<center><H1> Contents of the Reader for Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory

Contents of the Reader for Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory

(July 9, 1999)

The numbers for each chapter are page numbers for the large and small version (20-16, for example). The total is 622-363. A star (*) indicates that I have a computer file. @ indicates a reading to be dropped to get the small version of the Reader, which will probably be the actual version.

There would be 1-page citations and introductions for each article. The long version has 85 entries and the short version has 66 entries. If space were important, the article introductions could be condensed to a 1 or 2-page introduction for each of the 20 sections.

PREFACE
CHAPTER 1: THE RULES OF THE GAME 20-16
1. Straffin, Philip, ``The Prisoner's Dilemma,'' UMAP Journal. 1: 101-3 (xxx). 2pp.
2. Tucker, Albert, ``A Two-Person Dilemma,'' May 1950 notes. 1 pp.
3. Nash, John ``Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. 36: 48-9 (January 1950). 2 pp.
4. * "To Ensure High Prices, Some Haulers Have Been Known to Break the Rules," Jeff Bailey, Wall Street Journal, 8 November 1993, p. A6. 1p.
5. * Nash, John, ``Non-Cooperative Games,'' Annals of Mathematics, 54: 286-95 (September 1951). 9 pp.
6. * @ "Cash Flow: `Pay to Play' Is Banned, But Muni-Bond Firms Keep the Game Going --- Giant Lilco Deal Finds Them Giving to Accounts Tied To D'Amato and Pataki --- Hiring the Well-Connected," ," Charles Gasparino and Josh Hamilton, Wall Street Journal, 13 May 1998, p. A1. 4pp.
7. Ratbert the Consultant cartoon, United Features Syndicate, (1997). 1p.
CHAPTER 2: INFORMATION 21-21
1. Rothkopf, Michael, ``TREES-- A Decisionmaker's Lament,'' Operations Research, 28: 3 (January/February 1980). 1p.
2. Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, ``Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17: 18-32 (Spring 1986). 14 pp.
3. Livy, "The Horatii and the Curiatii," The Early History of Rome, Section 1.23, A. Selincourt, translator, Harmandsworth, England: Penguin, 1960. 2pp.
4. *Ayres, Ian and Jeremey Bulow, ``The Donation Booth,'' Boston Review ,xxx, 4 pp.
CHAPTER 3: MIXED STRATEGIES 5-5
1. "Very Guilty" cartoon, Herman Unger, Universal Press Syndicate, (1988). 1 p.
2. *``Shipping Price-Fixing Pacts Hurt Consumers, Critics Say,'' Wall Street Journal, Anna Mathews, 7 October 1997 xxx. 4pp.
3. *Rasmusen, Eric, ``A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining,''. October 18, 1997. 15 pp.
CHAPTER 4: DYNAMIC GAMES 28-28
1. * Zermelo, Ernst, ``On An Application of Set Theory to the Game of Chess,'' Proceedings, Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians. 2: 501-4 (1913). Translated by Ulrich Schwalbe and Paul Walker, pp. 8-10 of ``Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory,'' U. of Canterbury Economics working paper, August 14, 1997. 2pp.
2. Schelling, Thomas, Chapter 5 of The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. 21pp.
3. *``Art Thief Displays True Colors In Bargaining for Leniency,'' William Carley, Wall Street Journal, 29 September 1997, p. A1. 5pp.
CHAPTER 5: REPEATED GAMES 30-30
1. *Barro, Robert, "This Tax Amnesty Will Only Work Once," Wall Street Journal, 7 August 1986, xxx 2pp.
2. @*"Truth or Consequences? Hardly," Reed Abelson, The New York Times, 23 June 1996, p. 3.1.
3. Hofstadter, Douglas, ``Computer Tournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma Suggest how Cooperation Evolves,'' Scientific American, 248: 16-26 (May 1983) . 10 pp.
4. Axelrod, Robert \& William Hamilton, ``The Evolution of Cooperation,'' Science. 211, 4489: 1390-96 (March 1981) . 6 pp.
5. Cartoon: ``Don't Believe Everything You Hear...'' Stevenson, New Yorker, xxx, 1p.
6. Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory 27: 245-52 (19xx) . 7 pp.
CHAPTER 6: DYNAMIC GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 29-9
1. Farrell, Joseph, ``Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 18: 34-39 (Spring 1987). 5 pp.
2. *Excerpt from Pileggi, Wise Guy. p. 267-xxx. xxxx, 4pp.
