A GLOBAL APPROACH TO CRIME & VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA

Volume III

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GLOBAL THINKING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

"The essence of the knowledge is, having it, to apply it; not having it, to confess your ignorance. Ignorance is the night of the mind, but a night without moon or star".

Confucius.

"It is not the degree that makes a great man; it is the man that makes the degree great"

Nicoli Machiavelli.

The Economic Development Institute under the theme **Global Thinking Research** was established in 2001. We are group of past students of the University of the West Indies living in and outside Jamaica. We came to the realization from when we were on the Mona Campus that in the Information Age we live in, successful people are those who have access to information. We formed a group to share in this **New Way of Thinking** and found it fruitful to our endeavours . Unfortunately, we had to restrict our information bases in many cases as our lecturers and tutors deemed it fit to remain in a vacuum of limitation with regards to the evolution of the New Information Paradigm. We were clearly ahead of our time. We have developed this new product called the **Information Booklet Series (which there is a need for**), the product provides information on topical issues in the areas of Management, Sports, Information Technology, Public Administration, Information and Communication, Economics, Economic Development, Social Development, Legal Education, Industrial Relations at competitive prices. We have kept it simple so that all can understand and appreciate. As such, we do not regard them as theses on the chosen areas and they do not seek academic recognition, however they do meet WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) standards. We hope you will find the

following informative and instructive and as usual your comments would be appreciated.

Peter W. Jones
Executive Director

INTRODUCTION

"The basic mission of the police is to prevent crime and disorder. The proof of the efficiency of the police is the absence of crime and disorder."

Sir Robert Peel
Metropolitan London Police, 1829

"The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of modern life."

David H. Bayley
Police for the Future, 1994

The problems of crime and the quality of justice have become central issues in public debate and important public policy concerns in a number of Caribbean countries. This problem is perhaps most acute in Jamaica which has acquired an unenviable reputation for having a high rate of violent crime. There has been much research and discussion on this matter. Millions of dollars have been spent to tell us what the problems are, however after numerous reports such as:

- The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Violent Crime and Murder Reduction in Kingston, January 2001
- Strategic Issues Emanating from the PERF Report (with reference to the Hirst, 1991 and Wolfe, 1992 reports)
- Social Conflict and Reform Project (SCLR) Jamaica - Detailed Project Design Report, June 2000
- Jamaica Citizen Security and Justice Programme Project Report (IDB), May 30, 2001
- Report of the National Task Force on Crime (Wolfe Report), April 1993
- Project Memorandum Jamaica Constabulary Reform Modernisation Project (DFID)
- Report of the Technical Team to the Bipartisan Team to Seek Solutions to the

Problems Within the Police Service, Trinidad and Tobago (November, 2000)

- Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism (July 23, 1997)

To name a few of the many, the problem still persists.

The Government of Jamaica and in particular the Ministry of National Security has been the recipient of many reports and studies and have made serious attempts to solve the problem in Jamaica, and although some progress has been made by various policies coming from the implementation of report recommendations, the problem still persists.
This document will look at the problem from a global perspective drawing on what is happening Internationally and highlighting how countries having similar and/or identical problems have solved them, to see if Jamaica can seriously draw on their experiences to solve our burdensome problem of crime and violence.

WHAT IS CAUSING CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA?

Among the factors giving rise to crime and violence are the following [1]:

- Destabilized family structure (including poor parenting)
- Decline in values and attitudes across the society
- Urban drift
- Economic instability (including high unemployment)
- Inequality in income distribution
- Drug culture
- High Level of illiteracy
- Political tribalism
- Emergence of non-traditional/parallel leadership within communities
- Ineffectual, citizen-unfriendly policing
- Negative perceptions re: access to security and Justice (particularly in poor communities)
- Ineffectiveness of channels of communication between the community and the police

[1] Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence, October 31,2001

- High availability of firearms and other weapons
- Lack of community empowerment (to address/ameliorate problems before they escalate)
- Weak financial status of civil society organizations which limits pre-emptive and response capability
- Corruption

The above factors are not exhaustive but pretty much reflect factors highlighted in reports by Committees such as the National Task Force on Crime (1993) and the Police Executive Forum - PERF (2000).

WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA?

The most telling effects of crime and violence include [2]:

- Polarization of communities into warring factions
- Restriction of freedom of movement by citizens
- Overload of court system
- Loss of investment opportunities
- Loss of personal and business income (resulting from civil unrest, etc.)
- Outflow of foreign exchange for medical and related items
- Pressure on health facilities
- Lost man-days at work resulting in sub-standard productivity
- An overwhelmed and increasingly reactive police force
- Political and social disengagement of the citizenry (who lose their sense of security and well-being)
- Migration of skills
- Economic instability (including high employment).

[2] Ibid

WHY HAVE PAST INITIATIVES FAILED?

The Committee[3] acknowledges the many recommendations that have been put forward over the years and the many commendable programmes and interventions that have been pursued. Some success has been achieved at the conceptual and tactical levels but less at the grass-root level where the common citizen sees, feels and reacts to issues. If one is to be candid in ones assessment of the situation, the many interventions have not carried through with anything approaching maximum effectiveness to citizens and the communities within which they live. A way must be found to engage civil society on the basis of its own self-interest and participation.

Finding the way must necessarily begin with answering the question: Why have previous policies and initiatives not worked better? There is a multiplicity of reasons including the following:

- tendency to go for popular or politically expedient policies and programmes in preference to tough choices equal to the seriousness of the problems (lack of political will);
- reactive and prescriptive approach which falls to attack the problems at the root;
- mainstreaming of policies and programmes without the necessary infrastructure to take the initiatives downstream;
- communities not fully engaged;
- outputs not outcomes;
- failure to hold the gains;
- what works neglected;
- too little investment in people;
- failure of policy makers and implementers to "walk the talk",
- chasing the "useful many" instead of concentrating on the "vital few" causes.

[3] National Committee on Crime and Violence Report October 31, 2001

To be effective and win public support, strategies to fight crime and violence must focus on people and not statistical reports; on rebuilding community structures through which to deploy policies and programmes, and on rebuilding the moral authority of political leadership, which must take and pursue tough and sometimes unpopular decisions.

THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIAL CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN JAMAICA

Crime and violence in Jamaica is reflective of a breakdown in social, cultural and economic relationships[4]. The relationship dynamics have been fractured by:

- Centralization of authority and power that leaves communities without the knowledge, know-how and legislative arrangements to resolve their own disputes and problems, and makes them vulnerable to discrimination and indifferent treatment/service by the bureaucracy.

- excesses in policing that breaks down trust by citizens in those who are sworn to uphold the law and leaves a sense among segments of the society, that then, must look elsewhere for their protection and for "justice".

- Political tribalism that leads people to be overly dependent on their elected officials and to make such support contingent on public largesse.

- The emergence of leadership in some communities that has its roots in political tribalism and the drug culture, and which effectively undermines the traditional leadership to be found in community institutions.

[4] National Committee on Crime and Violence Report October 31, 2001

- Protracted economic hardships, which deny citizens the opportunity of a livelihood. take away their independence of action in determining their best possible future, and make them targets for crime and violence.

The Committee acknowledges that ultimately, premeditated criminal acts result from individual choices and behaviour; ensuring that there is a ready and just deterent is an obligation from which the state must not retreat.

An underlying theme of this report[5] and the recommendations it contains is the need for a cooperative effort between government, the private sector and civil society towards reducing and eventually eliminating crime and violence. Yet, it is clear that government in particular and politicians in general must bear the heavy end of the load. Treating with POLITICAL TRIBALISM and strengthening the MORAL AUTHORITY of the country's elected officials to demonstrate the POLITICAL WILL in leading the fight against crime and violence, are central to the overall recommendations of the Committee.

CONCLUSION

To quote the report on Crime and Violence **"To be effective and win public support, strategies to fight crime and violence must focus on people and not statistical reports; on rebuilding community structures through which to deploy policies and programmes, and on rebuilding the moral authority of political leadership, which must take and pursue tough and sometimes unpopular decisions."** What needs to be added to this from a qualitative point of view, the solution to the problems of Crime and Violence in Jamaica need to be viewed not in the context of Jamaica per say but in a global context. The attempt by the Jamaica Constabulary Force from time to time to use hard policing and the various formation of special squads have not really solved the medium to long term problem of crime and violence in Jamaica but have been only short term solutions which have had adverse effects on the country's prospects for Tourism, Investment and other important aspects of the country's economic development.

[5] National Committee on Crime and Violence Report October 31, 2001

Finally, in the context of the ends justify the means concept, we have seriously played in to the hands of such Human Rights groups **as Human Rights Watch of America**, **Amnesty International**[6], which is based in London has the respect of such media houses as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) with coverage in 183 countries world wide, and locally **Jamaicans For Justice (JFJ).**

THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

In an attempt to find not only a global approach to our crime and violence problem in Jamaica, since we have to acknowledge we live in a global village and hence we can not look at the problem primarily from a national point of view, it should be of great interest to us as how other countries in the world with similar or exact problems are dealing with our problems. We therefore look at what is happening world wide and perhaps we could adopt some of these measures.

CASE STUDY 1: A JAMAICA G.R.E.A.T. PROGRAMME

Genesis of The Programme

In early 1999, the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.)[7] National Policy Board (NPB) agreed that a high priority be given to expanding the G.R.E.A.T. Program during the next 5 years. The National Training Committee (NTC) met throughout 1999 to craft a strategic plan to meet the requirements set by the NPB. The purpose of the G.R.E.A.T. 2005 Plan is to set the direction and identify the goals and objectives that will guide the G.R.E.A.T. Program for the next 5 years.

The plan is not intended to address every issue that the program will face. Instead, it articulates a strategy that will help us focus on the issues of critical importance to achieving the G.R.E.A.T. mission. It is a living document that will be revised to reflect changing requirements and priorities.

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[6] See www.amnesty.org the section on Jamaica

[7] If you would like additional information about the G.R.E.A.T. Program, please contact ATF at **1-800-726-7070** or **(202) 927-2160** in Washington, D.C. or e-mail them at great@atf.gov.

The planning process used in developing the G.R.E.A.T. 2005 Plan followed the pattern used to develop G.R.E.A.T.'s first 5-year plan. The plan was developed through the cooperative effort of the members of the NTC, the G.R.E.A.T. Working Committee (WC), and the Regional Training Administrators (RTA). Those involved in the planning process had a common goal to enhance the G.R.E.A.T. Program's ability to impact positively on reducing youth gang violence and crime. This cooperative planning effort has resulted in a realistic and achievable plan.

The NPB wishes to express its appreciation to the personnel who participated in developing the G.R.E.A.T. 2005 Plan and for their hard work and commitment to expanding the G.R.E.A.T. Program. The expertise that was brought to the process was critical to the development of this plan.

The National Policy Board, by unamimous vote, approved this plan at a meeting held in Glynco, Georgia, on January 20, 2000.

Vision Statement

Prevent youth crime, violence, and gang involvement while developing a positive relationship among law enforcement, families, and our young people to create safer communities.

