Competitive collaboration and market contestability: 
Cases in Mexican and UK banking (1945-1975)

*Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo

** Gustavo A. Del Angel

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© Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica

*Lecturer in Management, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA Corresponding Author
b.batiz@Open.ac.uk

** Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, Carr. Mexico-Toluca 3655 Mexico, D.F. 01210
gustavo.delangel@cide.edu
ABSTRACT

This research explores the evolution of co-operation among different types of intermediaries in the UK and Mexican financial systems and provides an international comparison. In it we focus on how and why collaboration between commercial banks and non-bank financial competitors emerged in the context of the external innovations that modified the contestability of bank markets. Changes in Mexican banking consider collaboration between commercial banks and small regional banks, with an emphasis on the 1945 to 1975 period. The success of collaboration, between non-bank and non-finance providers to modify competitive capabilities and competitive challenges, in UK deposit markets is the benchmark for co-operation in Mexican banking. Business histories in the UK and Mexico show how some relations emerged out of integration strategies, with the purpose of establishing financial conglomerates. Other banks and non-bank providers in Mexico and the UK sought to create co-operative agreements that developed competitive capabilities and allowed barriers to enter deposit markets to be circumvented. As a result, the research sheds light on the success of collaboration agreements through changes in competitive strength rather than the longevity of the transaction or the formality and structural visibility of the agreements.

JEL Classification: Comparative Financial Markets (N20), Market Structure (L10), Networks (L22).
1. Introduction

Alton Gilbert’s\(^1\) landmark compilation warned that, conspicuously absent from the analysis of structure-conduct-performance in banking, was an assessment of the effects regulatory change has had in determining bank performance. It was until recently, however, that an important number of contributions thoroughly debated the economic role of market competition, its benefits and its workings in financial mediation\(^2\). This paper contributes to research into the effects of regulation on performance in bank markets by looking into how and why collaboration between commercial banks and non-bank financial competitors emerges in the context of changed competition (as reflected by distinct competitive environments in Mexico and the UK). The combination of secondary sources and previously unavailable archival material, suggests a wide spectrum in the organisational forms adopted by collaborators. What is distinctive about the forms of collaboration explored in this paper is the focus on the importance attributed to assessing market potential as the driver that brought collaborators together.

Collaboration in markets with a handful of participants can enable those with fewer resources and capabilities to absorb market intelligence without disrupting competitive equilibria. At the same time, collaboration can enable the creation of inter-organisational processes and procedures to distribute otherwise inaccessible information. Competitive collaboration, therefore, can provide advantages to financial intermediaries established in markets such as Mexican banking, where incomplete information is pervasive and there are acute asymmetries between principal and agent. Collaboration is also of interest for managers of banks working in competitive but otherwise geographically segmented markets, such as the UK retail financial services in the post war period, as a cost effective alternative to implementing geographic diversification prior to per capita income rising. Hence, both the context of a closed economy with a financial system in the early stages of development and in the context of an industrial economy with a developed financial system, inter-firm co-operation proved to be a relatively successful organisational response to market constraints.

Research results, into the formation and evolution of inter-firm collaboration in banking, suggested that collaboration allowed participants in Mexican and UK banking to internalise competencies and learn from their associates while co-operation
aimed to overcome regulatory and environmental restrictions to market penetration. Research results advance the literature discussing organisational alliances and collaboration in general, by suggesting that the assessment of market potential is critical to instigating collaboration while implementing related and semi-related diversification. Specifically, this paper documents evidence pointing towards established participants and potential entrants in bank markets seeking collaboration to inform strategic actions that could lead to activities associated with high sunk costs, such as the development of retail branch banking distribution.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a review of analytic categories and research design. Section 3 summarises the structure of Mexican and UK banking markets with an emphasis on the 1945-1975 period. Section 4 considers associations that emerged out of strategies of competitive collaboration. This through cases on the relationship between Mexican commercial banks, as well as cases on the role of finance houses (non-bank, purchase-hire, intermediaries) in the strategy of UK commercial banks. Section 5 explores a second theme through alliances that create co-operative agreements, circumventing barriers to entering bank markets and developing competitive capabilities. This is illustrated through co-operative links of Mexican commercial banks as well as collaboration between savings and clearing banks in Scotland. Section 6 offers a summary and tentative conclusions.

2. Understanding Competitive Collaboration

In the literature, regulation has been viewed as mitigating competition as well as hindering the adoption of technological innovation. Regulatory innovations developing into barriers to enter the markets for financial services in general and commercial banking in particular, can be traced to bank charters in the late eighteenth century. However, it was until 1960 when concerns were raised regarding the design of an optimal banking structure when, responding to a ruling of the Supreme Court, US government agencies had to consider the anti-trust effects of mergers in banking. More recently after a period of intense regulatory change during the 1970s and 1980s, the potential for fraud, money laundering and systemic failure impinged supervision, regulation and minimum capital requirement as prerequisites to participate in bank markets.
External change (such as regulatory innovations) can modify competition in bank markets. There are several potential strategic responses of actual and potential participants in banking to external innovations and competitive collaboration is one of them. However, competitive collaboration, as undertaken by participants in banking during the second half of the twentieth century, seems to be an under-researched organisational form. Moreover, practitioner and academic research on inter-firm cooperation has predominately focused attention on cross-border growth of banking institutions while excluding the assessment of collaboration amongst banks, non-bank and non-finance intermediaries with the potential of contesting domestic bank markets.

In this paper research into competitive collaboration between banks and non-banks as well as between banks, non-banks and non-finance organisations aiming to contest bank markets proceeded through an historical evaluation of associations in two different competitive environments and provides an international comparison. The assessment of the evolution of competitive collaboration could determine the success of collaboration agreements through changes in competitive strength rather than on the longevity of the transaction or the formality and structural visibility of agreements.

Firms engage in competitive collaboration through strategic alliances, outsourcing agreements, product licensing, co-operative research and an extended range of ‘rights’ (including rights to sell or buy). Such strategies allow partners in the transaction to achieve critical scale in a competency, distribution capability or markets currently out of their reach. According to this view, the main value of competitive collaboration for individual organisations is co-operation turning into a form of inter-partner learning. There is an evolutionary context to this view because learning implies adaptation and change, and indeed an important analytical stream has focused on the evolution of collaboration. In other words, the evolution of inter-firm co-operation is viewed in the broad sense of the life cycle of a product or service, that is, as a notion of transformation over time and adaptation to contextual and environmental contingencies.