CHAPTER 7: MORAL HAZARD 31-13
1. @ Becker, Gary and George Stigler, ``Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,'' Journal of Legal Studies, 3: 1-18 (January1974). 18 pp.
2. Farrell, Joseph, ``Monopoly Slack and Competitive Rigor: A Simple Model, '' MIT mimeo. February 1983. 6 pp.
3. Rubinstein, Ariel, ``An Optimal Conviction Expectation Regime for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident,'' in Applied Game Theory , 406-413, Wurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1979 . 11 pp.
CHAPTER 8: FURTHER TOPICS IN MORAL HAZARD 6-6
1. * Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, xxx, p. 207. 2 pp.
2. "Examples of Plea Bargains". Excerpted from " Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self Incrimination," Cardozo Law Review, (xxx 1998) xxx. 1p.
3. Cartoon: ``$200 for a Loaf of Bread!'', Zahm, WSJ, April 20, 1988, p. 19. xxx, 1p.
4. "Unions Say Auto Firms Use Interplant Rivalry to Raise Work Quotas," Dale Buss, Wall Street Journal, 8 November 1983, p. 1, 31, 2pp.
CHAPTER 9: ADVERSE SELECTION 45-20
1. *Akerlof, George, ``The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500 (August 1970) . 12 pp.
2. @Deneckere, Raymond and R. Preston McAfee, ``Damaged Goods,'' Journal of Economics and Management Science , 5: 149-174 (Summer 1996) . 25 pp.
3. "Bagehot, Walter" (pseudonym for Jack Treynor), ``The Only Game in Town,'' Financial Analysts Journal, 27: 12-14,22 (March/April 1971) . 4 pp.
4. "Frank's Neurosurgery" Gary Larson, Far Side cartoon. xxx 1p.
5. * ``Are Advertisers Ready to Pay Their Viewers?'' Wall Street Journal, Bart Ziegler, 14 November 1996. xxx. 3pp.
CHAPTER 9A: MECHANISM DESIGN IN ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD WITH HIDDEN INFORMATION 36-7
1. Gonik, Jacob, ``Tie Salesmen's Bonuses to their Forecasts, '' Harvard Business Review, 56: 116-23 (May/June 1978) . 7 pp.
2. @J. Mark Ramseyer, ``Public Choice, '' Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper Series no. 34 (second series). 1995. 13 pp.
3. @ Myerson, Roger and Mark Satterthwaite, ``Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,'' Journal-of-Economic-Theory, 29: 265-81 (April 1983). 16 pp.
CHAPTER 10: SIGNALLING 12-2
1. "Some Fine Day, All This Will Be Yours," Alan Dunn cartoon, New Yorker,.xxx. 1p.
2. @ Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole ``A Signal-Jamming Theory of Predation,'' RAND Journal of Economics . 17: 366-76 (Autumn 1986) . 10 pp.
3. "Clown" cartoon. Charles Barsotti, PLayboy, 1981, xxx 1p.
CHAPTER 11: BARGAINING 35-35
1. *Nash, John, ``The Bargaining Problem,'' Econometrica, 18:155-62 (April1950). 7 pp.
2. * Rubinstein, Ariel, ``Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model'' Econometrica, 50: 97-109 (January 1982). 12 pp.
CHAPTER 12: AUCTIONS 61-15
1. Shubik, Martin, ``The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation,'' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15: 109-11 (March 1971). 2 pp.
2. ``Advertisement for Bids,'' Bloomington Herald Times, November 8, 1997, p. C4. 1p.
3. @ Vickrey, William, ``Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,'' Journal of Finance, 16: 8-37 (March 1961) . 29 pp.
4. "Revenge of the Nerds," The Economist , July 23, 1994, p. 70. 1p.
5. @ * Federal Trade Commission v. Abbott Laboratories, 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.C. 1994). 10 pp.
6. @"Payment Terms Were Too Easy; Firms Bid More Than They Had," Wall Street Journal, Quentin Hardy and Bryan Gruley, 1 August 1997, p. A1, 7pp.
7. *McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan , ``Analyzing the Airwaves Auction,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:159-170 (Winter 1996). 11 pp.
CHAPTER 13. PRICING 65-31
1. @ Salop, Steven & Joseph Stiglitz, ``Bargains and Ripoffs; A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion,'' Review of Economic Studies, 138: 493-510 (October 1977) . 17 pp.