Mission Statement

Law enforcement provides a wide range of structured community-based activities and classroom instruction for school-aged children. The desired results are a sense of competency, usefullness and personal empowerment needed to avoid involvement in youth violence, gangs and criminal activity.

Slogan

No Violence is G.R.E.A.T.

G.R.E.A.T. Goals

GOAL #1: Increase the number of school-aged children who are successfully taught life skills in the G.R.E.A.T. Program.

OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE GOAL

Goal # 1 Objective A:

Ensure that the current curricula are effectively teaching the life skills desired by the G.R.E.A.T. Program.

A.1 - Evaluate the core middle school curriculum to ensure that the appropriate life skills needed at those grade levels are in the curriculum.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: G.R.E.A.T. Review Work Group (GRWG)

A.2 - Evaluate the 3rd & 4th grade curriculum to ensure that the appropriate life skills needed at those grade levels are in the curriculum.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: Curriculum Review Committee (CRC)

A.3 - Evaluate the 5th & 6th grade curriculum to ensure that the appropriate life skills needed at those grade levels are in the curriculum.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: Curriculum Review Committee (CRC)

A.4 - Implement needed improvements as determined by the above evaluations and related decisions.
Date: December 2003/2005
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

A.5 - Improve the process to encourage teachers and others to reinforce the life skills taught in the G.R.E.A.T. Program.
Date: December 2001
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

Goal # 1 Objective B:

Determine the need for implementing the G.R.E.A.T. Program at other grade levels.

B.1 - Research what other programs are teaching life skills that reinforce the G.R.E.A.T. Program.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: G.R.E.A.T. Review Work Group (GRWG)

B.2 - Identify opportunities to partner with other prevention programs.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: National Training Team (NTC)

B.3 - Determine the need to implement the G.R.E.A.T. Program at other grade levels and develop curricula as necessary.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

GOAL #2: Increase the number of school-aged children who have the opportunity to gain a positive perception of law enforcement.

OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE GOAL

Goal # 2 Objective A:

Increase opportunities for G.R.E.A.T. officers to interact with youth outside the classroom.

A.1 - Increase the number of law enforcement entities participating in the Summer Component.
Date: January 2000
Responsible: ATF

A.2 - Increase the number of law enforcement entities participating in G.R.E.A.T. partnerships.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: ATF

A.3 - Promote the increase of law enforcement interaction with students at community and after school events.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: NTT/NTC

Goal # 2 Objective B:

Strengthen the bond between G.R.E.A.T. officers and school-aged children.

B.1 - Improve the process working with the school administrators and teachers to support and participate in the G.R.E.A.T. Program with an emphasis on teamwork.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

B.2 - Emphasize the interactive aspects of the curriculum in the GOT.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

B.3 - Evaluate the existing core middle school curriculum for ways to strengthen the bond between law enforcement and students.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: G.R.E.A.T. Review Work Group (GRWG)

B.4 - Evaluate the existing 3rd & 4th grade curriculum for ways to strengthen the bond between law enforcement and students.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: Curriculum Review Committee (CRC)

B.5 - Evaluate the existing 5th & 6th grade curriculum for ways to strengthen the bond between law enforcement and students.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: Curriculum Review Committee (CRC)

B.6 - Implement needed improvements as determined by the above evaluations.
Date: December 2003
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

GOAL #3: Increase the number of certified G.R.E.A.T. officers who can effectively deliver the G.R.E.A.T. Program

OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE GOAL

Goal # 3 Objective A:

Increase the National Training Team (NTT) to adequately cover the number of G.R.E.A.T. Officer Trainings (GOTs) needed each year.

A.1 - Review and revise, when appropriate, the curriculum of G.R.E.A.T. Manager Training (GMT).
Date: December 2000
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

A.2 - Identify status and availability of NTT members.
Date: January 2000
Responsible: ATF

A.3 - Identify annually potential NTT members and schedule for GMT.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: ATF

A.4 - Annually schedule GMT trainings as necessary.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: FLETC/ATF

Goal # 3 Objective B:

Schedule the number of G.R.E.A.T. Officer Trainings (GOTs) consistent with demand.

B.1 - Identify demand for training.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: ATF

B.2 - Enhance and update G.R.E.A.T. officer database.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: ATF

Goal # 3 Objective C:

Implement processes to help assure the effectiveness of G.R.E.A.T. officers.

C.I - Develop and offer training annually for supervisors of G.R.E.A.T. officers.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: ATF

C.2 - Promote the use of the G.R.E.A.T. evaluation form.
Date: December 2005
Responsible: ATF/NTT

C.3 - Promote the use of the G.R.E.A.T. Assistance Program.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: ATF

Goal # 3 Objective D:

Support the National G.R.E.A.T. Officer Conference to help maintain skills and increase the knowledge of G.R.E.A.T. officers.

D.1 - Provide technical assistance and support as approved by the NTC.
Date: August 2000
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

GOAL #4: Increase the number of organizations that participate in the G.R.E.A.T. Program through effective marketing.

OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE GOAL

Goal #4 Objective A:

Develop a comprehensive national marketing strategy focusing on increasing the number of law enforcement agencies, schools and community based prevention partners involved in the G.R.E.A.T. Program.

A.1 - Designate a committee to review and revise the national/regional marketing strategy.
Date: December 2000
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

A.2 - Seek input from professional marketing consultant(s).
Date: December 2001
Responsible: Marketing Committee/National Training Committee (NTC)

A.3 - Present a comprehensive national marketing strategy for approval by NPB.
Date: October 2002
Responsible: Marketing Committee/National Training Committee (NTC)

A.4 - Implement a regional marketing plan that conforms to comprehensive national marketing strategy.
Date: October 20003
Responsible: Regional Training Administrators (RTA's)

Goal #4 Objective B:

Regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the comprehensive national/regional marketing strategy.

B.1 - Determine the criteria and frequency for evaluating the effectiveness of the marketing strategy.
Date: October 2002
Responsible: Marketing Committee (MC)/National Training Committee (NTC)

B.2 - Revise the marketing strategy
Date: Ongoing
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

GOAL #5: Effectively, efficiently and consistently manage the delivery of the G.R.E.A.T. Program nationwide through the regional network.

OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE GOAL

Goal #5 Objective A:

Ensure that the G.R.E.A.T. Officer Trainings (GOT's) are delivered consistently nationwide.

A.1 - Define the roles and responsibilities of the regions, ATF, and FLETC.
Date: January 2000
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

A.2 - Streamline the GOT by providing timeliness, direction and consistency to produce a more efficient training program.
Date: January 2000
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

Goal #5 Objective B:

Ensure the consistent administration and compliance of the Cooperative Agreement agencies.

B.1 - Evaluate Cooperative Agreement agencies for compliance.
Date: Ongoing
Responsible: ATF

B.2 - Develop actions to deal with non-compliance agencies.
Date: Ongoing
Responsible: ATF

Goal #5 Objective C:

Secure adequate funding for G.R.E.A.T. to ensure high standards and consistency nationwide.

C.1 - Provide justification to Congress and others for continuing and enhancing the G.R.E.A.T. Program.
Date: Annually
Responsible: ATF

C.2 - Seek assistance from public and/or private sources as appropriate and consistent with applicable laws and regulations.
Date: Ongoing
Responsible: Regions

Goal #5 Objective D:

Review and revise operational responsibilities of the G.R.E.A.T. Program at the regional and national level to ensure an effective program.

D.1 - Define the roles and the responsibilities of the regions, ATF, and FLETC.
Date: Annually
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC)

Goal #5 Objective E:

Enhance and maintain a diverse G.R.E.A.T. National Training Team (NTT).

E.1 - Ensure diverse representation of the NTT and Seminar Supervisors consistent with all applicable laws.
Date: Annually
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC) & National Training Team Coordinator/NTTC

E.2 - Ensure diverse representation in the GMTs consistent with all applicable laws.
Date: Annually
Responsible: National Training Committee (NTC) National Training Team Coordinator (NTTC)

CASE STUDY 2: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 5-YEAR STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2001-2006[8] (HIGHLIGHTS)

MESSAGE FROM THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL

On September 11, 2001, evil assaulted America. Those heinous acts of violence and the continuing threat of impending violence are an attack on America and her citizens. The fight against terrorism is now the first and overriding priority of the Department of Justice. We will devote all resources necessary to disrupt, weaken, and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations, to prevent or thwart terrorist attacks, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts.

Our single objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America. We will not hesitate in this pursuit, nor will we be thwarted.

The Department of Justice's Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2001 - 2006 reaffirms the Department's commitment and responsibility to protect all Americans, their loved ones, and their possessions, and to enforce vigorously the laws of the United States. The Plan seeks to maintain the balance between personal safety and personal freedom, between strict enforcement and abiding respect for individuals.

The Plan describes how the Department will uphold the American justice tradition that battles injustice to bring protection to the weak, freedom to the restrained, liberty to the oppressed, and security to all. The plan addresses the major obstacles to these freedoms, including: the threat of terrorist acts, violence, illegal drugs, illegal use of guns, discrimination, and exploitation. The

[8] Source www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/strategic2001-2006/index.htm.

Department of Justice is committed to combating aggressively these and other injustices, striving to prevent their occurrence, and, when they cannot be prevented, to prosecute their perpetrators.

The Plan describes the Department's commitment to:

1)Protect Americans and their institutions against the threat of terrorism through prevention of terrorist acts, and the investigation and prosecution of threats and incidents;

2)Keep America safe by enforcing our Nation's laws, especially reducing the incidence of gun violence and the trafficking of illegal drugs;

3)Protect our children and those most vulnerable from violence and exploitation;

4) Assist state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies in combating crime through cooperative efforts and the effective use of grants for community-based initiatives designed to reduce crime and violence;

5)Reduce racial discrimination and uphold the civil rights of all Americans, especially as they relate to racial profiling and voting rights;

6)Combat economic crime, particularly cybercrime, whose threat increases as technology advances;

7)Provide effective, accurate and courteous service to those who seek to enter our Nation lawfully, while securing aggressively our borders against those who would seek to pose harm to America or its interests; and

8)Ensure the safety and integrity of the judicial process, and provide for the safe, secure, and humane confinement of criminals.

We will accomplish these objectives by developing a workforce that is well-trained and professional; by strengthening financial systems that ensure the effective and efficient use of

taxpayer dollars; and by improving the integrity and security of computer systems, while making more effective use of information technology.

The men and women of justice and law enforcement have been asked to shoulder a great burden for the safety and security of the American people. We will not rest in this pursuit. We will, as we have in the past, never waiver in our faith and loyalty to the Constitution and never tire in our defense of the rights it enshrines.