An alternative view to explore the formation and evolution of collaboration, offers an overarching framework to assess inter-firm co-operation under two complementary approaches. First, a transactional view based on the degree of integration of firms,
continuous scale from market interaction to full vertical integration that places collaboration as a form of arms-length integration. A second approach is based on commitment, which emphasises the degree of mutual interdependence between the parties involved in an alliance. These views together allow a well-structured definition of the formation of competitive collaboration agreements and the organisational form they are likely to adopt, as well as offering a consistent reference to study the evolution and longevity of collaboration agreements.

Understanding the interaction between formation and longevity of collaboration is particularly important because evolutionary processes are sensitive to the initial conditions in which collaboration emerges and takes on its organisational form. Yves L. Doz has looked at the evolutionary rationale with more precision and explored the effect of initial conditions on the learning processes (rather than on the outcomes). Doz studied both successful and failing projects in the context of sequences of interactive cycles of learning, valuation and adjustment. In particular how the initial conditions are important to create progressing patterns of learning as well as adaptation. Such patterns of learning, according to Doz, are rooted in how cognitive-individual learning evolves into behavioural-organisational learning. Initial conditions may foster or block both types of learning and how learning process are reviewed themselves (learning to learn) by individuals and the organisation itself.

In this paper, evidence from building societies and non-bank intermediaries in the UK shows how collaboration permitted the latter to offer services out of their scope. Evidence from Mexican banking illustrates how small commercial banks associated themselves with larger entities to achieve scale in business processes such as credit cards, international banking and trust operations. As a result, fieldwork in this paper clearly illustrates how, through collaboration, firms expect to avoid unnecessary investments (i.e. enhance the allocation of scarce financial resources), gain time to improve their productive efficiency and quality control, and acquire their partners’ skills and market characteristics. Indeed, empirical-inductive evidence suggests that co-operation and alliances are a transitional step for further interaction between otherwise independent organisations, that could lead to integrated forms of management and certainly to the internalisation of partner skills.

Firms are free to enter any particular relationship provided there is a minimum common agreement, there is a clear perception of potential benefits and there is no
indication that the negotiations themselves will create significant irrecoverable costs. To date, however, disagreement prevails on whether collaboration strategies deliver sustainable competitive advantage. Some are sceptical that networks of independent firms can articulate long-term management of interdependence\(^1\). Others argue that collaboration strategies reflect changes in competitive tactics because they can effectively increase market competition through increased entry threats\(^2\). Throughout these perspectives, however, possibilities that environmental turbulence creates sunk (i.e. irrecoverable) organisational costs and deters entry have often been ignored. Barriers to exit may develop \textit{ex-post} as firms enter into particular agreements\(^3\). For instance, the possibility of environmental turbulence in the UK developing into sunk organisational costs, helps to explain why the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) failed to commit to a collaboration agreement with a building society and thus, CWS abandoned opportunities to diversify in UK retail bank markets.

Cases in this paper, such as CWS’s potential diversification, highlight how seldom the discussion around competitive collaboration considers whether co-operation responds to opportunistic diversification strategies that pursue income growth rather than enhancement of core capabilities. Documented evidence in this paper thus offers cases of strategic visioning but failed implementation in the UK. Whereas cases in Mexican banking document opportunistic but otherwise successful collaboration, which moved forward on flexible organisational structures (escaping the budgetary rigour associated with the pursuit of strategic intent).

Development and transformation of the competitive capabilities of one or all of the partners should be seen as the appropriate indicator for successful collaboration\(^4\). For instance, this paper offers details on how Trustee Savings Bank aimed to transform their capabilities in Scotland through collaboration with a commercial bank and how a Mexican commercial bank (i.e. Banamex) helped to transform the capabilities of its associates in Mexican regional bank markets.

In what follows the research explores competitive collaboration by taking the view that the only (relevant) costs to enter a market are those known to be sunk and which become exit barriers\(^5\). From the ‘contestable market’ perspective the degree of competition diminishes through means other than those facilitating collusion or reducing the number of independent participants. Competitive pressures are lower to the extent that known sunk costs reduce the threat of out-of-market participants.
entering the market. Strategic orientation is important to anticipate competitive advantage, including withstanding environmental turbulence unexpectedly turning idiosyncratic investments into exit barriers.

On the other hand, given the lack of widely accepted definitions of co-operative activity the discussion of inter-firm co-operation risks flounders because of the failure to specify the exact form of collaboration\textsuperscript{19}. Inter-firm relations take many forms and serve many purposes. Hence, it is useful to differentiate what part of the value chain is the focus of the agreement. Also whether there is (tacit or implicit) co-operation for direct involvement as measured by equity in joint ventures or the appointment of liaison managers\textsuperscript{20}. Secondly, whether participants have clear goals and shared expectations\textsuperscript{21}. Fuzzy objectives prevent designing adequate risk/reward agreements while asymmetric expectations of the various participants result in varying levels of commitment (i.e. a participant’s willingness to develop idiosyncratic resources). Thirdly, the extent to which collaboration will complement pre-collaboration activities, operates to the disadvantage of other collaboration agreements and limit the agreement to original signatories\textsuperscript{22}. Finally, whether co-operation is a pro-active (i.e. offensive) or reactive (i.e. defensive) response to uncertainty and environmental turbulence\textsuperscript{23}.

In summary, the evolving nature of competitive collaboration and of any form of inter-organisational dynamics is the motivation for analysing cases with a historical perspective. An historical view of an economic problem requires interweaving conceptual structures with contextual events and identifying how and why transitions appear. In this sense the research that follows aims to bring the history back to the concepts using as evidence the comparative historical cases of Mexico and the UK. Rather than providing an explanatory hypothesis to a problem, it aims to show how and why those business practices emerged in their respective contexts and explain their outcome in the light of conceptual tools.

3. Environmental Turbulence and Strategy in Banking

3.i

From 1945 until 1982 when all but two commercial banks were nationalised, participants in Mexican banking markets experienced an unprecedented development on the back of a relatively stable environment. Banking activity expanded in terms of
the number of firms and scale of activity. By 1940 less than fifty commercial banks operated, that number increased to 97 in 1945 and to 105 in 1971. The number of retail bank branches also increased from 265 branches in 1945, to 901 in 1960 and 1,777 in 1971. Financieras (non-bank intermediaries), the second most important private intermediary after commercial banks, also grew. By 1940 less than forty financieras operated. In 1945 they were 84, and 97 in 1965. However, the four-firm ratio on loans between 1945 and 1980 remained between 40 and 50 per cent of the market\textsuperscript{24}. In other words, in spite of economic growth a reduced number of participants had large shares of the market for deposits, loans and term investments. This suggested that commercial banks and particularly those bigger in terms of assets, benefited from organised capital markets being unavailable to most non-finance organisations.

