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Papers received as of Sun Nov  1 02:00:58 CST 1998.
(To retrieve abstracts without full papers, use e.g.    get 9811001.abs )
 get 3 2.abs 9303001  , e.g., returns multiple papers.

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Paper: ewp-game/9811001
From: bugarin@guarany.cpd.unb.br
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1998 07:24:42 -0600   ( 0kb + 245kb + 94kb )

Title: Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty
Author: Mauricio Bugarin (University of Brasilia)
Contact: bugarin@guarany.cpd.unb.br
Comments: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print
on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public
Choice
Keywords: Vote splitting, uncertainty, insurance
JEL: D72 C72 C78
EWPA-references:
Report-no: TD-230
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Paper: ewp-game/9811002
From: t.to@warwick.ac.uk
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1998 16:02:02 -0600   ( 0kb + 130kb + 287kb + 135kb )

Title: Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling
Author: Nick Feltovich (University of Houston) and Rick Harbaugh (Yale
University) and Ted To (University of Warwick)
Contact: t.to@warwick.ac.uk
Comments: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on any;
pages: 33; figures: included
Keywords:
JEL: C72, D82, D83
EWPA-references:
Report-no: AS-76-000001
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Paper: ewp-game/9811003
From: rs328@columbia.edu
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:04:55 -0600   ( 0kb + 226kb )

Title: Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational
Players
Author: Rajiv Sethi (Barnard College, Columbia University)
Contact: rs328@columbia.edu
Comments: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC; to print on
HP/PostScript; pages: 23; figures: included
Keywords: Dynamic Stability, S(1) Equilibrium, Procedural Rationality,
Evolutionary Games
JEL: C72
EWPA-references:
Report-no: BC-99-04
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Paper: ewp-game/9811004
From: oechsler@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1998 11:08:13 -0600   ( 0kb + 194kb + 145kb + 0kb + 67kb + 91kb )
Date (revised): Tue, 24 Nov 1998 03:38:07 -0600 (CST)

Title: Through Trial & Error to Collusion
Author: Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann and Joerg Oechssler (Humboldt
University, Berlin)
Contact: oechsler@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
Comments: Pages: 12; figure included in the second file
Keywords: learning, game theory, oligopoly, collusion
JEL: C72, L13
EWPA-references:
Report-no: HNO-2
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