John Ashcroft

The Department of Justice Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2001-2006 provides a multi year, comprehensive, realistic plan for carrying out the Department's mission. It is oriented toward achieving our vision of securing equal justice for all, enhancing respect for the rule of law, and making America a safer and less violent nation. It provides to the President, the Congress and the American people a report on the problems and challenges the Department faces in the years ahead and the goals and objectives we have set for ourselves. It is both a reaffirmation of our fundamental commitment to serve the American people in the pursuit of justice and a promise to be accountable for our progress.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is headed by the Attorney General of the United States. It is comprised of 39 separate component organizations. These include the U.S. Attorneys (USAs) who prosecute offenders and represent the United States Government in court; the major investigative agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—which prevent and deter crime and arrest criminal suspects; the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) which controls the border and provides services to lawful immigrants; the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) which protects the federal judiciary, apprehends fugitives and detains persons in federal custody; and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) which confines convicted offenders. Litigating divisions enforce federal criminal and civil laws, including civil rights, tax, antitrust, environmental, and civil justice statutes. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) provide leadership and assistance to state, tribal, and local governments. Other major

departmental components include the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the United States Trustees (UST), the Justice Management Division (JMD), the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the Community Relations Service (CRS), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Although headquartered in Washington, D.C., the Department conducts much of its work in offices located throughout the country and overseas.

CORE VALUES

In carrying out our mission, we are guided by the following core values:

Equal Justice Under the Law. Upholding the laws of the United States is the solemn responsibility entrusted to us by the American people. We enforce these laws fairly and uniformly to ensure that all Americans receive equal protection and justice under the law.

Honesty and Integrity. We adhere to the highest standards of ethical behavior.

Commitment to Excellence. We seek to provide the highest levels of service to the American people. We are effective and responsible stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

Respect for the Worth and Dignity of Each Human Being. We treat each other and those we serve with fairness, dignity, and compassion. We value differences in people and ideas. We are committed to the well-being of our employees and to providing opportunities for individual growth and development.

THE PERFORMANCE MANDATE AND THIS STRATEGIC PLAN

In recent years, the Department, and the Federal Government generally, have begun to embrace the concepts of performance-based management. These concepts have been effective in bringing about significant improvements in many private and public sector organizations and programs both in the United States and abroad. At the heart of performance-based management is the idea that focusing on mission, agreeing on goals, and reporting results are the keys to improved performance.

Congress has mandated performance-based management through a series of bipartisan statutory reforms. The centerpiece of this statutory framework is the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-62). The GPRA requires agencies to develop strategic plans that identify their long range strategic goals and objectives; annual plans that set forth corresponding annual goals and indicators of performance; and annual reports that describe the actual levels of performance achieved compared to the annual goal.

The Department of Justice Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2001-2006 is prepared pursuant to the requirements of the GPRA. It revises and supersedes the strategic plan submitted by the Department in September 2000 covering fiscal years 2000-2005. This revised plan incorporates a number of changes that reflect the goals, objectives, and strategies of a Department which has seen a change of Administration in the past year and wrenching attacks on our country in recent months.

Although the immediacy of terrorism has added a compelling new dimension to the administration of law and justice, there is much in that environment that remains relevant since the last strategic plan was published in September 2000. As a result, we have retained much of the introductory material describing the overall law enforcement environment as well as the specific problems and issues facing the Department. As before, we believe this background gives the reader greater context for understanding what we do and why.

We have revised the plan with the active involvement of our component organizations and with the oversight of the Strategic Management Council, established by the Attorney General on May 16, 2001. The Council, whose permanent members include the Deputy Attorney General as Chair, Associate Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, DEA Administrator, INS Commissioner, Director of the FBI, and the Chief of Staff to the Attorney General, was established as the formal board within DOJ to provide direction and leadership on long-range planning and initiatives.

Within the Department, strategic planning is the first step in an iterative planning and implementation cycle. This cycle, which is at the heart of the Department's efforts to implement performance-based management, involves setting long-term goals and objectives; translating

these goals and objectives into budgets and program plans; implementing programs and monitoring their performance; and evaluating results (figure 1). In this cycle, the Department's strategic plan provides the overarching framework for component and function-specific plans as well as annual performance plans, budgets, and reports.



[D]

The Department also is integrating performance-based management concepts and practices into other core management processes, including procurement, information technology, financial accounting, and human resources. For example, we are aligning our budget, accounting and performance data in order to produce a cohesive, integrated financial information framework.

Despite our progress, we recognize that further improvements are needed. Implementing performance-based management is an iterative, ongoing process that demands significant, fundamental changes in organizational culture and business processes.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PLAN

The plan is in three chapters. Chapter I briefly outlines the major themes underlying our strategic goals and objectives, including some of the key issues we are likely to face in the years ahead. Chapter II sets forth our goals, objectives and strategies for the next five years. It also describes key interagency cross-cutting programs and summarizes the external factors that may affect goal achievement. Chapter III describes the role of evaluation in developing the strategic plan and provides a schedule of ongoing and planned program evaluations.

The scope and complexity of the Department's mission make it impossible to describe in a single document the full range and content of the Department's programs and activities. Where appropriate, reference has been made to other plans and reports that provide more detailed information in specific areas.

The Appendices include (A) a description of the resources required to implement the plan; (B) a description of the linkage between the strategic plan and the annual performance plan; (C) a summary list of mission-critical management challenges; (D) key facts on crime and justice; (E) a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms; and (F) a list of Justice component web sites.

CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

At its very onset, the new millennium bore witness to a series of the most profound events to occur on United States soil: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the skies over Pennsylvania. But while no one disputes that these events will produce fundamental changes in the Nation's approach to crime and justice, the extent and effects of those changes may not be clear to us for many years.

Trends in other areas of crime and justice are more discernible, however, as data collected over the past thirty years provide a vantage point which affords a view of where we have been and where we may be headed. This section of the plan briefly describes these major developments, focusing on broad nationwide trends and issues. In addition, it attempts to look into the near term future to identify key conditions, including the terrorist threat, that are likely to impact crime and

justice over the next five years and which have particular implications for the Department's strategic approach.

REVERSING THE UPWARD TREND OF CRIME

Since the mid 1990s there has been a remarkable and sustained reduction in the Nation's rate of serious violent crime. Not long ago, the picture was not so bright. In the 1960s, the generally downward course that crime rates had followed since the 1930s came to an end. The use of illegal drugs became more widespread, and governments at all levels responded aggressively by strengthening enforcement efforts against drug law violators, attempting to block illegal drugs at the borders, working with other countries to dismantle the criminal organizations that manufacture and distribute drugs, and mounting efforts to reduce demand for drugs. In addition, serious crimes, including violent ones, committed by young people began to increase at a fast rate. By the late 1980s, violent crime committed by young people had reached epidemic proportions. This was tied in part to a growing market for cocaine and especially its derivative, crack, in the 1980s and by the easy availability of guns.

As crime escalated, the police made more arrests; lawmakers began passing tougher laws; the number of cases prosecuted by the courts increased; and the number of people in prisons or jails, or under probation and parole supervision, reached historic highs. Over time, there were widespread changes in policies regarding crime and criminals, the resources invested in fighting crime, and the institutions that we rely upon to prevent crime and enforce the law. Foremost among these changes were the following developments:

A More Coordinated National Effort. In 1968, Congress passed the Safe Streets Act. This watershed event marked a key step toward defining the Federal Government's responsibility for carrying out a coordinated national fight against crime. For the first time, the Department was authorized to provide federal financial assistance to strengthen and improve state and local criminal and juvenile justice systems.

After declining precipitously in the early 1980s, federal financial assistance has increased significantly in recent years. It has helped states, localities, and others adopt innovative and promising practices in a wide variety of program areas, including community policing, domestic

violence, and victim assistance. At the federal level, it has helped develop and disseminate new knowledge about crime, delinquency and the criminal and juvenile justice systems.

During this same time period, the Federal Government, and specifically the Department, began to increasingly invoke federal laws and resources to tackle sophisticated criminal organizations and serious offenders. It formed numerous multijurisdictional partnerships with state and local law enforcement, and supported improved information-sharing efforts among criminal justice agencies. In the 1990s, these collaborative partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies were strengthened and expanded. For example, U.S. Attorneys are more and more playing instrumental roles in working with state and local law enforcement to define district-level priorities and develop coordinated strategies.

A More Collaborative Approach.. Since the late 1980s, criminal and juvenile justice agencies have relied increasingly on partnerships not only with other government agencies but also with community-based organizations (including schools, churches, social service providers, health care agencies, victim advocacy groups, and the business community) to address specific crime and delinquency problems at the local level. In part, these interdisciplinary and interagency collaborations are a response to the growing awareness that the causes and correlates of crime and delinquency are far too numerous and complex for any one agency to address single-handedly, and that effective solutions must involve more than a law enforcement response.

Stronger, Better Prepared Criminal Justice Agencies. Criminal justice capabilities of all levels of government have been significantly strengthened over the past three decades, largely as the result of increased spending for criminal justice purposes (figure 3). Today,law enforcement and other justice agencies are better staffed, better trained, and better equipped than they were 30 years ago. Most have also been able to modernize by automating and enhancing their records and data systems, improving communications, upgrading forensic capabilities, and introducing computerized mapping and other analytic techniques. At the federal level, there have been similar improvements. For example, the FBI has upgraded its National Crime Information Center (NCIC), introduced a new Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and developed the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) for matching DNA profiles of suspected offenders.

Community Policing. During the 1970s, most police executives pursued a strategy of insulating their agencies from politics and the community to create independent, autonomous policing organizations that merely "enforced the law" impartially. However, problems with drugs, guns, gangs, public disorder, and other crime-related conditions continued unabated, or increased. As a result, beginning in the 1980s more and more agencies shifted to a community policing model. With community policing, law enforcement officers work closely with local community groups, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, e.g., youth groups, to identify and solve problems collaboratively. Today, community policing has been adopted by most of the Nation's larger law enforcement agencies and its core concepts are increasingly being applied to other areas of the criminal justice system, including prosecution, courts and corrections. This "community justice" movement is diminishing the distance between the police, prosecutors and other justice officials, and the communities they serve; helping restore and strengthen communal bonds; and bringing a wider range of resources to bear on solving specific community problems.

Combating Gun Violence. In the 1990s, the Federal Government, as well as many states, adopted a more aggressive approach to gun control. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required background checks during a five-day waiting period before the purchase of a handgun and the FBI established a National Instant Criminal Background Check System. By the end of 1999, more than half a million applicants with criminal records or other disqualifying conditions had been denied the purchase of a firearm by the FBI or state and local agencies. Since 1993, the use of firearms in the commission of crimes has declined, falling to levels last experienced in the 1980s.

Involving Victims. A movement to focus on the needs of crime victims began to gather strength in the late 1970s. In 1984, the federal Victims of Crime Act established an Office for Victims of Crime in the Department. Over the ensuing years, jurisdictions throughout the country, many with federal support, have set up more and more victim-witness assistance programs to advocate for victims in the criminal justice system. A number of new national organizations and thousands of community-based groups have formed to assist special victim groups, including parents of murdered children, elderly victims, victims of drunk drivers, rapists, and batterers. Many states--often through constitutional amendments--have provided for additional victim services, including victim notification of the status of court proceedings, victim impact statements during sentencing

hearings, and victim compensation for medical costs and lost earnings. In addition, the Violence Against Women Act, enacted in 1994, improved the response of the Nation's criminal and civil justice systems to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking.

