------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Papers received as of Wed May 1 02:01:27 CDT 2002. (To retrieve abstracts without full papers, use e.g. get 0205001.abs ) get 9404003 95011002.abs 9303001 , e.g., returns multiple papers. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-test/9912014 From: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 02:19:03 -0600 Title: A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games Author: P.J.J. Herings (University of Maastricht) and R. Peeters (University of Maastricht) Contact: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Comments: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 31 Keywords: Game theory Stochastic games computation of equilibria linear tracing procedure JEL: C63 C72 C73 EWPA-references: Report-no: JPP-rm00_31 \ \ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-test/9912017 From: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 05:50:26 -0600 Title: Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games Author: P.Jean-Jacques Herings (University of Maastricht) and Ronald J.A.P. Peeters (University of Maastricht) Contact: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Comments: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 22 ; figures: i Keywords: Game theory, stochastic games, Equilibrium selection, Linear tracing procedure, Correlated beliefs JEL: C72, C73 EWPA-references: Report-no: PJJrm01_19 \ In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative definitions. We show that exactly on of the proposed extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsany-Selten for games in standard form and captures stationary. \ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-test/9912022 From: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 03:24:23 -0600 Title: Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures Author: P.Jean-Jacques Herings (University of Maastricht) and Ana Mauleon (Université Catholique of Louvain) and Vincent Vannetelbosch (Université Catholique of Louvain) Contact: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Comments: Type of Document - ps.format; pages: 12 Keywords: Coordination Games, Coordination Failures, Rationalizability, Matching Devices JEL: C72, C78, D61 EWPA-references: Report-no: RM01/21 \ We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device. \ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-test/9912023 From: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 04:03:35 -0600 Title: The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy Author: Arkadi Predtetchinski (University of Maastricht) and P. Jean-Jacques Herings (University of Maastricht) and Hans Peters (University of Maastricht) Contact: p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl Comments: Type of Document - .ps; pages: 20 Keywords: core, stationary economies, uncertainty JEL: C71, C73, D51, D52 EWPA-references: Report-no: rm02-003 \ Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered in which information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption processes where no coalition of agents wishes to deviate at any moment for the rest of time. Comparable to the optimality principle in dynamic programming, necessary and sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the strong sequential core in stationary economies are derived, based on non- emptiness of classical cores of certain static economies. The main result of the paper is an existence result for stationary economies based on the presence of a competitive equilibrium in an associated limit economy, given a high enough discount factor. Moreover, sufficient conditions are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time and history independent processes. \ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-game/0205005 From: catilinae@wlu.edu Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2002 18:42:30 -0600 ( 0kb + 203kb ) Title: Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets: An (enhanced) two- Stage Approach Author: Eliane Catilina (Washington and Lee University) Contact: catilinae@wlu.edu Comments: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 43 Keywords: Information Acquistion, Cournot Market, Strong Nash Equilibrium JEL: C72, D43, D83 EWPA-references: Report-no: infacqcatilinea1 \\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \\ Paper: ewp-game/0205006 From: mtomochi@uci.edu Date: Mon, 20 May 2002 21:50:41 -0500 ( 0kb + 180kb ) Title: A Consumer-Based Model of Competitive Diffusion of Two Goods: The Effects of Network Externalities and Local Interactions Author: Masaki Tomochi (Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine) and Hiroaki Murata (Chuo Computer System) and Mitsuo Kono (Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University) Contact: mtomochi@uci.edu Comments: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on MicroSoft Windows; to print on ps; pages: 26; figures: separate but included (PDF). pdf format. comments are more than welcome. Keywords: competitive diffusion, network externality, local interaction, global externality, local externality, evolutionary game, spatial game JEL: EWPA-references: Report-no: mt-05-20-2002-diff \\