation:

(Equation 2) development performance $_{1990 - \text{end } 1990s} = a_1 + b_1 * \text{first part curvilinear function of development level} + b_2 * \text{second part curvilinear function of development level} + b_{3...} * \text{transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD)}_{\text{mid } 1990s} + b_{4...} * \text{unequal transfer (1/ERDI)} + b_{5...} * \text{foreign saving} + b_{6...} * \text{military expenditures per GDP} + b_{7...} * \text{aging} + b_{8...} * \text{public education expenditures per GDP} + b_9 * \text{membership in the Islamic Conference} + b_{10} * \text{European Union membership} + b_{11} * \text{absence of economic freedom (state interventionism)}$

In the following, we will present our results about the effects of globalization in a multi-variate perspective.

The final results for 109 countries

In general terms, several but not all aspects of the presented theories are confirmed, while other central assumptions of both the “*Washington Consensus*” and of its dependency theory counterpart are rejected. Also, theories about aging; feminist theories; human resource theories; military Keynesian theories/peace theories (i.e. theories maintaining that militarism has a very bad effect on long-run development); globalization critique and international economic integration theories have to tally with both positive and negative effects of their key indicators on different measurements of social, environmental and economic welfare, indicating that the time of the “quick fixes” has definitely gone and that contemporary development realities are very complex indeed. It should be noted that in this and in the following presentations, we already considered duly that “good effects” are “good effects” and that “bad effects” are “bad effects” when presenting our results; i.e. a development strategy that **increases**, say, under 60 **mortality** rates, is a **bad** strategy and thus has **negative** effects:

Table 4: the multivariate results at one glance


development dimension	indicator: high value is something ...	the indicator is determined by/ direction of the influence on the development dimension	aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	foreign saving (I-S)/GDP	absence of economic freedom (state interventionism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference membership	acceleration effects development ln(GDP PPP pc)	maturity effects development ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	R^2	F	df
development stability	positive	development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	positive	33	3,94	96
environmental quality	negative	CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative	positive	negative	positive	negative	negative	..	positive	74,7	21,7	88
environmental quality	positive	ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative	negative	..	positive	..	negative	positive	50,7	7,1	83
environmental quality	positive	GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	positive	negative	..	positive	negative	..	negative	negative	..	positive	72,1	16,8	78
gender justice	positive	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive	negative	..	negative	positive	positive	..	negative	..	negative	positive	positive	51,4	8,47	96
gender justice	positive	female share in total life years	negative	positive	..	negative	negative	positive	49,5	7,84	96
growth	positive	GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	negative	30,2	3,31	92
political democracy	negative	Political rights violations	negative	negative	negative	negative	positive	66,1	15,6	96
human development	negative	% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	negative	positive	negative	66,4	15,8	96
human development	positive	life expectancy , 1995-2000	negative	positive	negative	positive	..	positive	73,5	22,2	96

development dimension	indicator: high value is something ...	the indicator is determined by/ direction of the influence on the development dimension	aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	foreign saving (I-S)/GDP	absence of economic freedom (state interventionism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference members hip	acceleration effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$	maturity effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$	R^2	F	df
social inclusion	negative	share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive	negative	positive	..	positive	positive	..	negative	..	positive	60,4	9,26	73
social inclusion	negative	unemployment (UN) (employment)	positive	negative	negative	37,1	3,1	63
human development	positive	Factor Social Development	negative	positive	positive	85,7	48,1	96
human development	positive	human development index	negative	positive	negative	positive	91,8	80	86
concept	indicator	measurement	aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	foreign saving (I-S)/GDP	absence of economic freedom (state interventionism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference members hip	acceleration effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$	maturity effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$	R^2	F	df

Discussion


It must be recalled that our concept of **development** is **multi-dimensional**. Our **indicators** correspond to the following dimensions and thus are much more compatible with work being carried out over the last years by such organisms as the United Nations Development Programme than traditional cross-sectional research:

Graph 9: our concept of development



Also, our **determinants** of the development process are thought to be multi-dimensional:

Graph 10: the determinants of development



Our results can now be summarized briefly as follows:

Aging is part and parcel of the structure of industrialized societies, East and West. Aging contributes to a generalized scarcity of labor, which in turn leads to improved distributive relationships between the rich and the poor. However, several negative effects must also be considered properly – especially the negative effects of an aging population structure on the process of human development, which is basically the dire consequence of unreformed pension systems (Tausch, 2003).

	aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	positive
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive
unemployment (UN) (employment)	positive
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative
female share in total life years	negative
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	negative
life expectancy, 1995-2000	negative
Factor Social Development	negative

human development index	negative
-------------------------	----------

Political feminism has an aggregate positive effect on many phenomena of human and ecological development, but it fails to transform political power into improved employment and distribution structures. This is due mainly to the process of distribution coalition formation, featuring so prominently in neo-liberal theories of economic growth (see especially, the writings of Weede).

	political feminism % women in government, ministerial level
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	positive
female share in total life years	positive
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	positive
life expectancy, 1995-2000	positive
Factor Social Development	positive
human development index	positive
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	negative
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	negative
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	negative
unemployment (UN) (employment)	negative

As one of the three main indicators of dependency, the reliance on **foreign savings** eases the distribution burden against the poorer segments of society during the accumulation process, but it has several negative effects on a variety of other development processes, including the environment and political democracy.

	foreign saving (I-S)/GDP
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative
human development index	negative
ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative
Political rights	negative

Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim), paradoxically enough, increases the rationality of the societal resource allocation and leads towards an improved development stability but it fails to resolve two basic issues: overall environmental stress and societal sexism in the employment

sphere. State interventionism has negative consequences for women as the more vulnerable group in society.

	absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	positive
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	positive
development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	positive
ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative
female share in total life years	negative
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	negative

Military expenditures have a certain Keynesian effect but they contribute towards a worse environmental balance. Military expenditures lead towards a drying up of what Marxists term “the reserve army of labor”, which, in turn, leads to a certain better social cohesion and employment gender balance. But militarized structures consume large amounts of fossil fuel, with advanced air forces especially contributing to that process.

female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	negative

MNC penetration contributes to an improved ESI Index and towards better female employment, but it has negative consequences for human survival and life expectancy. In addition, an interesting phenomenon worthy of further research is the interconnection between decaying public services, decaying public transport and decaying public health services in the host countries of transnational investment on the one hand and the strategic policies of transnational corporations on the other hand, concentrated on the private sector, private transport, private medical services and the private automobile. The strengthening triple alliance between the MNCs, local capital and the state is a net result of the globalization process, and it still has dire social consequences as well.

	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive

ESI-Index (sustainability)	positive
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	negative
life expectancy, 1995-2000	negative

Human resources and human development investments ever since the publication of the first United Nations Human Development Reports in the early 1990s are regarded as the key towards a socially equitable and sustainable development. However, as often happens in development theory, the early optimism regarding the effects of one variable has soon to be qualified.

In our sample, the countries with the best **public education expenditure** record were:

Namibia
 Botswana
 Lesotho
 Sweden
 Denmark
 South Africa
 Jordan
 Tunisia
 Uzbekistan
 Israel
 Finland
 Poland
 Saudi Arabia
 Norway
 New Zealand
 Estonia
 Zimbabwe
 Yemen
 Kenya
 Latvia
 France
 Ireland

There are very surprising clear-cut negative interactions between public education expenditure and an eco-social market economy and political democracy. Positive effects exist as well, but they are not statistically significant. A plausible intervening variable, which we did not as yet consider in our investigation, could be the years of experience of a country as a centrally planned economy.

	public education expenditure per GDP
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	negative
Political rights	negative

Unequal transfer has the most clear-cut negative results of all dependency indicators on the process of development, as understood in this investigation; especially on democracy, the environment, gender justice and employment. The positive effect on income redistribution has to be seen in the context of the siphoning-off of the surplus value from periphery countries that reduces the share of the richest 20 % in total income distribution.

	unequal transfer
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	negative
Political rights	negative
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	negative
ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative
female share in total life years	negative
unemployment (UN) (employment)	negative

There are very diverse views nowadays on the **European Union**. As a recent paper, published in the journal *"Parameters"* of the US Army maintains (Wilkie, 2003):

"Still, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that the European Union, as an old-fashioned socialist bureaucracy, is "fundamentally unreformable" and also culturally hostile to the United States" (Wilkie, 2003: 46)²⁴

There is a wide range of literature now available that highlights the negative effects of European integration in a globalized world economy (for a survey of the literature and politometric evidence, see Tausch and Herrmann, 2001). In the present research design, the most considerable effect is the negative trade-off between EU membership and political democracy, once you control for the other intervening variables that together explain jointly 66.1 % of political rights violations.

	EU-membership
Political rights	negative

The "real existing" Union will have a lot to do to fulfill the Lisbon agenda to become by 2010 *"...the most competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, creating more and better jobs and greater social cohesion"*²⁵. The race between the Euro and the Dollar on the world currency markets has added to the sense of competition between the two systems that years ago were still considered to be the "Atlantic West". But even a first brief look

²⁴ <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/wilkie.htm>

²⁵ http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=51&LNG=en&version=

at the EU's statistical website, Eurostat²⁶ shows how far "old Europe" (quotation from Donald Rumsfeld; in Brussels "newspeak" simply "the EU-15") or for that matter also "the old and the new Europe" (the "EU-25" now comprising 25 European states, including 8 former Communist states in East Central Europe, Cyprus and Malta after the enlargement of May 1st 2004) are still away from this goal of becoming the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world.

Our results about the European Union might be considered more provocative still, when we also consider that – contrary to popular assumptions – membership in the **Islamic Conference** is not an impediment against political democracy. Our results clearly contradict many of the expectations inherent in the writings of Professor Samuel Huntington. 4 development indicators – 2 for the environment, 1 on human development, and 1 on democracy – are positively and significantly determined by membership in the Islamic Conference, once you properly control for the effects of the other influencing variables. However, gender justice and redistribution remain the "Achilles heel" of today's members in the Islamic Conference, strengthening the cause of those who advocate – like in the *United Nations Arab Human Development Report* – more social inclusion and more gender justice in the region.

	Islamic conference membership
Political rights	positive
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	positive
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	positive
life expectancy, 1995-2000	positive
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	negative
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	negative

The well-known **acceleration** and **maturity** effects of development have to be qualified in an important way. Ever since the days of Simon **Kuznets**, development researchers have applied curve-linear formulations in order to capture these effects. However, the results for equation 1 above are not as clear-cut as one might have expected; and – in addition – the direction of the influence does hardly correspond with the equation. The curve-linear function of **growth**, being regressed on the natural logarithm of development level and its square, is sometimes called the 'Matthew's effect' following Matthew's (13, 12):

'For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, for him shall be taken away even that he hath'

Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in middle-income countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the

²⁶

http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/reference/display.do?screen=detailref&language=de&product=EU_strind&root=EU_strind/strind/ecobac/eb011

poorest periphery nations ('have-nots') and the 'haves' among the semi-periphery countries (Jackman, 1982). Their hypothesis is only partially confirmed here – there is no significant acceleration at low levels of development, but a significant economic growth stagnation/saturation effect. The first expression - $+ b1 * \ln(\text{PCI}t)$ – yields the following results:

	acceleration effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive

The second part of the “Kuznets-curve” - $b2 * (\ln(\text{PCI}t))^2$ - has today the following results:

	maturity effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	positive
life expectancy, 1995-2000	positive
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive
ESI-Index (sustainability)	positive
female share in total life years	positive
human development index	positive
Factor Social Development	positive
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	negative

Implications for policy

By far the **most negative influence** on development is wielded by **unequal transfer**, followed by the **aging process** (especially without **pension reform**) and certain negative aspects of **feminist distribution coalitions** in society:

	% negative effects	% positive effects	% insignificant effects
unequal transfer	50,0	7,1	42,9
aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	42,9	28,6	35,7

political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	28,6	42,9	28,6
foreign saving (I- S)/GDP	28,6	7,1	64,3
absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	21,4	21,4	57,1
military expenditure as % of GDP	14,3	14,3	71,4
dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	14,3	14,3	71,4
public education expenditure per GDP	14,3	0,0	85,7
Islamic conference membership	14,3	28,6	57,1
EU-membership	7,1	0,0	92,9
maturity effects development ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	7,1	50	42,9
acceleration effects development ln(GDP PPP pc)	0,0	7,1	92,9

By far the most **positive effects** on social, ecological and economic development come about by the **maturity effects** of development, followed by **the positive aspects of feminism**, the **aging process** and **membership** in the **Islamic Conference**:

	% negative effects	% positive effects	% insignificant effects
maturity effects development ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	7,1	50,0	42,9
political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	28,6	42,9	28,6
aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	42,9	28,6	35,7
Islamic conference	14,3	28,6	57,1

membership			
absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	21,4	21,4	57,1
military expenditure as % of GDP	14,3	14,3	71,4
dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	14,3	14,3	71,4
unequal transfer	50,0	7,1	42,9
foreign saving (I-S)/GDP	28,6	7,1	64,3
acceleration effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$	0,0	7,1	92,9
public education expenditure per GDP	14,3	0,0	85,7
EU-membership	7,1	0,0	92,9

With all the talk about dependency, globalization or the “*Washington Consensus*” notwithstanding, it is shown that **feminism, pension reform, the maturity effects of capitalism** as well as **unequal transfer** open up new horizons of future development debates. The variables

- political feminism % women in government, ministerial level
- aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998
- maturity effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})^2$
- unequal transfer

are far more relevant in explaining our 14 development dimensions than the traditional “stars” of the debate, the political and left and right, pro- and anti-globalization movements, culturalist development theories etc. notwithstanding. The variables

- Islamic conference membership
- absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)
- foreign saving (I-S)/GDP
- military expenditure as % of GDP
- dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995
- public education expenditure per GDP
- acceleration effects development $\ln(\text{GDP PPP pc})$
- EU-membership

on the other hand do not have so many significant effects (insignificant effects > 50 %) as the “new” variables (insignificant effects < 50 %), which were analyzed in this article and which will determine future development outcomes in a decisive way:

	% negative effects	% positive effects	% insignificant effects
political feminism % women in government, ministerial level	28,6	42,9	28,6
aging: % population, aged >65y, 1998	42,9	28,6	35,7
maturity effects development ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	7,1	50,0	42,9
unequal transfer	50,0	7,1	42,9
Islamic conference membership	14,3	28,6	57,1
absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	21,4	21,4	57,1
foreign saving (I- S)/GDP	28,6	7,1	64,3
military expenditure as % of GDP	14,3	14,3	71,4
dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	14,3	14,3	71,4
public education expenditure per GDP	14,3	0,0	85,7
acceleration effects development ln(GDP PPP pc)	0,0	7,1	92,9
EU-membership	7,1	0,0	92,9

The (meager) effects of the “*Washington Consensus*” variables on development are the following. Relationships, contradicting the basic assumptions of the theory, are printed in bold letters:

	absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995
--	--	--

% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	..	negative
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	positive	..
development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	positive	..
ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative	positive
Factor Social Development
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	negative	positive
female share in total life years	negative	..
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	positive	..
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	..	
human development index
life expectancy, 1995-2000	..	negative
Political rights
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)
unemployment (UN) (employment)

In addition, it should be noted that a central assumption of the “*Washington Consensus*” – competitive exchange rates – could be operationalized by “1/ERDI” and amounts to “unequal transfer”.

The results for the **dependency explanation** of world development are the following. Relationships contradicting the theory are printed in bold letters:

	foreign saving (I-S)/GDP	dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995	unequal transfer
% people not expected to survive age 60 (survival)	..	negative	..
CO2 emissions per capita (Kyoto)	negative	..	negative
development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975
ESI-Index (sustainability)	negative	positive	negative
Factor Social Development
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	..	positive	negative
female share in total life years	negative
GDP output per kg energy use (eco-social market economy)	negative
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98
human development index	negative

life expectancy, 1995-2000	..	negative	..
Political rights	negative	..	negative
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% (income redistribution)	positive	..	positive
unemployment (UN) (employment)	negative

Let us turn to issue of Islamic development efficiency. The empirical record, presented in this essay, speaks a clear language in favor of Islamic democracy and against those in the West that attempt to treat Islamic cultural heritage as a general development burden. A careful reading of what theologians – most notably, also leading Christian experts on Islam among them – positively have to say on Islamic humanism and its interesting institutions of *zakat* and *sadaqat*²⁷ is in stark contrast to the contemporary rhetoric of cultural warfare; basic Islamic institutions have enormously many aspects to offer to world development. A glance at the literature could easily convince anyone about the richness of Islamic social doctrine and Islamic social philosophy (Abdullah and Khoury, 1984; Armstrong, 2001; Khoury, 1980, 1981, 1991; Kunzmann and associates, 1996; Russell, 1999; Tibi, 1985, 1992, 2001). *Zakat* is the first institution of social security in the world system. Payment of 2 ½ percent of savings of the *zakat* fund is one of the fundamental duties of a Muslim. The State is responsible to collect *zakat* and makes arrangements for its distribution; while *sadaqat* is paid at no fixed rate (see also: The Light of Islam website at <http://home.swipnet.se/islam/articles/Non-Muslim.htm>).