Sentencing Reform. The law, theory, and practice of criminal sentencing began to shift in the early 1970s. Faced with demands to "get tough on crime" in some quarters and to eliminate what was thought to be unequal justice in others, legislatures began curtailing judicial discretion and prescribing mandatory prison sentences for particular classes of offenses, such as drug sales and gun violations, and for particular types of offenders, such as repeat offenders. At the federal level, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established federal sentencing guidelines requiring mandatory prison terms for certain offenses. It also abolished federal parole. This sterner mood was also evident in the return of the death penalty in the mid 1970s. By the end of 1998, 38 states and the Federal Government had statutes authorizing imposition of the death penalty in certain capital cases. In 1999, 98 persons were executed, the highest number since the early 1950s.

Incarceration of Offenders. The changes in sentencing laws and the more aggressive approach to drug law enforcement have had a profound impact on the Nation's prisons and jails. By 1999, about 1.8 million persons were incarcerated--an all-time high. Incarceration rates have risen sharply--from one in every 218 U.S. residents in 1990, to one in every 147 at midyear 1999. During this same time period, federal, state, and local governments have had to accommodate an additional 83,743 inmates per year. To meet the needs for prison and jail space, a number of new prisons and jails have been constructed. In addition, several private firms have begun to offer correctional services.

Case Study 3 :COMMUNITY POLICING AUSTRALIA [9]

It is possible that we may all become enthused with the concept of community policing. Such forms of policing have much to offer. But they also have many problems not the least being the implementation of this form of policing. Just some of the problems will be outlined in this paper.

[9] Source: Wilson, Dr Paul, Avoiding The Dangers and Pitfalls of Community Policing, Australian Institute Of Criminology, Canberra

What are the primary aims of community policing?

Is it to benefit the police, the community or both? The author suggests that the major primary aim should be to obtain stronger police-community relationships. But how can we do this without the privacy and liberty of citizens being threatened? Is it possible to have good community policing without unwanted intrusions from authority? May we not want, in a democracy, at least some distance from the authorities in order to protect privacy and liberty? And, is it really possible to have proper community policing without some genuine form of control of the police by the community?

How do we define 'community'?

What exactly does the concept of 'community' mean in the context of modern urban Australia and indeed, is it possible to have such an entity in our fast-moving, impersonal and increasingly heterogeneous cities? If 'communities' are broadly defined as groups of people who share a sense of 'we-ness', then, it is important to recognise that at least some such groups often develop because they distrust outsiders—that distrust can manifest itself in high rates of assault, racism, graffiti, arson and other crimes. In other words, we have to be
careful that we do not, unwittingly, reinforce bigotry and prejudice in attempting to build up this concept of 'community'. In some communities in North Queensland people were proud of living in a town or a particular geographical area. But Aborigines were certainly not welcome in the town or area. Community policing must not reinforce this sort of prejudice.

Whose needs are being addressed?

This introduces a major issue for the police. When police liaise with these 'communities', whose needs are being addressed? Whose order is being upheld? Do the police talk only to formal community organisations who represent, undoubtedly, the predominance of power, status and wealth within an area? How can police be sure that they are hearing from, and really listening to, the voices of street kids, drug users, minority groups and others? If they do not listen to these groups then a cosy relationship with a particular and privileged section of the community could develop (white home-owners) that ignores tenants, young people, Aboriginal people, new

Australians and others. If this happens there is a real danger that an even-handed application of justice will never eventuate.

How do we avoid the police imposing their will on neighbourhoods?

The police are, as they say, 'the biggest gang in town'. They have huge resources and are potentially able to manipulate groups of citizens, who, so overwhelmed with gratitude for police interest in their affairs, will go
along with any agenda proposed by police. A few years ago in Victoria, Neighbourhood Watch groups were accused of handing out material pushing the police agenda for more police and more police powers. The problem here is that other groups in the community, which might well have different agendas, will quickly
lose interest in the community consultative process and disengage from it.

How do we train police to deal with community policing?

By definition community policing gives the police increased discretion to deal with specific problems and to make on-the-spot resolutions regarding potential and actual disturbances of public order. This requires them to have a vast knowledge of social problems and skills in dispute resolution. But what sort of training do they receive to acquire these skills? What sort of training should they receive? It seems that there is no real evidence indicating that current training courses for Australian police forces equip young recruits to acquire the interpersonal and social skills so necessary for successful community policing.

How do we make police organisations take community policing seriously?

Police themselves will tell you that, in introducing Neighbourhood Watch programs, many sections of the force saw Neighbourhood Watch as 'soft' law enforcement and not 'real' policing. How do we ensure that police careers give adequate recognition to the skills and values of general duties officers, the backbone of community police? It may be necessary, if we are serious about community policing, to reconsider the traditional para-military police structure and replace it with a more flexible 'tier' organisational model. These questions,

even if not resolved, should at least be addressed.

How do we measure the success of community policing?

What criteria do we use to evaluate community policing? A drop in crime, increased confidence in the police, less fear of crime, more use of community facilities like parks and streets, all of these? Before community policing is introduced in Queensland it would be appropriate for both 'communities' and the police to agree on what indices of performance or 'success' should be utilised to measure community policing impact. If no proper evaluations are planned, community policing could well dissipate into nothing more than an empty public relations exercise.

What model of policing should community policing promote?

Basically there are two models of policing, one of which is the crime control model, the other, the English-styled 'peace-keeping' model. Depending on which of these models is used, community policing will have markedly different characteristics. In Australia, unfortunately, too much emphasis has been given to the crime control model. Community policing is sometimes seen as the eyes and ears of the police in the fight
against crime, and, to some extent, the Neighbourhood Watch scheme is based on this model. In New Zealand a wider, peace-keeping approach is used with what are called Neighbourhood Support Groups (rather than Watch Groups) who tackle non-property neighbourhood social issues such as domestic violence, child abuse and incest. These support groups actively seek to generate a sense of belonging and 'community', freeing people from a sense of disorder and insecurity. Legalistic, crime control models of

policing (which themselves are a failure of early more local community order maintenance models)
have reached their limit. As Kelling and Moore argue (1987), police need to become more democratic and less formalistic and legalistic.

If we see community-policing reinforcing the 'peace-keeping' model do we have to reconsider the law officers' physical image and bearing?

Is it necessary for the police to carry guns conspicuously? Can the police ever get close to the community if they have a para-military presence? In England, deliberate attempts have been made to conceal truncheons which are carried in order to improve the police officers' image as mediators. Should we not consider this issue now before community policing is introduced in Queensland?

How do we ensure that the police adequately handle, and act upon, criticism from community groups?

This point is different from the issue of groups with which the police consult. No-one likes to be criticised, and the police are no exception to this rule. But if the police are serious about community policing, they must provide groups and individuals with the mechanism to voice their opinion about past, present and future law enforcement events. And, they must ensure that, when warranted, consultation and criticism leads to action and a re-direction in policy.
Not one of these ten questions has easy answers, but if community policing is to be more than an empty rhetorical phrase, answers to them have to be provided. It is very much in the interests of both the community and the police, that we attempt this difficult and complex task.

Case Study 4 : Community Safety Diagnosis: A Canadian Approach[10]

Introduction

Community safety is a fundamental value for Canadians that cannot be ensured solely by police and the criminal justice system. Although they concentrate on reducing crime, these traditional reactive approaches alone can only produce moderate results at best. Furthermore, they fail to respond to community safety needs that are not rooted in actual offences committed.

Public security at the city level

Beyond crime reported to police, public security includes, among other things, the value placed on participation in democratic and public life and the shared use of public spaces. It therefore calls for a much more comprehensive and proactive approach that requires the commitment of

[10] Source: Sanfacon, Daniel, Community Safety Diagnosis: Mobilization, Knowledge, Action

several social actors such as public authorities, community organizations, citizen and business groups, as well as the involvement of multiple sectors such as transport, housing, education, employment, and social services. From this perspective, safety must be "co-produced" and result from a social synergy, a concerted partnership endeavor. Only by working in partnership can it be possible to pool multiple and diverse resources and to act upon the risk factors of delinquency and crime, as well as the feeling of security.

Responsibility for co-producing security should be political without being partisan. This responsibility should rest primarily with municipal administrations, particularly because of their closeness to residents. This closeness gives a special advantage in mobilizing residents, getting to know their true interests and concerns, and thereby developing and delivering action plans tailored to their needs. It is therefore preferable to designate responsibility for coordinating the co-production of urban security to a person working within municipal government whose function within the community gives them the leverage to influence decisions regarding city services.

Local Action

Analysis of international trends in prevention and security-related policies and activities reveals that, while there is no single recipe for developing public security, many countries are using a similar approach. Despite using different methodologies, England, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and other countries have all opted for local approaches. This local approach is most often at the municipal level, therefore being close to the general population. Such initiatives are most often directed by a leader who coordinates activities and resources and facilitates exchanges between various partners involved as well as making necessary adjustments to the plan of action.

Canada has also chosen this direction although most Canadian cities have not yet created an integrated prevention and urban security service. Canada's *National Strategy for Crime Prevention and Community Safety* encourages municipalities to be the driving force behind public security. To do so, it provides financial support to local partnership initiatives that target risk factors related to the social development of children and youth. The Strategy also promotes

the development of tools – the Community Safety Diagnosis being one of them – that seek to put productive practices and lessons learned to good use.

What is a Community Safety Diagnosis?

The first step in co-producing security involves conducting a proper assessment of the problems and challenges in the given community in order to develop the most appropriate strategies for improving public security. A Community Safety Diagnosis is a knowledge tool that serves to better inform and guide actions taken.

A knowledge tool

The Community Safety Diagnosis is a tool used to better identify the issues and challenges involved, to identify the risk factors at the local level, and to determine the measures most likely to be successful given the community's resources. However, a diagnosis must go beyond simple description of issues and resources to also include a needs assessment based on the analysis of various types of data:

1)social indicators of risk such as unemployment and poverty rates, demographic and sociocultural make-up of the community, housing conditions and availability, and cultural and recreational facilities available;

2) data on delinquency, delinquents, and victims, particularly police and court statistics, the rates of cleared offences, incidents reported by community associations, schools, businesses, community-based groups, and public transit authorities. Such data is used to identify and analyze geospatial variations in security measures between different areas of the city. Use of geo-coding software can be used to produce maps representing geographical areas with concentrations and superimposition of various social and criminal problems. In turn, the use of such data collection and software does raise certain issues to be considered, both technical (collecting data that will be geo-codable) and ethical (protection of privacy), which a local committee would be best to resolve;

3) data on the demands for security such as issues raised in neighbourhood meetings, victimization polls that evaluate the population's feelings of security, other surveys of

professionals working on-the-ground in the relevant area, and analysis of data collected by prevention agencies that are already active;

4) data on the supply of security services (e.g., existing resources and on-going interventions) by the various organizations responsible for ensuring safety: police, justice, private security, social services and associations, etc. Many indicators can be used to evaluate the supply of security such as, among others, the allocation of police resources, indictments and convictions, consideration of victims, use of private security firms by businesses, insurance claim rates, security activities carried out by other organizations and institutions (schools, public housing), and the quality of public places.