Nevertheless, the emergence of new intermediaries coupled with economic growth was reflected in the growth of financial transactions. The overall level of financial activity increased in absolute terms and also with respect to gross national product (GDP). For example, as a measure of increasing financial deepening, the proportion of total loans of private financial intermediaries over GDP was 7 per cent in 1945, 9 per cent in 1960, and 19 per cent in 1970. The sum of total loans per capita, indexed to pesos of 1978, was $1,376 in 1945, $2,087 in 1955, $3,425 in 1960 and $9,046 in 1970. These measures are relatively modest if compared with economies showing larger financial development. However they are significant considering that in the 1930s the Mexican financial system emerged out of the ashes after its almost total collapse during the 1910 to 1921 revolution. Two important factors that also contributed to a low population’s access to financial services were Mexico’s uneven geography and little investments, in the early stage of development, on transportation and communication systems. In this way, Mexico characterised as an economy segmented into clearly identifiable regional markets rather than as one integrated national market. The structure of the banking industry reflected this segmentation.

Regulation specifying financial requirements and conditions for the establishment of bank markets dated to 1924 and was later amended in 1941. This banking law remained the main statutory legal code until the late 1990s. Regulation specified strict separation of activities in financial markets and typified activities for specialised financial intermediaries. Commercial banks were restricted to loan provision, deposit
taking, and trust operations. Regulation thus limited the number of activities within broader opportunities for brokering the financial needs of surplus- and deficit-spending agents as well as maintaining the national payment system. However, low per capita income and fragmented regional markets for goods and services also limited banks’ diversification.

The predominant form for distributing financial services was through proprietary channels such as retail bank branch networks. Nevertheless, collaboration with regional players or non-bank participants allowed banks to increase their geographic scope and to provide services commercial banks were otherwise unable to offer. Collaboration was an attractive way of implementing growth strategies of commercial banks that would prevail over reserve requirement regulations, over regulations constraining the maturity term of loans and over other environmental limitations. In particular, commercial banks used financieras (a non-bank intermediary), trust organisations and mortgage banks as affiliates to overcome regulatory restrictions on loan expansion.

Collaboration between banks and non-banks was diverse ranging from loose links with independent participants up to integrated operations, as collaboration sometimes ended in full ownership. Collaboration was also influenced by commercial banks and affiliated financial organisations being embedded in larger business groups. The association of banks and non-banks developed in the early 1940s, primarily through the establishment of non-banking organisations by business groups with a controlling stake in bank capital. Links between banks and non-banks were then expected to develop through repeated custom and preferential access (i.e. relationship banking).

Growth in the strength and diversity of collaboration forced regulators to re-assess conditions for establishing in Mexican bank markets. In 1970 modifications to the banking law acknowledged the collaboration between banks and affiliates in the provision of financial services. The legal recognition of otherwise evident ownership linkages and intensified operational relationships among financial organisations culminated in 1975, with regulatory changes that allowed the amalgamation of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries into multi-bank entities. Note that multi-banks or banca múltiple emerged from the amalgamation of commercial banks with specialised financial firms otherwise working in different market segments. Contrary to the belief that multi-banks were a form of universal banking, they were never
allowed to legally operate as investment banks nor to offer bankassurance although their corporate governance made them suitable to operate as such.

3.ii

Developments in Mexican markets were benchmarked with those in the UK because the UK always had a large and highly competitive wholesale banking markets and preceded other countries in regulatory change. Important features of the UK banking system included the absence of a formal statutory banking law, readiness to welcome the establishment of foreign banks and freedom for domestic banks to engage in international trade and to establish abroad.

As in Mexican banking, a reduced number of large organisations dominated the market for domestic deposits in the UK. This feature dated to the amalgamation process that swept through UK banking after the introduction of limited liability banking during the late nineteenth century. By 1900 ten clearing banks captured 46 per cent of total deposits in England and Wales and by the end of the first world war, five major clearing banks captured 97 per cent of total deposits. The number of major banks remained stable during the next 50 years while, during the 1950s, UK commercial banks actively pursued the aim of becoming depository institutions of excess funds and began to serve mid-income customers. From 1967 to 1973, mergers reduced yet again the number of clearing banks. By 1977, the top four biggest banks in terms of assets captured 73 per cent of deposits by UK residents, controlled 58% of the 12,947 retail bank branches and employed 78 per cent of the 258,065 persons in the sector.

Since 1920 English banking had been free of a major failure until the 1973 to 1974 secondary banking crisis. Operation of the banking system resulted from conventions agreed between the banks themselves and between banks and monetary authorities. Between 1950 and 1970 requests of monetary authorities became more regular and more specific, primarily asking banks (and later most financial intermediaries) to hold certain type of assets in proportion to their deposit liabilities. In 1971 controls to restrict lending growth to an annual rate as well as qualitative guidance on the priorities to assign credit were dissolved. In the period of monetary expansion that followed several smaller financial intermediaries were able to grow sufficiently to present a competitive challenge to clearing banks. However, interest
rate volatility and economic contraction resulted in the collapse of a number of intermediaries specialised in high volume, high worth transactions (i.e. secondary banks). The Bank of England with the clearing banks mounted a rescue operation through which some organisations ceased to trade or became subsidiaries of larger banks.

Since the late 1960s UK financial service organisations observed reduced rates of financial return, raised fees for deposit services, reduced branch operating costs and shifted to higher earning assets. In other words, external innovations (and in particular, regulatory change and information technology applications) were instrumental in the changes banks made to their balance-sheet size, in increasing business-portfolio diversity and in restructuring their geographic scope. Changes in the size and diversity of banks followed external changes in bank markets but banks’ strategic responses were still short of the competitive (or perfectly contestable market) benchmark.

Documented evidence would thus suggest that, as a result of environmental innovations, some bank strategies increased competition in bank markets while some other external changes provided incentives to pursue strategies aiming to deter new participants entering bank markets (such as deterring insurance companies to supply unsecured lending).

4. Competitive Collaboration as a Strategy

4.i

Being the biggest in terms of assets, Banco Nacional de México (Banamex) established associations with small provincial banks while increasing the geographic scope of its loan market. Associations emerged for diverse reasons but chiefly due to opportunistic responses such as other banks being in financial distress or other banks taking the initiative to build closer collaboration.