Our evidence shows that the majority of Islamic countries transformed their “growth” much better to the benefit of “life quality” (average life expectancy) than most other societies around the globe.

At the same time, the UNDP data set shows that life expectancy as the most direct indicator of life quality in the world system has dramatically increased in the regions of the Middle East and in the Andean countries of Latin America, while in Southern Africa and in Eastern Europe there was a stagnation over the long period 1970 – 2000:

Map 9: where development in the world 1970 – 2000 was really pro-poor


²⁷ In the framework of the ecumenical dialogue between Christianity and Islam the prayer meeting of His Holiness the Pope at the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus on the 6th of May, 2001 should be especially mentioned: http://www.kuftaro.org/English/wot/on_the_occasion_of_the_visit_of_the.htm; <http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264qr.htm>

life exp. increases 1970-2000



Legend: missing values for West Sahara, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Dem. Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea

life exp. increases 1970-2000




Seen in such a way, the contrary of common beliefs is true: “Kemalism”, “Arab socialism” and other “isms” were quite successful, while the “*Washington Consensus*” strategies put in place after 1989 in Eastern Europe and the former USSR proved to be one of the utmost development failures in human history.

At a time, when leading protagonists of the “*Consensus*” proclaim that growth is simply good for the poor, it is time to reckon by quantitative means the complicated relationships between growth and the social and ecological dimensions of growth.

Protagonists of the thesis that growth is good for the poor would have to expect a 1:1 correlation between these two variables. But this is clearly not the case, as our scatter plott from UNDP figures shows:

Graph 11: economic growth and life expectancy increases



High growth and high life expectancy increases are certainly good for the poor; but equally interesting are the cases of those countries that had **negative economic growth** (<0.0 % per annum) and yet experienced a life expectancy increase of more than 9 years all over the period of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. These countries were Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Bolivia, Algeria, Iran, Nicaragua, Peru, United Arab Emirates, El Salvador, Senegal, and Comoros. So, if growth is good for the poor, is stagnation also good for the poor?

There were indeed high-growth countries (real growth per capita > 3.0 % *per annum*) with dramatic life expectancy increases of 9 years or more – countries that correspond to a revised “*growth is good for the poor*” theory. These countries were Bhutan, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Maldives, Laos, India, South

Korea, Chile, Cape Verde, Thailand, Equatorial Guinea, and Malaysia. However, the problem for the Dollar and Kray school of thought is here that these countries were not precisely “shining examples” of world economic openness. In reality many of them combined “openness” with various degrees of import substitution and government control. **Their** long-run growth was really good for the poor. But what about the high-growth country Botswana ($> 3.0\%$ *per annum*) that had a life expectancy reversal of 8.7 years since the 1970s, brought about by the AIDS epidemic and rampant poverty? Let us further compare these success stories and failure stories in the world system: was really economic freedom responsible or to blame for their development success or failure?

Table 5: dramatic development successes or failures and economic freedom

Summary Economic Freedom Ratings, 1970 to 1997 (scale ranges from 0 (complete command economy) to 10 (highest value)). The present scale differs from the scale, used throughout the rest of this essay								
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997	Change during 1990s
Botswana (failure)	NR	3,9	4,7	5,6	6	6,8	6,6	0,7
Chile (success)	3,7	3,7	5,9	6	7,4	8,2	8,2	0,8
India (success)	4	3,6	4,3	4,1	4,1	5	5,8	1,8
Indonesia (success)	4,8	5	5,2	5,9	6,8	7,3	7,2	0,4
Malaysia (success)	6,5	6,4	7,1	7,3	7,7	7,6	7,5	-0,2
South Korea (success)	6,3	5,6	5,7	6	6,6	7,7	7,3	0,7
Thailand (success)	6,4	5,6	5,8	6,1	6,8	7,6	8,2	1,4

Legend and sources: the time series data about economic freedom were taken from http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/books/econ_free_2000/section_07.html

Our final test for this is a multiple regression analysis that explains **life expectancy increases** in the years since 1970 by the levels of life expectancy (and its square) already reached in 1970 and by economic growth 1975 – 2000:

(Equation 3) Life expectancy increases 1970 - 2000


life expectancy, 1970-75	(life expectancy, 1970-75) ²	GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 1975-2000	constant
0,46732761	-0,01331198	1,41730518	-29,2749294
0,13387574	0,00387424	0,44130905	12,1686364
0,16470681	4,96843806		
9,66203683	147		
715,533059	3628,75039		

3,49075644	-3,43602192	3,2115933	T-Test
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Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately below the standard errors are R² (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Two-tailed test, 10 % error probability; all predictors are significant. The the entire equation is significant at the 0.00 level according to the F-Test.

The following graph shows that a non-linear formulation for the trade-off between historic life expectancy levels and subsequent life expectancy increases is more adequate than a linear one:


Graph 12: life expectancy levels in 1970/75 and life expectancy increases 1970 - 2000




It emerges that the **Islamic countries** are among the **best** performers on this scale (i.e. as measured by the residuals from equation (3)) in the entire world system. The countries in Map 10 marked in dark colors are really those where growth (or stagnation) was in benefit for the poor, while the countries, marked in white colors, are the ones where growth (or stagnation) did not benefit the poor, irrespective of life expectancy levels reached back in 1970.

Map 10: human development efficiency in the world system

human development efficiency



Legend: there are missing data for Greenland, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Poland, West Sahara, Chad, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, the Congo, Eritrea, Tanzania, Yemen, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan



Legend: there are missing data for Greenland, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Poland, West Sahara, Chad, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, the Congo, Eritrea, Tanzania, Yemen, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan.

Looking back on short-run dynamics and long-term stagnation

A constant feature of dependency theories, especially Volker Bornschier's development theory is the idea that penetration by transnational capital causes short-term dynamism but long-term stagnation. In general terms, we observed at the beginning and in the mid 1990s high levels of existing penetration in the "dominion economies" like Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in many parts of Latin America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in Tunisia and on the Arab Peninsula, and in China and Southeast Asia. During the 1990s, penetration by transnational capital dramatically also increased in many parts of Europe (especially in what was described by Donald Rumsfeld²⁸, US Secretary of Defense, recently as "the new Europe"); in eastern Latin America, in Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in South and Southeast Asia. However, there was a **dramatic decrease of MNC penetration in most countries of the Arab world** during the second half of the 1990s.

²⁸ See also: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/24012003172118.asp>

In order to test the relevance of the dependency model proposed by Volker Bornschieer, based on MNC penetration and its increases over time, with the new data series provided by UNCTAD (independent variables MNC penetration 1995 and increases of MNC penetration 1995 - 2000) and the UNDP (HDR, 2000; independent variables: development level and all dependent variables), and try to project its consequences for the Muslim world, we calculated the multiple regressions for 14 development dimensions:

development performance = $a_1 + b_1$ *first part curvilinear function of development level + b_2 *second part curvilinear function of development level + b_3 ...***transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s** + b_4 * **DYN transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) 1995-2000**

n = 164 countries²⁹ complete data for GDP PPP, MNC Penetration, DYN MNC Penetration, unequal exchange

This leads to the following results. Bornschieer's theory receives confirmation by the reported performance of the human development indicator increases, and the economic growth theory is confirmed as well, but not at the 5 % level, and several other social indicators correspond in their performance to Bornschieer's implicit assumptions, but in several other cases the dynamism/stagnation approach has to be reversed.

	T-value and direction of effect by DYN MNC PEN	T-value and direction of effect by MNC PEN	shape of original Bornschieer/Chase-Dunn assumptions confirmed/rejected	results significant at 10 % level yes

²⁹ The countries with complete data were: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Congo, Dem. Rep. of the; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong, China (SAR); Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep. of; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, TFYR; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa (Western); Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Seychelles; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania, U. Rep. of; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

% parliamentary seats held by women	3,0633431	-2,657935	confirmed	yes
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	3,6572896	-3,838198	confirmed	yes
GDP output per kg energy use	4,1828965	-3,485711	confirmed	yes
change in human development index, 1990-98	0,1104156	-0,049958	confirmed	no
gender empowerment	0,6812837	-0,079334	confirmed	no
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	0,4226642	-0,200435	confirmed	no
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	-1,721939	1,5509028	confirmed	partially
% people not expected to survive age 60	4,6689891	-5,757221	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
CO2 emissions per capita	3,9199032	-3,25436	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)	-2,494461	2,8265732	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
human development index	-4,331852	6,4773985	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
infant mortality rate	6,4089206	-7,85845	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
maternal mortality ratio	5,7001883	-6,653413	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers	-3,493423	3,0727787	long term good effect by transnational penetration, stagnation is short-term	yes

That foreign capital so dramatically withdrew from several Muslim regions in the world economy should be kept in due consideration in future research. The above model shows that in the Muslim world a number of processes of sustainable development, like:

% people not expected to survive age 60
CO2 emissions per capita
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)

human development index
 infant mortality rate
 maternal mortality ratio
 teen-age mothers as % of all mothers

in reality benefited by the withdrawal of transnation capital from the region, while the processes:

% parliamentary seats held by women
 female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
 GDP output per kg energy use
 change in human development index, 1990-98
 gender empowerment
 GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98
 equitable income distribution (as measured by the share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%)


in reality suffered from the lack of dynamism associated with the massive withdrawal of foreign capital.

A deep look into the 21st Century


In the post-WWII-world in which the often neglected great political economist Franco Modigliani (1918 – 2003) – who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1985 - wrote his path-breaking essays on the life cycle, savings and the wealth of nations, the division between the centers, the peripheries and the semi-peripheries was relatively stable. Franco Modigliani's political economy has a tremendous message not only for the developed world, but also for the countries of what was once called the "Third World", and the Muslim world in particular. Modigliani above all shows to us what happens with the saving rate, and in his later work he dramatically advocated overhauling the pension systems based in so many countries on the "pay as you go" principle.

The world system approach, pioneered today, above all by Giovanni Arrighi and Andre Gunder Frank, however teaches us that the centers of gravity in the world economy are dramatically shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region, and that the days of "Eurocentrism" are outnumbered:

Map 11: the political economic geography of saving rates today



Note: missing values for Greenland, Antarctica, and several countries in the Balkan region, Africa and West Asia




Note: missing values for Greenland, Antarctica, and several countries in the Balkan region, Africa and West Asia

Modigliani's central hypotheses on savings are from the standpoint of world system theory:

- 1) saving rates are independent of per capita incomes
- 2) economic growth rates determine saving rates

Savings still ARE clearly a function of per capita incomes and the position of a country in the world system, but the geographical map of world savings dramatically changes. The following graph shows that cross-national variations in per capita income explain 30 % of saving:

Graph 13: per capita income and the saving rate



The correlations of the savings process indicate that it cannot be separated from the today so dramatically changing center – periphery structure that characterizes the entire world system. We just highlight the following interesting relationships. World system and dependency scholars have always maintained that conditions of economic and social “injustice” drain the societal savings rates and block productive investments in the periphery and the semi-periphery. On the other hand, conditions of mass demand, economic justice and economic growth provide a powerful impetus for the savings rate. It is more than symbolic that the highest negative correlation of the savings rate is with the variable: food consumption as % of total household consumption, while the highest positive correlation of the saving rate is with the UNDP human development index. “*Social justice*” enhances savings.

Table 6: correlations of the investment rate, and the saving rate with variables of the UNDP Human Development Report 2000

variable (if not specified otherwise, 1998)	correlation with investment rate, 1998	correlation with saving rate, 1998	difference between the correlations of savings with the UNDP HDR variables and the correlations of investments with the UNDP HDR variables, 1998
food consumption as % of total household consumption	-0,120	-0,465	-0,345
unequal transfer	-0,076	-0,420	-0,343
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers	0,110	-0,418	-0,528
infant mortality rate	-0,142	-0,407	-0,264
maternal mortality ratio	-0,186	-0,396	-0,210
% people not expected to survive age 60	-0,154	-0,395	-0,241
food imports as % of merchandise imports	0,084	-0,392	-0,476
youth female unemployment rate	-0,272	-0,349	-0,077
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	-0,226	-0,323	-0,097
female unemployment rate	-0,233	-0,301	-0,068
youth male unemployment rate	-0,328	-0,271	0,057
TB cases per 100.000 inhabitants	-0,125	-0,255	-0,130
homicide rate	-0,158	-0,224	-0,066
HIV rate	-0,194	-0,213	-0,019
male unemployment rate	-0,297	-0,208	0,089
juvenile convictions as % of all convictions	-0,406	-0,204	0,202
female economic activity rate	-0,105	-0,183	-0,078
% infants with low birth-weight	-0,088	-0,162	-0,074
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	-0,111	-0,106	0,005
military expenditure as % of GDP	-0,115	-0,105	0,010
central government expenditures as % of GDP	0,253	-0,090	-0,343
% female administrators and managers	-0,066	-0,083	-0,017
% women in government, subministerial level	0,183	-0,012	-0,195
rapes per 100.000 women aged >15 y.	0,091	0,006	-0,085
% women in government, all levels	0,080	0,046	-0,034
public education expenditure per GNP	-0,025	0,064	0,088
tax revenue as % of GDP	0,162	0,072	-0,090
female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid family workers	-0,062	0,092	0,153
change in human development index, 1975-80	0,186	0,095	-0,091
male suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants	-0,008	0,109	0,117
% female professional and technical workers	-0,036	0,109	0,146
doctors per 100.000 people	-0,055	0,120	0,175

change in human development index, 1980-85	0,086	0,121	0,035
net foreign direct investment as % of GNP	0,319	0,150	-0,169
public health expenditure per GDP	0,133	0,154	0,022
growth of female economic activity (1975=100)	-0,020	0,155	0,176
change in human development index, 1985-1990	0,095	0,164	0,069
% women in government, ministerial level	-0,065	0,168	0,233
female tertiary students as % of males	-0,089	0,188	0,277
% immunization against TB	0,206	0,198	-0,008
change in human development index, 1990-98	0,224	0,218	-0,006
internet hosts per 1000 people	-0,096	0,223	0,318
% parliamentary seats held by women	-0,024	0,250	0,273
gender empowerment	-0,131	0,259	0,389
% population, aged >65y, 1998	0,023	0,273	0,250
injuries and deaths from road accidents per 100.000 inhabitants and year	-0,005	0,301	0,306
% immunization against measles	0,174	0,313	0,139
GDP output per kg energy use	0,050	0,316	0,266
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	0,412	0,329	-0,082
divorce rate as % of marriages	0,108	0,332	0,225
% population, aged >65y, 2015	0,029	0,333	0,303
population, aged >65 y, 2015	0,029	0,333	0,303
life expectancy, 1970-75	0,061	0,334	0,273
female suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants	0,105	0,335	0,230
average cigarette consumption per adult and year	0,095	0,347	0,252
Televisions per 1000 people	0,017	0,353	0,336
CO2 emissions per capita	-0,023	0,359	0,382
overall budget surplus/deficit as % of GDP	0,098	0,364	0,266
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1975-90	0,229	0,373	0,144
women's GDP per capita	-0,142	0,375	0,518
female literacy	0,148	0,377	0,229
economic growth, 1975-98	0,403	0,394	-0,009
GNP per capita	-0,040	0,397	0,437
main telephone lines per 1000 people	0,022	0,403	0,381
female life expectancy	0,135	0,403	0,268
male literacy	0,151	0,406	0,255
life expectancy, 1995-2000	0,138	0,411	0,273
male life expectancy	0,141	0,418	0,277
daily supply of calories, 1998	0,106	0,432	0,326
GDP per capita PPP	-0,013	0,461	0,474
contraceptive prevalence rate	0,197	0,488	0,291
human development index	0,095	0,511	0,416


Hence, foreign savings become an important indicator of the center-periphery structure of the world system and its changing nature (with its ongoing shifts favoring mainly the Asia – Pacific region) as well. Giovanni Arrighi proposed in his provocative analysis of the *'Long 20th Century'* (1995) the

thought that the logic of accumulation on a world-scale is governed by the ups and downs in the succession of regulation and de-regulation, starting from the Venetian (regulatory) and Genoese (deregulated) era of capitalism, followed by the Dutch (regulatory) and British (deregulated) era, and the US hegemony, which - after 1945 - was a regulatory model. From the late 1970s, however, we witness, Arrighi's argument goes on, again the renewed rise of a deregulated model of world capitalism.