Correlating these quantitative and qualitative data from multiple sources creates a more comprehensive picture of the demand for security than that provided by police data alone. Next, people's security needs can be better identified by comparing information on the demand for A Safety Diagnosis' purpose is to compare

measured and expressed safety needs to existing resources and actions being undertaken. Making this comparison successful involves the collection of various types of data, particularly social, economic,

and criminal data. security with that on the supply of security services (actions and services offered by a plurality of actors). Such comparison allows the identification of non-response zones (where needs are not being met) as well as areas where services are not in line with the demand (needs inadequately met).

It is this analysis of the adequacy of balance between the supply and demand for security that is at the heart of the Community Safety Diagnosis. When carried out by all local partners collectively, a diagnostic can serve to strengthen a local coalition and contribute to the development of a common vision for all stakeholders. Furthermore, this analysis allows priorities to be identified and assists in preparing action plans that are tailored to local contexts. One challenge to consider is that such a collective effort brings together actors with differing conceptions and interests who, by virtue of their institutional nature, are not always inclined to accept sudden changes.

Impetus for action

A Community Safety Diagnosis is naturally oriented toward action given that it seeks to better inform decision-makers on local issues and challenges in order that they can come up with the best response possible. Moreover, a Safety Diagnosis makes it possible to invest in and take control of the sphere of public safety that is too often left solely to police and the criminal justice system. Finally, it also makes it easier to mobilize residents by giving them a platform through which they can express themselves – a goal that is sometimes hard to achieve due to cultural barriers or the fact that many citizens have lost confidence in traditional reactive approaches and have become disinterested in civic involvement.

Given that the collective co-production of security primarily involves the municipality, ideally the creation of the Diagnostic will be actively supported by an administrative body responsible for prevention and security. Doing so will help to ensure that prevention and security issues remain priorities and that the local coalition's efforts receive sufficient support.

Responsibility for the Diagnostic is fully shared among local coalition members and the elements making up the Diagnostic are open to debate and discussion between partners, which improves all partners' understanding of the action plan. Shared responsibility among diverse partners makes it easier to access leverage for influencing decisions in different areas as well as to access data from multiple sources for the development of the Diagnosis.

Finally, given that partners may not have the expertise to conduct the necessary analyses, this analysis element of the Diagnostic would best be left to outside experts while leaving the balance of the Diagnosis under the local coalition's control. By doing so, technical expertise will remain entirely at the service of the coalition and oriented toward local on-the-ground actors.

It is difficult to determine the territory on which the Diagnosis should be carried out. While defining "community" may not pose a problem for small municipalities or townships, the question can be very different when considering large urban centres. Conducting a Diagnosis at the neighbourhood level seems to be the most appropriate but it is important that this aspect be debated and dealt with by the local city coalition. Furthermore, in order to ensure the overall coherence of all neighbourhood-level Diagnoses conducted in an urban centre, it is essential that all Diagnoses conducted be subsequently integrated/coordinated at the city level.

Conclusion

Although Community Safety Diagnoses are promising and regularly used in the United Kingdom and France, few of them have been conducted in Canada. Only Montreal and Toronto appear to have made use of this tool in order to better identify their specific issues and challenges related to delinquency and crime prevention. Community Safety Diagnoses have made a wealth of information available to concerned actors. At same time, this has drawn attention to the inadequate use being made of this information, again demonstrating the potential benefit of such diagnoses.

It is important to realize that a Community Safety Diagnosis is not a miracle remedy that guarantees the development of community security or provides exact knowledge of delinquency problems. However it is a useful tool, especially for examining security issues more thoroughly so that action can be better targeted, for bringing together and mobilizing partners/stakeholders, and for informing debates. It is a tool that does more than allows communities to have an influence on decisions regarding security, it allows them to take control of security. It is a tool that broadens roads to solutions and reinforces democratic and social life by engaging citizens in local action and developing solutions to their problems, rather than excluding or stigmatizing them. However it is a tool whose results depend directly on the willingness and contribution of the partners who can play a valuable role in the co-production of public security.

Case Study 5: Crime Policy Evaluation Overview[11]

The evaluation of policies, strategies, and action in the field of crime prevention and community safety, notably the evaluation of their effects, impacts, and cost-effectiveness, has been the subject of considerable interest for several years. Government centers with responsibility for crime prevention and community safety - such as the Home Office in England, the National Crime Prevention Centre in Canada, or the Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy in Belgium – have included an important evaluation component in their strategies and initiatives.

[11] Sansfacon, Bachhechat, Oginsky, From Knowledge To Policy And Practice: What Role Evaluation?

Centers for research and policy analysis – the ICPC, the research division of the Home Office, the Australian Institute of Criminology, and the Department of Justice in the United States – have all produced syntheses of the results of evaluation studies on a range of prevention programs and strategies. Finally, academics have formed a specialized group called The Campbell Collaboration – which will receive more attention further in this paper – to produce comprehensive syntheses of evaluation findings in order to determine the state of knowledge. Most authors agree that, unlike fundamental research, evaluation research should be useful and should be used[1]. It should be useful to policy decision-making, useful to program management, and useful to the practitioner on the site.

However, apart from pronouncements – " what counts is what works" – calling for the implementation of policies and programs which have been shown to be practical and cost effective, the translation of evaluation research findings into program decisions is far from systematic. Who does not know of programs that continue to be funded despite the fact that they have been shown to be ineffective, especially in the area of criminal justice? there are programs that have been shown to be effective and efficient and yet are still implemented only here and there and without assurance of ongoing funding, rather than being integrated into a comprehensive strategy. This includes programs such as home visits by nurses to young families, especially in socio-economically disadvantaged areas.

Also, it is often difficult for politicians and managers to translate the results of evaluation studies into policies and integrated strategies. Often evaluations focus on isolated, time-limited projects, with little known about their context or potential for replication. This may in part explain why it is easier for decision-makers to support individual projects, on a pilot or experimental basis, rather than develop a systematic program with comprehensive measures. In crime prevention, psycho-social interventions aimed at individuals, and situational interventions aimed at improving the security of public places, such as the use of closed circuit television, can find themselves side by side in government approaches without apparent explanatory links. As well, certain types of quantitative evaluations have more appeal by force of numbers than context evaluations that are sometimes more qualitative. Perhaps this is also the reason that actions targeting individual psychological factors appear on the government agenda more often than community-based social development actions; the former lend themselves more easily to quantitative, quasi-experimental evaluations than the latter which are much more difficult to

evaluate. One could therefore say that the previous aphorism becomes – "what works is what counts or is countable…". Finally, the use of evaluation results to influence public policy is far from universal.

For methodological and even epistemological reasons sometimes, but also for theoretical and practical ones concerned with the very concepts of prevention and community safety, some observers remain sceptical. They are concerned about the validity of evaluating isolated projects, which are time-limited, sometimes undertaken after the fact, and which attempt to isolate certain variables from their larger social contexts. More specifically, doubts have been raised about the capacity to construct a logical sequence of cause and effect. This scepticism also relates to the difficulty of transmitting the results of evaluation into practice, notably because quasiexperimental types of evaluation are perhaps less sensitive to the processes underlying the success or the failure of such and such a measure.

At a time when it has become fashionable, as with private enterprises, to measure the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) of government action, evaluation has acquired much greater importance in general discussion if not in practice. But should evaluation primarily serve to determine the efficiency of government measures? To ask this question is also to ask about the final outcome of government policies. Are these measures governed by the same principles as those used by private enterprise? What is the role of societal values? What is the role of components that are difficult to assess, such as “the public good”? How do we include and assess these factors within a context of evaluation? And when we will have evaluations that are well done, what should be our expectations regarding their use by decision-makers and managers? In sum, why do we evaluate?

These are some of the questions addressed in a discussion paper prepared by the ICPC. This discussion document should be viewed as such: bringing up certain issues and questions without pretending to be exhaustive or to have considered all aspects. Not only are evaluation issues larger than just questions of methodology, but they are also more difficult to consider when approached from an international perspective. In looking at the larger picture and identifying major trends, the ICPC does not and cannot have an intimate knowledge of the situation and practice within each country, or for a specific government. Apart from access to academic

literature, we are largely dependent on the information provided to us when exploring the usefulness and the use of evaluation for public policy decisions.

This discussion paper is divided into 5 parts. The first sets out the broad lines of the evolution of the practice of evaluation of public policies, and sets it in a vast historical and political context. It demonstrates that evaluation of public policy already has a long history, and that over the course of some 50 years of evaluation practice there have been important modifications. Notably, evaluation focuses less on the validation of theory and more on the assessment of short-term impacts.

The second section presents a brief overview of the evolution of policies of prevention and security in the countries that are of immediate concern. Such policies were born in the 1970s, and have been consolidated, especially in Europe, during the 1980s. These policies are diverse in relation to both the emphasis placed on the specific content of prevention activities, such as the places or groups targeted by projects, and the support mechanisms for local initiatives. It follows that the focus of evaluation in countries will vary, depending on the overall direction of public policy.

The third section presents a more detailed look at the evolution of the practice of evaluation in terms of projects and strategies of prevention. In particular, it discusses recent reports synthesizing evaluations of prevention practice. This includes a report from the team directed by Lawrence Sherman in the United States, the Home Office report on the reduction of crime, and ICPC digests. Although they cover similar studies, these reports have different starting points. The Sherman and Home Office reports are aimed principally at identifying interventions that are successful in preventing and reducing crime according to strict scientific methods. The ICPC digests are aimed more at identifying the elements of an integrated strategy of prevention and security that appear to show promise, and at considering how to put them into practice successfully. On the basis of a pool of knowledge resulting from a synthesis of studies on the impact and cost-effectiveness of prevention, it is possible to ask whether prevention, which was formerly considered the business of police, is becoming the remit of technical knowledge specialists. The question still remains how to interpret and transmit those findings for decision-makers and practitioners, and especially, how to determine their relative weight in relation to other objectives of public policy.

The fourth section outlines government approaches in the evaluation of strategies and actions. Depending on whether they emphasize the content of actions or process factors, both the orientations of evaluation and, to a larger extent, the use of information, differ. In some cases, it would appear that a series of actions – which are put in parallel but isolated from each other – are initiated on the basis of the results of evaluation studies and take the place of integrated policy. In other cases, the overall policy coherence appears to take precedence, and an analysis of the impact of an action is only rarely considered. This results in a virtual absence of information for practitioners on promising practices. In other countries, prevention policies are a mix of these extremes. In all cases, there appear to be problems in developing an integrated strategy which is capable of simultaneously working for practitioners (e.g., mechanisms for the support of local action, changes in attitudes and practices) and for the targets of action (e.g. groups and places at risk of victimization and offending). The result would appear to be an evaluation practice that is fragmented, functioning on the basis of demonstration projects on the one hand, or on the process of specific mechanisms, on the other.