In the case of the banks in financial distress Banco de México, the central bank in Mexico, would ask Banamex to mount a rescue. In that way the central bank was able to intervene, have a second party implement reliable monitoring mechanisms and avoid collapse. Intervention would then proceed without recourse to public funds.
Examples of collaboration triggered by financial distress were Banco del Pacífico, Banco Ganadero y Agrícola, Banco del Noroeste de México, and Banco Provincial del Norte. Financial contributions by Banamex were accompanied by strict monitoring mechanisms. In particular, Banamex’s executives and senior managers entered the board of the failing bank. New board members acted with non-executive powers to oversee restructuring processes and instituted draconian inspection methods (including outsourcing internal auditing to Banamex). In fact, restructuring and inspection were deemed more important than the injection of funds itself. Transferring expertise alongside financial resources aimed to guarantee that the formerly distressed bank would service the agreement or, in the case of contributions to share capital, minimise possibilities that the contribution would turn into loss. Discipline mechanisms also involved matching financial procedures to those at Banamex.

Associations with financially distressed banks often evolved into a collaboration with Banamex but this was not to be the case of Banco del Pacífico, a commercial bank operating in the north-western regions of Baja California and Sinaloa. In the early forties Banco del Pacífico faced solvency problems due to a large proportion of non-performing loans in its portfolio. Most of the loans were concentrated in a single borrower, Alberto Alderete, who had been Governor of the northern region of Baja California and owner of an important brewery as well as other industrial assets. Alderete received substantial advances from the bank but without proper documentation as to how the loans were going to be serviced. At the time, evidence could not be found as to how such large amount of advances had been approved. The central bank considered that Banco del Pacífico should be rescued due to its high share of deposits in the region and asked Banamex to intervene on its behalf.

By 1945 top Banamex executives had joined the board of Banco del Pacífico as a means of monitoring the bank’s operations. By 1947 the new board had expelled at least five of the top executives of Banco del Pacífico and applied corrective measures to recover the past-due portfolio. Banamex advanced funds to Banco del Pacífico, some of which gave Banamex rights over Banco del Pacífico’s share capital. As a result, Banamex retained its participation on the board of Banco del Pacífico well into 1952, when Atanasio G. Saravia and Agustín Legorreta from Banamex still enjoyed non-executive powers and were on the board of Banco del Pacífico. Shortly after
Banamex amalgamated with Banco del Pacífico while turning non-financial assets into regional branches\(^{35}\).

Other banks in the north-western region saved from collapse by Banamex were Banco del Noroeste and Banco Ganadero y Agrícola, respectively located in the states of Sinaloa and Sonora. Banco Provincial del Norte, established in the northern state of Chihuahua, was another bank in financial distress assisted by Banamex. Figure 1 illustrates the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans for two regional banks. One of them, Banco del Noroeste, identified as having been in financial distress and then intervened by Banamex.

![Figure 1. Non-Performing loans/Total loans](image)


Banco del Noroeste was established in 1939 and had twelve branches serving what, at the time, some executives from Banamex considered as an attractive regional market\(^{36}\). During the 1950s Banco del Noroeste faced a growing proportion of non-performing loans which reached almost 20 per cent of the total portfolio. Figure 1 illustrates that in 1950 non-performing loans at Banco del Noroeste already were 10 per cent of total advances. The graph illustrates how this level was high (even when compared to other financially distressed banks). Banamex’s board sent Ladislao López Negrete. It is unclear when did López Negrete left the bank, but as late as by 1962 he still remained active on the Board of Banco del Noroeste. The effects of corrective measures introduced after López Negrete’s intervention are also shown in Figure 1, this as non-performing loans at Banco del Noroeste were only 6 per cent of
total loans in 1965. The trend is also evident in Figure 2 and Table 1, which illustrates the return on equity for the same sample of banks.

**Figure 2. Return on Equity**

![Graph showing the return on equity for Banco del Noroeste and Banco de Tuxpam from 1950 to 1970.](image)


Figure 2 depicts an important increase in the profitability of Banco del Noroeste from 1950 to 1965. The return on equity increased from 7 per cent in 1950 to 41 per cent in 1965, when the average for the industry was between 15 and 20 per cent. After restructuring Banco del Noroeste, Banamex maintained it as *associate* (more below).

**Table 1: Financial Performance and Banamex’s Intervention (1950-1970)**

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<tr>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Banco del Noroeste</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>41.79%</td>
<td>28.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banco de Tuxpan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>24.15%</td>
<td>29.33%</td>
<td>40.32%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Peforming Loans/Total Loans</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Banco del Noroeste</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
<td>5.54%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banco de Tuxpan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.21%</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
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Other large Mexican banks also developed a collaboration network by taking an interest in the share capital of smaller banks. From 1935 onwards Banco de Comercio, the second largest bank in terms of assets, developed a nationwide network of local banks. Although these links lacked formal managerial integration, banks in Banco de Comercio’s network behaved as affiliates (i.e. regional subsidiaries) rather than as associates (i.e. independent collaborators).

Banco de Londres y México, established in 1864, was the oldest and one of the fourth largest commercial banks in Mexico\(^3\). Originally established as a joint venture between British and Mexican investors, it was acquired by another group of Mexicans in the early 1930s. Later on and while aiming to expand its geographic scope along the US border and in the central Mexico region, Banco de Londres y México took a stake in the capital of Banco de Juárez and Banco de Jalisco. However, Banco de Londres also developed formal collaboration agreements with other providers such as three independent financieras.

In summary, a popular form of collaboration in Mexican markets was larger (asset) banks taking a stake in smaller (asset) banks’ share capital as well as supervising operations through non-executive directors. Direct involvement provided resilient monitoring mechanisms as well as symmetry in goals and commitment. Direct involvement seems to have precluded the need to draft detail agreements while maintaining organisational flexibility. Although pre-collaboration activities clearly complemented each other, collaboration associated with direct involvement were rather tactical moves (i.e. defensive responses), where larger banks could use negotiating advantage to capture residual claims or settle unexpected developments to their favour. Moreover, evidence is yet to emerge pointing to limitations in the agreements as to the number of participants. Dyadic partnerships, therefore, seem to have been the dominant organisational form.