The often-bemoaned end of the Keynesian era has its real basis; Arrighi's argument goes, in the shifting accumulation pattern of world capitalism. We agree with Arrighi that the rise of financial capitalism and the decline of productive capitalism are always connected to major shifts in the location of the centers of world capitalism, first from Venice to Genoa, followed by the shift from Genoa to Amsterdam, from Amsterdam to London, from London to New York, and from there on to the capitalist archipelago of East Asia of yesterday, perhaps to be followed by South Asia today (Arrighi, 1995). Arrighi also introduced the important notion that there is certain coexistence in the time-perspective between the 'different logics', so that elements of the waning and elements of the emerging order might coincide for years. Arrighi's sequential model of world capitalism is also a historic interpretation of the old Marxist notion of financial expansion - > material expansion - > financial expansion (MCM'), and as such radically challenges the notion of 'unchanging' general laws of rise and decline. Following Arrighi, we postulate that regulatory strategies might have been well compatible with growth under the rise of the Venetian, Dutch, and American era, while at the time of the rise of 'deregulation', such deregulatory strategies and not 'big government' will be conducive to economic growth..

The past economic growth rate of a country explains – as Modigliani correctly expected – the societal saving rate, but the relationship is smaller than Modigliani suggested:

Graph 14: past economic growth rates and the saving rate



Foreign savings are significantly determined by the maturity effects of a society (natural logarithm GDP per capita in PPP²) and the time series trend in the globalization process:

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	World Bank pension reform	Absence of economic freedom	military expenditure as % of GDP	globalization (time series trend ³⁰)	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic Conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc) ²	Constant
foreign saving	-1,162	10,769	-0,908	-2,167	0,879	2,0173	4,5383	1,3139	-0,365	1,7257	-0,253	1,0607	-22,16
	1,3694	21,525	3,6296	4,7828	1,6674	0,7419	3,705	0,8046	3,4895	4,0403	0,1851	0,5989	81,978
	0,3783	11,675											
	3,8035	75											
	6221,7	10224											
t-Test	-0,848	0,5003	-0,25	-0,453	0,5271	2,719	1,2249	1,6329	-0,105	0,4271	-1,368	1,7712	-0,27


Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outputs in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test and direction the influence (error probability 10 %, two-tailed test. Significant predictors are printed in bold letters. The values immediately below the standard errors are R² (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). The error probability (F) for the entire equation is 0,0002.

³⁰ time series correlation coefficient for each country of the world system with foreign direct investments per GDP since 1980

	error probability
% population, aged >65y, 1998	0,399
% women in government, ministerial level	0,618
World Bank pension reform	0,803
Absence of economic freedom	0,652
military expenditure as % of GDP	0,600
globalization (time series trend)	0,008
public education expenditure per GDP	0,224
<i>unequal transfer</i>	<i>0,107</i>
EUmembership	0,917
Islamic Conference	0,671
ln(GDP PPP pc)	0,175
ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	0,081
Constant	0,788

Gross **domestic** savings at first sight do not vary systematically with pension reform over time from 1960 to 1999, as the following comparison between European reformers (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), 2 typical non-reformers by around 2000 (Austria and France), the US (non-reformer until 2005) and Chile (reform country) shows:


Graph 15: gross domestic saving rates over time since 1960 in European non-reform and reform states, in Chile and in the United States of America




However, Modigliani was right in assuming – to put in the language of world system theory - that the dynamics of saving rates reflect the underlying dynamic of the world capitalist system. Our following map clearly shows this:

Map 12: the dynamics of saving rates in the 1990s – correlation of saving rates with the time axis since 1990

growth in saving rates



Legend: missing values for Antarctica, some African and Balkan countries



Legend: missing values for Antarctica, some African and Balkan countries

In the countries of the European Union, the following time series correlations of the saving rate could be observed in the 1990s:

Table 7: time series correlations of saving rates in the European Union from 1990 to 1999

	correlations
Romania	-0,8470339
Latvia	-0,84380293
Austria	-0,77071771
Malta	-0,72316132
Spain	-0,71944302
Lithuania	-0,67274426
Denmark	-0,66063659
Estonia	-0,64190524
Portugal	-0,58904695
Germany	-0,39101826

Czech Republic	-0,32506503
France	-0,28439494
Slovenia	-0,19324584
Poland	-0,169053
Netherlands	-0,1399943
Cyprus	-0,07700664
United Kingdom	0,16584087
Slovak Republic	0,2209186
Sweden	0,24781834
Greece	0,37351932
Hungary	0,46175069
Belgium	0,5296027
Finland	0,58444329
Italy	0,58450995
Luxembourg	0,89920109
Ireland	0,94321185

Our map 12 again shows the relevance of the “Re-Orient” hypothesis by Professor Andre Gunder Frank and the dramatic decline and growing impoverishment of the Euro-Atlantic region. The future of the world system lies in the Pacific.

Now, where would world system approaches, as described above, and Modigliani have agreed on the strategies that would follow from our analysis? As it is well known, Modigliani, Ceprini and Muraldihar stated in their August 2000 analysis that replacing the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) method of financing Social Security benefits with a fully funded system will indeed entail many benefits. In the framework of the world system approach and under the constraints of today’s capitalist world economy, analyzed in this essay, one cannot but agree to that formulation:

1. The funded system is more cost effective in the sense that it requires a smaller contribution for a given set of benefits.
2. The funded system is more stable and financially resilient because under PAYGO the required contribution rate depends on the rate of growth of payrolls.
3. The funded system in contrast to PAYGO results in a large accumulation of assets and thus makes a valuable contribution to national saving, the stock of productive capital and national income.

Modigliani and associates went on to say:

“In conclusion, we propose a permanent solution for Social Security resting on two pillars. The first is a fully-funded system, which permits a dramatic reduction in the required payroll tax. It also improves the resiliency of the system to changes in payroll growth, and contributes to capital formation. The

second is the current structure of defined benefits. It is secured by investing the pension accumulation in a single portfolio – representing a share of America’s wealth and reflecting its economic performance – and by swapping the return of that portfolio for a sure real rate guaranteed by the U.S. government. The approach we advocate clearly shifts to the government the risk that the market return deviates from that guaranteed to Social Security. But we contend that the US government is in a position to absorb this risk because of its size and indefinite life and the consequent ability to spread the risk of a single cohort of workers over a large number of cohorts and that it should be prepared to underwrite that risk to give to older Americans the peace of mind that they deserve. We conclude with a plea that the lucky occurrence of a large surplus not be used to cut taxes or increase current spending, or to temporarily fix the inefficient, unreliable, poorly designed PAYGO system. Instead, we propose using the surplus in a productive way, in the best interest of the country, both for the present and especially for the future, by making the transition to the more efficient and reliable funded system. And let us remember that while the Social Security bomb has a long fuse, the remedies suggested here have a fuse at least as long. The time for a decision is right now! “ (Modigliani et al., 2000)

Modigliani and associates have shown that first, under PAYGO the contributions, which are in effect compulsory saving, are used to finance the pensions and hence consumption. Second, - with a growing host of other economists – Modigliani firmly believed that PAYGO is financially unsound and forever at risk of insolvency because the contribution required for the promised benefits is highly sensitive to variations in population structure and productivity growth. With a funded system, the contribution is largely invariant from either variable. It is sensitive to the rate of return on financial assets, but moderately in the relevant range.

Modigliani and associates recommend investing these assets in a common fund holding a strictly indexed portfolio of all marketable securities, (equity and debt), managed by the government and/or private managers on the basis of the lowest bidder.

Modigliani has foreseen that the transition to a new pension system will not be without costs:

“Unfortunately, there are costs in the transition from the PAYGO to the funded system as saving needs to be boosted, at least temporarily, to fund the unfunded pension liability. We lay out an operational program for the transition in which these costs are shown to be transitory and contained within moderate limits-something like an additional payroll levy averaging some 3.2% for some 15 years. We argue that for the U.S. these costs can and should be absorbed by the Government by redirecting to SS (i.e. Social Security) the share of the large budget surplus anticipated over the next 15 years, which the Administration as well as Congress seems to be ready to pledge toward saving the PAYGO system and taking advantage of the surplus already accumulated in the Trust Fund and expected to continue in the near future. In this case, the transition can be accomplished without any additional levy, though this is achieved at the cost of a long transition. We suggest that our permanent solution is preferable to that presently advocated by the Administration, which is but a temporary one, and also to the set of proposals that goes under the misnomer of “privatization” of Social Security. These proposals generally involve only partial funding, and hence a substantially higher long-run contribution rate. But, what is worse, their basic feature is the principle of mandated contributions to individually managed accounts. These are not only much more expensive to manage, but also imply giving up the social welfare promoting principle of defined benefits in favor of a defined contributions approach with its serious risks-especially for poorer, less sophisticated participants-and high cost to government if a minimum outcome is guaranteed. Last, but not least, they would contribute

importantly to increase unnecessarily and arbitrarily the inequalities in the distribution of pension income. “ (Modigliani et al., 2000).

The present author has shown however³¹ that in the framework of a capitalist world economy, characterized by sharp ascent and decline of different nations that struggle with the challenges of aging, the introduction of a World-Bank type of pension reform will be closely associated with a dynamic development of key basic human needs indicators:

absence of high share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%
 female life expectancy in % of male life expectancy
 female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
 Factor Social Development
 human development index
 female life expectancy
 absence of teen-age mothers as % of all mothers
 absence of HIV rate
 absence of infant mortality rate
 life expectancy, 1995-2000
 absence of % people not expected to survive age 60

As stated, these results suggest that World Bank pension reforms, contrary to the negative picture presented by most globalization critics in the literature, dynamize the societies of the countries that opted for reform. Non-reform in Europe will further increase the peripherization of the continent which already set in with the secular declining economic growth rates since the beginnings of the 1960s that often even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. For the Muslim world, these tendencies imply the necessity to seriously think about pension reform **before** the process of population stagnation sets in.


Tectonic shifts in the international system, pension funds and the Muslim world

Considering the overwhelming influence of the process of unequal transfer for world poverty, it should be noted that the last years brought about **dramatic shifts** in the structure of unequal transfer.

To recall, poverty is determined to 2/3 by unequal transfer. The exchange rate deviation index, or ERDI Index, i.e. the reciprocal value of our indicator for unequal transfer, neatly determines the buying power of the poorest 20 % in the nations of the world system:

Graph 16: ERDI Index and buying power of the poorest 20 % in the countries of the world system

³¹ http://www.galileus.info/galileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107882936307/109542807699/



Source: Our own calculations from UNDP sources

To recall, the heyday of unequal transfer meant increases in poverty in East Central Europe and in the Muslim world in the 1990s. ILO statistics clearly show that in East Central Europe and the MENA region – an international development bureaucracy shorthand expression for large parts of the Muslim world between Morocco and Iran – were the only world regions which saw an increase in the percentage of people affected by poverty between 1990 and 1999, and lost in value terms against the centers:

Table 8: The social effects of globalization, 1990 – 1999

<i>absolute and relative values</i>	Millions of people < 1 \$ a day 1990	% pop < 1 \$ a day 1990	Millions of people < 1 \$ a day 1999	% pop < 1 \$ a day 1999
East Asia and Pacific	486	30,5	279	15,6
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	6	1,4	24	5,1
South Asia	506	45	488	36,6
Latin America and Caribbean	48	11	57	11,1
Middle East and North Africa	5	2,1	6	2,2

Sub-Saharan Africa	241	47,4	315	49
Total	1292	29,6	1169	23,2
<u>absolute and relative values</u>	Millions of people < 2 \$ a day 1990	% pop < 2 \$ a day 1990	Millions of people < 2 \$ a day 1999	% pop < 2 \$ a day 1999
East Asia and Pacific	1114	69,7	897	50,1
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	31	6,8	97	20,3
South Asia	1010	89,8	1128	84,8
Latin America and Caribbean	121	27,6	132	26
Middle East and North Africa	50	21	68	23,3
Sub-Saharan Africa	386	76	480	74,7
Total	2712	62,1	2802	55,6
<u>1990 = 100</u>	Millions of people < 1 \$ a day	% pop < 1 \$ a day	Millions of people < 2 \$ a day	% pop < 2 \$ a day
East Asia and Pacific	57,4	51,1	80,5	71,9
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	400	364,3	312,9	298,5
South Asia	96,4	81,3	111,7	94,4
Latin America and Caribbean	118,8	100,9	109,1	94,2
Middle East and North Africa	120	104,8	136	111
Sub-Saharan Africa	130,7	103,4	124,4	98,3
Total	90,5	78,4	103,3	89,5
<u>changes since 1990</u>	Millions of people < 1 \$ a day	% pop < 1 \$ a day	Millions of people < 2 \$ a day	% pop < 2 \$ a day
East Asia and Pacific	-207	-14,9	-217	-19,6
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	+18	+3,7	+66	+13,5
South Asia	-18	-8,4	+118	-5
Latin America and Caribbean	+9	+0,1	+11	-1,6
Middle East and North Africa	+1	+0,1	+18	+2,3
Sub-Saharan Africa	+74	+1,6	+94	-1,3

Africa				
Total	-123	-6,4	90	-6,5

Thus, the final balance of globalization since 1990 was the income impoverishment of Eastern Europe and the Muslim world in the Middle East and North Africa:

Table 9: Changes in the social structure of the world system, 1990 - 1999

changes since 1990	% pop < 2 \$ a day
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	13,5
Middle East and North Africa	2,3
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1,3
Latin America and Caribbean	-1,6
South Asia	-5
East Asia and Pacific	-19,6
Total	-6,5

Source: our own calculations from ILO sources, 2003 (Report of the Director-General: “*Working out of Poverty*”. International Labor Conference 91st Session 2003, ILO, Geneva)

The wave of global politics and economics in the 1990s negatively affected the social balances in many countries. Several European countries, but also in Japan and even in the US, inequality and globalization are on the increase **since 1980**, as the present author could confirm in his recent works based on the data series of the ILO, the UTIP project at the University of Texas, and the World Bank³². Malaysia and Jordan are practically the only major Muslim country with a falling rate of inequality since 1980:

³² see especially: ‘*Die EU-Erweiterung und die soziale Konvergenz. Ein „Working Paper“ zur Globalisierung und wachsenden Ungleichheit im neuen und alten Europa*’ Studien von Zeitfragen, ISSN-1619-8417, 38(2): 1 – 185 <http://druckversion.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Soziale%20Konvergenz%20EU-Erweiterung.pdf>; furthermore: ‘*Soziale und regionale Ungleichgewichte, politische Instabilität und die Notwendigkeit von Pensionsreformen im neuen Europa*’ Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für europäische Studien, Universität Trier, Band 56, ISSN 0948-1141 <http://www.uni-trier.de/zes/schriftenreihe/056.pdf>; see also: ‘*Towards a European Perspective for the Common Mediterranean Huse and the Positive Development Capability of Islamic Countries*’ In , *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*’ (Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (Eds.) Università degli Studi di Catania Facoltà di Scienze Politiche: 145 – 168, available at: <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmEBOOKSengl.htm>, and finally: (Ed., together with Peter Herrmann, University of Cork, Ireland) *DAR AL ISLAM. EUROPE, THE WORLD SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE EU-ENLARGEMENT*. Contributors: Samir Amin, Syed M. Ahsan, Pat Cox, Andre Gunder Frank, Peter Herrmann, Gernot Köhler, Victor Krassilchikov, Rabbi Michael Lerner, Syed Mansoob Murshed, Hans-Heinrich Nolte,

Model (1) time series correlations suggest: Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency towards slow growth (<0.0), tendency towards rising inequality (>0.0) – the worst of all worlds under globalization. The rallying-point of the anti-globalization movements

Brazil
Bulgaria
Ecuador
Gambia, The
Jamaica
Latvia
Moldova
Mongolia
Pakistan
Romania
Russian Federation
South Africa
Turkey
Ukraine
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Model (2) Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), but tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), and tendency towards rising inequality (>0.0) – model: globalization with growth – at an inequality price. Countries that could tend towards stronger protest movements

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Canada
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Czech Republic
Denmark
Ethiopia

John R. Oneal, Kunibert Raffer, Bruce Russett, Clara Mira Salama, David Skidmore, Arno Tausch, The First Declaration of Alexandria, Alfred Tovias, Patrick Ziltener. © Nova Science Hauppauge, New York, 2004, available at: <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmEBOOKSengl.htm>

Finland
 Honduras
 Hungary
 Ireland
 Israel
 Lesotho
 Madagascar
 Malawi
 Mexico
 Mozambique
 Netherlands
 Nigeria
 Norway
 Panama
 Peru
 Philippines
 Poland
 Portugal
 Slovak Republic
 Sweden
 Tanzania
 Trinidad and Tobago
 United Kingdom
 United States
 Venezuela, RB

Model (3) Strong tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0) – model: redistribution with growth under globalization. Countries, whose experience contradicts the anti-globalization movements and theories

Belgium
 Costa Rica
 Croatia
 Dominican Republic
 France
 Germany
 India
 Nepal
 Nicaragua
 Uganda

Model (4) Stronger tendency towards globalization (>0.5), tendency towards slower growth (<0.0), and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0)

Korea, Rep.
 Kyrgyz Republic
 Lithuania
 Thailand
 Tonga

Model (5) tendency towards weaker globalization (> 0.5), tendency towards slower growth (< 0.0), tendency towards rising inequality – the worst of all worlds for neo-liberal growth theory (failed anti-globalization)

Algeria
 Bahamas, The
 Burundi
 Cameroon
 Colombia
 Congo, Dem. Rep.
 Egypt, Arab Rep.
 Italy
 Japan
 Morocco

Model (6) tendency towards weaker globalization (< 0.5), tendency towards higher growth (< 0.0), but tendency towards rising inequality (> 0.0) – model: “successful anti-globalization ” – at an inequality price

Australia
 Barbados
 Central African Republic
 El Salvador
 Fiji
 Gabon
 Ghana
 Greece
 Guatemala
 Iran, Islamic Rep.
 Kuwait
 Macedonia, FYR
 Malta
 New Zealand
 Papua New Guinea
 Portugal
 Rwanda
 Senegal
 Seychelles
 Slovenia

Spain
 Syrian Arab Republic
 Tunisia
 Uruguay
 Yemen, Rep.