Finally, the fifth section sets out areas for analysis, and proposals for the direction of subsequent work. In terms of directions for analytical work, we discuss four issues: the positioning of evaluation within government structures; the type of evaluation chosen; the utilization of evaluation findings; and the current challenges. Depending on the type of prevention policy they adopt, governments do not use the same approach or have the same experience with respect to evaluation. And what may appear to be – and is sometimes presented as – methodological or epistemological contradictions, could, in many ways, result from the objectives themselves of policies of prevention and security. But in the end, it seems that certain substantive issues are common to all governments, notably those in relation to the challenges of evaluating integrated prevention approaches on a community wide scale.

In conclusion, the paper proposes a number of options for further work and development. These are:

1)Improve and complete our analysis of the evaluation practice in the governments identified here and in other selected countries (Denmark, Sweden, United States, Australia, and New Zealand).

Continue work on an annotated bibliography, notably by placing it on the ICPC website and inviting others to contribute to it.

2) Continue work on the development of comparative indicators of community safety in relation to the evaluation of public policies.
3) Undertake a more focused study of the problems and challenges of evaluating comprehensive community crime prevention initiatives while taking account of the lessons learned from the evaluation practice of initiatives, such as the Comprehensive Community Initiatives in the United States.
4) Finally, over the course of 2002, contribute to a national seminar organized by each government on an aspect of the culture and practice of evaluation that each country has identified as important in the area of prevention and security.

Case Study 6: Investing Wisely In Crime Prevention[12]

U.K. Turns to Prevention To Spend Better, Not More

‘‘no more’’ to rising expenditures unless they would reduce crime. It undertook a comprehensive spending review using American, British, and Dutch evaluations and analysis by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime. This review identified programs that had significantly reduced crime by investing in

prevention. It showed evidence that particular preventive approaches were more cost-effective than paying for more intervention and detention (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (1998)—comprising experienced police chiefs in the U.K.—examined the success of British police in reducing crime.

Police forces that had achieved a 40-percent reduction in crime over 5 years without an increase in personnel had used problem-solving policing and partnerships with other organizations. Written under the chairmanship of John Stevens, head of Scotland Yard, the review found that significant policing was still reactive despite the interest in preventive tools. A report by the Audit Commission (1996)—a governmental watchdog on local government spending—reported that funding for youth crime was being misspent. Funding was going to inefficient responses after the harm was done, rather than to programs that involved children in their early years when chances were good that they could be diverted from a life of crime. The Audit Commission agreed with research conducted for the U.S. Congress showing that the main impact of incarceration is to incapacitate offenders by placing them behind bars and that jail experience has little effect on reducing crime, as offenders relapse into crime at a high rate within the first 2 years of their release (Sherman et al., 1997). As a result, the British Treasury allocated the equivalent of 5 percent of spending ($7 per household per year) on enforcement and deterrence to a new crime reduction program based on proven ways of reducing crime. Ten percent of this money was to be spent on evaluating the costs and benefits of the investment (Home Office, 1999). The program focuses on the following:

• Establishing programs for families, children, and schools to prevent youth from offending.

[12] Source: Community Research Associates, Investing wisely In Crime Prevention: International Experiences, BJA Series

• Tackling high-volume crime (e.g., burglary) in communities. • Redesigning consumer products so that they are difficult to steal. • Implementing more effective sentencing.

All city government officials and police managers were required to cooperate on a new community safety approach to reduce crime. This effort required city government and police services to collaborate on a safety diagnosis, the design and implementation of a community safety strategy, and the evaluation of the results. These tasks were coordinated with other social policies of the government. This national "crusade" was to be tough on crime and its causes.

France Pioneered Local Prevention Contracts, Now Creates Prevention Jobs

In 1983 the French government developed a national crime prevention policy. It set up a national crime prevention council to coordinate the crime prevention efforts of a broad range of ministries, such as law enforcement, justice, education, youth, and housing. This council had funds to form contracts with mayors to support local crime prevention projects that would develop a broad committee organization chaired by the mayor and that would analyze local problems to tackle situations that led to crime.

In the 1980s many local councils were developed. In 1989 the functions of the national crime prevention council were integrated into a broader based policy on urban and social development, managed by the interministerial secretariat. Crime prevention became a component of policies on housing, health, education, culture, and recreation. The council continues to form contracts with mayors each year on a range of urban issues, including security and justice. In 1997, the national cabinet committee on safety and security decided to reenergize the process and find a better balance between social prevention and community safety by proposing contracts to be signed by the mayor, the chief prosecutor, the police chief, and, in many cases, the national official for education.

Approximately 450 contracts have been signed, covering most urban areas in France. A total of 700 are expected. Many smaller communities have local crime prevention councils and are also expected to draw up contracts in the future. The contracts foster crime prevention through projects involving social integration, employment, and support for parents, as well as access to

justice and victim assistance through community justice centers *(maison de justice)*. The national government has made funds available to local communities to employ 35,000 youth who work with police as safety and security assistants or as social mediation agents in communities.

The Netherlands Uses Learning-Based Strategies

The Netherlands has specialized in testing innovative crime prevention efforts in local projects. If evaluation results show that a particular effort works, the results are publicized and communities across the country are encouraged to try this activity. For instance, when results showed that setting particular design standards for houses reduced the number of houses burglarized in the early 1990s, the standards were promoted nationally. Another example is a program called HALT. Through this program juveniles involved in vandalism are required by the police or the prosecuting authority to repair the damage and seek assistance. Evaluations show that the program reduces recidivism, and the program has been established in 65 sites. The current policy to prevent youth violence has been influenced by results from the United States. It follows three tracks:

• A structured and inclusive national action directed at reducing delinquency among minority youth.

• A structured program of action to lower secondary school dropout rates and to facilitate employment of at-risk youth.

• A structured program to give children and teenagers a healthy start.

New Zealand Puts Prevention Where It Matters Most

In 1993 New Zealand created a crime prevention unit within the Prime Minister's office. The unit has an annual budget of more than $3 million to allow local communities called Safer Community Councils. It also influences the allocation of government resources to prevent crime. The unit has assisted in developing more than 60 Safer Community Councils.

Case Study 7: Local Government and Crime Prevention [13]

Overview

This section highlights a variety of community safety initiatives developed by local government partnerships in countries around the world. They have been selected to illustrate different aspects of the strategic approach, as well as showing how communities of different sizes have tackled a range of issues.

The examples show how large cities developed strategic plans following safety audits and public consultation (Brent and Toronto); neighborhood-based committees and action groups (Salt Lake City and Hartford); urban planning and management strategies for youth and public spaces (Brisbane & Leichhardt); small town initiatives (Freeport); domestic violence strategies (METRAC); state-wide city initiatives targeting hot-spots, and cooperative financing strategies (Maryland); coalitions of local authorities and cities (Big Cities; EURO 2000); and social observatories as tools for strategic local planning (Aix en Provence).

London Borough of Brent (England): Community Safety and Community Empowerment.

Population: 240,000

Lead office: Community Safety and Community Empowerment under Mayor

– Brent is one of 33 London boroughs, each with their own mayor and council.

–It has the highest proportion of Black and ethnic minority citizens in London - 50%.

– It is the most culturally and racially diverse of all local authorities in England and Wales.

– It includes areas of considerable wealth and extreme poverty.

– The average unemployment rate is 13%, but as high as 30% in some local wards.

– Crime rates in the borough are higher than the national average, and concentrated in deprived housing estates, some of them presenting serious problems of policing.

[13] Source : Shaw, Margaret, The Role Of local Government In Community Safety, ICPC

– Major concerns are street robbery, theft and burglary, drug and alcohol related crime and violence.

Partnership working

Brent now has ten years of experience of working with partnerships, undertaking safety diagnoses and planning and implementing strategies. It has a *permanent* department of *Community Safety and Community Empowerment* within its Community Development Directorate, which works closely with all council services, police, health, voluntary sector, national agencies and businesses.

In Brent's experience, the 3 key principles necessary for effective local authority crime prevention work can be classified as the 3 C's:

Councillors - to secure political support for crime prevention

Corporate - to secure a council corporate approach to crime prevention

Coalitions - to ensure that local authorities take the lead in developing crime prevention strategies.

Over the past ten years, Brent has developed *five* inter-agency crime prevention and community safety strategies. Projects developed with partners have included burglary reduction programs, a mentoring scheme for young people, neighborhood watch, and a Targeted Policing Initiative for highcrime areas using crime mapping and analysis. The latter has been funded by a £1.3million national and a community information system web site BRAIN (www.brent.gov.uk/brain). It recently held a conference on community safety which was transmitted on the internet, and will form the basis of a video.

Its most recent safety strategy for 1999-2002 was produced by the partnership between the local council and the police, probation service and health authorities serving the borough, and followed a safety audit and extensive community consultation.

Brent Community Safety Strategy 1999-2002

Top priority targets identified for reduction:

1. residential burglary
2. robbery and street crime
3. improve partnership response to racial incidents, and

violence and victimization of ethnic minorities
4. reduce crime and disorder in town centers
5. reduce crime by young offenders

The *Crime and Disorder Audit* (1999) compared Brent's crime levels with neighboring boroughs, highlighted crime hot spots, and examined trends in the major crime issues: burglary, robbery, violence, sexual offences, young offenders, domestic violence, racial incidents, victimization of the elderly, disorder, road injuries, drug and alcohol problems, and fear of crime. It showed, for example, that recorded crime had decreased in the Borough by 5% between 1996 and 1998 - burglary and street robbery by 13 and 14%, although violent crimes as a whole had gone up. The audit listed some of the options for reducing the problems identified.

Community consultation

– 10,000 copies of a summary of the *Crime and Disorder Audit* were sent to the public, statutory, voluntary and private groups including ethnic minority groups, faith groups, neighborhood watch and business groups.
– the full Audit was available in police stations, libraries, medical clinics etc.
– 100,000 copies of a freepost questionnaire were distributed with the Council magazine to all households, and with copies of the council community newspaper *Safer Brent*, asking for comments on the findings and suggestions for action.
– a special survey of young people's crime concerns was carried out among 1000 secondary school children.
– area consultation forums were held to discuss the audit, and at resident and tenant organizations, police community consultation groups, and the Brent Youth Council.

The resulting *Crime and Disorder Reduction and Community Safety Strategy* 1999-2002 identifies the fifteen priority targets for the Borough, an overall target for each priority, a detailed list of action plans for each of the targets, and performance measures to assess their effectiveness. The top priority is burglary reduction and the target is reduction by a minimum of 6% in 12 months, or 12% in 36 months compared with 1998 figures. Apart from the top five

other priority targets include reducing youth victimization, domestic violence, road injuries and drug and alcohol abuse.

Toronto, Ontario, Canada: A Community Safety Strategy for the City of Toronto

Population: 2.5 million

– Toronto has seen enormous growth as a city and region over the past twenty years

– rapid changes in the ethnic distribution of the population are occurring - before 1980 60% of immigrants were from Europe, since then the majority are from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, China, Hong Kong, the Philippines

– 42% of citizens have a mother tongue other than English

– these changes have brought considerable social and economic benefits, but there is increasing income disparity and poverty

– only 27% - 36% of Toronto citizens feel that all ethno-cultural groups are treated fairly by city politicians and the police

– overall levels of crime rose from the 1980's to 1993 but have since declined

– violent crime levels were still increasing by 1997

– levels of insecurity increased over this period and remained high

– community safety was one of the top concerns of citizens.

