------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Papers received as of Wed Apr  1 02:27:44 CST 1998.
(To retrieve abstracts without full papers, use e.g.    get 9804001.abs )
 get 3 2.abs 9303001  , e.g., returns multiple papers.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\
Paper: ewp-game/9804001
From: shalev@core.ucl.ac.be
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 1998 05:13:24 -0500   ( 0kb + 368kb + 133kb + 74kb )

Title: Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
Author: Salvador Barberà (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and Michael
Maschler (Hebrew University) and Jonathan Shalev (CORE)
Contact: shalev@core.ucl.ac.be
Comments: Type of Document - AMSTeX; prepared on IBM PC; to print on
PostScript; pages: 1+48 ; figures: included
Keywords: voting, elections, clubs, game theory, noncooperative games,
pure-strategy equilibrium profiles, refinements
JEL: C7 D7 D71
EWPA-references:
Report-no: CORE-DP-9822
\\