Model (7) tendency towards weaker globalization (<0.5), tendency towards higher growth (<0.0), and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0) – model: “successful anti-globalization” – at no inequality price

Iceland
 Liberia
 Mauritius
 Sri Lanka
 Togo


Model (8) tendency towards weaker globalization (<0.5), tendency towards slow growth (<0.0), and tendency towards falling inequality (<0.0) – model:

Cyprus
 Haiti
 Indonesia
 Jordan
 Kenya
 Malaysia
 Singapore
 Swaziland


It is now simply unthinkable that changes in the structure of unequal transfer will not affect the entire system. The center received inputs to the tune of around 8 % of its current GDP through to the middle of the 1990s, however at the end of the 1990s we seem to have arrived at a historical junction where this very structure seems to evaporate and be substituted by another one:

Map 13: the changing geography of global unequal transfer


DYN 1/ERDI 1998-2002




DYN 1/ERDI 1998-2002




changes in world position



change in world econ. pos.





The main winners and losers of these changes are:

Table 10: the main winners and losers at the turn of the 21st Century in the structures of unequal transfer

Country code	changes in unequal transfer 1998 – 2002: increases (+) or decreases (-) in unequal transfer (1/ERDI)	unequal transfer 2002	unequal transfer 1998
Nicaragua	-2,49	3,30	5,79
Angola	-2,29	2,50	4,79
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	-1,56	5,91	7,48
Turkmenistan	-1,31	2,61	3,92
Moldova, Rep. of	-1,25	3,88	5,12
Kyrgyzstan	-1,03	5,06	6,10
Romania	-0,95	3,20	4,15

Yemen	-0,95	1,62	2,57
Jamaica	-0,63	1,32	1,95
Zimbabwe	-0,63	3,67	4,31
Honduras	-0,61	2,68	3,29
Mexico	-0,59	1,42	2,01
Jordan	-0,57	2,34	2,91
Armenia	-0,51	4,00	4,51
Comoros	-0,44	3,33	3,78
Sudan	-0,40	4,41	4,81
Trinidad and Tobago	-0,37	1,28	1,66
Oman	-0,35	1,67	2,02
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-0,33	1,50	1,83
Albania	-0,30	3,17	3,46
Panama	-0,28	1,47	1,76
Bulgaria	-0,28	3,66	3,94
Saint Lucia	-0,27	1,14	1,42
Congo	-0,26	1,20	1,46
Samoa (Western)	-0,25	3,33	3,58
Mongolia	-0,24	3,82	4,05
Azerbaijan	-0,24	4,30	4,53
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-0,22	1,50	1,72
Venezuela	-0,21	1,43	1,65
Kenya	-0,21	2,59	2,80
Hungary	-0,20	2,07	2,27
Indonesia	-0,19	3,95	4,14
Kuwait	-0,19	1,07	1,25
Barbados	-0,18	1,64	1,82
Bahrain	-0,16	1,56	1,72
Côte d'Ivoire	-0,14	2,15	2,28
Madagascar	-0,13	2,77	2,91
Bahamas	-0,12	1,06	1,18
Cyprus	-0,10	1,37	1,47
Lebanon	-0,09	1,12	1,22
Ecuador	-0,09	1,89	1,98
Costa Rica	-0,08	2,08	2,16
Czech Republic	-0,08	2,32	2,40
Grenada	-0,05	1,75	1,80
Guatemala	-0,04	2,10	2,14

Nigeria	-0,04	2,61	2,65
United States	-0,02	0,99	1,01
Georgia	-0,02	3,44	3,46
Tanzania, U. Rep. of	-0,01	2,17	2,18
Saudi Arabia	0,00	1,47	1,47
El Salvador	0,01	2,20	2,18
Ireland	0,03	1,17	1,15
Dominican Republic	0,04	2,64	2,60
United Kingdom	0,04	0,99	0,95
Antigua and Barbuda	0,05	1,14	1,10
Lithuania	0,06	2,59	2,53
Canada	0,06	1,29	1,23
Iceland	0,10	1,00	0,90
Sierra Leone	0,10	3,38	3,27
Norway	0,10	0,87	0,77
Malaysia	0,12	2,34	2,22
Syrian Arab Republic	0,12	2,96	2,83
Korea, Rep. of	0,13	1,69	1,57
Algeria	0,14	3,23	3,09
Japan	0,14	0,86	0,72
Zambia	0,14	2,32	2,18
Portugal	0,15	1,53	1,38
Belize	0,16	1,88	1,72
Sweden	0,16	0,97	0,81
Malta	0,17	1,79	1,63
Israel	0,17	1,24	1,07
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	0,17	5,59	5,42
Macedonia, TFYR	0,18	3,47	3,30
Finland	0,18	1,03	0,86
Switzerland	0,18	0,82	0,64
Latvia	0,19	2,56	2,37
Slovenia	0,19	1,65	1,46
Spain	0,19	1,34	1,15
Poland	0,21	2,16	1,95
Gabon	0,22	1,74	1,52
Denmark	0,23	0,96	0,73
Netherlands	0,23	1,12	0,89

Belgium	0,25	1,16	0,92
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0,25	1,13	0,88
Italy	0,26	1,29	1,02
<i>Estonia</i>	<i>0,27</i>	<i>2,55</i>	<i>2,29</i>
France	0,27	1,12	0,85
Australia	0,27	1,36	1,09
New Zealand	0,28	1,46	1,18
Kazakhstan	0,29	3,55	3,27
Austria	0,29	1,15	0,86
<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>0,29</i>	<i>2,91</i>	<i>2,62</i>
Germany	0,29	1,13	0,83
Benin	0,31	2,59	2,28
Greece	0,31	1,50	1,19
Singapore	0,35	1,15	0,80
Guyana	0,35	4,71	4,36
Mali	0,36	3,09	2,73
Dominica	0,38	2,00	1,62
Turkey	0,39	2,42	2,03
Sri Lanka	0,40	4,08	3,68
Niger	0,44	4,14	3,70
Egypt	0,45	2,81	2,36
Fiji	0,45	2,37	1,91
Viet Nam	0,46	5,28	4,82
Morocco	0,46	3,13	2,67
China	0,49	4,63	4,14
Nepal	0,51	6,02	5,51
Bolivia	0,52	2,77	2,25
Vanuatu	0,52	3,00	2,48
Chad	0,53	4,25	3,72
Tunisia	0,53	3,15	2,62
Haiti	0,54	3,91	3,37
Luxembourg	0,55	1,30	0,74
Russian Federation	0,56	3,42	2,86
Burkina Faso	0,57	4,19	3,62
Croatia	0,58	2,04	1,46
Peru	0,62	2,37	1,75
Chile	0,62	2,38	1,76
Senegal	0,65	3,16	2,51
Botswana	0,65	2,64	1,99

Mauritius	0,68	2,91	2,23
Uruguay	0,75	2,17	1,42
India	0,77	5,49	4,72
Malawi	0,77	3,26	2,49
Central African Republic	0,77	4,50	3,73
Togo	0,84	5,00	4,16
Thailand	0,88	3,40	2,53
Philippines	0,89	4,28	3,39
Belarus	0,93	3,83	2,90
Bangladesh	0,94	4,83	3,89
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	0,95	4,05	3,10
Solomon Islands	0,95	3,50	2,55
Colombia	1,01	3,44	2,43
Cameroon	1,04	3,46	2,42
Pakistan	1,11	4,76	3,65
Cape Verde	1,14	3,83	2,69
Guinea-Bissau	1,15	5,00	3,85
Swaziland	1,36	4,08	2,73
Brazil	1,56	3,00	1,43
Namibia	1,57	4,24	2,67
Cambodia	1,59	6,43	4,83
Mozambique	1,63	5,36	3,73
Guinea	1,70	5,06	3,36
Papua New Guinea	1,71	4,36	2,65
Gambia	1,73	6,00	4,27
South Africa	1,82	4,38	2,56
Eritrea	2,17	6,33	4,16
Paraguay	2,18	4,62	2,44
Tajikistan	2,27	5,08	2,81
Burundi	2,36	6,43	4,07
Mauritania	2,39	6,20	3,81
Uganda	2,41	5,88	3,46
Ukraine	2,46	5,72	3,26
Ghana	2,50	6,95	4,45
Argentina	2,55	4,05	1,50
Ethiopia	2,89	8,62	5,74
Uzbekistan	3,17	5,33	2,16
Rwanda	3,25	6,12	2,87

Lesotho	3,29	6,14	2,85
Equatorial Guinea	5,03	6,67	1,64

By and large, it is shown that the member countries of the “old” EU-15 are on the losing side in that transnational equation. No “old” European country improved its position, on the contrary, “old Europe” becomes a region that is itself a victim of unequal transfer. It also emerges that *ceteris paribus* the Muslim world indeed became the main loser of these tectonic shifts. A positive sign of a regression coefficient must be interpreted as an increase of the negative phenomenon in the structures of unequal transfer:

Table 11: the determinants of a rising rate of unequal transfer, 1998 – 2002

	changes in (un)equal transfer 1998 – 2002: explaining changes in unequal transfer, 1998 – 2002 (first column, Table 10)				t-test ³³
	left column: unstandardized regression coefficients	second column: standard error of the estimate			
% population, aged >65y, 1998	0,097	0,273	r ² =0,145	F = 1,2416	0,354
% women in government, ministerial level	0,103	0,095		df = 95	1,085
(I-S)/GNP	-1,835	1,490			-1,231
Absence of economic freedom	-0,158	0,231			-0,683
military expenditure as % of GDP	-0,001	0,009			-0,064
MNC PEN 1995	-0,162	0,110			-1,479
public education expenditure per GNP	0,003	0,052			0,065
unequal transfer	0,007	0,005			1,266
EU-membership years by 2004	-0,009	0,050			-0,177
Islamic conference	0,418	0,220			1,902
ln(GDP PPP pc)	-0,001	0,008			-0,176
ln (GDP PPP pc) ²	0,015	0,013			1,167
pension reform	-0,034	0,036			-0,959
Constant	7,644	5,710			1,339

³³ (p<.10; two-tailed test)


Legend: the error probability for the entire equation is rather unsatisfactory ($p = 0,264$); the error probabilities for the predictors are:

<i>% population, aged >65y, 1998</i>	<i>0,7241</i>
<i>% women in government, ministerial level</i>	<i>0,2807</i>
<i>(IS)/GNP</i>	<i>0,2214</i>
<i>Absence of economic freedom</i>	<i>0,4963</i>
<i>military expenditure as % of GDP</i>	<i>0,9491</i>
<i>MNC PEN 1995</i>	<i>0,1424</i>
<i>public education expenditure per GNP</i>	<i>0,9483</i>
<i>unequal transfer</i>	<i>0,2086</i>
<i>EUmembership years by 2004</i>	<i>0,8599</i>
<i>Islamic conference</i>	<i>0,0602</i>
<i>ln(GDP PPP pc)</i>	<i>0,8607</i>
<i>ln (GDP PPP pc)^2</i>	<i>0,2461</i>
<i>pension reform</i>	<i>0,34</i>

It is entirely conceivable that these pressures – as Gernot Kohler has shown – also explain a good part of the negative trends on the labor markets in the Muslim countries and in Europe:


Map 14: the changing structure of unemployment in the world system

DYN unemployment 1980-2001




Our own compilations from Laborsta (ILO). No data for wide parts of Africa and West Asia


DYN unemployment 1980-2001



Unemployment 2000



Unemployment 2000



It is clear that rising rates of unequal transfer are causing rising rates of unemployment. An approximate, admittedly crude measure would be to correlate DYN 1/ERDI (in the short term, **assuming** that this reflects a longer-run tendency as well) with the changes in unemployment over the last 2 decades since 1980, observable from the ILO Laborsta data set. A non-linear function explains 16 % of the rise in unemployment (time series correlations, ILO Laborsta data series).


So, while the Muslim world can optimistically evaluate recent trends in world savings, recent changes in unequal exchange rather differentiate between those Muslim countries with a favorable world economic prospect and those that further remain in a peripheral status. *Inter alia*, prospects for the following Muslim nations deteriorate due to **rising unequal exchange**, and they will be faced, according to this analysis, with a rising unemployment:

Algeria
 Bangladesh
 Egypt
 Eritrea
 Iran, Islamic Rep. of
 Kazakhstan
 Malaysia
 Mali
 Mauritania
 Morocco
 Niger
 Pakistan
 Senegal
 Syrian Arab Republic
 Tajikistan
 Tunisia
 Turkey
 Uzbekistan

Declining unequal exchange is to be observed in the following countries:

Albania
 Azerbaijan
 Bahrain
 Comoros
 Indonesia
 Jordan
 Kuwait
 Kyrgyzstan
 Lebanon
 Oman
 Sudan
 Turkmenistan

Yemen

Graph 17: the rising rates of unequal transfer and rising unemployment in the world system

Development is a contradictory and dialectical process. There is no single strategy that has only positive results, and there is no strategy that has only negative results. No single development theory today captures all these negative and positive effects that interact together. At this stage, perhaps, the question will arise – what are the **real policy implications**, then, of this kind of analysis? It should be clear that a reliance on the “*Washington Consensus*” alone will not “fix” the performance of countries beyond a better and more predictable “development stability”. The most consistent

consequence of the **“dependency”** analysis of this essay is the realization that a reliance on foreign capital in the short term might bring about positive consequences for employment – especially female employment – but that the long-term negative consequences of dependence in the social sphere, but also for sustainable development, outweigh the immediate, positive effects. Our three-fold empirical understanding of the process of globalization – reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and unequal transfer, - goes beyond the average analysis of the workings of dependency structures and shows how different aspects of dependency negatively affect development performance. The **integration of the countries of the periphery into larger currency blocs** – quite contrary to what the *“Washington Consensus”* has to say about *“competitive currencies”* - **will be one of the most important tasks for international development strategies for years to come.** Left for themselves in the capitalist world economy, the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery will always be victims of international currency instabilities. In the light of earlier published analyses, it is no surprise that **“unequal transfer” (1/ERDI; ERDI being the exchange rate deviation index)** is again established to be the **most important dependency variable**, far more important in its negative effects on social and sustainable development than the UNCTAD data series on MNC penetration. **European Union integration**, this analysis again shows, on the other hand is not a quick fix for many of the social ills of the periphery and semi-periphery. The EU under present conditions fails to have sufficiently enough dynamic effects and its **democratic deficits** become ever more clear. In terms of the size of the quantitative effects on the 14 dimensions of development under investigation here, it is shown that the new political structures associated with **political feminism** that substituted patriarchic structures inherent in practically all world regions for much of the 19th and the early 20th Century have a very considerable effect on the development outcomes of today. As we have outlined above, feminism in power – i.e. the share of women in positions of political decision making - achieves to transform many aspects of development, but, as other “distribution coalitions” before it, creates certain aspects of stagnation as well and thus is not free from the effects of the logic of *“collective action”* that is at the heart of the neo-liberal doctrine of today (see especially the works Olson and Weede). In the 21st Century, the **process of aging** and the necessity of pension reform, closely linked to that process, also cannot be overlooked anymore. In our analysis, unequal transfer, aging, and political feminism achieve the majority of the significant effects³⁴ on the 14 development dimensions under investigation here, i.e. far more than the “master” variables of earlier debates, like “economic freedom” versus “MNC penetration”. As has been argued elsewhere, globalization critics especially must start to look at pensions and pension funds seriously – because the way, in which you manage the savings of society for old age, you also manage technological innovation and world systems position in general (Tausch, 2003). It is also evident from the analysis presented in this article that **Islamic culture** is not a development blockade; on the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus – a very positive effect on political democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto-process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a “religion of the Middle Ages” Islam has an important message for the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that socially progressive forces in the MENA countries will achieve a better monetary distribution of incomes and a better gender distribution of work in the societies concerned in the future.