Formerly a city of 650,000 people, the new megacity of Toronto was created in 1998 with the amalgamation of the surrounding municipalities of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and York. The new city council established a *Task Force on Community Safety* to develop a comprehensive safety plan. Chaired by two councillors it included representatives from the police, school boards, neighborhood crime prevention groups, businesses, ethno-cultural groups and agencies, and organizations working with “at-risk” children, the disabled, and family violence prevention.

Its key strategy was community consultation using a community survey, interviews with city councillors, public meetings and presentations. Its interim report was discussed at a conference bringing together citizens, local organizations and councillors.

The final report *Toronto. My City. A Safe City. A Community Strategy for the City of Toronto* (1999) outlines the extent of the problems of crime, insecurity, and inequalities, discusses their root causes and how these can be overcome, existing community services and programs, sets out its vision for a safe city within a healthy communities framework, and outlines 35 recommendations for implementation. One percent of money spent on criminal justice was to be allocated to additional prevention programs. Each recommendation identifies the major city services which should take the lead. A new task force to develop a *work plan* to implement the recommendations was established in 2000. Among other work, a social atlas, based on analysis of city wards is being constructed, and implementation of the plan is expected to take three years.

Strategy Summary

Toronto Community Safety Strategy (1999)

A Vision for a Safer City

– reducing crime and fear of crime

– increasing the knowledge and involvement of the community in creating a safer city

– focusing on vulnerable groups

– recognizing diversity

– knowing what works: the importance of evaluation

Five Directions for Action

– strengthening neighborhood

- investing in children and youth

– policing and justice

– information and coordination

– making it happen: community safety as a corporate policy and with council accountability structure.

Brisbane, Queensland, Australia: Youth and Public Space Major Centers Project

Population: 1, 575,000

– a major Australian city with regional and sub-regional satellite centers recent strong population growth including immigration from South East Asia concerns about crime, vandalism and incivilities in public places and the presence of street kids, youth gangs, and the increasing exclusion of minority youths

– high numbers of indigenous young people from rural areas

– lack of transport, services, and facilities designed to meet the needs of young people .This project aimed to develop safer public spaces which were more inclusive and relevant to the needs and interests of young people. It focused on the major public sites where young people gathered, such as city and regional shopping malls, beaches, parks. The project took as its starting point the importance of recognizing their right to have access to public space and to be consulted and involved in the development of facilities.

The city held extensive discussions with young people and other users of commercial and community spaces and compiled information on the city council planning system, strategic, corporate and local area plans and urban design.

It examined good practice models and principles, and the current use of major centers in the city, suburbsand regions. The report *Planning and Management Guidelines* (1998) "provides the most comprehensive analysis and series of prescriptions on young people and public space issues in Australia". It sets out principles and recommended policies, detailed strategy outlines, and target indicators to reach each of the policy objectives in three areas: youth and community development policy; urban management through strategic and local planning and design; and operational management and community relations in major centers.

Freeport, Illinois: Coalition for a Safe Community

Population: 27,000

Lead office: Mayor

– in the early 1990's 25% of the population lived at or below the poverty line

– 54% of children were living in poverty

– 20% of the population was Afro-American and there were concerns about disparities in educational provision and treatment of students

The *catalyst* to action was the threat by four Fortune 500 companies who provided 40% of local

employment to pull out of the city. The city set up *Project 2009* with local businesses in 1993. They developed a strategic plan to ensure that 90% of young people stayed in school, and graduated from school equipped to work in local businesses. The project coalition included the city leaders, school administrators, business and community representatives and local clergy.
In 1994 the Mayor met with 100 residents over 18 months to discuss and debate concerns about increasing violence. This resulted in the setting up of the 1996 *Coalition for a Safe Community* with the mission to build a safe and healthy community for children and families. Four task forces developed plans. Family mentoring, parenting education and media awareness, programs and curricula and a jobs bank have been developed. Rates of child abuse and neglect have since fallen; the local newspaper has developed a guide to local family and social services; new lighting has been installed; a new neighborhood park and play area is planned; school buildings are now available as community centers; and 50 new mentors for local youth are being recruited by local organizations and businesses. Even with a new mayor and police chief in 1997 and 1998 implementation of the plan was completed. The Coalition has been able to get over $450,000 from state, federal and foundation grants and will be developing an affordable housing project.

Hartford, Connecticut: Neighborhood Problem-Solving Committees (and CCP)

Population: 124,000

Lead office: Mayor and police chief

– from 1986-1996 Hartford crime levels put it in the top 10 for cities over 100,000

– it had severe gang wars in neighborhoods

– main tools: neighborhood problem-solving committees (PSCs) and Police Gang Task Force

– other programs - *Our Piece of the Pie* (OPP); community courts; an ACTION line for citizen complaints

A mayor's commission on crime was set up in 1987 (NCPC, 1999a). It recommended city-wide community policing, and the development of partnerships with other agencies and the community, recommending that the entire community needed to work on the social issues. The ACTION line takes calls from residents about disorder and crime problems which are followed up. A Police Gang Task Force was established in 1992, and neighborhood problem solving committee (PSCs) were set up in the 17 city neighborhoods. These meet monthly and diagnose

neighborhood problems, and decide on objectives and plans. Three special assistants to the City Manager were hired to liaise between PSCs and the city government. *Our Piece of the Pie* (OPP) is a pre-work program for youth set up in 1996. It hires young adult managers (20-26 years) as trainers, councillors, role-models and supports for at-risk youth, and acts as a youth job clearing house. Rates of employment placement from the program have been up to 87%.
Overall rates of crime fell by 30% from 1986 to 1996.

Salt Lake City, Utah: Comprehensive Community Program (CCP) - Changing the way government works

Population: 180,000
Lead office: Mayor
– percentage of population below poverty level 16.4% (national level 12.8%)
– unemployment rate (1995) 3.6% (national level 5.6%)
– rate of violent crime 83 per 10,000 (national level 72)
– area targeted: city-wide
– main targets: youth offenders and gang members
– main tool: Community Action Teams.
Salt Lake City has not only grown but become increasingly diverse ethnically and racially in recent years.
Youth violence, including drive-by shootings, and gang-related crime rose in the early 1990's. Fear of crime increased and the courts were overloaded. The city set up *Community Action Teams* (CATs) in each geographical area, as neighborhood-based, problem-solving teams focusing on the problems of youth and youth gangs. The CATs include community police, probation, city prosecutor, community mobilization specialist, youth/family specialist, and a community relations coordinator. The CAT youth workers are from the local Boys and Girls Club, and help link at-risk youth to local services. More recently, school representatives have joined each team. The CATs meet weekly to deal with neighborhood problems, with the aim of providing services quickly to clients, cutting across agency boundaries and “red tape”.
The Mayor’s Office of Community Affairs acts as the liaison between agencies and city government and the teams. Some of the outcomes include *Community Peace Services,* a diversion program providing education, mediation and intervention to first-time offenders; a

domestic violence court; increased youth and family specialist staff. The city has been able to attract increased resources from federal, state and local government and from foundations. These have led to new programs, new staff. Gang activity has diminished, property crime is down, and homicides have declined 33% from 1995.

State initiatives: Maryland Hotspots Communities - Reclaiming our Neighborhoods

This initiative targets communities across the state of Maryland:
– it recognizes that nationally 50% of crime occurs in 3% of addresses
– it is the first *statewide* intervention to help selected "hot-spot" areas reclaim their neighborhoods – it involves $3.5million state and federal grant funding invested in 36 communities
Responding to the heavy concentration of crime, insecurity and victimization in certain areas of cities and towns and rural areas, 36 "hot-spot" communities across the state of Maryland are being targeted with comprehensive programs. The program began in 1997 and provides funds to neighborhoods to develop partnerships and strategies to reclaim those areas.
A major innovation is the pulling together of *state and federal funding* to support "core" and "enhancing" projects arising out of strategic plans. Each community also receives operational and technical assistance from a wide range of state and local council agencies and services. The *core* elements are: community mobilization, community policing, community probation, community maintenance, youth prevention and local coordination. The *enhancing* elements are: community prosecution, juvenile intervention, crime prevention through environmental design, victim outreach and assistance, community support for addiction recovery, and housing and business revitalization.

Coalitions of cities:

Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht, Netherlands - Big Cities Policy

Major problems: social problems including drugs, nuisance and street crime in the major cities in the Netherlands led to the development of a *Big Cities Policy*. A memorandum was drawn up by the municipal authorities of the major cities to strengthen their social and economic bases, in partnership with the national government, in three major areas: employment and education, public safety, quality of life and care. The main impact has been at the neighborhood level and the plan sets targets and outlines measures to be taken. As part of the initiative *Justice in the Neighborhood* "*Justice closer to the citizens and their problems*"
is a pilot project 1997-1999, modeled on the French example.26 Neighborhood Justice offices were opened in 5 Dutch cities to work in problem-oriented ways with local residents. The offices provide accessible quick, and direct action to deal with local street crime, nuisance and conflicts. They offer information, legal advice, and mediation of conflicts, to help prevent local conflicts get out of control.

Aix-en-Provence, France: Local Security Contract and Observatory

Population: 126,000

Lead office: Mayor

– the city has experienced considerable growth in the past 30 years

– it is "rich, cultured and young"

– but with increasing disparities between its economically stable and its marginalized populations The city received a *Contrat de Ville* in 1994 to improve housing, transport, health, education and health services, as well as develop delinquency and drug prevention. A partnership community council for the prevention of delinquency was formed, which applied for a new security contract (CLS) as soon as they were announced in 1997. The partnership includes not only the city of Aix-en-Provence, but its surrounding communities each with their own mayors, police and other services. Representatives of the region and national ministries are also included. A very comprehensive *security diagnosis* was undertaken, looking at direct and indirect problems. A permanent *observatory of social problems* has been set up, using specific indicators

used at the local government level, which is for use by the city itself and the adjoining municipalities.

Ten priorities have been established relating to: the quality of life; social, cultural and sports facilities and policies; citizen access to the law; prevention of child abuse and neglect; prevention of substance abuse; parental support; victim support and aid; improving court and reintegration policy and practices; and safety and security. The action plan (*Fiches actions de contrat*, 1999) outlines 42 separate actions relating to these ten priorities. In each case it identifies the specific problem; the objectives set; the agreed action; the partners responsible for piloting and implementation; methods of finance where applicable; evaluation;
and target dates. The prevention of school violence, for example, involves measures to reduce absenteeism and school exclusion, early identification of behavior problems, the use of alternative measures for dealing with discipline problems, educational support etc. The plan is now being implemented and evaluated.