4.ii

In the UK, finance houses, savings banks and building societies competed in the market for deposits with clearing banks (i.e. those controlling the national payment system and able to issue claims redeemable on demand). Just as it was the case in Mexico, non-bank providers had great potential to be used as platform for non-finance providers to contest UK bank markets.
On the one hand, finance houses were the main organisations providing consumer finance for purposes other than house purchase and primarily involved in hire-purchase lending for private individuals to buy automobiles. Through the hire-purchase agreement individuals would rent (or hire) the goods but would become proprietor when the last instalment was paid. Finance houses obtained resources directly from the general public through retail outlets but most funds developed from term deposits of large non-profit organisations and from organised money markets.\(^{38}\)

Guidance regulating solvency requirements and the limit of £50,000 above which consent for the raising of finance houses’ new capital was necessary\(^ {39}\), seems to have done little in the way of preventing opportunities for the formation of hundreds of small houses.\(^ {40}\) However, most of these remained dormant and it was the larger, bank-controlled houses which took the greatest share of the market. In 1969 out of a population of 1,000 finance houses the nine largest accounted for nearly 60 per cent of total debt outstanding, and the twenty-six largest for 78 per cent.\(^ {41}\) Of the total outstanding no less than 29 per cent was accounted for by four-wholly own subsidiaries of banks accepting deposits of UK residents and a further 9 per cent by one finance house jointly owned by two clearing banks.\(^ {42}\) Large finance houses were thus firmly connected to one of the main clearing banks.\(^ {43}\) Outside of the eleven largest, the only other major finance houses were wholly-owned subsidiaries of companies in motor manufacturing and consumer durables, the largest being Ford Motor Credit Co. Ltd.\(^ {44}\). Hence, evidence is yet to emerge that non-finance providers or indeed foreign banks used finance houses to diversify into UK bank markets.

On the other hand, there have been instances where building societies (specialised savings banks) were used as a platform to enter UK bank markets. Until 1989, when Abbey National started a trend through which most of its peers converted into banks, building societies operated as mutuals and dealt primarily in financing home acquisitions. Their system of fixed mortgage interest rates reflected the failure of building societies gaining access to the clearing arrangement of the Committee of London Clearing Banks (finally resolved in the Building Society Act of 1986). This failure ensured that building societies could offer deposits withdrawable on demand but could not offer current accounts and could only engage in payment services through correspondent banks. Lack of short-term mediation possibilities, excess supply of long-term funds and low interest rates brought fierce competition amongst
the building societies\textsuperscript{45}. The aim of protecting societies from the consequences of extreme competition together with an environment conducive of cartels and the 1939 Building Societies Act (which restricted their activities to residential mortgages), encouraged the growth of a trade association called the Building Societies Association (BSA).

Starting in 1939 the Council of the BSA issued recommended rates for personal deposits, term investments and mortgages. In effect, the recommended rate system created a cartel of building societies\textsuperscript{46}. Under the recommended rate system competition to acquire mortgages shrank and building societies increasingly gave:

‘...priority to their own savers in the allocation of mortgage funds.’\textsuperscript{47}

Societies could then reward loyal depositors with pricing for mortgage loans rather than market interest rates. However, coincident with the passing of the Building Societies Act came the outbreak of the second world war and so the testing of its provisions had to wait for a number of years during which public attention was being drawn elsewhere. In the mean time, competition between building societies structured round most of them adopting the same interest rates and commission-payment schemes while customers were forced to maintain patronage of a single institution in order to qualify for a mortgage loan. A number of small building societies operated on rates above recommended rates for borrowers or below recommended rates for deposits but this was an accepted part of building society practice\textsuperscript{48}.

Although building societies offered non-bank and non-finance intermediaries access to services and customer groups previously out of their reach, co-operation between them was rare\textsuperscript{49}. One such exceptional occurrence took place between a building society and the banking arm of a non-finance organisation. This agreement was forged shortly after the second world war, a time when UK property values had increased because during the war half a million homes were destroyed or made unfit, while the number of families had actually grown\textsuperscript{50}. In 1943, the Co-operative Permanent Building Society or CPBS (today Nationwide) approached the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS), at the time the biggest producer and retailer in the UK, to enter discussions in response to the change in property values, aiming to\textsuperscript{51}:

- Develop business in the housing market;
- Encourage more housing societies within the co-operative movement; and
• Provide a range of loan producing insurance (through CWS’s wholly owned insurance subsidiary) well as other expenditure associated with housing and equipment.

For the CPBS the offer provided unique access to the Co-operative Movement with its 10m strong community of producers and consumers. However, the real attractiveness of this potential market depended on CPBS’s ability to take advantage of that special relationship. The deal was formalised when, as a result of the official meetings, the CPBS modified its rules in 1944. For the first time in its history, CPBS appointed representatives of the CWS and the Scottish CWS onto its management board\(^52\). The CWS’s ambitions in financial services were also reflected in the application by the CWS Bank, a wholly owned CWS subsidiary established in 1872 (and the only co-operative bank in the UK), for membership of the Committee of London Clearing Banks\(^53\). The application was refused on grounds not publicly disclosed but the CWS Bank was formally admitted in 1975.

Opportunities of having identified customer loyalty as a competitive strength and the collaboration that ensued never came to be. The CWS and Scottish CWS failed to invite nominations of the CPBS’s directors to either one of their Boards. Links between the CWS and CPBS were limited to the latter, making insurance referrals on the same terms as any other agent of the Co-operative Insurance Society. Moreover, CPBS’s organic expansion attracted members and clients which were overwhelmingly outside of the Co-operative Moment. Simultaneously, CPBS’ agencies within the Co-operative Movement failed to generate mortgage referrals while co-operative societies (including CWS wholly owned subsidiaries) consistently withdraw term deposits\(^54\). The CPBS’s directors then took advantage of the approaching retirement of CWS and Scottish CWS representatives to their Board, stopped making nominations and in 1965 the alliance formally ended.

In summary, collaboration with building societies had the potential of allowing non-bank and non-finance providers to challenge bank markets while offering diversification opportunities for banks product/service portfolio. Collaboration could be an attractive way to complement pre-collaboration activities. The issue being the extent to which collaboration would contribute to achieve strategic intent\(^55\) as well as commitment and share expectations to achieve that intent. Interestingly, in both Mexican and UK markets collaboration moved forward with a very loose agreement
but with the appointment of representatives to the smaller partner’s Board. This would suggest that monitoring and commitment from the larger partner (rather than the one with the critical capabilities) seems to be the key for the success of the agreement itself. Monitoring provided a low cost alternative to gather market intelligence, sort out uncertainty and enhance the assessment of potential investments. The nature and intensity of commitment from the bigger participant thus helps typifying whether collaboration was, on balance, a proactive (i.e. offensive) or reactive (i.e. defensive) response to environmental turbulence.

5. Developing Capabilities through Co-operation

5.i

Collaboration in Mexican banking took place between independent providers and without the recourse of making share capital contributions. Starting in the early 1940s some banks undertook agreements for the provision of services and business collaboration. In the vernacular these agreements were called ‘associated banks’, bancos asociados. Most collaborations took the form of strategic alliances between regional players and larger participants, characterised with head office in Mexico City and with nation wide operations. Table 2 summarises collaboration agreements developed between small regional banks and large banks.