It is shown in this article that transnational integration is and remains to be a contradictory process that does not lead 1:1 to a greater amount of social cohesion and sustainable development in the host countries of transnational penetration. So, in the words of Osvaldo Sunkel again:

³⁴ significant at the 5 % level, one-tailed test, or 10 % level, two-tailed test

'The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) The effects of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for social mobility. (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular base, the universities etc.' (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42).

This picture, drawn more than 3 decades ago, will – in the light of this empirical analysis – correspond much more to the trajectory of countries like Turkey over the next decades than optimistic analyses, which are shared by the majority of decision makers on a European level. The role of the social scientist then will not be “pathfinders to globalization” but to become pathfinders for those millions, who will become marginalized by the process of social disintegration that goes along and is part and parcel of transnational integration.

Appendix


Legend: In our tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number **0,000141972** will be abridged to **1E-04**, i.e. a decimal number rounded to 0,0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal point with three zeros after the comma. A number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros after the comma, i.e. 0,0000000009.

The multivariate results in detail:

Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test and direction of the influence. The values immediately below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, left side entry), F , and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Error probability <10 %, two-tailed tests.

The two-tailed t-Test for 30 degrees of freedom or more at the 10 % error probability level³⁵) yields the following results:

³⁵ These calculations were performed with the T-VERT and F-VERT routines in the EXCEL program.



	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln((GDP PPP pc)^2)	constant
Political rights violations	0,050	-0,832	1,371	0,099	0,198	-0,089	0,018	0,218	1,340	-0,032	-0,012	-0,069	2,038
	0,139	2,184	0,346	0,544	0,162	0,078	0,008	0,075	0,327	0,012	0,019	0,055	8,401
	0,661	1,328											
	15,618	96,000											
	330,407	169,245											
T-Test	0,359	-0,381	3,968	0,182	1,221	-1,141	2,399	2,901	4,094	-2,577	-0,654	-1,270	0,243

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln((GDP PPP pc)^2)	constant
% people not expected to survive age 60	3,199	-65,554	-3,004	-1,500	-0,789	1,541	0,039	-0,692	1,793	-0,167	0,070	-0,749	345,824
	1,159	18,176	2,876	4,525	1,352	0,646	0,064	0,624	2,725	0,102	0,156	0,454	69,912
	0,664	11,050											
	15,828	96,000											
	23190,174	11720,882											
T-Test	2,759	-3,607	-1,045	-0,332	-0,584	2,386	0,609	-1,108	0,658	-1,631	0,449	-1,650	4,947

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln((GDP PPP pc)^2)	constant
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	16493,255	15580,810											
T-Test	2,366	-2,987	-0,970	-2,719	2,384	2,145	-1,289	-1,839	-0,374	-1,724	2,267	4,927	4,183

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
GDP output per kg energy use	0,712	-10,464	0,107	1,000	-0,433	-0,041	-0,026	-0,220	-0,126	0,034	-0,027	-0,086	42,440
	0,166	2,688	0,442	0,580	0,189	0,087	0,013	0,081	0,396	0,016	0,022	0,058	10,879
	0,721	1,377											
	16,816	78,000											
	382,730	147,937											
T-Test	4,281	-3,893	0,242	1,724	-2,293	-0,471	-2,016	-2,706	-0,318	2,097	-1,186	-1,476	3,901

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	0,254	-2,130	-0,788	1,506	0,087	-0,353	0,021	-0,104	-0,902	0,005	0,009	-0,533	8,206
	0,341	5,339	0,848	1,358	0,413	0,216	0,019	0,188	0,832	0,030	0,048	0,133	20,532
	0,302	3,222											
	3,310	92,000											
	412,400	955,148											
T-Test	0,745	-0,399	-0,930	1,109	0,212	-1,635	1,132	-0,550	-1,083	0,176	0,192	-4,001	0,400

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
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	29	37											
T-Test	-1,701	2,052	-3,746	-0,488	-3,695	-1,520	0,373	-2,197	0,316	3,003	0,976	-6,192	-1,565

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
ESI-Index	-0,837	15,394	-3,537	-4,608	-0,947	0,973	-0,004	-0,837	-0,297	0,104	0,209	0,246	-19,840
	0,694	10,839	1,730	2,552	0,807	0,369	0,052	0,362	1,718	0,076	0,092	0,261	41,705
	0,507	6,032											
	7,102	83,000											
	3101,234	3020,246											
T-Test	-1,205	1,420	-2,044	-1,806	-1,173	2,640	-0,074	-2,315	-0,173	1,367	2,272	0,942	-0,476

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
female share in total life years	-0,228	3,749	0,105	-0,702	0,019	0,011	-0,005	-0,063	-0,046	0,003	0,006	0,145	35,855
	0,070	1,098	0,174	0,273	0,082	0,039	0,004	0,038	0,165	0,006	0,009	0,027	4,222
	0,495	0,667											
	7,835	96,000											
	41,866	42,745											
T-Test	-3,257	3,416	0,604	-2,569	0,230	0,294	-1,187	-1,678	-0,282	0,423	0,651	5,277	8,492

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
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development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) 1975 - ^1998	0,803	-4,819	-4,497	8,897	0,371	-1,118	0,040	0,499	0,314	0,107	0,090	-0,796	-4,580
	1,348	21,138	3,344	5,263	1,573	0,751	0,074	0,726	3,169	0,119	0,181	0,528	81,306
	0,330	12,850											
	3,937	96,000											
	7801,509	15852,839											
T-Test	0,596	-0,228	-1,345	1,691	0,236	-1,488	0,541	0,687	0,099	0,900	0,499	-1,509	-0,056

	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventions)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln(GDP PPP pc)^2	constant
unemployment (UN)	-3,794	65,612	3,076	0,208	0,340	0,309	-0,028	0,672	-1,748	0,035	-0,001	0,217	-273,184
	0,761	13,217	1,848	1,920	0,876	0,334	0,044	0,374	1,512	0,069	0,075	0,201	57,545
	0,371	4,444											
	3,098	63,000											
	734,006	1244,020											
T-Test	-4,986	4,964	1,665	0,109	0,388	0,925	-0,640	1,795	-1,156	0,507	-0,018	1,079	-4,747

Legend: in our tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number **0,000141972** will be abridged to **1E-04**, i.e. a decimal number rounded to 0,0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal point with three zeros after the comma. A number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros after the comma, i.e. 0,0000000009.

Summary Table of statistical significance:

% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(IS)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionism)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2	constant	variable name	degrees of freedom	F	error probability, entire equation
0,007	0,000	0,299	0,741	0,561	0,019	0,544	0,271	0,512	0,106	0,654	0,102	0,000	% people not expected to survive age 60	96	15,83	0,000
0,000	0,000	0,065	0,002	0,029	0,634	0,942	0,008	0,402	0,009	0,849	0,190	0,000	CO2 emissions per capita	88	21,69	0,000
0,553	0,820	0,182	0,094	0,814	0,140	0,590	0,494	0,921	0,370	0,619	0,135	0,955	development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) 1975 ^1998	96	3,937	0,000
0,232	0,159	0,044	0,075	0,244	0,010	0,941	0,023	0,863	0,175	0,026	0,349	0,635	ESIIndex	83	7,102	0,000
0,000	0,000	0,937	0,792	0,902	0,828	0,267	0,450	0,401	0,109	0,632	0,000	0,000	Factor Social Development	96	48,13	0,000
0,020	0,004	0,334	0,008	0,019	0,034	0,200	0,069	0,709	0,088	0,026	0,000	0,000	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	96	8,468	0,000
0,002	0,001	0,547	0,012	0,819	0,769	0,238	0,097	0,779	0,673	0,517	0,000	0,000	female share in total life years	96	7,835	0,000
0,000	0,000	0,809	0,089	0,025	0,639	0,047	0,008	0,751	0,039	0,239	0,144	0,000	GDP output per kg energy use	78	16,82	0,000
0,458	0,691	0,355	0,270	0,833	0,105	0,261	0,584	0,282	0,861	0,848	0,000	0,690	GNP per capita annual growth rate, 199098	92	3,31	0,001
0,000	0,000	0,047	0,552	0,110	0,199	0,979	0,569	0,993	0,450	0,880	0,002	0,000	human development index	86	80,01	0,000
0,005	0,000	0,712	0,759	0,779	0,046	0,309	0,316	0,494	0,074	0,475	0,076	0,003	life expectancy, 19952000	96	22,23	0,000
0,720	0,704	0,000	0,856	0,225	0,257	0,018	0,005	0,000	0,011	0,515	0,207	0,809	Political rights violations	96	15,62	0,000
0,093	0,044	0,000	0,627	0,000	0,133	0,710	0,031	0,753	0,004	0,332	0,000	0,122	share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	73	9,262	0,000

The original independent variables

Country code	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2
Albania	5,83	10,53	22,68	3,70	1,10	8,70	3,10	3,46	0,00	1,00	7,94	63,03
Algeria	3,69	0,00	-0,08	3,45	3,90	3,50	5,10	3,09	0,00	1,00	8,47	71,82
Argentina	9,61	8,33	2,51	2,10	1,40	10,80	3,50	1,50	0,00	0,00	9,39	88,24
Armenia	8,12	0,00	33,14	3,10	3,60	1,20	2,00	4,51	0,00	0,00	7,64	58,32
Australia	12,10	14,29	0,57	1,90	1,90	27,90	5,50	1,09	0,00	0,00	10,02	100,38
Austria	14,66	20,00	0,57	2,05	0,80	7,50	5,40	0,86	1,00	0,00	10,05	101,01
Azerbaijan	6,47	10,00	34,37	4,20	2,70	6,10	3,00	4,53	0,00	1,00	7,68	59,05
Bahrain	2,83	0,00	-36,07	1,80	5,00	41,10	4,40	1,72	0,00	1,00	9,48	89,89
Bangladesh	3,18	5,26	5,09	3,75	1,60	0,50	2,20	3,89	0,00	1,00	7,22	52,07
Belarus	13,18	2,78	5,97	4,10	1,00	0,50	5,90	2,90	0,00	0,00	8,75	76,59
Belgium	16,40	3,33	-4,53	2,10	1,50	40,80	3,10	0,92	1,00	0,00	10,05	101,06
Belize	4,33	0,00	4,99	2,80	1,50	25,80	5,00	1,72	0,00	0,00	8,43	71,00
Bolivia	3,93	5,88	9,17	2,65	1,80	23,40	4,90	2,25	0,00	0,00	7,73	59,71
Botswana	2,45	14,29	-1,21	2,95	3,50	23,00	8,60	1,99	0,00	0,00	8,72	75,98
Brazil	4,95	4,17	2,66	3,50	1,40	6,00	5,10	1,43	0,00	0,00	8,80	77,41
Bulgaria	15,43	15,00	1,06	3,40	2,50	3,40	3,20	3,94	0,00	0,00	8,48	71,88
Burkina Faso	2,63	10,00	16,24	3,40	1,50	3,40	3,60	3,62	0,00	1,00	6,77	45,81
Burundi	2,72	7,69	11,53	4,00	5,80	3,40	4,00	4,07	0,00	0,00	6,35	40,26
Cambodia	3,07	8,33	9,51	3,00	2,70	12,10	2,90	4,83	0,00	0,00	7,14	50,93
Chad	3,41	0,00	12,41	3,80	1,40	24,40	1,70	3,72	0,00	1,00	6,75	45,60
Chile	6,95	13,70	1,33	2,00	1,90	23,80	3,60	1,76	0,00	0,00	9,08	82,46
China	6,55	2,63	-4,35	3,40	1,90	19,60	2,30	4,14	0,00	0,00	8,04	64,66
Colombia	4,62	17,65	5,66	2,90	2,60	6,90	4,40	2,43	0,00	0,00	8,70	75,70
Costa Rica	4,91	15,00	1,85	2,85	0,60	23,30	5,40	2,16	0,00	0,00	8,70	75,64
Côte d'Ivoire	2,87	3,13	-6,35	3,45	0,90	16,20	5,00	2,28	0,00	1,00	7,38	54,42
Croatia	14,04	12,00	9,00	3,50	6,20	2,50	5,30	1,46	0,00	0,00	8,82	77,74
Cyprus	11,41	0,00	6,49	2,55	4,40	17,80	4,50	1,47	0,00	0,00	9,77	95,43
Czech Republic	13,44	16,67	1,41	2,20	2,10	14,10	5,10	2,40	0,00	0,00	9,42	88,78
Denmark	15,22	40,91	-3,35	2,25	1,60	13,20	8,10	0,73	1,00	0,00	10,09	101,91
Egypt	4,04	6,25	6,46	3,50	2,90	23,40	4,80	2,36	0,00	1,00	8,02	64,32
El	4,84	6,25	12,65	2,00	0,90	3,10	2,50	2,18	0,00	0,00	8,30	68,94

Salvador												
Estonia	13,40	11,76	9,66	2,20	1,20	14,10	7,20	2,29	0,00	0,00	8,95	80,04
Ethiopia	2,87	5,00	11,85	3,50	3,80	2,90	4,00	5,74	0,00	0,00	6,35	40,35
Fiji	4,29	9,52	-1,29	3,30	1,40	41,20	5,40	1,91	0,00	0,00	8,35	69,73
Finland	14,62	28,57	-8,85	2,20	1,50	6,50	7,50	0,86	1,00	0,00	9,94	98,90
France	15,61	11,76	-3,94	2,50	2,80	12,30	6,00	0,85	1,00	0,00	9,96	99,21
Country code	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2
Gabon	5,89	3,45	-10,93	3,10	0,30	15,20	2,90	1,52	0,00	1,00	8,76	76,68
Gambia	3,00	28,57	10,95	3,40	1,10	48,40	4,90	4,27	0,00	1,00	7,28	53,01
Georgia	12,15	3,85	13,97	3,65	1,00	1,70	5,20	3,46	0,00	0,00	8,12	65,89
Germany	15,86	8,33	-1,51	2,20	1,50	7,80	4,80	0,83	1,00	0,00	10,01	100,13
Ghana	3,09	9,38	9,70	3,10	0,80	12,70	4,20	4,45	0,00	0,00	7,46	55,63
Greece	17,14	4,55	8,27	2,75	4,80	11,20	3,10	1,19	1,00	0,00	9,54	91,06
Guatemala	3,49	0,00	8,33	2,70	0,70	15,00	1,70	2,14	0,00	0,00	8,16	66,62
Guyana	4,13	15,00	11,65	3,20	0,90	57,40	5,00	4,36	0,00	1,00	8,13	66,14
Honduras	3,32	11,11	6,21	3,35	0,80	16,50	3,60	3,29	0,00	0,00	7,80	60,79
Hungary	14,47	5,26	2,56	2,55	1,30	26,70	4,60	2,27	0,00	0,00	9,23	85,25
India	4,82	7,89	2,73	3,80	2,10	1,60	3,20	4,72	0,00	0,00	7,64	58,35
Indonesia	4,54	3,45	-10,10	3,50	1,00	25,00	1,40	4,14	0,00	1,00	7,88	62,14
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	4,24	0,00	1,61	4,55	3,10	2,60	4,00	3,10	0,00	1,00	8,54	72,95
Ireland	11,36	21,05	-17,78	1,85	0,80	14,40	6,00	1,15	1,00	0,00	9,97	99,50
Israel	9,71	0,00	11,11	2,75	8,70	7,10	7,60	1,07	0,00	0,00	9,76	95,23
Italy	17,59	13,04	-4,33	2,30	2,00	5,80	4,90	1,02	1,00	0,00	9,93	98,65
Japan	16,10	0,00	-1,18	2,15	1,00	0,60	3,60	0,72	0,00	0,00	10,05	101,09
Jordan	2,86	1,61	21,17	2,90	9,60	9,20	7,90	2,91	0,00	1,00	8,12	65,87
Kazakhstan	6,95	5,00	4,46	3,70	1,00	14,60	4,40	3,27	0,00	1,00	8,38	70,30
Kenya	2,99	0,00	7,70	3,05	2,30	8,10	6,50	2,80	0,00	0,00	6,89	47,43
Kyrgyzstan	5,90	4,35	16,12	3,60	1,40	9,70	5,30	6,10	0,00	1,00	7,75	60,03
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	3,25	0,00	1,15	4,60	2,40	11,60	2,10	5,42	0,00	0,00	7,46	55,62
Latvia	13,83	6,67	13,22	2,65	0,70	12,50	6,30	2,37	0,00	0,00	8,65	74,88
Lebanon	5,72	0,00	40,42	3,20	3,20	1,00	2,50	1,22	0,00	1,00	8,37	70,10
Lesotho	4,13	6,25	91,24	3,55	3,20	143,80	8,40	2,85	0,00	0,00	7,39	54,67
Lithuania	12,87	5,56	11,90	2,90	1,30	5,80	5,50	2,53	0,00	0,00	8,77	76,91
Luxembourg	14,11	25,00	-16,05	1,80	0,80	40,80	4,00	0,74	1,00	0,00	10,42	108,57