Among other initiatives, community policing has been established, and new security assistants recruited to aide the police and public. Better links and coordination between the national and municipal police have also be set up. Social mediation agents have been recruited and trained to work on public transport, around schools and in public spaces. Their role includes mediating situations before they become out of control, and acting as interveners between groups such as local shop owners and young people, to try to develop creative solutions. While the outcomes have not yet been evaluated, in terms of the development of the observatory, and the energy generated at the local level, the CLS has clearly had a considerable impact on policies and practices in the city as well as the region.

Case Study 8: A Framework for Community Safety[14]

A strategy for analyzing problems and mobilizing energy and resources

[14] Source : Shaw, Margaret, The Role Of local Government In Community Safety, ICPC

This section outlines the major elements of the framework for fostering community safety which are now being used by local governments in many countries. The approach includes:
– recognizing community safety as a right and an issue of the quality of life in healthy communities – working across jurisdictional boundaries horizontally as well as vertically
– the crucial role of political leadership
– adapting strategies to local needs on the basis of good analysis and targeted plans
– building capacity

Safe and healthy communities

Community safety - like health - is a central aspect of the quality of life of citizens, and one they are entitled to. Protecting communities from crime, or re-establishing levels of safety can be tackled in the same way as public health issues. A preventive public health approach, such as that used to reduce the incidence of heart disease, involves looking for the factors which increase the risks of its development. By looking at the patterns of economic and social problems in a neighborhood or community, and of crime, disorder and victimization, it becomes easier to see how and where to intervene. In the US, *The Center for Disease Control and Prevention* has been active in demonstrating how crime and violence can be seen as health problems; the *Communities That Care* program pioneered in Seattle is a good example.
Communities That Care in Seattle, Washington uses a public health approach. Its main goals are to reduce delinquency and drug use by combining knowledge about risk and protective factors and effective interventions, with carefully planned community mobilization. A community board of key local leaders, residents and agencies undertake an assessment of the main risk and protective factors and develop a strategy for intervention.
Similar programs are now being developed in the UK (Nuttall et al., 1998) Scotland and the Netherlands (Junger-Tas, 1997) as well as other states in the US. This type of approach encourages broader responses for victims too. Recognition of the long-term impact of crime on victims' health has resulted in programs which provide ongoing community assistance beyond immediate victim support. An example is the Boston partnership to support youth victims of crime and to prevent re-injury, since it is now well known that the risk of re-victimization is high once someone has been victimized (see box below). In London, England the local health service

is now developing a health strategy which recognizes the links between crime, disorder and victimization and health, and thus the need to take a much broader view of prevention (Crime Concern, 1999).

Horizontal and vertical thinking

A second major theme is the development of collaborative *partnerships* which "think outside the box". Working across boundaries is important for two major reasons. Isolated projects are unlikely to be effective in dealing with the multiple problems facing families living in deprived and high crime areas. In their review of what works in preventing crime, for example, Sherman and his colleagues (1997) concluded that effective crime prevention in high-violence neighborhoods requires intervention in *many local institutions* at the same time. This applies to small town settings too.

Secondly, in many countries there has been frustration with years of funding, or project development, which does not have long-term or measurable impacts. Effective local government action requires all the municipal services to work together, rather than in isolation. It requires support from higher levels of government and links between national, state, region or province. This has been a major motivation for the policies initiated in England and Wales which stress the importance of working across jurisdictions and developing "joined-up thinking", and has always been characteristic of the approach in France.

Political leadership - the role of the champion - everyone knows who the mayor is

The third theme relates to experience from many countries which has shown that there needs to be real *commitment and leadership* from someone at a high level who takes *responsibility* for putting the issues of
community safety on the policy agenda. This has often been the mayor, a Chief Executive of a local authority, a Chief of Police or another key person at the local government level. In some cases a specific body or community safety officer is appointed and given the responsibility of animating and developing partnerships and plans. It is clear that local governments, whether mayors in big or small cities, local boroughs or municipalities are best placed to give citizens a *say* and a *role* in the development of their neighborhoods, and they can play a number of major roles:

– *preventive* in terms of educating the population and the media

– *active* in terms of providing aid to victims, facilitating mediation and resolution of local disputes and
conflicts

– knowledge *development and planning*

– articulating the internal and external requirements and constraints

– putting in place a *permanent local structure* with local coordination and the necessary resources

What brings communities together?

The NCPC asked a range of local government-community coalitions what had motivated them to work together. The answers show that it varies considerably, depending on local circumstances and events.

There may have been one or more of six different factors which acted as a catalyst or triggered action (*Creating a Blueprint for Community Safety*, 1998: 13):

– a pending crisis and a sense that the situation would worsen without immediate action

– community pressure arising from a catalyzing event or tragedy

– success of an existing or related single issue initiative

– support from outside
– realization that single-focus interventions cannot deal with complex issues
– desire to sustain safe neighborhoods and avert a crisis.

Adapting strategies to local needs on the basis of good analysis

The fourth theme to emerge has been the importance of thorough and careful analysis of local problems. This includes melding knowledge about the factors which place people and places most at risk, and effective intervention strategies for reducing those risks, with rigorous analysis of local problems.
A careful analysis of local problems - sometimes called a *safety audit* or a *security diagnosis* - requires the collection of detailed information about crime, victimization, disorder and fear of crime in a neighborhood or across a whole municipality or city (where, when, who). This can include police statistics, census data, as well as the results of local surveys of residents, businesses, schools, transport officials, hospitals. But the analysis needs to go further by looking at the links to a range of other problems such as housing, jobs and unemployment, school drop out, youth facilities and other existing community resources. A good security diagnosis can take between six months and one year to complete. This careful analysis allows for the development of targeted strategies and plans. Once projects have begun, they need to continuously monitored and evaluated to see if they are working as planned, or need to be modified.

Neighbourhood management projects are most likely to be successful if they adhere to the following five principles:
– someone with overall responsibility at the neighborhood level
– community involvement and leadership
– the tools to get things done
– a systematic, planned approach to tackling local problems
– effective delivery mechanisms

The more focused the strategy, the more successful it is likely to be. This means, for example, allocating resources to:

areas where most crime occurs or hot spots

– places already victimized

– families most at risk

– individuals most at risk

– individuals who have been victimized

There may be differences in the types of approaches which can be used in small cities and rural areas compared with large urban areas.

The importance of capacity building

Developing *partnerships,* getting *funding* or *local security contracts*, conducting a *security diagnosis* or *safety audit,* developing an *action plan, implementing* and *evaluating*, and *sustaining* the plan are not simple tasks. They require expertise, information and approaches which may be very different from traditional ways of working.

Capacity building includes the development of the skills, practical knowledge, experience and tools required to undertake effective community-based action. Many countries now recognize the importance of capacity building. A growing range of training programs for community safety personnel, on monitoring and evaluating, training on special issues (eg., drugs, domestic violence, mental health) and the provision of on-going technical assistance, advice and support is now being developed.

In European countries training is being provided by organizations such as the *European Forum for Urban Safety*, *Crime Concern* and the London Borough of Brent in England and Wales, and In the US, the CCP's have been provided with technical assistance, as well as budget and program guidelines by the federal funders (BJA). The National Funding Collaborative on Violence Prevention (NFCVP) and the NCPC already provide training for collaboratives and local authority community safety initiatives. The NCPC is also developing a curriculum training program with Kansas University for use over the web.

The press and the media

Building capacity to develop public awareness of community-based prevention, and to utilize the media appropriately is another important area. This includes showing the benefits and successes from well planned strategies, telling stories about how problems have been reduced or solved. Mayors, and councillors, local agency staff, the police, community safety professionals, community members, researchers and evaluators all need training and clear policies, to develop their ability to communicate with the media. It is important to present initiatives as a *citizen* project to help to ensure community ownership.

It is important to be able to get information across quickly - in sound bites!

Local security contracts and funding

Community projects cost money for start-up, pilot projects, and implementation, as well as needing longterm funding. Resources are needed to *sustain* action at the local level; to *demonstrate* the effectiveness

and efficiency of projects; and to *disseminate* information and best practices through transfer and training.

One of the major ways has been through the development of local security or community safety contracts which allow local partnerships to develop and tailor plans to their own needs. In many cases there are requirements that projects are monitored and evaluated.

Apart from specific grants and contracts from state or national organizations, pooling existing funding across local government agencies, with schools, community organizations, private foundations and businesses are all ways in which initiatives can be funded. The NFCVP pools resources from public and private sources to help local community coalitions develop programs to reduce violence.

Quality of Life and Social Safety: Ghent, Belgium

In 1997 a Safety Contract enabled a high-rise "problemestate" to improve its physical conditions and quality of life, reduce drug dealing, car theft and burglaries, and escape from its "problem" image. Over 300 residents,local government and the police developed and carried out the plan.

Tool boxes and tools

Tools are needed to *identify trends* in crime and insecurity, their location and geography, and the associated social and economic problems; to *target risk factors* underlying those problems; to *evaluate* the process and impact of programs.

Manuals and guides

A great deal of information on community-based strategy development is now accessible in many countries, based on experience gained over the past ten or more years. Compendiums of best practice programs, guides and "how-to" manuals, summaries of evaluated research, detailed "blueprints" or guides to setting up a range of tested, effective programs in communities are now available (see Sources and resources). US examples include: *Innovative State and Local Programs* (BJA 1997); *Creating a Blueprint for Community Safety* (NCPC, 1998a); *Standing in the Gap* (NCPC, 1999b); *Blueprints for Violence Prevention* (CSPV, 1997); *150 Tested Strategies to Prevent Crime from Small Cities, Counties, and Rural Communities* (NCPC, 2000).24

Collecting local information - observatories and crime mapping

One of the major requirements for working collectively at the neighborhood level, and in partnerships, is information. A safety diagnosis requires good information about the range of social, economic, health, environmental problems apart from information on crime and disorder from police records or local residents and organizations. One solution in Europe has been the creation of *observatories.* These are permanent centers set up in communities or cities which collate information on a range of social, economic, health indicators, including criminal justice measures. Their effectiveness depends on the quality of the data, the diversity of sources and their accuracy, as well as good qualitative observations.

In France, Eurolille set up its Observatory in 1995 to collect information about the frequency and location of crime, mental health problems etc., on the capacity of neighborhoods to respond to

problems, their strengths and weaknesses. It surveyed residents, disadvantaged groups and young people to assess their views on problems and solutions.

Other tools which can be used include *crime mapping* involving systematically collecting and assessing the location and development of specific problems in neighborhoods. Other recent initiatives in the US include *Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiatives* (SACSI) and *Addict Drug Monitoring Indicator* (ADAM).

Benchmarking is another tool used to compare practices and performance between different service providers, to identify good practices, to foster collaboration between providers, or to establish a basis for subsequent evaluation of programs. By using standardized procedures and measures, comparisons to be made between them.

Euralille

Euralille is a new neighborhood in the city of Lille, France built in 1990 with large residential, shopping, entertainment and commercial sectors and a rapid transport system. It established its Social Observatory in 1995 to collate information as a basis for developing a joint action plan, and neighborhood safety policy.

Businesses were required to contribute resources to the process. The overall purpose is to develop a healthy social climate in Eurolille, reduce crises and encourage interaction between institutions, agencies and individuals. (EFUS, 1996)