There are four reasons that could, together, explain competitive collaboration in Mexican banking. First large commercial banks offering second and third party processing to decreased scale and capital disadvantages in the provision of many services. Through associations large banks could enjoy economies of scale without management discontinuities and hence, reduce overall cost levels. Second, there was a reputation effect when smaller banks were perceived as within the strategic remit of large banks, collaboration would then have an element associated with greater stability and solvency. Third, through collaboration smaller banks could access otherwise unavailable skills and expertise. And fourth, through collaboration smaller banks had preferential access to inter-bank funding. This as large banks expanded their activities by offering rediscounting loan facilities to smaller banks.
### Table 2: Strategic Alliances in Mexican Banking (1940-1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Bank</th>
<th>Associated Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), one of the two largest in terms of assets.</strong></td>
<td>Banco del Pacífico, Banco Ganadero, Banco del Estado de México, Banco de Tuxpam, Banco Ganadero y Agrícola, Banco del Noroeste de México, Banco Provincial de Norte, Banco del Sureste, Banco del Centro, Banco de Oriente and Banco Agrícola e Industrial de Linares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banco Comercial Mexicano, one of the fourth largest in terms of assets.</strong></td>
<td>Sources of 1957 indicate that they were Banco de La Laguna, Banco Comercial de la República, Banco Comercial de Veracruz, Banco de Oaxaca and Banco Comercial de Jalisco. By 1958 Banco Ganadero de Camargo had joined them. By 1974 Banco Comercial Mexicano de Monterrey, Banco Comercial Mexicano de Tamaulipas, Banco Comercial Peninsular also joined this network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banco de Londres y México, one of the four largest in terms of assets.</strong></td>
<td>Financiera de Nuevo León, Financiera del Norte and Financiera Crédito de Monterrey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banco Internacional, one of the ten largest in terms of assets.</strong></td>
<td>In 1965 they were Banco Provincial de Sinaloa, Banco Industrial de Jalisco, Banco de Yucatán, Banco de Nogales, Banco del Centro, Banco de Zamora and Banco de Oaxaca. In 1968 nine others were added including Banco Agrícola Sonorense, Banco de Baja California, Banco de Campeche, Banco de Matamoros, Banco de Nuevo Laredo, Banco General de Tabasco, Banco Guanajuatense and Banco Industrial de Jalisco.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources*: Archivo Banamex, Noticias Banamex (#73, 2-Jun-1970), Archivos Económicos (SHCP) and Excelsior (29-Mar-1957).
During the late 1960s, associations had an important technological component. Investment in information technology infrastructure by large banks during the mid-sixties motivated small banks to approach them. An example of this type of collaboration was the creation of three independent credit card franchises. In 1968, Banamex became the first international member of the Interbank Card Association (ICA), later to become MasterCard International\(^{57}\). In the US, ICA was the main competing franchise to card issuing banks collaborating with Bank of America (later to be called VISA). The formation of ICA differed from that of VISA in being an association controlled by member banks which took responsibility for promoting the MasterCard brand and for setting standards for security, authorisation, clearing and settlement systems between members. ICA also had an alliance in Europe through Eurocard and managed to attract banks in Japan.

A second credit card network in México emerged in 1968 as large and medium size Mexican banks joined around the Carnet brand. These banks were Banco Comercial Mexicano, Banco de Londres y México, Banco del Atlántico, Banco Internacional and Banco de Industria y Comercio. Shortly after other medium banks joined Carnet, namely Banco Azteca, Banco del País, Banco Longoria, Banco Mercantil, and Banco del Ahorro Nacional\(^{58}\). Yet a third card franchise emerged in Mexico in the late 1960s. This one encompassed Banco de Comercio and its associated banks.

However, collaboration in Mexican banking sought much more than achieving scale in technology. A good example of collaboration is Banamex and its associated local banks, in particular the agreement with Banco de Tuxpam. This bank established in 1942 in the north-eastern region of Tamaulipas with four branches. Banco de Tuxpam approached Banamex with the explicit purpose of establishing a ‘mutually beneficial strategic relationship’. This represented an opportunity to penetrate markets in which Banamex did not have a solid position and the associate did\(^{59}\). Although there is no evidence of when the alliance started, there is evidence of involvement dating to the early 1960s as Banamex’s directors figure in Banco de Tuxpam’s Board of Directors. For instance, in 1962 Ladislao López Negrete and in 1968 Salvador Villar were recorded as being part of Banco de Tuxpam’s Board. At the same time, the 1960s were years of sustained improvement in the financial performance of Banco de Tuxpam (see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1 above). Hence, this is an example of a
successful co-operation where Banamex’s intervention was triggered by the opportunity to learn about customers in a different geographical locations rather than by financial distress. The small bank benefited from scale and scope advantages of the larger bank. The small bank also found attractive the possibility of preferential treatment in the inter-bank market and the transfer of financial expertise. In exchange, Banco de Tuxpam supplied knowledge and information about local markets and high-quality loan referrals (more below).

The agreement between Banamex and its associated banks involved the provision of services that could also had been opened to other banks (such as second party processing of credit card receivables). The core of the collaboration, however, was a more complete package of co-operation. First, there were explicit forms of co-operation exclusive to the associated bank. Second, there were externalities derived from the alliance that added strategic value to the collaboration agreement.

A form of exclusive co-operation was the provision of trust services. Trusts were important as an additional service to clients as well as a key element of loan administration. Another service was the provision of international banking, in which Banamex had a comparative advantage. Banamex also offered training courses for the employees of associated banks.

An important part of strategic collaboration involved rediscounting loans of associated banks. Apparently, Banamex refused rediscounting loans from banks other than its associates.\textsuperscript{60} Rediscounting allowed Banamex to expand its credit activities while agreements enabled some control over the client’s credit worthiness. The associated bank would receive funds and manage the service of loans, carrying out the monitoring and recovery processes. Although rediscounted loans were limited to a small proportion of the associate’s loan portfolio, rediscounting facilities generated confidence among the associate’s clients and investors by creating the perception of augmented financial capabilities as well as signalling the presence of a mechanism that could prevent solvency problems. It is therefore likely that associated banks had an incentive to offer their highest quality loans to the rediscounting facility.