Madagascar	2,93	18,75	7,97	3,20	1,40	5,40	1,90	2,91	0,00	0,00	6,63	43,93
Malawi	2,67	4,17	13,32	3,65	0,80	17,50	5,40	2,49	0,00	0,00	6,26	39,19
Malaysia	4,00	15,63	-21,80	2,70	1,70	32,30	4,90	2,22	0,00	0,00	9,00	81,08
Mali	3,66	20,83	10,83	2,90	1,90	6,60	2,20	2,73	0,00	1,00	6,52	42,56
Malta	11,44	0,00	5,40	2,95	0,80	28,40	5,10	1,63	0,00	0,00	9,71	94,24
Mauritania	3,23	4,35	13,02	3,80	2,30	8,60	5,10	3,81	0,00	1,00	7,35	54,09
Mexico	4,54	5,00	1,96	3,00	0,60	14,40	4,90	2,01	0,00	0,00	8,95	80,09
Moldova, Rep. of	9,60	0,00	28,76	3,20	0,60	6,50	10,60	5,12	0,00	0,00	7,57	57,36
Mongolia	3,89	0,00	5,80	3,15	2,20	4,20	5,70	4,05	0,00	0,00	7,34	53,88
Namibia	3,83	8,33	0,17	2,90	2,60	74,00	9,10	2,67	0,00	0,00	8,55	73,13
Nepal	3,57	3,12	11,23	3,60	0,90	0,90	3,20	5,51	0,00	0,00	7,05	49,75
Country code	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2
Netherlands	13,55	27,78	-7,01	2,05	1,80	28,00	5,10	0,89	1,00	0,00	10,01	100,14
New Zealand	11,64	8,33	-0,65	1,70	1,30	43,10	7,30	1,18	0,00	0,00	9,76	95,21
Nicaragua	3,06	5,00	32,35	3,60	1,20	19,20	3,90	5,79	0,00	0,00	7,67	58,82
Nigeria	2,99	6,45	8,23	3,30	0,70	50,00	0,70	2,65	0,00	1,00	6,68	44,60
Norway	15,66	20,00	-7,06	2,30	2,30	12,80	7,40	0,77	0,00	0,00	10,18	103,61
Pakistan	3,14	7,14	4,42	3,40	4,20	9,10	2,70	3,65	0,00	1,00	7,45	55,46
Panama	5,41	5,88	9,30	2,40	1,40	41,00	5,10	1,76	0,00	0,00	8,57	73,37
Philippines	3,53	9,52	4,26	2,85	1,40	8,20	3,40	3,39	0,00	0,00	8,18	66,85
Poland	11,61	17,24	5,17	2,80	2,10	6,20	7,50	1,95	0,00	0,00	8,94	79,90
Portugal	15,35	10,00	8,70	2,30	2,20	17,10	5,80	1,38	1,00	0,00	9,60	92,08
Romania	12,70	7,69	8,48	3,30	2,20	3,20	3,60	4,15	0,00	0,00	8,64	74,63
Russian Federation	12,27	7,50	-4,94	3,70	3,20	1,60	3,50	2,86	0,00	0,00	8,77	76,97
Saudi Arabia	2,81	0,00	-5,22	2,95	12,80	17,50	7,50	1,47	0,00	1,00	9,23	85,12
Senegal	2,49	3,33	4,71	3,05	1,40	8,30	3,70	2,51	0,00	1,00	7,18	51,48
Singapore	6,81	0,00	-17,79	1,45	5,10	71,50	3,00	0,80	0,00	0,00	10,09	101,90
Slovakia	11,16	19,05	11,17	3,00	2,00	4,40	5,00	2,62	0,00	0,00	9,18	84,27
Slovenia	13,17	0,00	1,45	3,00	1,50	9,40	5,70	1,46	0,00	0,00	9,57	91,54
South Africa	3,51	14,81	-1,24	2,90	1,60	9,90	8,00	2,56	0,00	0,00	9,05	81,84
Spain	16,47	17,65	-1,20	2,40	1,40	18,70	5,00	1,15	1,00	0,00	9,69	93,96
Sri Lanka	6,39	13,33	6,45	2,90	4,20	10,00	3,40	3,68	0,00	0,00	8,00	63,99
Sweden	17,45	43,50	-7,01	2,35	2,20	12,90	8,30	0,81	1,00	0,00	9,94	98,72
Switzerland	14,54	16,67	-4,44	1,90	1,20	18,60	5,40	0,64	0,00	0,00	10,15	102,96

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Syrian Arab Republic	3,04	7,50	11,17	4,00	6,30	8,00	3,10	2,83	0,00	1,00	7,97	63,51
Tajikistan	4,43	6,45	-0,59	4,00	1,20	7,00	2,20	2,81	0,00	1,00	6,95	48,27
Thailand	5,48	4,00	-16,50	2,70	2,10	10,40	4,80	2,53	0,00	0,00	8,60	74,04
Tunisia	5,74	3,23	3,20	3,00	1,80	61,00	7,70	2,62	0,00	1,00	8,59	73,87
Turkey	5,56	5,00	3,47	2,75	4,40	3,00	2,20	2,03	0,00	1,00	8,77	76,87
Uganda	2,16	13,16	9,41	3,00	2,20	4,70	2,60	3,46	0,00	1,00	6,98	48,71
United Kingdom	15,96	23,81	0,47	1,90	2,70	17,60	5,30	0,95	1,00	0,00	9,92	98,41
United States	12,53	26,32	1,40	1,80	3,20	7,30	5,40	1,01	0,00	0,00	10,30	106,00
Uzbekistan	4,49	3,33	0,24	4,40	1,40	1,00	7,70	2,16	0,00	1,00	7,63	58,17
Venezuela	4,30	3,23	0,06	3,30	1,30	9,00	5,20	1,65	0,00	0,00	8,67	75,12
Yemen	2,39	0,00	19,15	3,85	6,50	44,80	7,00	2,57	0,00	1,00	6,58	43,27
Zambia	2,24	3,33	9,01	2,90	1,80	43,70	2,20	2,18	0,00	0,00	6,58	43,28
Zimbabwe	2,81	12,00	1,83	3,90	2,60	4,80	7,10	4,31	0,00	0,00	7,89	62,25
Country code	% population, aged >65y, 1998	% women in government, ministerial level	(I-S)/GDP	Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)	military expenditure as % of GDP	MNC PEN 1995	public education expenditure per GDP	unequal transfer	EU-membership	Islamic conference	ln(GDP PPP pc)	ln (GDP PPP pc)^2

The dependent variables of the final model:

Country code	% people not expected to survive age 60	CO2 emissions per capita	development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	economic growth, 1975-98	ESI-Index	Factor Social Development	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	female share in total life years	GDP output per kg energy use	GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	human development index	life expectancy, 1995-2000	Political rights violations	share of income/c onsumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	unemployment (UN)
Albania	13,900	0,600	-10,000	-0,786	57,900	0,361	72,534	52,022	2,345	-0,484	0,708	72,750	4,000	..	9,100
Algeria	18,500	3,300	-9,000	0,178	49,400	0,069	36,272	51,034	1,634	-0,876	0,661	68,890	6,000	6,100	29,800
Argentina	16,500	3,700	8,000	0,641	61,500	0,945	44,398	52,418	4,775	4,909	0,824	72,890	1,000	..	15,000
Armenia	19,800	1,000	-3,000	-6,608	54,800	0,373	85,865	52,266	1,750	-6,510	0,718	70,470	4,000
Australia	8,900	17,000	23,000	1,861	60,300	1,237	74,898	51,802	3,841	2,672	0,927	78,250	1,000	7,000	6,600
Austria	10,900	7,300	23,000	2,166	64,200	1,399	64,303	52,093	8,699	1,605	0,901	77,020	1,000	3,200	3,600
Azerbaijan	22,100	4,000	-8,000	-9,765	41,800	0,216	73,452	53,034	0,259	-10,736	..	69,860	6,000	..	1,300
Bahrain	14,600	18,600	-7,000	-1,440	..	0,579	36,956	51,448	0,687	1,381	0,803	72,860	7,000
Bangladesh	37,900	0,200	23,000	2,366	46,900	-1,723	76,166	50,051	1,709	3,209	0,441	58,130	3,000	4,900	3,300
Belarus	26,100	6,000	-6,000	-1,322	..	0,735	81,283	54,313	0,827	-2,187	0,778	67,980	6,000	2,900	2,300
Belgium	10,100	10,500	23,000	1,913	39,100	1,380	64,495	52,156	4,998	1,690	0,921	77,210	1,000	3,600	7,000
Belize	13,700	1,600	17,000	2,277	..	0,459	30,731	50,928	..	0,536	0,754	74,690	1,000	..	12,700
Bolivia	32,800	1,300	-8,000	-0,201	59,400	-0,481	57,041	51,366	1,721	2,098	0,631	61,390	1,000	8,600	7,400
Botswana	68,300	1,400	23,000	5,172	61,800	-0,886	77,632	51,086	..	1,350	0,584	47,390	2,000	..	15,800
Brazil	26,800	1,700	22,000	1,153	59,600	0,332	52,329	52,930	4,341	1,268	0,736	66,780	3,000	25,500	9,600
Bulgaria	18,300	6,500	-9,000	0,179	49,300	0,886	86,741	52,491	0,531	-2,039	0,769	71,050	2,000	4,400	19,400
Burkina Faso	64,300	0,100	23,000	1,223	45,000	-2,007	90,588	50,893	..	1,712	0,290	44,390	4,000	10,000	..
Burundi	67,800	(.)	-6,000	-0,403	41,600	-1,793	88,661	51,585	..	-4,155	..	42,440	6,000	5,300	..
Cambodia	46,600	(.)	9,000	1,986	45,600	-1,024	95,657	51,742	..	1,785	..	53,360	6,000	6,900	..
Chad	56,100	(.)	-4,000	-0,393	45,700	-1,527	76,186	51,581	..	0,058	..	47,190	6,000
Chile	13,800	3,400	23,000	4,237	55,100	0,555	47,061	51,987	2,980	6,635	0,812	74,940	2,000	17,400	7,900
China	18,000	2,800	22,000	7,494	38,500	0,363	86,158	51,481	0,750	9,227	0,700	69,830	7,000	7,900	3,100
Colombia	20,700	1,800	22,000	1,731	59,100	0,340	59,071	52,403	3,183	1,524	0,760	70,430	4,000	20,300	14,700
Costa Rica	11,600	1,400	15,000	0,993	63,200	0,867	44,580	51,525	3,492	2,049	0,789	76,030	1,000	13,000	6,100
Côte d'Ivoire	63,400	0,900	-16,000	-0,992	43,400	-1,503	50,298	50,611	2,022	1,261	0,401	46,720	6,000	6,200	..
Croatia	16,400	3,900	-3,000	-1,418	62,500	0,974	71,561	52,651	2,781	-1,489	0,790	72,640	2,000	..	15,800
Cyprus	10,000	7,100	23,000	5,666	..	0,834	61,589	51,445	4,448	2,558	0,877	77,760	1,000	..	3,900
Czech Republic	14,200	12,400	-4,000	0,402	50,200	1,098	84,426	52,392	1,336	-1,604	0,841	73,880	1,000	3,500	8,100
Denmark	12,800	10,800	23,000	2,145	56,200	1,524	83,642	51,749	9,138	2,529	0,909	75,650	1,000	3,600	4,600
Egypt	23,000	1,500	23,000	3,528	48,800	-0,153	43,169	51,181	1,684	2,586	0,604	66,270	6,000	4,000	8,100
El Salvador	23,400	0,700	-4,000	-0,157	48,700	0,191	52,616	52,157	2,459	2,970	0,693	69,130	2,000	16,600	7,000
Estonia	23,800	11,200	-5,000	-0,099	60,000	0,947	82,155	54,091	0,991	-1,774	0,798	68,680	1,000	6,700	12,600
Ethiopia	65,500	(.)	-9,000	-0,391	41,800	-1,843	67,264	51,067	0,396	1,036	0,297	43,320	5,000	6,700	..
Fiji	14,600	1,000	9,000	0,640	..	0,316	42,436	51,482	..	-0,063	0,755	72,660	6,000	..	5,400
Finland	11,300	11,600	21,000	2,049	73,900	1,529	85,651	52,469	4,180	1,206	0,913	76,830	1,000	3,600	9,100
France	11,300	6,200	23,000	1,759	55,500	1,403	75,210	52,473	6,444	1,190	0,914	78,120	1,000	5,600	8,800
Gabon	48,600	3,300	-11,000	-1,451	54,900	-0,970	75,179	51,268	3,277	0,535	..	52,420	5,000
Gambia	53,700	0,200	-12,000	-0,038	44,700	-1,300	77,735	51,696	..	0,053	0,388	47,000	7,000	12,000	..
Georgia	17,500	0,600	-9,000	-3,980	..	0,233	76,872	52,819	1,619	-11,749	..	72,730	4,000	..	11,000
Germany	10,700	10,500	5,000	1,226	52,500	1,454	68,689	52,020	7,160	..	0,905	77,210	1,000	4,700	7,900
Ghana	34,900	0,200	-5,000	-0,129	50,200	-0,757	98,351	51,431	1,021	1,543	0,552	60,000	2,000	5,000	..
Greece	8,900	7,700	23,000	1,640	50,900	1,265	56,820	51,617	4,796	1,420	0,869	78,110	1,000	5,400	10,200
Guatemala	31,100	0,600	-6,000	0,488	49,600	-0,481	39,564	52,254	2,796	1,658	0,603	64,040	3,000	30,000	..