2. *Hotelling, Harold (1929) ``Stability in Competition,'' Economic Journal, 39: 41-57 (March 1929). 16 pp.
3. * Edgeworth, Francis, "The Mathematical Economics of Professor Amoroso," Economic Journal, 30: 400-407 (September 1922). 7 pp.
4. * D'Aspremont, Claude, J. Gabszewicz, & Jacques Thisse , ``On Hotelling's `Stability of Competition', '' Econometrica, 47: 1145-50 (September 1979) . 5 pp.
5. *Shaked, Avner, ``Existence and Computation of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for 3-Firms Location Problem,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 31: 93-6 (September/December 1982). 3 pp.
6. @ *Stigler, George, "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72: 44-61 (February1964). 17 pp.
CHAPTER 14 ENTRY 48-8
1. *"Continental May Agree to Buy Planes Exclusively From Boeing. Airline Wants Sole-Supplier Pact Similar to Ones Secured by Rivals," Wall Street Journal, Jeff Cole and Scott Mccartney, 14 April 1997, p. A3. 3pp.
2. @* Bulow, Jeremy, John Geanakoplos & Paul Klemperer, ``Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements,'' Journal of Political Economy, 93: 488-511 (June 1985). 23 pp.
3. @*Haltiwanger, John & Michael Waldman, ``Responders versus Nonresponders: A New Perspective of Heterogeneity, '' Economic Journal, 101: 1085-1102 (September 1991). 17 pp.
4. *Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole, "The Fat-Cat Effect, The Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look,'' American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74: 361-66 (May 1984) . 5 pp.
CHAPTER 14A: MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 26-26
1. @ Polya, G., "Summary, Example," pp. xvi-xvii, 7-20 of How to Solve It , 2nd Edition, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1957 (1st ed., 1945). 24 pp.
2. "I'd Like to See Them Wriggle..." Chon Day, New Yorker, cartoon. xxx 1 p.
3. ``Einstein Discovers that Time is Actually Money,'' Gary Larson cartoon. xxx1pp.
CHAPTER 15: BIOGRAPHY 49-23
1. * Varian, Hal, "How to Build an Economic Model in Your Spare Time," From Passion and Craft: Economists at Work, edited by Michael Szenberg, University of Michigan Press, 1999. 16 pp.
2. @ *Dixit, Avinash, "My System of Work (Not!)," The American Economist (Spring 1994). Also in Passion and Craft: Economists at Work, edited by Michael Szenberg, University of Michigan Press, 1999. 12 pp.
3. Nasar, Sylvia, "School of Genius (Princeton, Fall 1948)," pp. 58-65 of A Beautiful Mind New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. 7 pp.
CHAPTER 16: RESEARCH 38-38
1. * David Levine advice for PhD students. xxx HTML. 5pp.
2. "Memorandum of Agreement," book contract. 6 pp.
3. *Roberts, Harry and Roman Weil, ``The University of Chicago. Starting Research Early,'' (August 14, 1970). 10 pp.
4. "Shooting the Bird's Eye," pp. 18-19 of The Five Sons of King Pandu: The Story of the Mahabharata , adapted from the Kisari Ganguli translation by Elizabeth Seeger. New York: William R. Scott, Inc. 1967. 2 pp.
5. McCloskey, Donald, "Other Things Equal: He's Smart. And He's a Nice Guy, Too," Eastern Economic Journal, 21: 109-112 (Winter 1995). 3 pp.
6. Davis, Philip Reuben Hersh and Elena Marchisotto "The Creation of New Mathematics: An Application of the Lakatos Heuristic," pp. 291-298 of The Mathematical Experience,xxx Birkhauser: 1981. 7 pp.
7. *Lachman, Judith ``Knowing and Showing Economics and Law, '' (A review of An Introduction to Law and Economics, A. Mitchell Polinsky (1983)) Yale Law Journal, 93: 1587, 1598-1605 (July 1984). 7 pp.,
CHAPTER 17: WORKSHOPS 16-16
1. Davis, John ``The Argument of an Appeal" from American Bar Association Journal , 26: 895-909 (December 1940). Check pages. 14pp.
2. *Stigler, George, ``The Conference Handbook,'' Journal of Political Economy , 85: 441-443 (April 1977). 2 pp.
CHAPTER 18: WRITING 55-12
1. @*Sonnenschein, Hugo & Dorothy Hodges, ``Manual for Econometrica Authors'', Econometrica, 48: 1073-1081 (July 1980). 8 pp.