Although small banks had an internal auditing department, Banamex also provided auditing services to associated entities. Outsourcing internal auditing allowed associates access to superior skills as well as the transfer of some of those
skills and expertise (particularly those related to financial procedures and inspection). Monitoring by a second party also translated into enhanced credibility and better reputation for the smaller bank. Expertise from Banamex was important especially for those banks that had appointed large customers and investors (rather than financial professionals) to their boards and directorates. Expertise combined with the enlarged financial capabilities of the smaller banks generated positive externalities to the small bank and created synergy from co-operation.

Negotiation and policing of the agreement was limited to Banamex and the affiliated bank. At the same time, evidence is yet to emerge to suggest that the creation of a bigger network was ever pursued by Banamex (as was in the case of Banco de Comercio’s network of associates). Apparently, banks that approached Banamex had the confidence that Banamex would exercise restraint, would respect the smaller bank’s independence and would show consideration for arms-length co-operative agreements. As a result, collaboration agreements seldom included the insertion of Banamex managers in the board of the other bank. Banamex could nevertheless require a small participation in the share capital of affiliated banks as part of the agreement. However, during the 1970s Banamex ceded its stock participation in all of the affiliated banks, with the exception of Banco Provincial del Norte. In fact, as opposed to the Banco Comercial Mexicano and Banco Internacional, Banamex failed to amalgamate its associates with the creation of financial conglomerates in 1975.

Other associated banks with Banamex were Banco del Sureste, established in 1944 in the southern state of Yucatan, and Banco Agricola e Industrial de Linares, established in 1945, in the northern state of Nuevo Leon. Banks which developed strategic alliances with Banamex but had a more independent relationship were Banco del Centro, established in 1935 in the central state of San Luis Potosí, Banco Ganadero in the north-eastern state of Veracruz and Banco de Oriente, established in 1944 in the Eastern state of Puebla. Banco del Centro started its alliance with Banamex in 1963. At the same time, however, Banco del Centro also established an alliance with another relatively large bank, Banco Internacional. The associations of Banco del Centro with larger entities focused on the provision of services. For instance, Banamex managed the credit card system of this bank.
Some independent financieras also established collaboration agreements with Banamex. Most notably Financiera y Fiduciaria del Golfo, established in 1946 to support cattle raising activities in the north-eastern Huasteca region, and Financiera Peninsular. Before 1967 Financiera Peninsular was Financiera Americana, established in 1945. In 1967 Financiera Peninsular had financial distress problems that required capital injections and a restructuring process.

Close competitors of Banamex also engaged in collaboration agreements. For instance, Banco de Londres y México developed links with three independent financieras, that is, financial organisations that were not a direct component of its business group, namely Financiera de Nuevo León, Financiera del Norte and Crédito de Monterrey. Alliances with those financieras ensured the bank a better position in the markets for corporate credit in northern Mexico and particularly amongst manufacturing interests established around the city of Monterrey. At the same time, the collaboration ensured that these financieras had preferential access to funds from retail deposits collected by the bank as well as financial expertise in the placement of loans.

In summary, associations in Mexican banking encompassed more than outsourcing agreements for the provision of services. Collaboration was considered to be of strategic value by informing decisions that could lead to an expansion of the retail bank branch network. Large banks could offer auditing, trust services and international banking to its associates. Of greater value for smaller banks, however, were skills and financial expertise available at larger banks. In return smaller banks offered market intelligence about local markets and clientele. To a large extent many of the collaboration agreements tended to be at the initiative of the small bank and quite opportunistic for the large bank.

5.ii

In 1810 the first ‘savings’ bank under control of voluntary managers and trustees was established in Ruthwell, Scotland. From the beginning savings banks were retail finance institutions characterised as mutuals, owned by depositors and generally operated through democratic guidelines. Savings banks sought to create thrifty habits amongst small and medium-size savers like craftsmen, house servants or the growing proletariat, that is, outside banks’ target market\textsuperscript{63}. In the first half of the nineteenth
century, bank-runs or bank collapses were common so mutual savings banks had no safe outlet for deposits. To create trust among potential depositors and as a matter of policy, from 1817 onwards, funds were invested in government bonds or deposited at the Bank of England.

Savings banks paying interest on deposits (at a rate ranging from 3 to 5 per cent per annum) proliferated. The number of successful institutions in the British Isles grew until it reached 645 in 186164. Market diversification started as some of these banks made advances to local authorities, but the Savings Bank Act of 1891 expressly prohibited this practice. It was not until 1965 that savings banks were allowed to issue current accounts, undertake the payment of utility bills, and safe guard securities and valuables, because throughout most of its history deposits at savings banks were used to finance government debt65.

By 1975 the large number of separate banks had been reduced by amalgamation to 73 loosely tied up in an association with £2,806m in total assets. Five of the banks had over £100m in assets (25 per cent of amalgamated total), 14 had between £50 and £100m (35 per cent), 39 between £10 and £50m (38 per cent) and 17 under £10m (2 per cent)66. Regulatory changes in 1976 further amalgamated independent savings banks into 19 federated organisations working under a single central institution (called Trustee Savings Bank or TSB). That same year the TSB became a functional member of the Banker’s Clearing House67.

Although together the TSBs would rank in size with any of the four main London clearing banks, the geographical distribution of their 1,655 retail bank branches was uneven. The three largest banks were in London and the South East, Glasgow and Belfast while among the twenty largest many resulted from merges of smaller banks over a wide area68. Typically, the north of England would contribute with 50 per cent of all funds, the south of England and Wales with 27 per cent, Scotland for 19 per cent and Northern Ireland for less than 5 per cent69. Branch density, however, was higher in Scotland and the North of England. Hence, in 1978 there was one retail saving bank branch per 18,000 persons in Scotland but only one per 75,000 persons in the otherwise high density area of London70. The same pattern emerged from individual accounts, with two out of five persons in Scotland having a saving bank account, one out of five in the north of England and one out of twenty in London and the home countries71.
An interesting development was co-operation between the Bank of Scotland and ten of the largest Scottish trustees savings banks (together accounting for 95 per cent of Scotland’s saving bank branches). The first to accept the bank’s invitation was the Savings Bank of Glasgow, the second largest in the UK. It was followed by those of Edinburgh, Paisely, Perth, and Kirkcaldy. Three months later they were joined by those of Aberdeen, Dundee, Falkirk and Counties, South of Scotland, Stirling and Counties.