Country code	% people not expected to survive age 60	CO2 emissions per capita	development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	economic growth, 1975-98	ESI-Index	Factor Social Development	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	female share in total life years	GDP output per kg energy use	GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	human development index	life expectancy, 1995-2000	Political rights violations	share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	unemployment (UN)
Guyana	28,200	1,100	-14,000	-0,249	..	0,246	48,359	52,583	..	8,904	0,698	64,410	2,000	7,400	11,700
Honduras	22,800	0,700	4,000	0,707	53,100	0,085	45,722	51,713	1,355	1,354	0,644	69,400	3,000	17,100	4,200
Hungary	21,600	6,000	14,000	1,391	62,700	1,103	71,513	52,815	1,871	0,211	0,813	70,870	1,000	4,500	5,700
India	29,700	1,100	22,000	3,048	41,600	-1,001	49,268	50,319	0,889	3,770	0,545	62,590	2,000	5,700	..
Indonesia	26,700	1,200	22,000	4,112	45,100	-0,191	66,200	51,433	1,644	2,405	0,664	65,130	3,000	5,600	5,500
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	21,300	3,800	-12,000	-1,012	44,500	0,220	35,227	50,597	0,717	2,279	0,691	69,220	6,000
Ireland	10,000	9,800	22,000	4,450	54,800	1,196	50,478	51,828	6,293	5,953	0,896	76,350	1,000	6,400	3,700
Israel	9,300	9,300	21,000	1,792	50,400	1,217	66,023	51,304	5,241	2,000	0,877	77,750	1,000	6,200	9,300
Italy	9,000	7,100	23,000	2,162	47,200	1,111	57,344	51,978	6,807	0,994	0,895	78,170	1,000	4,200	9,500
Japan	8,200	9,300	22,000	2,604	48,600	1,088	66,409	51,910	10,631	1,143	0,916	79,960	1,000	3,400	5,000
Jordan	19,500	2,500	11,000	1,783	51,700	0,214	32,396	50,972	1,389	1,498	..	70,150	4,000	5,800	..
Kazakhstan	25,800	10,400	-7,000	-4,743	46,500	0,382	80,196	53,478	0,530	-5,943	..	67,640	6,000	..	13,700
Kenya	56,300	0,300	14,000	0,461	46,300	-1,278	84,018	50,848	0,680	-0,329	0,503	52,040	6,000	10,000	..
Kyrgyzstan	25,400	1,400	-5,000	-3,429	51,300	0,195	82,733	53,109	1,401	-6,937	..	67,640	6,000	7,500	..
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	44,900	0,100	10,000	4,345	56,200	-1,372	83,996	51,163	..	3,475	0,469	53,230	7,000	4,200	..
Latvia	25,000	3,700	-4,000	-0,100	63,000	0,835	81,437	54,284	1,234	-5,536	0,770	68,420	1,000	5,300	12,800
Lebanon	19,000	4,600	9,000	1,994	43,800	0,428	37,472	51,298	2,293	5,278	0,718	69,920	6,000
Lesotho	43,300	..	22,000	3,499	..	-0,790	55,776	51,086	..	0,940	0,556	56,020	4,000	21,500	..
Lithuania	23,300	3,700	-4,000	-1,542	57,200	1,026	79,331	53,921	0,879	-4,846	0,785	69,890	1,000	5,200	17,000
Luxembourg	10,600	20,200	23,000	3,388	..	1,088	56,564	52,143	5,540	1,883	0,895	76,670	1,000	3,900	2,700
Madagascar	38,800	0,100	-21,000	-1,836	38,800	-0,975	77,872	51,295	..	-1,519	0,478	57,510	2,000	10,200	..
Malawi	72,500	0,100	-15,000	0,249	47,300	-1,977	90,276	50,364	..	0,891	0,375	39,270	3,000
Malaysia	16,100	5,800	22,000	3,935	49,500	0,403	59,697	51,504	2,103	3,786	0,762	72,000	5,000	12,000	3,900
Mali	43,200	(.)	-9,000	-0,011	..	-1,620	80,503	51,211	..	0,785	0,371	53,300	2,000	12,200	..
Malta	8,400	4,800	23,000	8,268	..	0,691	35,390	51,427	7,152	12,137	0,848	77,160	1,000	..	6,500
Mauritania	44,400	1,300	-16,000	-0,601	38,900	-1,599	73,621	51,484	..	1,287	0,441	53,500	6,000	7,400	..
Mexico	18,900	3,700	23,000	1,212	45,900	0,467	46,063	52,062	2,882	1,228	0,775	72,180	2,000	16,200	1,700
Moldova, Rep. of	25,700	2,700	-9,000	-4,671	54,500	0,605	82,828	52,915	0,651	..	0,697	67,520	2,000	6,000	7,300
Mongolia	25,900	3,500	-4,000	-0,130	54,200	0,033	87,049	51,137	..	-1,811	..	65,850	2,000	5,600	5,700
Namibia	52,400	..	-10,000	-0,615	57,400	-0,780	67,069	50,507	..	1,121	0,624	52,410	2,000
Nepal	39,100	0,100	17,000	1,646	45,200	-1,162	66,360	49,784	0,678	2,302	0,449	57,320	3,000	5,900	..
Netherlands	9,300	10,000	23,000	1,823	55,400	1,400	65,198	51,818	5,684	2,119	0,919	77,920	1,000	5,500	3,300
New Zealand	11,100	8,300	20,000	0,696	59,900	1,312	77,178	51,830	3,764	0,974	0,900	76,900	1,000	17,400	6,000
Nicaragua	24,300	0,700	-16,000	-3,389	51,800	-0,114	54,236	51,744	0,809	0,915	0,624	67,860	3,000	13,100	9,800
Nigeria	52,200	0,700	-7,000	-0,706	36,700	-1,439	55,665	51,395	0,343	0,558	0,425	50,080	4,000	12,700	..
Norway	9,100	15,400	23,000	2,911	73,000	1,507	83,100	51,884	6,602	3,414	0,932	78,140	1,000	3,700	3,400
Pakistan	26,700	0,700	21,000	2,744	42,100	-1,053	40,546	50,877	1,145	1,749	0,489	63,950	6,000	4,300	7,800
Panama	15,100	2,500	9,000	0,954	60,000	0,564	53,909	51,547	3,648	2,879	0,770	73,600	1,000	14,700	11,800
Philippines	21,800	0,900	-3,000	0,501	41,600	0,273	60,183	51,329	2,157	0,993	0,739	68,300	2,000	9,700	9,800
Poland	17,300	9,300	16,000	1,564	46,700	1,063	79,337	52,975	1,360	3,679	0,811	72,520	1,000	5,300	16,100
Portugal	12,600	4,900	23,000	2,917	57,100	1,203	70,036	52,303	5,489	2,356	0,858	75,290	1,000	5,900	4,000
Romania	20,700	5,300	11,000	0,380	50,000	0,627	76,138	52,702	0,722	-2,572	0,767	69,950	2,000	4,200	7,100

Russian Federation	29,700	10,700	-9,000	-0,771	49,100	0,667	80,792	54,550	0,556	-7,019	0,769	66,560	5,000	12,200	13,400
Saudi Arabia	16,800	14,200	-18,000	-1,696	34,200	0,488	24,853	51,223	1,342	-1,794	0,715	71,420	7,000
Senegal	47,000	0,400	-17,000	-0,210	47,600	-1,249	71,766	51,772	1,792	0,546	0,405	52,320	3,000	7,500	..
Singapore	10,600	19,500	22,000	5,689	..	0,680	63,901	51,423	3,611	5,994	0,876	77,100	5,000	..	3,400
Slovakia	16,400	7,400	-4,000	0,572	61,600	1,051	84,539	52,578	1,146	-0,114	0,822	72,950	1,000	2,600	18,600
Slovenia	14,600	6,800	6,000	1,213	58,800	0,987	79,559	52,537	3,181	..	0,857	74,450	1,000	4,200	7,400
South Africa	50,500	6,900	-12,000	-0,671	48,700	-0,281	58,702	52,793	1,505	-0,379	0,689	54,730	1,000	22,300	5,400
Spain	10,100	5,900	23,000	1,947	54,100	1,349	54,889	52,221	5,529	1,796	0,891	78,000	1,000	5,400	10,500
Sri Lanka	15,300	0,400	23,000	3,278	51,300	0,070	54,382	51,534	2,010	3,653	0,727	73,110	3,000	5,400	8,200
Sweden	8,700	6,200	21,000	1,179	72,600	1,723	88,808	51,446	4,590	0,484	0,923	78,550	1,000	3,600	4,700
Switzerland	9,800	6,100	14,000	0,947	66,500	1,426	65,201	52,033	11,924	-0,160	0,910	78,650	1,000	5,800	2,700
Syrian Arab Republic	20,700	3,100	23,000	1,259	43,600	0,129	35,547	51,665	1,202	0,926	0,636	68,890	7,000	..	11,200
Tajikistan	25,300	1,000	-8,000	-6,660	42,400	0,217	77,335	52,201	0,576	-11,637	0,659	67,180	6,000	..	2,700
Thailand	25,800	3,500	21,000	4,901	51,600	0,212	84,606	52,252	2,191	3,378	0,741	68,810	2,000	7,600	2,400
Country code	% people not expected to survive age 60	CO2 emissions per capita	development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975	economic growth, 1975-98	ESI-Index	Factor Social Development	female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate	female share in total life years	GDP output per kg energy use	GNP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98	human development index	life expectancy, 1995-2000	Political rights violations	share of income/c onsumption richest 20% to poorest 20%	unemployment (UN)
Tunisia	19,600	1,800	23,000	2,234	50,800	0,252	45,919	50,845	2,983	2,730	0,688	69,500	6,000	7,800	15,600
Turkey	20,100	2,900	23,000	2,251	50,800	0,263	59,367	51,870	2,743	2,798	0,726	69,020	4,000	8,200	7,300
Uganda	76,300	(.)	12,000	2,167	48,700	-1,748	88,132	50,984	..	3,850	0,401	39,640	6,000	7,000	..
United Kingdom	9,800	9,500	23,000	1,938	46,100	1,330	73,183	51,714	5,136	1,595	0,914	77,180	1,000	6,500	5,500
United States	12,600	19,700	23,000	1,874	53,200	1,526	79,936	52,164	3,572	1,758	0,927	76,700	1,000	8,900	4,800
Uzbekistan	25,100	4,100	-7,000	-2,037	41,300	0,257	83,607	52,339	0,545	..	0,683	67,520	7,000	5,500	0,400
Venezuela	17,000	6,500	-12,000	-0,786	53,000	0,455	51,922	51,978	1,423	0,538	0,763	72,410	1,000	14,400	14,900
Yemen	38,000	1,100	-4,000	-0,590	..	-1,204	36,224	50,428	1,211	-1,457	0,389	57,990	5,000	7,600	..
Zambia	79,500	0,300	-19,000	-2,163	49,500	-1,692	76,158	50,678	0,638	-1,338	0,413	40,090	5,000	13,000	..
Zimbabwe	74,500	1,600	13,000	0,110	53,200	-1,231	78,011	50,536	0,808	-0,487	0,551	44,130	6,000	15,600	..

Original data for the analysis of the dynamics in the world system

based on:

*Global Development Network Growth Database (William Easterly and Mirvat Sewadeh, World Bank³⁶)**Laborsta ILO³⁷.**UTIP (University of Texas Inequality Project)³⁸*

	globalization – correlation with time axis 1980 - 2001	growth – correlation with time axis 1980 – 2001	inequality – correlation with time axis 1980 - 2001
Albania	0,6202	0,0407	0,3412
Algeria	-0,309	-0,155	0,4945
Argentina	0,6686	0,2758	0,4621
Armenia	0,7608	0,6811	0,0338
Australia	0,2031	0,1635	0,9271
Austria	0,7848	0,1916	0,5785
Azerbaijan	0,7959	0,4095	0,7991
Bangladesh	0,6644	0,0346	0,9462
Belgium	0,7835	0,0982	-0,743
Bolivia	0,7429	0,7673	0,5254
Brazil	0,5559	-0,058	0,6779
Bulgaria	0,7215	-0,414	0,8482
Burundi	-0,4	-0,499	0,7678
Chile	0,8015	0,2271	0,0647
China	0,8514	0,0339	0,9629
Colombia	0,4957	-0,241	0,7491
Costa Rica	0,9056	0,4592	-0,528
Cote d'Ivoire	0,5822	0,621	0,6387
Croatia	0,9047	0,8229	-0,1
Cyprus	-0,909	-0,247	-0,591
Czech Republic	0,7051	0,0053	0,949
Denmark	0,7825	0,2374	0,7026
Egypt, Arab Rep.	-0,563	-0,368	0,9194
El Salvador	0,4015	0,7133	0,695
Ethiopia	0,6858	0,2333	0,7431
Fiji	-0,006	0,0433	0,0379
Finland	0,5877	0,0061	0,3943
France	0,9233	0,1083	-0,075
Gabon	0,0583	0,115	0,917
Gambia, The	0,7225	-0,124	0,9451
Germany	0,7496	0,2414	-0,875
Ghana	0,4646	0,4915	0,3791
Greece	-0,469	0,3127	0,7617
Guatemala	0,0147	0,6817	0,6115
Honduras	0,7945	0,1149	0,7648
Hungary	0,7605	0,0948	0,9323
India	0,8065	0,0987	-0,118

³⁶ <http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm>³⁷ <http://laborsta.ilo.org/>.³⁸ <http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/>

Indonesia	0,2286	-0,354	-0,758
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0,301	0,1712	0,53
Ireland	0,6234	0,769	0,777
Israel	0,8512	0,0171	0,6332
Italy	0,2579	-0,262	0,4941
Japan	0,4288	-0,464	0,8147
Jordan	0,1792	-0,263	-0,359
Kenya	-0,455	-0,304	-0,703
Kyrgyz Republic	0,7427	-0,123	-0,398
Latvia	0,8504	-0,212	0,9258
Lesotho	0,7341	0,1742	0,5112
Lithuania	0,8195	-0,036	-0,778
Madagascar	0,6333	0,4645	0,4297
Malawi	0,662	0,262	0,7718
Malaysia	0,2089	-0,186	-0,054
Malta	0,202	0,3153	0,7544
Mexico	0,7941	0,0238	0,9023
Moldova	0,846	-0,451	0,8806
Mongolia	0,8103	-0,328	0,3015
Nepal	0,7519	0,1214	-0,563
Netherlands	0,7234	0,5226	0,8167
New Zealand	0,4086	0,0023	0,8273
Nicaragua	0,7882	0,2836	-0,067
Nigeria	0,6278	0,2947	0,9545
Norway	0,5893	0,0034	0,12
Pakistan	0,8626	-0,737	0,8276
Panama	0,6544	0,1293	0,9285
Philippines	0,7089	0,1701	0,8873
Poland	0,9762	0,4554	0,7744
Portugal	0,9207	0,2228	0,7769
Romania	0,8285	-0,356	0,922
Russian Federation	0,8337	-0,439	0,597
Senegal	0,3988	0,1891	0,5737
Singapore	-0,162	-0,084	-0,958
Slovak Republic	0,8306	0,1888	0,9617
Slovenia	0,4035	0,7438	0,8119
South Africa	0,5166	-0,134	0,7189
Spain	0,4415	0,2187	0,9428
Sri Lanka	0,3462	0,1164	-0,626
Sweden	0,6254	0,1067	0,6772
Syrian Arab Republic	0,4855	0,0602	0,1503
Thailand	0,6762	-0,283	-0,266
Tunisia	-0,082	0,1226	0,8089
Turkey	0,7793	-0,016	0,8074
Uganda	0,8504	0,5893	-0,309
United Kingdom	0,594	0,1656	0,7432
United States	0,6005	0,4465	0,5563
Venezuela, RB	0,7574	0,1213	0,8909
Yemen, Rep.	-0,521	0,4346	0,1253
Zambia	0,6696	-0,044	0,6846
Zimbabwe	0,5739	-0,31	0,4364

Country code	changes in unequal transfer 1998 – 2002	correlation of unemployment over time
Albania	-0,300	0,766
Algeria	0,140	0,907
Argentina	2,550	0,898
Australia	0,270	0,070
Austria	0,290	0,358
Azerbaijan	-0,240	0,971
Bahamas	-0,120	-0,574
Bangladesh	0,940	0,814
Barbados	-0,180	-0,093
Belarus	0,930	0,548
Belgium	0,250	-0,708
Belize	0,160	0,030
Bolivia	0,520	-0,298
Botswana	0,650	-0,860
Brazil	1,560	0,855
Bulgaria	-0,280	-0,329
Canada	0,060	-0,458
Chile	0,620	-0,608
China	0,490	0,064
Colombia	1,010	0,503
Costa Rica	-0,080	-0,465
Croatia	0,580	0,956
Czech Republic	-0,080	0,883
Denmark	0,230	-0,971
Dominican Re-public	0,040	-0,840
Ecuador	-0,090	0,725
Egypt	0,450	0,725
El Salvador	0,010	-0,707
Estonia	0,270	0,964
Fiji	0,450	-0,597
Finland	0,180	0,669
France	0,270	0,012
Georgia	-0,020	-0,917
Germany	0,290	0,075
Greece	0,310	0,891
Guatemala	-0,040	-0,701
Haiti	0,540	0,988

Honduras	-0,610	-0,705
Hungary	-0,200	-0,926
Iceland	0,100	-0,598
India	0,770	0,553
Indonesia	-0,190	0,954
Ireland	0,030	-0,851
Israel	0,170	0,662
Italy	0,260	0,489
Jamaica	-0,630	-0,933
Japan	0,140	0,789
Korea, Rep. of	0,130	-0,055
Latvia	0,190	-0,783
Lithuania	0,060	-0,195
Luxembourg	0,550	0,854
Malaysia	0,120	-0,840
Mauritius	0,680	0,997
Mexico	-0,590	-0,288
Moldova, Rep. of	-1,250	-0,978
Mongolia	-0,240	-0,836
Morocco	0,460	-0,950
Namibia	1,570	0,921
Netherlands	0,230	-0,874
New Zealand	0,280	0,067
Nicaragua	-2,490	0,680
Norway	0,100	0,473
Pakistan	1,110	0,789
Panama	-0,280	0,511
Peru	0,620	0,545
Philippines	0,890	0,847
Poland	0,210	0,409
Portugal	0,150	-0,690
Romania	-0,950	-0,567
Russian Federa-tion	0,560	0,669
Saudi Arabia	0,000	0,866
Singapore	0,350	0,016
Slovakia	0,290	0,774
Slovenia	0,190	-0,829
South Africa	1,820	0,987
Spain	0,190	0,060
Sri Lanka	0,400	-0,964

Sweden	0,160	0,648
Switzerland	0,180	0,065
Tajikistan	2,270	0,979
Thailand	0,880	-0,139
Trinidad and Tobago	-0,370	0,120
Tunisia	0,530	0,030
Turkey	0,390	-0,841
Ukraine	2,460	0,882
United Kingdom	0,040	-0,694
United States	-0,020	-0,800
Uruguay	0,750	0,725
Uzbekistan	3,170	0,775
Venezuela	-0,210	0,555
Zimbabwe	-0,630	-0,872

Methodological remarks on the Dollar/Kraay approach “Growth is good for the poor”

The following critique of the Dollar/Kraay approach as the dominant paradigm of the “growth is good for the poor” school should be mentioned:

Problem number 1: The data-set has been questioned. In a statement on Kraay, 2001, James K. Galbraith maintains in “*Foreign Affairs*” July/August 2002 (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020701faresponse8531/james-k-galbraith/by-the-numbers.html>):

“It is extraordinary that India, China, and Vietnam should be offered as three of the five major examples of globalizing success stories. India's relative success began in the 1980s, partly because strict capital controls and long-term official development assistance helped protect it from the debt crisis that occurred in Latin America and elsewhere. China grew at first on the strength of agricultural reform and then through a program of industrialization financed mainly by internal savings; it has to this day not liberalized its capital account. Vietnam and China remain under the control of their communist parties; these are not “Washington consensus” countries by any means.