2. @ McCloskey, Donald, ``Economical Writing,'' Economic Inquiry, 24: 187-222 (April 1985). 35 pp.
3. * Rasmusen, Eric, ``Notes on Writing, Talking, and Listening.''. 12 pp.
ARTICLES I DIDN`T HAVE ROOM FOR
1. Halmos, Paul (1970) ``How to Write Mathematics'' L'Enseignement Mathematique, May/June 1970. 16: 123-52. 29 pp.
2. Fisher, R.A. (1934) "Randomization, and an Old Enigma of Card Play," The Mathematical Gazette, FINISH CITE.
3. Harman Eleanor (1975), ``Hints on Poofreading'' Scholarly Publishing , pp. 151-157 (January 1975). 6 pp.
4. *Salant, Stephen, Sheldon Switzer & Robert Reynolds (1983) ``Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics. (May 1983) 98: 185-99. PDF . 14 pp.
5. @von Zermelo, E. (1913) ``Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels,'' Proceedings, Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians. 1913. 2: 501-4.
6. Farrell, Joseph and Drew Fudenberg (1981) "A Simple Model of Destructive Competition," mimeo, MIT, March 1981.
7. Cooter, R. and Rubinfeld, D. 1989. "Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution". Journal of Economic Literature 27: 1067-1097. NOT IN PACKET. 30 pp.
8. Bebchuk, L. 1996. "A new theory concerning the credibility and success of threats to sue" Journal of Legal Studies 25: 1-26.NOT IN PACKET. 26 pp.
9. Gelman, J. and S. Salop (1983) ``Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14: 315-25. 10 pp.
10. @ Bertrand, Joseph (1883) ``Rechercher sur la theorie mathematique de la richesse,'' Journal des Savants . September 1883. 48, 499-508.
11. *Shapiro, Carl and Joseph Stiglitz. 1984. ``Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device.'' 74 American Economic Review 433-444. PDF . 11 pp.,
12. Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz (1970) ``Increasing Risk I,'' Journal of Economic Theory , 2: 225-243. 18 pp.
13. Emmanuel Petrakis and Eric Rasmusen, ``Defining the Mean-Preserving Spread: 3-pt versus 4-pt,'' in Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Empirical Findings , edited by John Geweke. Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1992. TEXT FILE.
14. Krugman, Paul (1993) "How I Work," The American Economist (Fall 1993) 37:25-31.
15. Landes, William (1993) "How I Work," The American Economist . CITE?
16. * Bennett, Amanda, ``Nobel in Economics is Awarded to Three for Pioneering Work in Game Theory,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 October 1994, B12. HTML.
17. ``3 Economists Share a Prize for Insights into How Rivalries Function,'' New York Times, 12 October 1994, C6. MISSING.
18. Flanders, Stephanie, ``Games of Chance Set up Nobel Prize in Economics,'' Financial Times, 12 October 1994, p. 1.
19. *Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Michael Alexeev, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Stake and Robert Heidt) , `Review Discussion: Game Theory and the Law,'' Law and Society Review , 31: 613-629 (1997). TEXT FILE. 16 pp.
20. Bower et al. (1994) ``Protocol, Etiquette, and Responsibilities of Reviewers in Finance'' , Financial Practice and Education , Fall/Winter 199, 418-24. 6 pp.
21. @* Stigler, George (1961) "The Economics of Information," The Journal of Political Economy, (June 1961),69: 213-225. PDF. 12 pp.
22. @ * "Learn to Play the Earnings Game (And Wall Street Will Love You). The Pressure to Report Smooth, Ever Higher Earnings has Never been Fiercer. Your Don't Want to Miss the Consensus Estimate by a Penny-- and You Don't Have To," Fortune , Justin Fox, March 31, 1997, p. 76-XXX. TEXT FILE.
23. @ Rapoport, Anatol & Melvin Guyer (1966) ``A Taxonomy of 2x2 Games'' General Systems, 11: 203-14. 11 pp.
24. Waldegrave, James (1713) ``Excerpt from a Letter'' (with a preface by Harold Kuhn). From Baumol \& Goldfeld (1968). 1p.
25. @ Van Damme, Eric (1989) ``Stable Equilibria and Forward Induction'' Journal of Economic Theory . August 1989. 48: 476-496. 20 pp.
26. *@Nasar, Sylvia, ``The Lost Years of a Nobel Laureate,'' New York Times . November 13, 1994, p. 3.1. TEXT FILE. 14 pp.
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