Through the ‘Scotloan’ scheme, the Bank of Scotland operated and underwrote a personal instalment loan scheme for customers referred by associated savings banks, up to a maximum of £1,000 and available to customers of ‘undoubted sufficiency’ for a period of 6 to 36 months, at 7 per cent interest per annum. The scheme was designed by the Bank of Scotland in July 1971, promoted privately amongst regional banks, savings banks and finance houses; and advertised in the national and Scottish press between September and November of 1972. The bank appointed John McNeill, formerly of the Inspector’s Department, as Controller of the new Savings Bank Loan Centre. The collaboration played on the geographic strengths and customer loyalty of the TSBs and superior financial capabilities at the bank. Collaboration was also attractive because each TSB bank served a separate geographic area. There was little competition between savings banks, although they were actively challenged by other organisations. At the same time, Bank of Scotland’s main competitors were very much engaged in developing capabilities in international markets through clubs and consortia with other European banks.

Unfortunately, the visionary collaboration in the Scottish banking agreement failed to deliver significant results. The OPEC-led rise in oil prices and subsequent inflation together with a secondary banking crisis added to environmental volatility and uncertainty. At the same time, there was internal instability which involved top managers in all UK savings banks being very much engaged in deliberations about the future organisational structure and functioning of the movement as well as individual savings banks. Introspection moved in tandem with government efforts to enhance the working of savings banks and together gave rise to the publication of the TSB Bill in 1975, which granted savings banks rights to offer equivalent services to those of the commercial banks. The amalgamation of individual banks into purposely created regional banks then brought about the introduction of personal lending in 1977 by the
TSBs\textsuperscript{78}. However, by 1979 the relentless move of Giro Bank, the Trustee Savings Banks and the Co-operative Bank resulted in only just over £200m in direct consumer loans and this accounted for less than 3 per cent of total consumer lending that year\textsuperscript{79}.

In summary, for the Bank of Scotland, using savings banks as distributors was a proactive (i.e. offensive) response to penetrate a previously unexplored market segment. However, evidence has yet to emerge to support the idea of high commitment from the savings banks. It would rather seem that collaboration by the savings banks was a form of defensive co-operation, emerging as a reactive response to environmental change. Defensive co-operation is often characterised by avoidance of investment, that is, co-operation is considered a superior alternative for growth to the time and/or financial resources required to develop capabilities internally. Avoiding uncertainty is also central to mount a reactive response as co-operation can provide participants with more time to adjust to environmental turbulence. However, when collaboration is used as a means of avoiding investment rather than appraising opportunities, co-operation is unlikely to be successful\textsuperscript{80}.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

The nature of information sharing and learning is central to the formation and longevity of competitive collaboration. Cases in Mexican and UK banking suggest that information sharing is also relevant to assess diversification moves with the potential to deliver new income streams (when tapping into new customer groups or geographies). Assessing market potential is critical for activities associated with high sunk costs such as retail branch distribution in post WWII bank markets.

A second issue is the extent to which clearly defined goals and detailed collaboration agreements could be expected to achieve success. Evidence documented in this paper as well as that for commercial banks by others\textsuperscript{81}, would suggest that maintaining commitment and opportunities to inform activities resulting in investments with high sunk costs, are more important in the formation stage of collaboration than detailed agreements, well defined goals and even strategic foresight. For instance, the visionary intent of both Bank of Scotland to deliver through TSB and the CPBS to deliver through co-operative retail stores anticipated foreign operations would under perform returns available in home markets. However, both these visionary attempts failed to consolidate because of internal turbulence
within their collaboration partners rather than to poor agreements. At the same time, the opportunistic collaboration of Banamex with smaller regional banks was managed through a representative (acting as point of contact) rather than through a written agreement. However, this type of collaboration but offered the regional player exclusive access to rediscounting loan facilities in exchange for market intelligence from geographies where Banamex’s retail bank branch network was to expand.

The configuration of the market and of the competitive space provides different environmental characteristics and incentives for the collaboration to succeed. In this story Mexico and UK represent two different competitive spaces. Mexico, due to its uneven geography and low development of transportation and communication systems had larger regional barriers to penetrate the markets than the UK. In Mexico markets were regionally segmented and the national market was little integrated. Needless to say, the penetration of the banking services into the Mexican population was low. In the UK, geography and better-developed transportation as well as communications systems facilitated the operation of financial systems. In addition, there were information systems that enabled easier exchange of information (about credit worthiness, for instance), as well as higher penetration of banking services, particularly checking and payroll services. Hence, participants in Mexican markets apparently found more incentives to engage and develop collaboration agreements.

Detailed agreements in UK banking seem to achieve little as a way of focusing efforts in making the collaboration work. At the same time, fuzzy goals backed by cautious pragmatism and high commitment seem to be the formula behind tactical (i.e. opportunistic) strategies associated with success in changing competitive positioning within Mexican bank markets. Detailed collaboration seems to require greater foresight as well as strict internal discipline to develop relevant skills and resources. This would suggest that even when partners’ expectations were similar and reasonably consistent, detailed collaboration is associated with a potential commitment to invest ex-post in assets unique (i.e. idiosyncratic) to the agreement. Potential irrecoverable investments in specific physical or organisational assets that encourage and maintain co-operation (such as mechanisms to share information and co-ordination) would then explain failure to make co-operation work.

Archival searches also seem to support arguments about the critical importance of market intelligence for the formation and eventual success of collaboration. In all
cases documented in this paper, an agreement manager was appointed by the bigger partner (in terms of assets) but seldom, if ever, did this person seem had to produce detailed reports on the evolution of the agreement. This suggests that the role of the agreement manager was predominantly to capture contextual information about the partner’s market and share implicit knowledge with the partner’s managers. To the extent that collaboration was successful, the agreement manager spear-headed and co-ordinated multiple points of contact between collaborators. If true, this would reinforce the view that cognitive-individual learning evolves into behavioural-organisational learning through interactive cycles of doing, evaluation and adjustment. Moreover, that investments in organisational resources and capabilities to manage collaboration would follow to the extent that information acquired through collaboration lowered managers’ perception of failure for decisions involving high sunk cost investments (such as expanding the retail bank branch network). Hence, the importance of market intelligence in the formative stages of collaboration can help explain why the evolution of competitive collaboration can withstand the risk of environmental turbulence turning organisational investments into sunk costs.

In summary, organisational flexibility associates with a tactical approach to collaboration. Flexibility can provide collaborators with greater freedom to assess the potential of (perceived) growth opportunities. Tactical approaches to collaboration associate with irrecoverable investments but only to the extent that collaboration is proving to be successful. Hence, engaging tactical collaboration is likelier to be successful. Vaguely expressed aspirations offer greater possibilities to improve the competitive position of participants while, at the same time, tactical collaboration is associated with low or negligible idiosyncratic investments.
7. Notes


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