Missing from Dollar and Kraay's list of successes are the true globalizers of recent times, including Argentina, until just a few months ago the leading neoliberal poster child, or Russia, now attempting to recover from the collapse that followed shock globalization. So too are the erstwhile “Asian tigers” who liberalized in the early 1990s and failed before the end of the decade. Nor are these examples isolated. World growth rates were systematically higher under the structured international financial regime of Bretton Woods from 1945 to 1971 than they became in the era of deregulation after 1980.

Dollar and Kraay assert that there is no general pattern of rising inequality under globalization. However, the source on which they base this assertion, the World Bank's inequality data set, is riddled with gaps and implausible measurements. According to these measures, for instance, inequality declined in Canada from 1971 to 1991 and in Mexico from 1975 to 1994, Spain is one of the most egalitarian countries in Europe, and India and Indonesia have general measures of inequality similar to that of Norway.

My own work, in contrast, shows a clear and severe global pattern of rising inequality in industrial pay, beginning in the early 1980s. This is based on the United Nations data that permit about 3,000 data points to be estimated, roughly five times as many as in the published editions of the World Bank data set (and more than three times as many as in a forthcoming edition).

Rising inequality after 1980 is the rule in this data, with limited exceptions mainly in Scandinavia and in Southeast Asia before 1997. The patterns strongly suggest that forces of globalization, including high global interest rates, debt crises, and shock liberalizations, are associated with rising inequality in pay structures. Pay is, of course, the major component of income, and if pay inequalities are rising, it is a good bet that broader income and social inequalities are rising too.”

Problem number 2: Some of the measures, used by Aart Kraay and associates in their works to explain inequality are highly controversial. Kraay and associates use the straight openness indicator, but also another measure, adjusted by the so-called Frankel/Roemer method. But Geoffrey Barrows, who won the 2004 Moffat Prize in Economics, however wrote about the complicated econometric procedure, first established by Frankel, J. and D. Romer, in their articles “Does Trade Cause Growth?,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 89, no. 3 (June 1999): 379-399, and Frankel, J and D. Romer, “Trade and Growth: an empirical Investigation.” *NBER working paper* No. 5476. Cambridge, MA: March 1996, in his comments at <http://economics.about.com/library/weekly/aa043004d.htm>), maintaining:

“To see the connection between trade and standards of living, researchers often estimate cross-country regressions of income per person on the ratio of exports or imports to GDP. Many economists have found modest positive correlations between the two variables and have usually interpreted the correlation as causation.[1] The problem with concluding causation from correlation is that the correlation may contain a simultaneity bias. If overlooked, the bias would lead OLS estimations to overstate the effect of trade on income.

Frankel and Romer (1999) attempt to correct for the simultaneity bias by instrumenting for trade of a particular country with its geographic characteristics. As these geographic characteristics are truly exogenous, the Frankel-Romer IV regression seems plausible; however, if some other variable that affects income were also determined by geographic characteristics, then omitting such a variable would cause the Frankel-Romer IV regression to overstate the effect of trade on income by omitted variable bias. After testing a cross-sectional data set of 150 countries, Frankel and Romer were unable to conclude that OLS estimates overstate the effect of trade on income, though they argue simultaneity bias would cause it to do so. Rather, Frankel and Romer found that OLS understates the effect of trade on income. If it could be shown that Frankel and Romer omit a relevant variable from their IV regression, then omitted variable bias could explain the incompatibility of the Frankel-Romer hypothesis with the Frankel-Romer findings. “

Problem number 3: predictors are highly intercorrelated. For example, we find arable land and total land, and we find “rule of law” and we find “democracy”, the R^2 of these indicators being in our sub-list of countries and datapoints with fairly widely available data 68 %

Problem number 4: results are unstable. Even Dollar and Kraay admit in their first version of their 2000 paper in Table 5 (page 37 of the March 2000 version) of their still internationally available at <http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdffiles/growthgoodforpoor.pdf> that for 213 observations, ln Per Capita Income, and the export + and the import share in total GDP increase the ln per capita income of the poor, but equation 5 in the same Table (introducing inflation, government consumption and the rule of law as further predictors) “**world economic openness**” (i.e. exports + imports per GDP) **decreases the incomes of the poor** (the unstandardized regression coefficient is -0.004 , the error probability is only 1.3 %, thus the result is quite significant). Our own test with $n = 260$ observations yields the result that only by including the time point openness has the reducing significant effect on economic inequality; while without time frame of reference or working with data points for 1980 and after, **the effect on the GINI is not significant at all**³⁹.

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entire period, without time axis	Openness-Index, exports+imports	Government consumption per GDP	nat. logarithm (inflation +1)	Bank deposit assets per total bank assets	rule of law index	stock of secondary education	Average stocks of primary education	Arable land area index	Democracy Index	constant
explaining the GINI Index	-0,5558	0,6757	-1,2603	-1,5574	-2,6804	3,2292	6,0882	13,4291	2,5945	41,2215
	0,9951	0,5275	0,4757	0,7002	1,0207	3,0762	1,8627	11,9944	2,3533	3,0864
	0,3863	7,4103								
	17,4875	250,0000								
	8642,6292	13728,2834								
T-test	-0,5585	1,2808	-2,6491	-2,2243	-2,6261	1,0498	3,2684	1,1196	1,1025	13,3558

Problem number 5: ever since Kurt Rothschild's famous article in the *Economic Journal* in 1944, it is known that the share of imports – or also of exports - per GDP are a function of the size of nations. Even with the mentioned Frankel/Roemer adjustments, the indicator is heavily dependent upon the size of a nation. It emerges from the Dollar/Kraay data set that the highest openness over the last decade was to be found in Estonia, Norway and Saint Lucia. From the entire Dollar/Kraay data set it emerges that among the 30 most open economies of the entire world economy were apart from the obvious small territory cases like Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Saint Lucia, Slovenia and Switzerland the two nations Communist Bulgaria before the transformation and Belarus under the Lukashenka regime and the heavily social democratic “Consociational Democracy” in the sense of Cornell Professor Peter Katzenstein – Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s, plus the also heavily social democratic Norway during that time. If anything, thus the Dollar and Kraay results demonstrate either (what Kraay certainly did not intend) that communism Bulgarian or Lukashenka-style is the model, or – better that there is some truth in Professor Peter Katzenstein's theory about small states, the need for

entire period, with time axis	Time axis	Land area	Openness-Index, exports+imports	Government consumption per GDP	nat. logarithm (inflation +1)	Bank deposit assets per total bank assets	rule of law index	stock of secondary education	Average stocks of primary education	Arable land area index	Democracy Index	constant
explaining the GINI Index	-0,5240	0,5718	-1,2475	-1,7291	-2,6463	3,0482	5,9664	13,2169	3,0436	0,0000	0,0047	31,7979
	1,0105	0,5881	0,4795	0,8316	1,0761	3,1155	1,9193	12,2033	2,5823	0,0000	0,0591	116,4869
	0,3869	7,4369										
	14,2252	248,0000										
	8654,4769	13716,4358										
T-test	-0,5186	0,9723	-2,6016	-2,0793	-2,4593	0,9784	3,1086	1,0831	1,1787	0,4618	0,0802	0,2730

data points for 1980 and after	Openness-Index, exports+imports	Government consumption per GDP	nat. logarithm (inflation +1)	Bank deposit assets per total bank assets	rule of law index	stock of secondary education	Average stocks of primary education	Arable land area index	Democracy Index	constant
explaining the GINI coefficient	-1,4484	0,2752	-1,1286	-0,8259	-1,9668	-1,4127	6,6386	18,6259	1,7042	42,2391
	1,2289	0,7359	0,5688	0,9256	1,3343	3,7329	2,0467	14,4902	3,0365	3,7860
	0,3651	7,7555								
	10,0314	157,0000								
	5430,2997	9443,1663								
t-test	-1,1786	0,3739	-1,9843	-0,8923	-1,4740	-0,3785	3,2435	1,2854	0,5612	11,1567

social compromise and social partnership in such states, and redistribution and development in such nations and their ascent in the international system⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ see especially: "Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984; paperback edition 1987; Spanish translation 1987). In that context, it is worthwhile to analyze the top 30 "globalizers" according to Dollar and Kraay. We sorted his original data with the EXCEL "sort" routine. It seems that except for the cases of communist Bulgaria in the 1980s and postcommunist Belarus, and the then Crown Colony Hong Kong, all other countries support rather Katzenstein's small state theory and not Dollar and Kraay's own interpretation

The top 30 globalizers according to Kraay and associates

Opennes Index	Country Code	Country	Year
0,9014	AUT	Austria	1987
1,2614	BEL	Belgium	1979
1,3456	BEL	Belgium	1985
1,5769	BEL	Belgium	1992
1,0761	BGR	Bulgaria	1989
1,2134	BGR	Bulgaria	1984
0,9689	BLR	Belarus	1993
1,0415	CHE	Switzerland	1982
0,8597	DNK	Denmark	1986
0,9396	DNK	Denmark	1991
0,8840	EST	Estonia	1993
1,0722	EST	Estonia	1998
0,9003	HKG	Hong Kong	1976
0,9225	HKG	Hong Kong	1971
0,9743	HKG	Hong Kong	1981
1,1419	HKG	Hong Kong	1986
1,7160	HKG	Hong Kong	1991
1,0190	IRL	Ireland	1987
0,8957	LCA	Saint Lucia	1995
2,6691	LUX	Luxemburg	1985
3,0757	LUX	Luxemburg	1991
0,9087	NLD	Netherlands	1975
0,9605	NLD	Netherlands	1981
1,0302	NLD	Netherlands	1986
1,1636	NLD	Netherlands	1991
0,8586	NOR	Norway	1989
0,8831	NOR	Norway	1979
0,9553	NOR	Norway	1995
0,9975	SVN	Slovenia	1992
0,8465	SWE	Sweden	1995

The top 30 anti-globalizers according to Kraay and associates

CODE	Country	YEAR	OPENAV
ARG	Argentina	1961	0,0719
BDI	Burundi	1992	0,0819
BGD	Bangladesh	1963	0,0171
BGD	Bangladesh	1973	0,0176
BGD	Bangladesh	1978	0,0193

BGD	Bangladesh	1988	0,0226
BGD	Bangladesh	1983	0,0228
BGD	Bangladesh	1995	0,0299
BRA	Brazil	1970	0,0613
BRA	Brazil	1986	0,0707
BRA	Brazil	1960	0,0713
BRA	Brazil	1981	0,0726
BRA	Brazil	1976	0,0817
CHN	China	1980	0,0197
CHN	China	1985	0,0362
CHN	China	1990	0,0630
ETH	Ethiopia	1995	0,0772
IND	India	1977	0,0287
IND	India	1988	0,0335
IND	India	1983	0,0338
IND	India	1993	0,0347
KOR	South Korea	1961	0,0518
KOR	South Korea	1966	0,0680
MOZ	Mozambique	1996	0,0774
NPL	Nepal	1977	0,0310
NPL	Nepal	1984	0,0367
NPL	Nepal	1995	0,0585
PAK	Pakistan	1990	0,0783
PAK	Pakistan	1985	0,0820
RWA	Rwanda	1983	0,0627

Methodological remarks on the Chen/Ravallion study

Their materials render themselves for further rigorous testing and calculations. It emerges that the wave of the world recession of the early 1980s badly affected the Middle East, while Eastern Europe and Central Asia still experienced a period of relative poverty reduction. The end of the 1980s was a good period for all world regions, with a general decline in relative poverty rates. The turn of the decade with its recession devastatingly hit first East Asia and Eastern Europe, with the tide then spreading to the Middle East and Latin America. Latin America was worst hit by the crisis of the early 1990s and did not manage to benefit from the “Clinton boom” years, while the Middle East reduced its poverty first in the middle of the 1990s only to see an increase again at the turn of the decade and the millennium. The entire evidence, based on calculations⁴¹ from Chen and Ravallion, Table

⁴¹ Chen and Ravallion include India and China in the larger South Asia and East Asia regional heading, respectively, but report separate values for India and China as well. Thus, the values for South Asia without India and East Asia without China can be directly calculated. These re-calculated Tables for the number of people below \$2 a day are

	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2001
East Asia (without China)	294	294,8	297,5	291,7	276,4	272,6	272,1	270,7
China	875,8	813,8	730,8	824,6	802,9	649,6	627,5	593,6
Eastern Europe, Central Asia	20,2	18,3	14,7	22,9	81,1	97,4	112,3	93,5
Latin America, Caribbean	98,9	118,9	115,4	124,6	136,1	117,2	127,4	128,2
Middle East, North Africa	51,9	49,8	52,5	50,9	51,8	60,9	70,4	69,8
South Asia (without India)	191,1	197,2	214,3	226,1	235,3	223,4	234,6	237,7
India	630	661,4	697,1	731,4	769,5	805,7	804,4	826
Sub- Saharan Africa	287,9	326	355,2	381,6	410,4	446,8	489,1	516
East Asia+Chin a	1169,8	1108,6	1028,3	1116,3	1079,3	922,2	899,6	864,3
South Asia+India	821,1	858,6	911,4	957,5	1004,8	1029,1	1039	1063,7
Total	2449,8	2480,2	2477,5	2653,8	2763,5	2673,6	2737,8	2735,5


3, is this. The neat picture that millions were lifted out of poverty in the age of globalization has to be qualified on the basis of the very same World Bank figures that are often quoted to qualify that assertion. The above Table has the clear follow-up, based again on our calculations from Chen and Ravallion (our own compilations⁴² from Chen and Ravallion).

millions falling into/lifted out of poverty	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2001
East Asia (without China)	0,8	2,7	-5,8	-15,3	-3,8	-0,5	-1,4
China	-62	-83	93,8	-21,7	-153,3	-22,1	-33,9
Eastern Europe, Central Asia	-1,9	-3,6	8,2	58,2	16,3	14,9	-18,8
Latin America, Caribbean	20	-3,5	9,2	11,5	-18,9	10,2	0,8
Middle East, North Africa	-2,1	2,7	-1,6	0,9	9,1	9,5	-0,6
South Asia (without India)	6,1	17,1	11,8	9,2	-11,9	11,2	3,1
India	31,4	35,7	34,3	38,1	36,2	-1,3	21,6
Sub-Saharan Africa	38,1	29,2	26,4	28,8	36,4	42,3	26,9
Total	30,4	-2,7	176,3	109,7	-89,9	64,2	-2,3

⁴² the original Table is: Percentage of population below \$2 per day:

	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2001
East Asia	84,8	76,6	67,7	69,9	64,8	53,3	50,3	47,4
China	88,1	78,5	67,4	72,6	68,1	53,4	50,1	46,7
Eastern Europe, Central Asia	4,7	4,1	3,2	4,9	17,2	20,6	23,7	19,7
Latin America, Caribbean	26,9	30,4	27,8	28,4	29,5	24,1	25,1	24,5
Middle East, North Africa	28,9	25,2	24,2	21,4	20,2	22,3	24,3	23,2
South Asia	89,1	87,2	86,7	85,5	84,5	81,7	78,1	77,2
India	89,6	88,2	87,3	86,1	85,7	85,2	80,6	79,9


World Poverty: Percentage of People with less than 2 \$ a Day Per Capita Income – percentages of people falling into poverty or being lifted out of poverty over the preceding 3-year period




Sub-Saharan Africa	73,3	76,1	76,1	75	74,6	75,1	76	76,6
Total	66,7	63,7	60,1	60,8	60,1	55,5	54,4	52,9

The following regional aggregates about poverty reduction (+ or – the percentage of people below 2 \$ a day as compared to the preceding period) emerges:


a) East Asia including China




b) only China




c) Eastern Europe, Central Asia




d) Latin America




e) Middle East, North Africa




f) South Asia




g) India only



h) Sub-Saharan Africa



i) total, developing world



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